I. Le NFT en droit : propos introductifsDfinitions du NFT.Il existe de nombreuses dfinitions doctrinales du NFT, lesquelles sont toutes plus ou moins interchangeables.Les NFT (Non Fungible Tokens, ou Jetons Non Fongibles en franais) sont des jetons numriques uniques et indivisibles certifis par une blockchain 1 .Certains auteurs proposent cependant des dfinitions fondes sur une approche technologique.Pour Monsieur Legeais, le NFT est un jeton enregistr dans la blockchain, comportant une suite de caractres alphanumriques rpondant aux rgles de la cryptographie.Ce jeton contient les mtadonnes permettant d'identifier son metteur et l'objet sous-jacent.Selon les rgles dfinies par celui qui a cr le NFT, le fichier vers lequel il renvoie devient donc grce lui unique.Le fichier reste duplicable l'infini, mais le NFT permet dsormais de crer un original cr et authentifi 2 .Rcemment, l' Administration fiscale a propos, certes pour rpondre une question pose en matire de TVA, une dfinition des NFT : Les jetons non fongibles (JNF), communment dnomms NFT en lien avec l'appellation anglaise non fungible tokens , sont des fichiers informatiques uniques, crs et stocks sur un registre numrique de suivi de transactions dnomm chaine de blocs ( blockchain ) 3 .Les NFT seraient ainsi d'aprs leurs caractristiques technologiques des jetons crs par smart contract et dont le propre serait d'tre uniques, donc non fongibles.La catgorie gnrale des jetons serait ainsi compose des jetons fongibles et des jetons non-fongibles.La question est cependant de savoir si les notions technologiques et juridiques de jetons se recoupent o si le droit s'autorise, dans la poursuite de ses objectifs propres, dvier de la technologie.Fongibilit, choses de genre, corps certains, choses fongibles.La fongibilit est une notion du droit des obligations qui s'appuie sur un couple de contraires en droit des biens : les corps certains et des choses de genre.Les choses de genre sont celles qui ne se dfinissent pas par leur individualit, mais par leur espce et leur quantit.Au sein d'un ensemble de choses de genre, chaque chose en vaut une autre.Cette identit se traduit, en droit des obligations, par l'indiffrence du crancier de choses de genre recevoir celles-ci plutt que celles-l.Dans l'excution de l'obligation, les choses de genre sont dites fongibles.Il ne faut cependant pas se mprendre sur la notion de fongibilit : elle ne dpend pas de l'absence d'individualit des choses, mais de l'indiffrence des parties un rapport d'obligation cette individualit. chaque fois que les parties voient les choses comme des quantits et non comme des individualits, il est possible de parler de 1 B. GLEIZE, L'irrsistible ascension des jetons non fongibles in Actualit du droit des technologies nouvelles (
Local taxes with fiscal power for local authorities arte gradually being dismantled by State tax reductions which lead to the abolition of these taxes. The financing of decentralization is therefore increasingly dependent on the sharing of national tax revenues. The impossibility of local fiscal autonomy prompts a rethinking of the complex fiscal relations between the State and local authorities. The re-creation of a local fiscal power would go through consultation and co-decision between the State and the local authorities but also, in particular, with the crisis of representative democracy, through a better association of local elected representatives and citizens. However, veticality today characterizes the relationships between these actors.
This chapter synthesizes practitioner and academic literature on LGBTQ organizing in the pracademic tradition. It analyzes the ways that advocates, activists and allies âqueer it upâ and harness digiqueer resistance through participatory and policy advocacy against challenges to diverse LGBTQ expression. This includes new rituals of LGBTQ organizing through hashtag activism, crowdfunding advocacy, philanthropy through non-fungible tokens, and the continued commodification of LGBTQ identity through ecommerce for advocacy and allyship. The chapter considers where LGBTQ networked expression sits within the digital organizing landscape. On one level, political insecurity through the âhate feedback loopâ keeps LGBTQ organizers in the policy âtrenchesâ as they maintain the fight for basic relationship, expression and conduct rights that the general public might take for granted. On another level, increased recognition of LGBTQ expression through popular culture, relationship rights such as same-sex marriage, and social networks sees a related expansion of the social imagination of homosexuality as identity rather than conduct across health and welfare, religion, securitization, markets, nationalism, a sense of belonging, and other identifiers.
