Blockchain Papers

Dorothy Gail Rey

This research study investigates the evolution of the Taliban from an insurgent movement into a hybrid insurgent-state actor. Utilizing datasets from terrorism, conflict, and open-source intelligence, the paper analyzes the motivations, organizational structure, financing mechanisms, operational capabilities, targeting patterns, and governance practices of the Taliban. It assesses the group's transition from insurgency to a de facto government following its resurgence in Afghanistan and examines the implications for regional security, international recognition, sanctions compliance, and counterterrorism policy. The findings indicate that the Taliban's unique blend of centralized ideological leadership, decentralized operational execution, economic adaptability, and increasing diplomatic engagement poses a multifaceted challenge for contemporary security analysis and international governance frameworks.

Hasnain Nawaz, Qurat-ul-Ain Bashir

Pakistan's most significant federalist initiative, the 18th Constitutional Amendment (2010), scrapped the Concurrent Legislative List and transferred wide-ranging legislative, administrative, and fiscal responsibilities to the provinces. But more than ten years on, devolution remains uneven. In this paper, we explore the administrative, political and institutional obstacles to devolution between 2010 and 2018, with a focus on Centre-Punjab relations, the pivot of Pakistan's federation. Through a qualitative documentary analysis of parliamentary proceedings, archival documents, institutional reports and academic work, we argue that bureaucratic mediation operates as a two-pronged process: provincial bureaucracies, especially in Punjab, facilitate some devolved functions, while federal bureaucracies continue to exert control via regulatory coordination, conditional fiscal transfers and legal grey areas. The National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, which increased provincial transfers, has not ended fiscal dependence: the provinces receive 60-70% of their budget from the centre. The removal of the Concurrent Legislative List resulted in unequal sectoral outcomes - provincialization in health and education, but contested labour and interprovincial coordination. We suggest that constitutional devolution in the absence of simultaneous bureaucratic, fiscal autonomy and effective intergovernmental coordination creates a hybrid governance form: constitutionally decentralized and operationally centralised. In the case of Punjab, we find that bureaucratic capacity is not enough; path dependence, bureaucratic opposition and political bargaining over devolution shape the outcomes. Our insights enrich understanding of decentralization theory by identifying bureaucratic mediation as a critical variable and provide policy lessons for other federations in the midst of reforms. References Adeney, K. (2020). Federalism and ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan. Palgrave Macmillan. Asian Development Bank. (2015). Pakistan: Decentralization and local governance. Asian Development Bank. Asian Development Bank. (2023). Pakistan: Fiscal decentralization and service delivery. Asian Development Bank. Bahl, R. (2008). The implementation of fiscal decentralization. In E. Ahmad & G. Brosio (Eds.), Handbook of fiscal federalism (pp. 388–413). Edward Elgar Publishing. Bardhan, P. (2002). Decentralization of governance and development. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(4), 185–205. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533002320951037 Bird, R. M., & Vaillancourt, F. (Eds.). (2008). Fiscal decentralization in developing countries. Cambridge University Press. Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77–101. https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa Faguet, J. P. (2014). Decentralization and governance. World Development, 53, 2–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.002 Gerring, J. (2007). Case study research: Principles and practices. Cambridge University Press. Government of Pakistan. (2017). 6th population and housing census 2017. Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. Government of Punjab. (2015). Annual devolution implementation report 2014–15. Finance Department, Government of Punjab. Government of Punjab Finance Department. (2011). Annual revenue report 2010–11. Finance Department, Government of Punjab. Government of Punjab Finance Department. (2014). Annual revenue report 2013–14. Finance Department, Government of Punjab. Government of Punjab Finance Department. (2017). Annual revenue report 2016–17. Finance Department, Government of Punjab. Government of Punjab Finance Department. (2018). Annual revenue report 2017–18. Finance Department, Government of Punjab. Grindle, M. S. (2011). Good enough governance revisited. Development Policy Review, 29(s1), s199–s221. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2011.00539.x Hill, M., & Hupe, P. (2014). Implementing public policy: An introduction to the study of operational governance (3rd ed.). SAGE Publications. Husain, I. (2018). Governance and decentralization in Pakistan. Oxford University Press. Husain, I. (2019). Civil service reform in Pakistan. Oxford University Press. Jaffrelot, C. (2015). The Pakistan paradox: Instability and resilience. International Journal of South Asian Studies, 8(1), 1–22. Jaffrelot, C. (2024). The 18th Amendment and Pakistan's democratic transition. Contemporary South Asia, 32(1), 45–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2024 Kennedy, C. (2012). Bureaucracy and governance in Pakistan. In M. Waseem (Ed.), Pakistan’s political economy (pp. 89–112). Oxford University Press. Khan, H. (2017). Constitutional and political history of Pakistan. Oxford University Press. Litvack, J., Ahmad, J., & Bird, R. (1998). Rethinking decentralization in developing countries. World Bank. Mustafa, Z. (2019). The 18th Amendment and Pakistan's federal evolution. The Lahore Journal of Economics, 24(2), 1–28. Naseer, A., & Khalid, I. (2021). Bureaucratic mediation in Pakistan's devolution. Asian Journal of Political Science, 29(3), 301–320. https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2021.1967304 National Assembly of Pakistan. (2014). Parliamentary debates on devolution implementation. Government of Pakistan. National Finance Commission. (2009). 7th National Finance Commission Award 2009. Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan. Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Aldine-Atherton. North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press. Oates, W. E. (1999). An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature, 37(3), 1120–1149. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.37.3.1120 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2019). Making decentralisation work: A handbook for policy-makers. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g9faa7-en Pasha, H. A. (2016). Fiscal federalism in Pakistan: The 7th NFC Award and beyond. The Pakistan Development Review, 55(4), 387–410. https://doi.org/10.30541/v55i4IIpp.387-410 Pressman, J. L., & Aaron Wildavsky. (1973). Implementation: How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland. University of California Press. Rana, M. (2020). The 18th Amendment and bureaucratic resistance. Pakistan Journal of Public Administration, 18(2), 55–78. Rondinelli, D. A. (1981). Government decentralization in comparative perspective. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 47(2), 133–145. https://doi.org/10.1177/002085238104700205 Shah, A. (2012). The 18th Constitutional Amendment: Glimpses of multi-order governance. The Lahore Journal of Economics, 17(SE), 265–284. Shah, A. (2019). Federalism in Pakistan: The 18th Amendment and beyond. In N. Aziz (Ed.), Pakistan’s constitutional journey (pp. 145–176). Oxford University Press. Stepan, A. (1999). Federalism and democracy: Beyond the U.S. model. Journal of Democracy, 10(4), 19–34. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1999.0072 Supreme Court of Pakistan. (2015). Government of Punjab v. Federation of Pakistan (Civil Appeal No. 12 of 2015). Talbot, I. (2015). Pakistan: A modern history. Oxford University Press. Thelen, K. (2004). How institutions evolve: The political economy of skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan. Cambridge University Press. Treisman, D. (2007). The architecture of government: Rethinking political decentralization. Cambridge University Press. United Nations Development Programme. (2013). Federalism in Pakistan: Opportunities and challenges. UNDP Pakistan. United Nations Development Programme. (2023). Devolution in Pakistan: Status, challenges and way forward. UNDP Pakistan. Waseem, M. (2019). Centre–province relations in Pakistan. In L. R. Singh (Ed.), Federalism in South Asia (pp. 123–148). Routledge. Watts, R. L. (2008). Comparing federal systems (3rd ed.). Queen’s University Press. Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society. University of California Press. Wilson, J. Q. (1989). Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it. Basic Books. World Bank Group. (2017). Pakistan federalism and service delivery. World Bank Group. World Bank Group. (2022). Pakistan: Fiscal federalism and service delivery. World Bank Group. Zaidi, S. A. (2014). The bureaucratic steel frame. Economic and Political Weekly, 49(12), 45–52. Zaidi, S. A. (2020). Issues in Pakistan’s economy (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press.

