Blockchain Papers

Peter Ayolov

This article develops the concept of the “Manufacture of Deviance* 2.0” as an extension of the economic model proposed in The Economic Policy of Online Media: Manufacture of Dissent. It argues that the transition from traditional mass media to decentralised digital platforms has produced not simply a transformation in the distribution of violent imagery, but a new economic relationship between attention, taboo and atrocity. Traditional broadcast media developed institutional and ethical mechanisms intended to restrict representations of real torture, mutilation and death. The online attention economy partially reverses this logic: what is forbidden, disturbing, transgressive or difficult to access can acquire additional informational value precisely because of its exceptional character. As audiences become saturated with conventional news, entertainment and political controversy, increasingly extreme material can compete successfully for the scarce resource of human attention. Violence consequently becomes capable of generating multiple currencies simultaneously: advertising value, subscriptions, donations and cryptocurrency, but also views, followers, notoriety, group membership, prestige and social recognition. The article traces a genealogy from the spectacle of public punishment and execution, through the controversial appearance of uncensored atrocity footage on traditional television, to gore communities, extremist propaganda, cartel execution videos, closed social-media groups and contemporary networks of digitally performed vigilantism. Particular attention is given to the evolution of so-called “pedophile hunter” subcultures associated with Maxim “Tesak” Martsinkevich and Occupy Pedophilia, in which humiliation and violence could be transformed into reproducible performances possessing recognisable scripts, symbols and gestures. Rather than assuming the existence of a single organisation commissioning such violence, the article proposes a more disturbing possibility: networked media can reproduce violent behaviour without central command because attention, imitation, belonging and social currency themselves operate as incentives. Against this background, the article examines the 2026 Youth Hill case in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, involving teenagers accused of participating in the fatal assault and humiliation of a 37-year-old man after he had allegedly been lured to a meeting. The case is treated cautiously, distinguishing established information, prosecutorial allegations and media reporting from the broader theoretical interpretation developed here. It nevertheless provides a disturbing case through which to investigate the migration of violent spectacle from the screen into physical behaviour and its subsequent return to the screen as content. The article argues that this process resembles, in technologically transformed form, the public scaffold: the condemned sinner, the righteous crowd, ritual humiliation and spectacular punishment return within a global digital square in which spectators can simultaneously watch, judge, distribute and reward the spectacle. The Manufacture of Deviance 2.0 therefore describes a potentially advanced stage of the attention economy: not merely the monetisation of disagreement and outrage, but the conversion of transgression, cruelty and ultimately human suffering into communicative value.

Dorothy Gail Rey

This research study investigates the evolution of the Taliban from an insurgent movement into a hybrid insurgent-state actor. Utilizing datasets from terrorism, conflict, and open-source intelligence, the paper analyzes the motivations, organizational structure, financing mechanisms, operational capabilities, targeting patterns, and governance practices of the Taliban. It assesses the group's transition from insurgency to a de facto government following its resurgence in Afghanistan and examines the implications for regional security, international recognition, sanctions compliance, and counterterrorism policy. The findings indicate that the Taliban's unique blend of centralized ideological leadership, decentralized operational execution, economic adaptability, and increasing diplomatic engagement poses a multifaceted challenge for contemporary security analysis and international governance frameworks.

Clement Aryee, Juliana Popoola

Terrorist financing is a major fuel for political violence and extremist operations in the world. The increasing advancement of digital technologies, cryptocurrencies, crowdfunding platforms, and social media has significantly transformed how extremist groups raise, transfer, and conceal funds, yet little has been done to examine the broader digital transformation of terrorist financing and its implications for the United States. This scoping review examined evolving trends, financing strategies, and operational challenges associated with terrorist financing networks and assessed their implications for the United States counterterrorism agenda. Following the Arksey and O’Malley guidelines for scoping reviews, relevant studies were identified through systematic database searches and screened using predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria. Ten studies were selected and analyzed thematically. The findings underscored four major themes: the digitalization of terrorist financing, the fusion of lawful and unlawful funding mediums, administrative and institutional weaknesses, and the growing need for collaborative and intelligence-driven disruption strategies. The review found that extremist financing increasingly operates within ordinary digital and financial ecosystems, making detection more difficult for regulators, financial institutions, and law enforcement agencies. The study concludes that terrorist financing has become more decentralized, adaptive, and technologically sophisticated than many existing counterterrorism frameworks are prepared to address. Hence, strengthening United States national security will require a more proactive digital financial monitoring, sophisticated regulatory systems, and stronger inter-sectoral collaborations to disrupt evolving extremist financing networks before they escalate into acts of violence.