Jeremiah Hurley, Deborah Milinkovic, David Feeny, G. Emmanuel Guindon · 6 authors
Social finance offers innovative ways to finance solutions to many of societyâs most challenging problems by attracting private investments that create both financial returns for investors and desired social and environmental impacts. Community Foundations of Canada (CFC) is working with sector partners to develop a social-finance platform called Outcomes Canada (OC) to facilitate community-driven social finance. Many community initiatives face significant capacity challenges and resourcing gaps. At present, community initiatives bear the burden of navigating a highly decentralized financing ecosystem to secure funding and other support needed to build their capacity and achieve desired outcomes. At the same time, governments, social financiers, philanthropists, and academics seek to find and support community initiatives that are producing results. This gap reflects the need for new tools, innovative financing vehicles and streamlined approaches to support community-driven outcomes in Canada.
Today, the problem of cities local finances and their governance, is at the heart of major national debates and reforms, as well as major concerns in all countries where decentralization continues and aims to strengthen the autonomy and competences of local administrations. The mobilization of local fiscal potential is a fundamental condition for promoting sustainable urban development. Despite the efforts made, local Moroccan finance, like most developing countries, does not escape an absolute reality: The scarcity of the resource. The weakness of local resources in Morocco is more related to the real low level of local tax deduction than to the economic poverty of local authorities. Many sectors of the economy have very little or no tax, while property taxes does not contribute enough to local economic activity. This article uses the case of Morocco to analyze the challenges and failures of local finances in general, and of local taxation in particular. We also discuss the tools to promote the financing of cities to promote sustainable urban development in Morocco.
In the last decade, ICT infrastructures for smart cities have become a reality and the number of projects affecting citizens' lives is growing. In particular, the technology supporting civic participation is mature, although many systems do not reach the needed critical mass, as they are not able to capture the interest of their intended target. To overcome this difficulty, we describe a proposal for encouraging citizens' participation by a reward mechanism based on a civic currency, powered by blockchain tokens, used to recognize civic engagement.
This article examines the assumption that recent reforms in social and public services can be understood as a transition from New Public Management to post-New Public Management. English and French social housing delivery are selected as two cases in which to test out this assumption, for ostensibly these delivery structures share significant cross-national, post-NPM similarities â a movement towards a more âenablingâ or steering role for central government, the creation of coordinating agencies, âdecentralizationâ initiatives, the extensive use of publicâprivate arrangements to finance social housing and the involvement of a wide range of extra- and semi-governmental organizations. However, further investigation reveals that these reforms of delivery structures have not been predominantly driven by an unfolding post-NPM managerial or governance logic as the thesis assumes. Rather the reforms have been driven by the partisan electoral and ideological goals of central government policymakers within the context of institutional legacies and entrenched social values. Points for practitioners New Public Management and post-New Public Management have become the conventional wisdom on administrative reforms particularly in a comparative context. This article argues that these ideas reflect an impoverished understanding of public administration given that they assume that change occurs predominantly through the unfolding of managerial and/or governance logics. These logics exclude the critical role of the political parties and other socio-political factors, such as urban unrest, in driving change. This Anglo-French analysis of social housing delivery demonstrates the significance of these political factors in how policymakers define social problems, re-design and implement social housing service delivery systems.