Syed Aqeel Abbass Shah

This paper looks at Pakistan's decentralisation policy under the Musharraf era and emphasises how it has affected the bureaucratic and administrative structure of the nation. The main contention is that Musharraf decentralization imitative were designed to improve governance and address disparities between the civilian and military sectors. The research technique, which draws from a variety of government and academic sources, involves a thorough analysis of legislative modifications, policy changes, and their practical ramification. The article summarises Musharraf's original seven-point plan, emphasising the transfer of financial and administrative authority to local levels. The national reconstruction bureau NRB and the provincial finance commission PFC were two important reforms that attempted to transfer authority and funds from the federal to local governments; nevertheless, bureaucracy and political parties posed strong obstacles to the execution, which reduced the efficacy of these changes. The results show that while decentralisation attempts enhanced women's participation and community involvement and briefly strengthened local governments, they were eventually undermined by a lack of resources, poor administration and ongoing military supervision. Although the national accountability bureau was established with the intention of combating corruption, it was criticised for being abused for political purposes. According to the report, improved coordination between different levels of government, a sincere desire on the part of the political class to maintain changes, and continued support for local government are all necessary for decentralisation to be successful. Developing institutional capabilities and promoting an open and transparent culture are essential for long-term success.

Mohammad Qadam Shah

This chapter explores the period between 2001 and 2021 when Afghanistan was the center of attention by major international donors—especially, the United States of America. It particularly focuses on the post-2001 reforms of Afghanistan’s public finance management system. In addition to explaining how and why Afghanistan ended up with the same old, centralized model of governance, this chapter unpacks how the centralized public finance management system remained unchanged despite numerous efforts to decentralize it. Likewise, this chapter provides a general description of the most recent planning and budgeting reforms that became the basis of provincial planning and budgeting since 2015.

Sayeed Ebrahim Darwishean, Abdul Qahar Jawad, Nangialai Nangial

The study explores how to synergize Public Relations 3rd Generation (PR3.0), 3rd generation of the web (Web3.O), and new technologies to have an effective interactive online higher education (OHE) in Afghanistan. It analyzed the distinguishing characteristics of the three concepts by focusing on their application in the context of OHE in the country, aiming to assess the trio's compatibility in Afghanistan. Thus, a prescriptive methodology was used in this study. The findings indicate that the trio possesses common individualities that could be applied productively in the context of Afghanistan for collaborative higher education. The communal features include interactivity, ubiquity, and mobility, which indicate the compatibility of the concepts in the country. New technologies are accessible with the light version of applications for low-speed internet and are installable in smartphones, showing their usability. The 3rd generation of public relations (PR3.0) should be synergized with the two others to produce an effective online scheme of higher education in Afghanistan.