Omkar Sonawane

The changing nature of cyber conflicts in the era of information technology marks a noticeable shift from physical realms towards digital realms, wherein nation-states and non-state actors effectively leverage cyberspace for political, social, ideological and economic purposes. Asymmetry Conflict is in its central theme of cyberterrorism. With limited resources, supply chains and logistics, power-deficient groups effectively leverage cyberspace, against strong adversaries through coordinated cyberattacks on critical infrastructure including, energy, finance, transportation, healthcare, defense and communication. The difficulty of attribution allows non-state actors to effectively leverage cyberspace by acting freely and challenging the conventional deterrence capabilities of the state. Further, terrorist organizations prefer decentralized networks making them highly adaptable and resilient. With unclear boundaries between cybercrime and cyberterrorism it becomes challenging to comprehend such security scenarios

Maria Jofre, Mirko Nazzari, Alberto Aziani

The introduction section highlights the potential exploitation of financial technology, particularly cryptocurrencies, for terrorist financing, emphasizing the need for empirical research on the involvement of political extremist groups, such as right-wing extremists. Despite theoretical arguments suggesting vulnerabilities in the financial system, limited empirical evidence exists on the extent of cryptocurrency funding within these groups. The chapter aims to address this gap by conducting the first empirical analysis on the financing activities of extreme right-wing groups in the United States.

Daniel Rabitha, Novi Dwi Nugroho, Ismail, Marpuah · 10 authors

This study explores the strategic shift in terrorist financing methods employed by the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) network, specifically the transition from decentralized crowdfunding to centralized single-donor mechanisms. Using a qualitative case study grounded in Fraud Diamond Theory, this research investigates how foreign philanthropic channels are manipulated to support militant operations. The findings reveal that single donors possess the technical sophistication to exploit transnational financial systems, specifically through the manipulation of Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) and informal charity networks. Consequently, this study proposes an enhanced risk-profiling framework for Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) that prioritizes individual behavioral patterns and ideological alignments over mere transactional volumes, offering critical insights for anticipatory counter-terrorism financing measures

Yaohui Wang, Yang Qiu

How do the emerging Web 3.0 technologies affect the survival of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in their violent struggles vis-à-vis state entities? While techno-optimists argue that Web 3.0 can democratize the internet and curb monopolistic practices, its decentralized features, such as enhanced privacy, data ownership, and personalization, also present significant security challenges. These technologies can be weaponized by NSAGs to promote their efficiency and resilience. Borrowing insights from social movement theory, we construct a theoretical framework to explain how Web 3.0 applications affect the dynamics of NSAGs by impacting their organizational modes and strategies. It is argued that blockchain-based platforms, metaverse projects, and other Web 3.0 technologies promote the efficiency of the recruitment, training, financing, purchasing, and communication processes of NSAGs, increasing their capacities as social organizations, and thereby render these groups more resilient to collapse. We illustrate and corroborate our theoretical claims by examining the cases of how NSAGs such as the Islamic State utilize decentralized crypto exchanges and the Dark Web in their operations.

Dror Parnes, Sapir Stephanie Parnes

Purpose This study aims to examine here various (nonlinear) time-series comovements between daily changes in both prices and trading volumes of five popular cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, Dogecoin and Tron) and diverse types of terror attacks, by all known terrorist organizations (though the authors later focus on the most active ones), across different geographic regions and through lead/lag relations, from July 2010 to July 2021. Design/methodology/approach The authors form 130 dedicated subsamples and use wavelet coherence analyses that provide numerous highly detailed and informative heatmaps. Findings The authors find that the six most active terrorist organizations (Al-Qaida, Taliban, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Houthi and the Islamic State) exhibit mostly short-term comovements with a variety of crypto assets. Occasionally, these interactions last for longer periods of time. Assorted terrorist groups often leverage on periodic adaptations in the prices and trading volumes of crypto assets to enhance their ongoing financing and possibly to adjust their global operations. Practical implications The high-resolution findings and inferences can serve worldwide agencies to better comprehend the relationships between different crypto assets and global terrorism and therefore counter terrorism financing more effectively. Originality/value The authors overcome research gaps in existing literature, where the topic was partly engaged over shorter time frames, through truncated samples and strictly with Bitcoin.