Key points The year 2014 witnessed the advent of new and strengthened collective action clauses (CACs) in foreign law sovereign bonds. These new clauses hold the promise to significantly strengthen the orderliness and predictability of the contractual market-based framework for the sovereign debt-restructuring process. This article looks at how these new CACs came about. The new CACs were borne from a process undertaken by an informal âSovereign Debt Roundtableâ grouping that was convened, chaired and strategically led by US Treasury staff over more than one-and-a-half years. The inclusiveness of the Roundtable, the deliberative process, which was followed and the leadership and backing of the official community were integral to bringing about the private sector and success. The Roundtableâs deliberations built heavily upon earlier Treasury work to advance CACs, in particular during the 2002â2004 period. But the new clauses go further than the bond-by-bond clauses that were the focus from 2002 to 2004, as they allow in certain defined conditions the votes of different bond issues to be aggregated into a single up or down vote on the issuersâ restructuring proposal. In this regard, the new clauses reflect the continuity in the US approach under the Bush and Obama Administrations to promoting an orderly and predictable sovereign debt-restructuring process based upon the contractual framework, in addition to US opposition to statutory approaches. But they also represent innovation under the Obama Administration in advancing and buttressing the US approach. ⊠in order to strengthen the orderliness and predictability of the sovereign debt restructuring process, we welcome the international work on strengthened collective action and pari passu clauses. We call for their inclusion in international sovereign bonds and encourage the international community and private sector to actively promote their use. G20 Leadersâ Communique; Brisbane, Australia; 16 November 2014 We welcome Mexicoâs leadership with its successful issuance of a bond with new and innovative collective actions clauses under New York law. These new clauses will strengthen the sovereign debt restructuring process, and we encourage other nations to follow suit. Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew, 19 November 2014 We look forward to upcoming discussions around the International Capital Market Associationâs (ICMA) proposal on possible means to reinforce collective action clauses in sovereign bonds⊠G20 Finance Ministers; Cairns, Australia; 21 September 2014 ⊠ICMA recently published revised collective action clauses for sovereign debt that permit more orderly workouts and lower the chance of spillovers. These clauses ⊠now allow for aggregation across many different debt issues, avoiding the need to vote on each loan one by one. John B. Taylor, Wall Street Journal, 9 July 2015 The late autumn of 2014 witnessed the advent of new and strengthened collective action clauses (CACs) in foreign law sovereign bonds. These new clauses hold the promise to significantly strengthen the orderliness and predictability of the contractual market-based framework for the sovereign debt-restructuring process. They were born from a process that was convened, chaired and strategically led by Treasury staff over more than one to one-and-a-half years. 1 The group working on the new clauses included issuing country representatives, inter alia from Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil and Turkey; leading UK and US sovereign debt legal experts; an array of market participants and academics; other official actors, including from France, the UK and Germany; and the IMF. In particular, this informal âSovereign Debt Roundtableâ grouping also included Mexicoâs debt manager and representatives from the London-based International Capital Markets Association (ICMA), an association representing some 500 firms from the international financial community, among others. The inclusiveness of the Roundtable, the deliberative process, which was followed and the leadership and backing of the official community were integral to bringing along the private sector and success. The Roundtableâs deliberations built heavily upon earlier Treasury work to advance CACs, in particular during the 2002â2004 period. But the new clauses go further than the bond-by-bond clauses that were the focus from 2002 to 2004, as they allow, in certain defined conditions, the votes of different bond issuers to be aggregated into a single up or down vote on the issuersâ restructuring proposal. In this regard, the new clauses reflect the continuity in the US approach under the Bush and Obama Administrations to promoting an orderly and predictable sovereign debt-restructuring process based upon the contractual framework, in addition to US opposition to statutory approaches. But they also represent innovation under the Obama Administration in advancing and buttressing the US approach. The US Treasury, in a speech by the then Under Secretary John B Taylor, outlined its support for the decentralized, market-oriented contractual approach to sovereign debt restructuring in 2002. 2 Around that time, a G-10 working group, chaired by Randal K Quarles, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, and including leading sovereign debt lawyers, began work on developing CACs for inclusion in foreign law sovereign bonds. 3 In 2003, building on the âQuarles Reportâ, Mexico launched the first CACs pursuant to New York law. Mexicoâs issuance solved the first mover problem, there was no observable pricing impact, and CACs overnight became the norm in the New York market. 