Asif Ali, Zeeshan Ahmad, Munazza

The Amendment shall not be effective unless completely performed. The main element of the Amendment was the decentralization of the Power. At the federal and provincial levels, it was merely a concept. It has been highlighted, for instance, that the Federal Government has traditionally tended to direct these groups rather than advise them, undermining the core function of these bodies. The Federal Government issued policy directives that allowed regulatory bodies to operate independently. Similar to the National Finance Commission Awards, the Provincial Finance Commission Awards were necessary to fairly divide the funds to districts. Political, administrative, and financial accountability should be upheld as mandated by Articles 32 and 140 A of the Constitution.

William Ryle-Hodges

This thesis challenges the conventional view of Muḥammad ʿAbduh’s reform ideas in broad and binary terms as bridging a gap between ‘Islam and Europe’ or ‘tradition and modernity’. I offer instead an analysis of ʿAbduh’s reformist thought in his own words and local practical context in 19th century Egypt, based on a close-reading of his newspaper articles. I argue that ʿAbduh’s reform project, in terms of what was at stake in his job as Director of Publications for the Egyptian state from 1880-1882, is best understood as a bureaucratic publishing project or politics of adab that bridged journalism and the modern state, the Arabic Nahḍa and the Ottoman modernizing reforms known as the tanẓīmāt. He was pioneering journalism as a form of moral education (adab) to mobilize the souls of the reading public in what he conceptualized as a new biopolitical phase of state reform – reform and accountability to law that would operate bottom up from the people. His journalistic pedagogy worked by addressing readers with a polemic about a superficial nationhood and empty modernity that lacked both substance in the people’s souls and visible proof in ‘society’. Locating this project in Egypt’s emerging capitalist economy, I argue that his journalism particularly targeted Egypt’s cotton-enriched landed elite for failing to uphold rule of law and to distribute the benefits of modernization. ʿAbduh’s reform thus becomes a window into a wider dynamic of power taking shape between journalism, bureaucracy and law – itself crucial to understanding a pivotal moment in Egypt’s modern history, known for being the time of the so-called ʿUrābī Revolution.

Roger Owen

There are three interconnected discussions concerning the role of the state in the globalizing, post-Cold War world. The first focuses on the impact of globalization itself and the effect of the huge increase in cross-border flows of capital, information, people and ideas on the ability of governments to manage their own economies. A second, slightly older discussion, addresses the question of whether the state itself is in retreat as a result of both market forces and its inability to finance or sustain its previous levels of health, educational and welfare services. The third discussion concerns the ability of states to maintain their monopoly over the creation of values and the definition of citizenship in the face of new forces of pluralism, decentralization or local, ethnic and religious nationalism. Egyptian businesses practice a more direct form of avoidance when it comes to the establishment of new plants.

Quint Hoekstra

No abstract is available for this record.

Erum Sattar

No abstract is available for this record.

А. В. Криворучко

In the early twentieth century British colonial authorities continued their efforts to decentralize the governance and financial system of British India by providing greater administrative and financial authority to provincial governments, which required delineation of powers and the financing of the government of British India and the provincial governments. Governor-General of India, Lord Curzon tried to escape the disadvantages of the "Ripon scheme" and introduced a scheme of "quasi-permanent nature", based on three principles. The basic idea of the scheme was to raise the interest of the provinces to increasing of their income. The lack of success of the reforms led to the establishing by Edward VII in September 1907 of "Royal Commission on Decentralization of India", which was to examine the situation on the ground and then to make suggestions. In February 1909 the Commission submitted a report, which laid out the arguments both in favor of centralization of governance and in favor of decentralization. In order to enhance the decentralization they proposed measures for increasing of the powers of provincial governments and authorities subordinate to administrative units, governance of public services on a wide range of issues, primarily "provincial" and "subordinate" parts of the Indian Civil Service, the police, as well as medical, sanitation and so on. Particular emphasis was placed on the need to develop local government throughout India, particularly in rural areas. The most important role among them was assigned to panchayati. They envisaged the establishment of self-government at the district level and at the lowest level - a village or a group of villages. Accordingly, the proposed redistribution of competences between different levels of government and self-government. To implement the changes, the commission recommended to redistribute sources of financing government bodies at each level and discussed specific taxes thoroughly enough. They also mentioned some situations when the income did not cover the costs of provinces, districts and villages. The report revealed the need for changes in the cost structure of different levels of authorities. The article suggests some measures for implementation of recommendations of the Commission, the assessment of its activities by a number of researchers and sources, and makes a brief conclusion.

Ehtisham Ahmad

Introduction The 18 th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan disentangles overlapping spending responsibilities between the federation and provinces in a wide range of functions, devolving them to the latter. The legislation was also a reaction to relatively poor service delivery and living standards that had fallen continuously behind those in other countries in South Asia, and, indeed, are now lower than sub-Saharan Africa in most respects. The Musharraf government had used this argument for its own decentralization effort—delegating power to the districts and bypassing the political centers of power in the provinces. The 18 th Amendment reasserts the provinces' power and the associated political centers of power. It is designed to weaken the center, and correspondingly make it less attractive for the military to assume power by moving against an elected Prime Minister, as it has done periodically in Pakistan's history. But will this major reform work effectively and ensure higher living standards for all people in all the provinces? To what extent is the need for a national identity important in ensuring that the decentralization does not cause the federation to unravel or the overall delivery of public services to deteriorate and lead to greater exclusion of the poor? These are important issues and could well determine the fate of the 18 th Amendment as well as social stability in Pakistan. Section 2 outlines developments in theory linking governance and the decentralization process. The links between the two are critical. The main question is whether decentralized service provision can better provide for the poorer sections of society by utilizing information that may be available at the local level in tailoring services to local preferences and making access easier. How are these responsibilities financed? Does the process impede closer economic integration between the federating provinces? This chapter argues that positive approaches to intergovernmental reforms, as exemplified by the People's Republic of China, are perhaps more important for countries such as Pakistan that face significant structural challenges.