Carina Miller

Cyber resilience is an essential aspect of modern cybersecurity strategies, ensuring the ability of organizations to anticipate, withstand, and recover from cyber threats. This paper explores the concept of cyber resilience in the context of increasing cyberattacks, particularly targeting financial institutions, government systems, and decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms. The research addresses key questions regarding the effectiveness of current cyber resilience frameworks and the role of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and blockchain in mitigating cyber risks. A mixed-method approach, combining statistical analysis of cyber incidents and expert interviews, was used to evaluate cyber resilience strategies. The results highlight the growing need for adaptive security measures, enhanced regulatory policies, and international cooperation. Data analysis suggests that organizations with proactive resilience strategies experience significantly lower financial losses and operational disruptions. The study concludes that cyber resilience should be a top priority for businesses and governments, requiring continuous improvement and investment in cybersecurity innovations.

Essa Al-Mansouri

This article critically evaluates the Sharia legitimacy of Bitcoin by applying Usul al-Fiqh—the foundational principles of Islamic jurisprudence—to several influential fatwas that prohibit it. Despite stemming from sincere concerns, many such fatwas rely on incomplete factual understanding, unverified analogies, or secondary policy considerations rather than explicit textual or consensus-based evidence. Consequently, these rulings risk conflating genuine harms (fraud, volatility, illicit use) with Bitcoin’s inherent characteristics, which classical fiqh frameworks may otherwise recognize as permissible if carefully regulated. Drawing on examples of fatwas that deem Bitcoin permissible, the study demonstrates how thorough subject comprehension and methodologically robust legal derivation (ijtihad) often yield more nuanced conclusions. It further underscores that well-established Qur’anic and Prophetic principles— such as avoiding excessive uncertainty (gharar) and upholding wealth preservation—need not preclude thoughtful, evidence-based engagement with emerging financial technologies. Concluding that clear methodological grounding and accurate technology assessment are indispensable, the paper advocates ongoing dialogue between Sharia scholars, economists, and technical experts to ensure balanced rulings that protect Muslims’ interests while fostering innovation.

Murad M. Madzhumayev, Olga A. Kuznetsova

Advances in digital technology - particularly Web3’s pseudonymity and decentralized naming systems, combined with information flows’ anonymity, accessibility, and cross-border nature - enable terrorist organizations to recruit members and perpetrate discrete socially dangerous acts. Conventional reactive counterterrorism measures prove inadequate against rapid illicit content dissemination that leaves detectable digital traces. This study explores artificial intelligence’s (AI) counter-criminal potential on machine learning and predictive analytics for proactively identifying and preventing terrorist activity through behavioral indicators and digital footprints that facilitate a strategic shift to proactive security paradigms. The research develops a multimodal analytical framework integrating natural language processing, computer vision, audio analysis, and social network analysis, detailing the complete machine learning pipeline from data preprocessing to model deployment. It examines the “RED-Alert” system as practical implementation and proposes a novel “Threshold Adaptive Intervention” (PORA) module utilizing graph neural networks and time-series analysis for digital risk assessment. Machine learning excels at threat detection and digital evidence generating, necessitating reevaluation of internet service providers’ (ISP) liability - particularly collective digital inaction. A differentiated liability framework accounts for providers’ technical influence while treating AI-derived risk indicators as ancillary tools for establishing individual culpability. Machine learning and predictive analytics enable a strategic shift to proactive counterterrorism.

Agama Emomotimi

Stablecoins have become a critical element of the cryptocurrency ecosystem, offering benefits such as value stability, efficient cross-border transactions, and enhanced access to Decentralized Finance (DeFi) and everyday payment systems.Their increasing adoption demonstrates their capacity to transform financial processes by enabling faster transactions, reducing fees through blockchain technology, and expanding financial inclusion for unbanked populations.However, these advantages come with significant national security concerns, including the risks of illicit financial activities, gaps in regulatory oversight, and potential disruptions to monetary policy.This article explores the implications of stablecoins for Nigeria's national security, focusing on their usage, regulatory challenges, and associated risks.It highlights vulnerabilities such as the potential for market manipulation, exploitation by criminal networks, and the use of stablecoins for money laundering, cyberattacks, and other illicit financial activities.The article also examines how these risks could undermine financial stability and national security, particularly in a context of limited regulatory capacity.By drawing lessons from global regulatory frameworks, the study stresses the urgent need for Nigeria to develop robust regulatory measures to address these risks and ensure financial stability.It calls for a balanced approach that promotes innovation while safeguarding the integrity of the financial system.