4 Importantly, though, the CACs applied only to each individual bond. During this period, the IMF advocated a statutory approach to sovereign debt restructuring. The Fund in essence reasoned that in a domestic setting, all unsecured creditors were bound into the restructuring deal through the bankruptcy process. Since there was no analogous international mechanism to bind similarly placed creditors into the restructuring through a single vote, there was a gap in the global financial architecture that should be filled through the creation of a âSovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanismâ (SDRM). 5 Treasury was sceptical that the SDRM could be made to work in practice. There were concerns about politicization of the mechanism. There were questions about the possible impact on official debt. There was no appetite for pursuing an international agreement that could result in a supranational body having the authority to supplant core US sovereign decision making or judicial authority. There was the basic judgement that there would be little Congressional support for any amendment to the IMF Articles needed to implement SDRM. In contrast, the advent of CACs offered the promise that the contractual framework could be used to better mimic domestic bankruptcy proceedings and bind creditors. In 2012, two important developments occurred, raising questions about the continued viability of the contractual framework to promote the orderliness and predictability of the sovereign debt-restructuring process and giving rise in some quarters to renewed calls for re-consideration of SDRM or statutory approaches more generally. These developments, left unaddressed, also had important implications for New Yorkâs continued role as a major financial centre for the issuance of foreign law bonds. Long-standing debates about the meaning of the â pari passu â clause in sovereign law bonds were underscored in judicial rulings. Many sovereign debt lawyers had long felt that the pari passu clause simply meant that the legal ranking of an instrument was equal (and not subordinate) to a borrowerâs other debt instruments. Others, for over a decade through a novel interpretation of the clause, contended borrowers could be compelled to pay all of their obligations on a ratable basis. With US federal court rulings in New York supporting the latter interpretation, clearly the meaning of the â pari passu â clause could no longer be considered settled. 6 Importantly, these legal challenges were not arising in the context of just one country; rather, there had been a substantial increase in creditor litigation over the past two decades impacting countries across the globe. 7 While bond-by-bond CACs had become the market practice in New York since 2003, the limits of this âper seriesâ approach became clear in the case of the Greek debt exchange. Of the 36 bond issuances governed by English law that included CACs and could partake in the debt exchange, only 17 were successfully restructured using CACs, accounting for 30 of the total value of Greek debt governed by foreign law. 8 In early 2013, against the background of these emerging questions about the ability of the contractual framework to continue delivering orderly and predictable outcomes, as well as renewed interest in statutory approaches, especially in the United Nations, Treasury staff convened a roundtable of governmental and private sector experts and interested parties to discuss potential changes to clauses in sovereign bond contracts. The effort was premised on the US retaining its long-standing reservations about statutory approaches, and instead examining what changes in the â pari passu clauseâ and in âbond aggregationâ could strengthen and impart renewed vigour to the contractual framework. Equally, the effort was premised on seeking pragmatic, targeted and concrete results, but not engaging in a meta-debate about broad strategic or conceptual approaches. At the outset, Treasury staff made clear that the USA did not support work on statutory approaches. For their part, the IMF representatives also made clear that the Fund had no intention of pursuing work on statutory approaches and it would be regardless infeasible to do so without the full support of the institutionâs Executive Board, including major shareholders. At a kick-off meeting in April 2013, on the margins of the IMF/World Bank Spring Meetings, the Roundtable launched into a discussion of the evolution of the sovereign debt-restructuring process over the prior decade, recent â pari passu â litigation and its implications and how âaggregation clausesâ could be used to help overcome some of the problems posed by bond-by-bond voting and increased creditor litigation. Private sector participants discussed how recent court â pari passu â rulings could complicate the sovereign debt-restructuring process and how â pari passu â language had taken on many disparate forms in contracts over the years. They were concerned about the consequences of the âratable paymentsâ interpretation of the pari passu clause for the majority of creditors. With respect to aggregation features, there was a lengthy discussion of the Greek restructuring, and a view that the Greek foreign law bond restructuring was far less successful, because of the bond-by-bond collective action feature, than the Greek domestic law-governed bond restructuring. Some participants advocated developing ideas on aggregation across foreign law sovereign bonds so that there could be one vote to modify an entire series of bonds. However, it was also underscored that developing aggregation features could have important implications for inter-creditor equity considerations. Against this background, a number of key points were agreed at the meeting, in turn charting the path forward for the Roundtable: Modifications to contractual clauses should be developed to address the emerging issues that had complicated the sovereign debt-restructuring process. Clarity was needed on pari passu clauses to dispel confusion and provide legal certainty. The clause should be seen as an âequal rankingâ clause; the âratable paymentsâ interpretation of the clause was not the intended meaning. Aggregation features in bonds, especially aimed at allowing one vote to modify a series of foreign law bonds, could represent a useful innovation to enhance the restructuring process, provided that strong safeguards were also incorporated to protect the rights of all creditors. At a second meeting in October 2013, again on the margins of the semi-annual IMF/World Bank meetings, the Roundtable reconvened to continue its discussions on pari passu clauses and aggregation. The group reviewed an options paper on the â pari passu clauseâ. 