Samuel J. Abrams

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN'S LITTLE AMERICA: THE WAR WITHIN THE WAR FOR AFGHANISTAN, is about NATO's counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan since 2009. Published in 2012, it is one of the few works that links high-level policy to on-the-ground realities of a far away war. As the United States determines a role for its military after 2014, it is worth looking back. Many have focused on the book's portrayal of personal infighting, bureaucratic sclerosis, and parochialism. (1) Perhaps interesting is that he shows how Western ideas about state-society relations led NATO to conduct a campaign that has cost trillions of dollars, has had at best limited successes, and may have simply armed an array of factions for civil war when NATO leaves. (2) We're bringing the of Afghanistan back here, Lt. Col. Cal Worth explained to a resident of Marja in Afghanistan's Helmand Province. (3) He was explaining not just his immediate objective, but also the underlying logic of NATO's counterinsurgency campaign. This logic is found in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, which was written as the U.S. military fought insurgencies in Iraq. The logic holds that insurgencies require support from the population, and if the state reaches the people, popular support for the insurgency withers away. While insurgencies require support from populations because insurgents cannot draw on state resources, the idea that more government will attenuate this support is not necessarily true. This idea is based on a Western-centric definition of the state as a sovereign, autonomous entity that determines social relations throughout its territory. Yet, this Western-ideal type of state has never existed in Afghanistan. Those who have tried to build such a state have incited violent resistance and either chose an alternative model of governance or were deposed. When the U.S. military and civilian agencies endorsed the Western-ideal type of state, they too encountered violence. This was not because the insurgency felt threatened by the state, but because Afghan society rejected the Western-ideal-type model of state-society relations. As a result, the U.S. national security apparatus--from the White House to civilian and military organizations in the field--could not develop an effective stabilization strategy. This is not to say that Afghanistan has never been stable; rather, that stability has been closely associated with a minimalist state that is distinct from the Western model. Going forward, this means that NATO should be prepared to accept, if not encourage, the of Afghanistan to seek a political solution that decentralizes political authority. This would center around reducing responsibilities of the central Afghan state and enforcing particular redlines for its subnational components, such as prohibiting threats to the state or launching attacks on other countries. Peripheral governing authorities would determine other issues for themselves. This could leave room for a Taliban-affiliated political party to assume some authority, the promise of which could be part of a negotiated settlement to the conflict. This analysis is also relevant for Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. In these unstable places, the time and resources required to build a Western-type state are simply not available and the appropriateness of the Western model varies widely. The U.S. national security apparatus will need to deal directly with nonstate actors, tribal leaders, religious figures, warlords, militias, etc.--not only as conduits of information and temporary leaders, but as primary actors in a complex but stable political tapestry. This approach is not without risks, but after than ten years, trillions of dollars, and thousands of lives, the United States cannot afford to approach the rest of the world like it has Afghanistan. Understanding the Western-ideal-type State The Western-ideal-type state is a product of a specific political and intellectual history, and for many people around the world, its benevolence is not self-evident. …

Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson, Jason Potts

Are there differences between the sale of an unopened Super Mario Bros. computer game and of the digital collage of 5,000 images? Viewed from the perspective of the doctrine of exhaustion, we can easily conclude that the two transfers have significant differences. The auction of the tangible data carrier of the Super Mario’s 1986 edition (for $660,000) 1 fits well into the doctrine. The auction of the NFT (non-fungible token) representing Beeple’s “Everdays: the First 5000 Days” (for an equivalent of an astounding $69.3 million) 2 seems to be hype with a snowball effect rather than a modern encapsulation of digital exhaustion. Some commentators, 3 including the present author in collaboration with Alexandra Giannapoulou, João Pedro Quintais, and Balázs Bodó, 4 have thoroughly introduced the incompatibility of the NFT mania with the existing copyright status quo, and so – in connection with the present book’s topic – the sale of tokenized information, which is capable of representing information related to digital artworks, is practically excluded from the scope of the exhaustion of the right of distribution. At the same time, NFTs de facto offer a “code-based digital ecosystem that has practical consequences for the copyright-relevant fields of creativeness.” 5 The sale and resale of NFTs is possible; an exchange of information and title to “own” and “trade” information related to copyrightable subject matter is technologically guaranteed. In line with that, a quasi-exhaustion regime has also emerged. As such, the NFT mania can practically evidence the need for and modern technology’s capability of offering digital marketplaces for artworks as well.