Rischan Mafrur, Khadijah Hasim

No abstract is available for this record.

Sumita J Shroff, Nidhi Agrawal, Udai Lal Paliwal, Miklesh Prasad Yadav

No abstract is available for this record.

John A. Nagl

Al-Qaʿida’s attacks on September 11, 2001, were likely the most cost-effective use of military force in history. Conducted at the grand expense of several hundred thousand dollars, the attacks and the American overreaction cost the US Treasury some seven trillion dollars, and counting, in addition to the horrific loss of civilian and military lives on that tragic day. They did not, however, accomplish al-Qaʿida’s strategic objective of separating America from its allies in the Middle East, and al-Qaʿida was gravely damaged in the aftermath of the attacks even as the American efforts to remake Iraq and Afghanistan foundered.Were the trillions of dollars America spent in the wake of al-Qaʿida’s catastrophically successful masterstroke a smart investment in the security of the American people? More briefly, does counter-terrorism work? Richard English, of Queen’s University Belfast, answers with a qualified “sometimes” in his short new book, already in press by the time Hamas replicated al-Qaʿida’s’ terror strike with one of its own on October 7, 2023, in Israel.English is a longtime student of “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland who, in the wake of September 11, broadened his focus to encompass other conflicts around the globe. In Does Counter-Terrorism Work? he provides a comparative analysis of US (and, to a much lesser extent, UK) counterterrorism efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader “War on Terror”; British CT in Northern Ireland, where he is on familiar ground; and Israeli counterterrorism. The comparison extends interest in his work from the United Kingdom to the United States and the Middle East, and as is sometimes the case, foreign eyes can see things that Americans and Israelis too often miss.English oddly treats his cases in reverse chronological order, beginning with Afghanistan, Iraq, and ISIS before turning to Northern Ireland and then finally Israel in what I assume is a bid to attract American readers. The result reads awkwardly and upends his otherwise commendable claim to adopting a historically minded approach; if Israeli and British counterterrorism efforts provide lessons that could inform American strategy, why not cover them first? The damage is not fatal, but it is an entirely self-inflicted wound that mars an otherwise valuable study.English argues that strategic victory in counterterrorism, while possible, is unlikely; instead, partial strategic success is more likely, while tactical success can and often does come at the expense of accomplishing strategic goals. This is a truth that cannot be overemphasized; the 2006 U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual noted that an operation that removed three terrorists from the battlefield while inciting another dozen previously uncommitted civilians to join the insurgent cause was a net loss to the effort.1The same can be true on a broader scale—tactical counterterrorism successes can have negative strategic effects and often have done just that in the cases he presents. This is perhaps the most valuable argument English makes and one he returns to repeatedly, with America and especially Israel receiving severe criticism; English notes that “in Israeli counter-terrorist experience overall, there is a striking tension between tactical brilliance and strategic self-harm” (162), analysis that the ongoing “mowing the lawn” CT operations in Gaza have only reinforced.2The American response to the September 11th attacks was a lightning fast “by, with, and through” counterterrorism campaign that used Northern Alliance Afghan ground forces supported by Central Intelligence Agency and Special Forces operators to topple the Taliban with airpower and chase bin Laden out of Afghanistan, rendering his organization largely combat ineffective and arguably defeated by the end of 2001.3 It did not fall prey to this particular error of tactical success at the expense of strategic failure, ending particularly badly for other reasons. The most critical of all of America’s many failings in Afghanistan was the unnecessary and bungled invasion of Iraq in 2003. The decision to invade Iraq, a country that had nothing to do with September 11 and did not harbor terrorists prior to the invasion, meant that already in 2022 “Afghanistan slipped down the list of priorities, and the Iraq-based distraction and self-delegitimization proved extremely pernicious for the War on Terror” (27).An America that chose not to mobilize for war in the wake of September 11th simply did not have the resources to fight two grinding counterinsurgency campaigns at the same time. Top American officials made no secret of the fact that Iraq took priority over Afghanistan; Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Armed Services Committee in December 2007 that “In Afghanistan, we do what we can; in Iraq, we do what we must.”4English notes that “the US withdrawal [from Afghanistan] unquestionably represented a setback in terms of the War on Terror and its objectives” (23) since “the 2021 imbroglio (presented by the Taliban as a victory over the US) might yet lay the foundations for more terrorism” (24). Counterterrorism expert and CNN national security analyst Peter Bergen agrees, calling the August 15, 2021, fall of Kabul to the Taliban the best day for global jihadis since September 11 itself and noting that since the Taliban’s resumption of power Afghanistan has become a magnet for jihadis, including at least 400 members of an al-Qaʿida that gained new life from the American defeat in Afghanistan.5Indeed, the American invasion of Iraq—what Tom Ricks in Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq described as “one of the most profligate actions in the history of American foreign policy”—“stimulated more anti-Western, jihadist terrorism internationally (exactly the phenomenon that it was supposed to be eradicating).”6 English cites US counterterrorism official Richard Clark noting that George W. Bush’s invasion succeeded in turning Iraq “from a nation that was not threatening us into a breeding ground for anti-American hatred” (36). The war in Iraq cost the United States tens of thousands of casualties, trillions of dollars, thousands of Americans (and tens or hundreds of thousands of Iraqis) killed, all while weakening the main regional counterbalance to strongly anti-American Iran, which now arguably controls Iraqi politics and has stationed significant numbers of proxy forces inside Iraq’s borders.7 English sums up the ledger of the American war of choice in Iraq: “Terrorism actually grew as a consequence of the Iraq War; the country became a magnet for jihadists, a site of violent struggle and lasting chaos, a justification deployed in defence of terrorist attacks elsewhere, and part of the complex sequence of events which generated the ISIS crisis” (36). Other than that, and distracting attention from Afghanistan and contributing to America’s defeat there, it was fine.The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq should be understood not in isolation from each other but as part of what President George W. Bush proclaimed as a “Global War on Terror” in the wake of September 11th. This meta-attempt to defeat an enemy tactic through global counterterrorism failed both in its component campaigns and overall; indeed, it was a pipe dream to think that even the United States, the most powerful nation in world history, could eradicate all terror from the face of the earth. In his excellent conclusion, English argues that “the actual causes behind al-Qaida’s assault on the US were misdiagnosed, the historical inheritances of Afghanistan and Iraq were not appropriately respected, and the known knowns of effective counter-terrorism were overlooked” (180). Instead of the clumsily named GWOT, English recommends realistic goals, consistently pursued; he argues that “a more realistic approach probably involves learning to live with and to contain terrorism, rather than pledging to eradicate it” (163). This is doable because even the most horrific terror attacks in living memory—September 11th in the United States, October 7th in Israel (proportionally a heavier blow)—were intended to “kill one, terrorize one thousand,” and succeeded. But “terrorism rarely embodies an existential threat to a state” and “the actual danger posed in practice can be comparatively trivial” (164); indeed, in most years deer kill more Americans than do terrorists. In point of fact, right-wing domestic terrorism is now a greater threat to Americans than radical Islamic terrorism; FBI Director Christopher Wray noted in March 2021 that the threat to Americans from white supremacists was on the same level as the threat to Americans from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, an al-Qaʿida successor organization.8English’s book loses some steam after its opening chapters on “The Post-9/11 War on Terror”; it is hard, after all, to maintain momentum when you begin with perhaps the biggest mistake any nation has made since Napoleon and Hitler chose to roll the iron dice on the frozen steppes of a Russian winter. Both the British forces in Northern Ireland and Israeli counter-terrorism forces have certainly made their share of mistakes in their campaigns against terrorists, often due to an early overreliance on force in response to terrorist provocations. English notes that this is entirely intentional on the part of the insurgents: “Provoking over-reaction by the state is one of the longstanding aims of terrorist organizations. . . . For states, the clumsy use of military force can give a huge lift to terrorist opponents” (166). This is true even for the “heroes” of English’s book, the British in Northern Ireland, whose “military heavy-handedness in Irish nationalist areas was often productive of terrorist sympathy” (166).But the British, in the best tradition of successful counterterrorism, learned and adapted over the course of their long campaign against the Irish Republican