Authors unavailable

Spozhmai Zaryab and Her Narrative WorksBorn in 1955 in Kabul and holding a BA in French language from Kabul University and an MA and a PhD in comparative literature from Montpellier University in France, Spozhmai Zaryab is one of Afghanistan's major authors. She has published two collections of short stories, Sharang Sharang-i Zang-ha [The Jingling of the Bells] and Dasht-i Qabil [Cain's Desert], and a novel, Dar Keshwar-i Digar [In Another Country]. It is not the quantity but the artistic merit of her works that has established her reputation. Zaryab has been writing fiction since the early 1970s, but she emerged in the 1980s as one of the country's leading writers. She writes in a variety of genres, but her contribution to modern fiction in Afghanistan lies mainly in her anti-war works; she is considered the godmother of Afghan anti-war literature (Bezhan, Women Causes 264). This type of fiction emerged with the outbreak of war after the 1978 Leftist coup and the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops in late 1979. Neighboring countries, Iran and Pakistan, and the West chose to channel financial, military, and political aid to the armed opposition groups, known as the Mujahideen, or freedom fighters. Soon the war escalated and involved many players, from domestic to regional to international superpow- ers. To the present day the war has undergone many stages. But the peak of the war was in the 1980s, when Afghanistan became a battleground for internal, regional, and superpower forces. Although the protagonists changed, the misery of the people did not. As the conflict ground on, each side accompanied their military efforts with fierce public relations campaigns to promote the righteousness of their cause and to vilify their opponents.The significance of Zaryab's works lies in the ways that they give voice to the ordinary people who have no stake in the war. They demonstrate the impact of war on the population in general and women in particular. Her account of the war is from the victims' perspective. An essential element of this strategy involves bringing elements of oral storytelling, the people's medium, into her narrative frameworks. Zaryab incorporates two types of traditional stories into her works: epic and religious folktales. They represent literary, religious, and folk heritage and assume value in being the collective residue of the past. As well, they are the most popular types of storytelling across a wide spectrum of society, from the educated elites to illiterate groups. By using these types of stories, she also undermines ideological representations of the war by the warring partisans.The Leftist government and the Mujahideen had striven to create mas- ter narratives of the conflict that would serve to uphold their own political/ ideological outlooks. The Leftist regime portrayed it as a nationalist struggle, defending the homeland from the aggression of foreign powers who would install the Mujahideen as their proxy. The support of the Mujahideen by the regional governments and the West was proof of their intention to compromise Afghanistan's sovereignty and keep it a backward country. The regime's invitation to the Soviet troops simply served to defend the national sovereignty and the southern, eastern and western borders and to sustain socioeconomic and cultural progress. For the Mujahideen, Russian troops represented an occupying power that would transform Afghanistan into a satellite socialist state. They believed that the Russians would destroy not only the country's sovereignty but also its sociocultural and religious character. The war was fought (and is still being fought) not only for the liberation of the homeland from invaders but also for the liberation of Dar ul-Islam, the land of Islam, from the grip of infidels. Zaryab's use of epics and religious folktales had the intended effect of countering both sides' warring narratives.Storytelling in AfghanistanStorytelling has a rich tradition among women and men in Afghanistani culture, from courtly palaces to popular meeting places where ordinary people gathered. …

Kidane, Chekol, Alemu, Getnet

The objective of this study is to
\n explore in depth public finance issues and their impact on
\n decentralized service delivery at the regional and woreda
\n levels in Benishangul Gumuz (BG) region. The study is
\n carried out as part of the federal and some regional case
\n studies designed to examine effectiveness of public finances
\n of sub-national governments. This study was expected to (i)
\n review the institutional arrangement for managing public
\n finances at the regional level including policies, budgetary
\n institutions, systems and processes; (ii) assess the level,
\n trend, and composition of public spending (both functional
\n and economic classification) in per capita terms over the
\n past five years and identify key achievements and
\n limitations; (iii) assess the level, trend, and, composition
\n of revenue at the regional level and examine the financing
\n framework, including ways to increase local revenue
\n generation capacity; (iv) assess the role of external aid in
\n supporting decentralized service delivery and the
\n sustainability of the program in absence of external aid;
\n (v) review the planning and budgeting process as well as the
\n quality of PFM system; and (vi) data permitting, establish
\n the link between the level of spending and the outputs and
\n outcomes for selected sectors. The study used standard
\n public financial process review methodologies used for
\n undertaking PFM assessments. The report reviewed the various
\n studies, plans and performance reports of the various
\n sectors in the regions between 1997 and 2001. In addition,
\n key informant interviews were carried out at bureaus levels
\n and woreda offices of education, health, water, agriculture
\n and rural development, finance and economic development,
\n revenue, General Auditor, rural road and woreda administrations.

Aisha Ghaus-Pasha

This article discusses how the 7th National Finance Commission award and the 18th Amendment to the Constitution have strengthened the autonomy of the federating units in Pakistan. The former has empowered the provinces by increasing their access to financial resources, but there is the danger that it may increase the consolidated fiscal deficit unless both the federal and provincial governments increase their fiscal efforts and rationalize their expenditures. The 18th Amendment has the potential to change the structure of governance, but has been implemented in such a way that effective decentralization has been at least partially rolled back. For devolution to work in Pakistan, financing and the delivery of devolved services will have to be more effectively organized and managed.