Army. As is almost always the case, better intelligence operations were essential to locating the fish swimming in the sea of the people; as a result of better information networks and more precision in targeting terrorists, a PIRA that had killed more than one hundred people annually during the 1970s took the lives of less than half that many on average over the decade that followed. English argues convincingly that “the UK used its intelligence networks to try to encourage movement towards more political and less violent modes of struggle in the republican movement” (97). In a portrait of counterinsurgency operations that will be familiar to many veterans of the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, English argues that “operations, interim concessions, publicity, the undermining of opponents, control over relevant populations, and the strengthening of the state” (112) all contributed to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 that by his estimate saved more than 2,400 Irish and English lives in the quarter-century since its signing. It is, he argues, “a partial strategic success for the state” (112) as well as additional proof, as if any were needed, that waging war on rebellion is messy and slow.English’s treatment of Israel’s long counterterrorism campaign against Palestinian forces is more interesting in light of the attacks of October 7th; although he titles his sixth chapter “From the Six-Day War to the Gaza Tragedy,” the Gaza tragedy of which he writes is Operation Protective Edge, which killed more than 2,000 Palestinians and wounded more than 20,000 in 2014 (144); there has obviously been a far greater tragedy in Gaza since. Still, the analysis English provides remains useful, particularly his note that “Ultimate Israeli counter-terrorist success would involve the eradication (or the partial yet substantial eradication) of the basis for terrorism itself” (153). While events since the publication of Does Counterterrorism Work? make it harder to see a path forward, English is not alone in suggesting that “it still remains possible that a two-state resolution could be reached in Israel/Palestine and, while this would be unlikely to eradicate all political violence, it might prove the long-term basis for decisively lowering levels of terrorism and could be considered a partial strategic success if it did so” (156).9The finale of Does Counterterrorism Work? is as marked-up with stars and exclamation points as any chapter in any book I can remember reading recently; English’s summary comments are exceptionally valuable and could have saved many lives and immense amounts of treasure had they been internalized earlier in my country, in England, in Israel, and in dozens of other countries around the globe that have been afflicted with terrorism. He focuses, again, on the counterproductive tendencies of states to overreact to terror attacks, offering the rule of law as a counterbalance to excess: “Legal restraints and processes are crucial here, if counter-productive tactics are to be avoided; and the rule of law offers a strong foundation for the successful limitation of terrorism” (167).He notes that terrorists seek that overreaction and counsels against it: “The disjunction between what most Muslims actually think and what groups like al-Qaida want them to think can either be reinforced or reduced by states’ actions and approaches” (170). Indeed, drawing on the cases he discusses in the book and many more globally, English argues that counterterrorism alone is insufficient. Channeling his inner Clausewitz, English is correct to note that “where counter-terrorism has most effectively dried up the reservoir of support for terrorist violence (such as in Northern Ireland), it is because it has been part of a wider political approach to the relevant root causes, an approach which does not focus exclusively on the terrorism” (171).In one of his best lines, English says that “Terrorism is a blood-stained symptom of the more important issues at stake” (171); a different analyst correctly called war “the continuation of politics by other means.” This means that if you want to do more than mow the lawn—punish today’s terrorists while sowing the seeds of tomorrow’s—you have to provide some resolution of the core issues for which terrorists are fighting. Thus, “effective counterterrorism must therefore be conceived of in terms of the wider politics ultimately at stake in these situations. Counter-terrorism must be integrated into such broader politics, and failure to recognize this will lead repeatedly to failure” (173).William Westmoreland noted in his memoirs that he kept a copy of Mao’s Guerrilla Warfare on his bedside table during his service in Vietnam but was generally too busy doing general officer things to read it. The architects of counterterrorism policy in Israel and the United States should take a few hours out of their schedules to read English’s short book, lest their policies end in the abject failure that marked the American counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam.

Ashton Kingdon, Aaron Winter

In response to the data revolution, academic research and media attention have increasingly focused on the technological adaptation and innovation displayed by the far right. The greatest attention is paid to social media and how groups and organizations are utilizing technological advancement and growth in virtual networks to increase recruitment and advance radicalization on a global scale. As with most social and political endeavors, certain technologies are in vogue and thus draw the attention of users and regulators and service providers. This creates a technological blind spot within which extremist groups frequently operate older and less well regarded technologies without the oversight that one might expect. This article examines the less well-studied traditional and official websites of the Ku Klux Klan, the most established and iconic of American far-right organizations. By incorporating non-participant observation of online spaces and thematic analysis, this research analyzes the evolution of 26 websites, from their emergence in the early 1990s to the present day. We examine the ways in which traditional printed communications and other ephemera have progressed with advances in technology, focusing on the following central elements of Klan political activism and community formation: Klan identity, organizational history, aims and objectives; technology and outreach, including online merchandise and event organization; and the constructions of whiteness and racism. The results add value and insight to comparable work by offering a unique historical insight into the ways in which the Klan have developed and made use of Web 1.0, Web 2.0, and Web3 technologies.

Shuo Yang, Jiachi Chen, Mingyuan Huang, Zibin Zheng · 5 authors

Reentrancy, a notorious vulnerability in smart contracts, has led to millions of dollars in financial loss. However, current smart contract vulnerability detection tools suffer from a high false positive rate in identifying contracts with reentrancy vulnerabilities. Moreover, only a small portion of the detected reentrant contracts can actually be exploited by hackers, making these tools less effective in securing the Ethereum ecosystem in practice. In this paper, we propose BlockWatchdog, a tool that focuses on detecting reentrancy vulnerabilities by identifying attacker contracts. These attacker contracts are deployed by hackers to exploit vulnerable contracts automatically. By focusing on attacker contracts, BlockWatchdog effectively detects truly exploitable reentrancy vulnerabilities by identifying reentrant call flow. Additionally, BlockWatchdog is capable of detecting new types of reentrancy vulnerabilities caused by poor designs when using ERC tokens or user-defined interfaces, which cannot be detected by current rule-based tools. We implement BlockWatchdog using cross-contract static dataflow techniques based on attack logic obtained from an empirical study that analyzes attacker contracts from 281 attack incidents. BlockWatchdog is evaluated on 421,889 Ethereum contract bytecodes and identifies 113 attacker contracts that target 159 victim contracts, leading to the theft of Ether and tokens valued at approximately 908.6 million USD. Notably, only 18 of the identified 159 victim contracts can be reported by current reentrancy detection tools.

Ahmed Alnaffar

This study delves into the escalating dynamics of the digital landscape in the Middle East, focusing on the pressing need for cybersecurity resilience amidst the rapid technological advancements and connectivity expansion. By analyzing the current state of cybersecurity, the burgeoning role and implications of cryptocurrency, and the transformative impact and inherent risks of Artificial Intelligence AI, the research identifies pivotal challenges and formulates strategic recommendations to fortify digital resilience and mitigate risks. It underscores the critical importance of adopting best practices in cybersecurity, ensuring secure cryptocurrency transactions, and establishing comprehensive AI governance frameworks. Through a synthesis of government and industry initiatives, case studies, and an exploration of regulatory environments, the study emphasizes the necessity for a collaborative, multifaceted approach involving policymakers, industry leaders, and researchers. The findings advocate for ongoing investment in technology, the development of robust legal and ethical frameworks, and international cooperation to navigate the complex digital ecosystem and safeguard the MiddleEasts digital future against emerging threats.

Alexander Mironov

Countering and combating manifestations of terrorism and extremism is an urgent and priority task for law enforcement agencies. These provisions underlie the national security of the state, and the fight against manifestations of this kind of crime rightfully deserves the most serious attention. The article presents the prerequisites for the use of cryptocurrencies for criminal purposes, based on the features of its functioning and use. The role of cryptocurrencies in the financing of terrorist and extremist activities in the current international financial and economic environment is indicated. The main problems that law enforcement agencies have to face in identifying and suppressing criminal activity, the financing of which can be organized with the help of cryptocurrencies, are reflected. Substantiated points of view are presented regarding the danger of the spread of cryptocurrencies in crimes of this direction, not only in relation to the Russian Federation, but also to the world community as a whole. The author presents statistical data of the indicated areas of crime and analyzes it. The results of a study by third-party organizations specializing in research in the field of cryptocurrencies are also presented and summarized. Examples of the use of cryptocurrencies to finance terrorist and extremist activities are noted. The ways of solving the presented problems are proposed, taking into account the mechanisms already proposed by scientists for preventing crimes using cryptocurrencies. In particular, the main emphasis is placed on the need to modernize the existing mechanisms of financial control and the reasonable involvement of representatives of large IT companies in this activity, since the main flow of information capable of exposing criminal activity is accumulated by them.