Rebecca Stewart

Kabul—In the traditional pose of Afghan men, Abdul Zia sits quietly—squatting down on his haunches close to the ground. But something about Abdul Zia doesn’t look like the rest of the men crouched along the streets of this capital city. Over his Pashtu turban are khaki, military-issue ear warmers. The hood of his dirty, 1970s ski jacket, likely a western cast off, is riddled with holes. His beard is grubby and matted.His posture carries none of the pride associated with most Afghan men, who hold themselves like warriors. His hands, when they emerge from beneath his thin and ripped shalwar kameez, are mottled and scarred. Between the black dirt lining his fingers, is dried and fresh blood from the wounds caused by the biting, relentless wind. He would wash, if all the water didn’t turn to ice. He is curling himself into the tiniest possible ball, trying desperately to keep warm. Abdul Zia is just one of almost 400,000 Afghans displaced from their homes by the fighting—now living in appalling conditions in camps in the capital city. Throughout the country, the official statistics are fast approaching 750,000, but the reality is much worse.Overflowing with more than 20,000 residents with nowhere else to go, the Nasaji Bagrami internally displaced people’s camp in the center of Kabul must be as close to hell on earth as any place on the planet. Yet, these lost people displaced by an international conflict rarely capture the world’s or even their own nation’s attention. A sprawling mass of mud huts and UNHCR logo-ed tarpaulins, the camp is a freezing nightmare of poverty, misery, and death. Amongst the bitter and hungry, Taliban recruiters find easy pickings to join their radical insurgency. The ground sparkles with ice particles, formed around the mud—a perilous quagmire where the incautious slip or sink. The ice goes down at least a yard, probably more. The Kabul River, normally a trail of brown sludge snaking through the city, is now frozen solid and piled high with at least three feet of snow—the same snow that falls on tarpaulins, precariously balanced above hastily built mud walls. Not strong enough to bear the weight, tarpaulins collapse regularly onto freezing families who must then spend the rest of the night digging themselves free. “We huddled round her to try and keep her warm,” Abdul Zia says. “I sat here, and my wife sat there,” he adds as he motions to two people sitting opposite each other with crossed legs. Just four days ago, in that space between them, lay their two-month old daughter Shah Gul. In temperatures 4 degrees Fahrenheit below zero, with the worst snowfall the country has seen in decades, Shah Gul was freezing to death. She contracted neither pneumonia nor hypothermia. Her little body simply froze, and there was nothing her desperate parents could do to stop it. Just a week earlier, their two-year-old son, Akhtar, had succumbed to the same fate. Abdul Zia and his wife are not alone. In the first week of February, as many as 40 children froze to death in the Nasaji Bagrami camp—one of at least 10 camps in Kabul and several hundred throughout this war-torn country. There’s no tally of how many other children like Shah Gul or elderly people succumbed that week. The same day Abdul Zia told his story, 16-year-old Fatima was desperately thin and struggling to breathe. Her frantic mother described how the effects of the cold had cost her daughter the use of her legs. Fatima died later that day. Abdul Zia and his family have been living here for six years. A sprawling maze of mud, open sewerage, and ripped tarpaulins, there is no infrastructure or logic to the “informal settlements” that so many people now call home. But it’s not really home—home is 400 miles away, on the outskirts of Lashkar Gah, the capital of war-ravaged Helmand province. Helmand is a sprawling expanse of over 22,000 square miles. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was dubbed the “America of Afghanistan,” with a huge hydroelectric plant and dam designed for massive cotton production, which needs substantial water supplies. These ambitious plans sputtered along through the arrival of Russian troops and later the Taliban. For if it wasn’t cotton, other crops could use the vast irrigation promised by this massive investment in water resources. Indeed, with low production costs and easy export routes, the fertile soil of Helmand province provided the perfect growing conditions for poppy. Helmand became the epicenter of the Afghan heroin trade. Today, the province produces over half of the opium in the global drug trade. Whatever the roots—rich poppy crop or tribal affiliations—Helmand is one of the most strongly held Taliban areas and has proved one of the biggest headaches for American-led forces since the invasion in 2001. In fact, the majority of all combat and civilian casualties alike have been in this province. The total civilian casualties are impossible to quantify, but since 2007, nearly 25,000 have been recorded. Yet nearly six years since the start of the major western offensive known as Operation Mountain Thrust, the Taliban, rather than showing signs of retreat, are stronger than ever. One of the principal justifications for the “Security Assistance” in Afghanistan is the protection of the civilian population from the worst Taliban excesses. Yet UN figures suggest that from 2001 to 2005, more civilians were killed by NATO forces than by insurgents. The Taliban aren’t the only ones from whom civilians, like Abdul Zia and his family, need protection. What’s striking is that, with NATO’s formal mechanism of compensation for civilian casualties, much less attention is being paid today to the hundreds of thousands who are neither killed nor injured, but internally displaced by the fighting. Abdul Zia, like 90 percent of his fellow Helmandis, worked as a farmer. His wife was looking after their seven children in their modest but comfortable home when it was suddenly hit in an airstrike. Six of his children were killed instantly. His home lost, Abdul Zia fled to Kabul with his wife and only surviving child. Few in Abdul Zia’s position have the courage or knowledge to confront those who killed their family members and ask for compensation. While NATO has rightly recognized the need to redress families for civilians deaths and that the pre-2006 levels of “collateral damage” were unacceptable, it is not enough. The internally displaced population of Afghanistan requires sustainable, practical solutions that enable them to go home or to re-establish themselves elsewhere. For Abdul Zia and his family, it was a perilous journey by foot from the outskirts of Lashkar Gar to Kabul that he undertook because he thought his family might be safe there. In the capital, he found refuge in Nasaji Bagrami, where most of his neighbors are Helmandi. But rather than sanctuary, he found despair with his two youngest children, born in the camp, dying just the same. With the fighting still escalating in Helmand, they have no option to return home—stuck in a city that doesn’t want them.Abdul Zia’s family are direct civilian casualties of the operations of international military forces in Afghanistan. For most here, it is irrelevant whether the culprits were the Taliban or the international military forces. In these camps and in the streets of the city, their only wish, after 30 years of war, is for the fighting to end, allowing them to go home. For many, the victor is besides the point with more and more seeing the return of the Taliban as the only option. As long as the fighting continues, the numbers of those fleeing into the capital will rise. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center now estimates that at least 400 people, literally running for their lives, arrive in Kabul every day. While their displacement may have been caused by international forces, it would appear that they then slip through a series of loopholes. The official mandate of the UNHCR is the care of refugees, but to achieve the status of refugee, civilians need to flee one country and enter another. Internally displaced people are those who have been forced leave their homes but who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.Even if the internally displaced flee for the same reasons as refugees, the fact that they have not crossed an international frontier denies them the protections afforded to those with official refugee status. While the UNHCR works tirelessly to re-integrate the internally displaced, it has already been overwhelmed by four million refugees who have returned to Afghanistan since 2001, consuming enormous resources to reintegrate, re-house, and support those who have grown up in camps in Pakistan or as exiles in Iran. Because IDPs are not defined as refugees under international law, they remain the responsibility of their own government. But the cabinet of President Hamid Karzai seems generally unable or unwilling to assist them. UN agencies have been known to step in when the problem becomes a humanitarian crisis, like this winter, but in general IDPs remain ignored and abandoned. The areas where they settle do not even receive the official title of “camps,” but rather “informal settlements,” and are thus not afforded the protection of aid agencies or international law that official refugees receive. As fighting has intensified with a surge in military operations against Taliban strongholds, 91,000 Afghans have fled their homes in the first half of 2011, up from 42,000 in the first half of 2010. “This is a largely hidden but horrific human rights crisis,” says Horia Mosadiq, an Amnesty International researcher in Kabul. Furthermore, Western military forces, while taking positive steps to mitigate the level of civilian casualties, have no strategy for dealing with those who are not injured or killed during operations, but displaced. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, in a 2011 report, found that in the Afghan cables published by Wikileaks in 2010, the U.S. government did not make a single reference to any displacements. The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement require governments to assist their internal refugees, but such demands are not legally binding. There are also no guidelines to identify these individuals in the first place. The right to housing is guaranteed by the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights—a treaty signed and ratified by Afghanistan. The ability to live somewhere with security, peace, and dignity is a fundamental human right recognized under this same pact, which also imposes obligations on signatory nations to provide access to health care, water, and sanitation. Yet, the country’s government officials actively prevent agencies from providing clean water and even basic latrines. Afghan law forbids the intervention of UN agencies in what are referred to as the “Kabul Informal Settlements.” The government argues that rather than civilians fleeing fighting, these people are economic migrants. While it has a responsibility under international law to provide for internally displaced people, it does not have such an obligation to help people leaving the provinces to seek a better life in the bright lights of the capital. Indeed, international aid agencies are barred from giving any assistance that would contribute to the permanence of internal migrants’ settlements, including building latrines, creating schools, and providing health care systems. Who gets assistance from the small number of local Afghan aid groups and international aid groups is all too often a matter of luck. The migratory pressures often go far beyond the simple and direct need for Afghans to remove themselves from military engagements and deadly force to safety. Increasing numbers are also being forced to move to survive economically. While the government brands these as individuals seeking a more prosperous life, more often the move is simply a case of needing to feed one’s self. At the root of this dilemma is a keen desire by the Afghan government and the international community to discourage pure economic migration to the nation’s capital, which is ill-prepared to absorb them. Already bursting at the seams, the population of Kabul has mushroomed from 800,000 in 2001 to over 3 million today. A 2011 report by the Brookings-Bern Institute points out that internally displaced people usually leave their homes for the same reasons as economic migrants—improved security, some hope of integration into a stable social framework. For economic migrants, these factors influence where they go, not when. This is the crucial difference. Internally displaced people like Abdul Zia and his family had no choice but to leave their villages, fearing for their lives and their family’s safety. When they arrive, they are condemned, often for years, to cramped, squalid, desperate conditions in what are effectively refugee settlements with no access to water, education, or health care. For their children to attend school, they need national identity cards, which often get left behind or destroyed in a desperate scramble to flee an attack on their homes. Peter Nicolaus, head of the UNHCR mission in Afghanistan, acknowledges the full extent of the crisis. “The problems in the KIS [Kabul Informal Settlements] cannot be overestimated,” he says. This winter, just 10 minutes from the presidential palace and several UN guesthouses, Abdul Zia’s children and at least 38 others were freezing to death. Once the humanitarian crisis kicked in, the and other agencies to provide and the people from the relentless “We have a humanitarian problem every continues, this it was had on a with the other would responsibility for the IDPs in the areas and those in Kabul under the care of In this didn’t go to and up to step in here as over people, and for two in February, were the in an a military position in which and barred all from Afghanistan. while UNHCR were running out of almost half a million and other were in in In the for years, only half the aid was are nearly the snow there will be there will be will have to but the less the less a the aid has still not the UNHCR did under these is to that the IDPs in the “informal settlements” are not the responsibility of the While they look after the million refugees from the problem falls to the Afghan government. While there is an Afghan for and the to be on of rather than on the needs of internally displaced individuals or many that their homes have displaced and The Afghan does some for refugees and But is them to their place of solutions and humanitarian care. most of those go home at this strategy is a of and resources. to a report by Amnesty the Afghan to internal displacement is to that it doesn’t while displaced also on aid The Amnesty report one aid as are not to even call them are told they are and an Afghan official like not in those mass areas where But these are not In to in as an an Afghan needs of and identity is to people like Abdul Zia who fled his home in the of an The Afghan government actively even to the status of that they themselves this title to get Indeed, the government says they have been in the camps for more than two years, they are and would any status like a to life in these most economic are men, IDPs to of and most of the residents of Nasaji Bagrami are Afghan government officials that families are to by the of aid as as and rather than fleeing fighting. his and the of his children, Abdul Zia says that he has been to Nasaji Bagrami by aid and of a “I want to go he want to live like in this There of a substantial for the Afghan government to IDPs their status. they to them as of conflict and them as economic migrants, they have no responsibility to provide them with water, health care, or Afghan officials that they help their own but that they in be to on international aid that may be But because of the government has effectively barred from legally such aid to even the most The of these is to turn an economic or dilemma into a desperate humanitarian crisis or other a for the for and infrastructure for them, they will But they as every of they have on to a government official or He then “The country live in of where these people go becomes by the of in Afghanistan. For over 30 years of a of and have to a of and of the with the of of is a to the of the internally displaced to their their them in in and around Kabul where have it is the on whom usually “I do the says Abdul as most to to all military forces with and western are for lives, because they were their and they killed Nicolaus, has as to is to he “The There is no country in the that could with this of migration into Indeed, head of the UN for the of in Afghanistan points to this just something that in the capital. right Afghanistan. in every major center have these settlements, have these and because of a of of access to water, or health care, it simply the conditions for the most As huddled in the one that to Abdul Zia and six other a has has that there are in the camp, and after other these people and the with a of and One of those who has the is He out from the because of the his position demands or because he has and so many of the residents He does not have the look of Abdul Zia and his His do not frozen by too for any one human to He is the camp and is not huddled into a on the ground. He and “I says “I for all these are and want to them all by the of have into have they the being by the and others to Afghanistan, the of and for the is only the of for there is the of where to these families who have lost In 2005, a with the of providing and IDPs with of But to they their is a bitter and since to it would require vast of that are already for by far more and than the refugees One under this is on the outskirts of Kabul. One aid in the Amnesty report are and it’s There is no water Yet, the need is the government areas in where there is no a “We have to be about the of the a of But if living in a or in the of a city center in temperatures of below zero, but prevent it’s He adds that many of these families have been living in Kabul for 10 years, with no of any in their “We need to prevent this he have to is how to with the of these conditions rather than dealing with the when they A first says of is to a and of even a small of the “We are families out of the KIS and into just Kabul. about and the official he points a of the population of Afghanistan are IDPs or million The international aid officials is that the Afghan government must the that their hands, allowing them to provide basic and stop more civilians from more than any who have succumbed to the of the While enormous have been by western military forces to civilian casualties, it is that the “collateral damage” those who have been displaced and will from or the of Afghanistan. The children freezing to death in the camp are just as much civilian casualties as those hit by At the same must be to UNHCR to make they the vast number of IDPs who they now In conflict like Afghanistan, it is and for the UNHCR mandate to to only refugees who have crossed the UN mandate be in conflict to IDPs a humanitarian crisis like this displacement is migration only has been But there is the reality that military officials need to as Not only do the IDPs a humanitarian crisis, but a and crisis as These housing these bitter people and their are fertile for Taliban is that the Taliban, simply a small of through of refugees in the camps of Pakistan while their Afghanistan was being by of the The same is UN has found that children as as are being by the Taliban for such as digging where are then of these children are being often their as with the being by far With growing the and what are now seen as a of hungry, and people is in the for the Taliban to

Zubair Ali Shahid

No abstract is available for this record.

Kent Eaton

In recent years, decentralization and regional autonomy measures have figured prominently in negotiations designed to end some of the world's most important conflicts, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. Reforms that shift powers to subnational units deserve the attention of those who are trying to promote security via institutional design, but the risks associated with these territorial reforms are considerable. When political and economic resources are transferred to subnational governments in the attempt to create meaningful access to the political system for former combatants, the great risk is that these same resources can be used to finance a continuation of the armed struggle instead. In response to the popularity of territorial reforms in many post-conflict settings, this paper sounds a cautionary note by evaluating the negative impact of decentralization on security in Colombia, site of Latin America's longest and deadliest armed conflict. After analyzing the design decisions of reformers who hoped that decentralization would help end the conflict, I argue that decentralization in fact financed the expansion of armed clientelism by illegal groups on both the left and right. Thanks to the weakness of the police in much of the national territory, guerrillas and paramilitaries have been able to use decentralized resources to destabilize the state, limiting even further its monopoly over the use of force and creating what are in effect parallel states on the left and right.