Seden Akcinaroglu, Moyan Shi

The nexus between economic motivations and terrorist activities has been extensively theorized, but existing explanations often overlook the contemporary shifts in terrorist financing ushered in by technological advancements. The advent of cryptocurrencies, with their hallmarks of anonymity, decentralization, liquidity, usability, and profitability, has bestowed upon terrorist groups new avenues for raising funds while remaining largely clandestine. This exploratory research delves into the repercussions of this digital financial realm, examining how Bitcoin popularity, price volatility, and regulatory frameworks influence the operational latitude of terrorist groups. Drawing on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) for terrorist attack data, coupled with Google Trends data on “bitcoin” searches from 2009 to 2020 as an indicator of cryptocurrency popularity in each country, the study uncovers a nuanced dynamic. While the rising prominence of cryptocurrencies subtly amplifies the operational sphere for terrorist outfits, the uncertain nature of Bitcoin prices as well as the legal and regulatory landscape act as deterrents.

Ali Fisher, Nico Prucha

The fronts on which groups such as the Islamic State wages the media war have evolved. The modus operandi of Salafi-Jihadi groups, such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda (AQ), means that they can appear to be degraded or in decline when closer inspection of their documents, written mainly in Arabic, shows that their operations and media strategy have evolved. The Islamic State uses dispersed forms of network organisation which constantly reconfigure, much like the way a swarm of bees or flock of birds constantly reorganizes mid-flight. This marks a shift from the broadcast models of communication during conflict to a new dispersed, fast moving, and resilient form, the user-curated ‘Swarmcast’. Through the Swarmcast, the Islamic State has continued to disseminate its set of coherent narratives expressed in tens of thousands of written documents and in thousands of professionally made audio visual productions. This chapter demonstrates the role Telegram and Web3 now play in the information ecosystem and media strategy employed by Salafi-Jihadi groups.

Shahad Al-Khalifa

In this research, we discussed a rising issue for Muslims in today world that involves a financial and technical innovation, namely: cryptocurrencies. We found out through a questionnaire that many Muslims are having a hard time finding the jurisprudence rulings on certain cryptocurrencies. Therefore, the objective of this research is to investigate and identify features that play a part in determining the jurisprudence rulings on cryptocurrencies. We have collected a dataset containing 106 cryptocurrencies classified into 56 Halal and 50 Haram cryptocurrencies, and used 20 handcrafted features. Moreover, based on these identified features, we designed an intelligent system that contains a Machine Learning model for classifying cryptocurrencies into Halal and Haram.

Idrus Idrus

The invention of the computer which was originally a calculating machine (Difference Engine no. 1) which was discovered by Charles Babbage (1791- 1871) is something very famous in the history of computer development and is the first automatic calculator. With the very rapid development of the digital world, in 1983 an American cryptography expert David Chaum used cryptographic electronic money called e-cash, and in 1995, he implemented it through Digichash, which became the initial form of collaboration between the digital world of computers and Money, which is a cryptographic electronic payment instrument that requires user software to pull notes from the bank and designate a specific encrypted key before it can be sent to the recipient. And in 1996, the NSA, namely the United States National Security Agency, which was founded by President Harry S. Truman on November 4, 1952, had the task and function of collecting and analyzing communications from other countries, as well as protecting information belonging to the United States. The agency published a paper entitled How to Make a Mint: The Cryptography of Anonymous Electronic Cash, describing the Crypto currency system that first published it on the MIT mailing list, later in 1997, in the journal The American Law Review (Vol. 46, Issue 4). It was these researches that eventually led the developers to start developing what is known today as blockchain which is basically a distributed open ledger to record transactions between two parties efficiently and in a verifiable and permanent way. The discovery of Bit coin in 2009 which was declared as electronic money was developed by an institution or individual who has the initials Satoshi Nakamoto, the technology used is using a peer to peer network without centralized storage so that verification can be done anywhere in the world anywhere that dedicates a computer, to do this or it is called mining. Since 2009 other coins and tokens have started to appear, as we can see on CoinMarketcap which has more than 6000 coins and tokens. The utilization and use of this technology is still being debated from the point of view of Muslims in Indonesia, as stated by Yenny Wahid in the activities carried out by the Islamic Law Firm (ILF), this is due to the uncertainty of the asset value which can change at any time.

Cemre Kadioglu

No abstract is available for this record.