9 In the end, the Roundtable reached several conclusions on the pari passu clause and narrowed down consideration to two of the options, both of which were seen as offering a plausible path forward: There was concern that the clause had resulted in significant litigation over the past decade, complicating the sovereign debt-restructuring process, and that the likelihood was for continued increases in creditor litigation in coming years. Several lawyers in the Roundtable in particular felt that given the confusion raised by the clause over the years and its uncertain meaning, the pari passu clause should be simply eliminated from bond contracts. However, others questioned whether market participants would readily accept elimination of the clause, and thus proposed retaining a rewritten version that disavowed the ratable payments interpretation of the clause. They pointed to market inertia as well as noted that retaining such a modified version of the clause would still protect against the risk of involuntary legal subordination. Participants agreed that the Roundtable needed to come to a consensus on pari passu to provide a basis for market acceptability for a first mover. The discussions on aggregation, in contrast, entered more of an exploratory realm. The Roundtable agreed that a key policy goal of constructing an aggregation framework was to reduce the scope for obtaining blocking positions, provide the sovereign with greater flexibility and at the same time protect against possible abuse or oppression of the minority by sovereigns. While there was wide acceptance of the concept of aggregation in principle, it was also recognized that to achieve these goals, there were numerous design details to be worked out with consequential legal ramifications and an enormous bearing on market acceptability. In wrapping up the second meeting, the Roundtable agreed to further pursue the one-limb option and its requisite features and come to a conclusion on the future of the pari passu clause. The IMF also expressed interest in pursuing further work on the contractual framework, using the Roundtableâs work as a foundation to inform its activities. An initial discussion focused on whether to use a âone limbâ aggregated voting structure, or a âtwo limbâ structure with an aggregated and a per series vote. Several European officials supported a âtwo limbâ structure as this approach had already been enshrined in the ESM treaty, developed and adopted within the euro-area. The rest of the Roundtable wished to explore whether a suitable âone limbâ framework could be developed, and felt an appropriate aggregation clause could further reduce incentives for creditor litigation. 10 One participant offered the insight that an important feature of a one-limb aggregation structure was that it would lessen the chances that a creditorâthat might wish to vote against the proposal, but be willing to accept it should the requisite majority decide to do soâwould âaccidentallyâ be kept out of the restructuring. The Roundtable began to delve into the kinds of protections that would be essential to protect against abuse of the minority. Most significantly, the Roundtable agreed that there should be a high voting threshold for one-limb aggregation, and that all participants in an aggregated vote should be treated the same. Participants also agreed that the scope of aggregated debt should be confined to foreign law sovereign bonds, and thus differ from the European CAC framework, which did not differentiate between foreign and domestic law bonds. In discussions in early 2014, including conference calls, and at a third meeting in April, the Roundtable reviewed a model aggregation clause 11 and bore down on achieving concrete results. In wrapping up this meeting, the Roundtable also welcomed ICMAâs proposal to develop model pari passu and aggregation language and conduct a public consultation. 12 To address the question of which pari passu option to pursue and given the view that eliminating the clause might not be seen as acceptable by all market participants, the Roundtable agreed to back model pari passu language that disavowed the ratable payments interpretation. The Roundtable further agreed that aggregation, allowing for a single cross-series vote with strong safeguards, along with a bond-by-bond restructuring option, would help promote the orderliness and predictability of the sovereign debt-restructuring process. With respect to safeguards, it was agreed that: âvoting thresholdsâ should be set at a level which an aggregated cross-series modification vote could only succeed with the support of a large super-majority (ultimately 75 per cent of the eligible outstanding principal); single-limb aggregation would be limited to âbonds governed by foreign lawâ (outside of the euro-area, which retained its two-limb structure for foreign and domestic bonds); âuniform applicabilityâ would provide for an identical offer requirement for any cross-series vote; ârobust disenfranchisement provisionsâ would exclude bonds controlled by the issuer from the vote; and âenhanced transparency and information disclosureâ would be required such that the issuer would need to disclose its overall restructuring plan, including its proposed treatment of other groups of creditors and claims, as part of its offer. In subsequent months, ICMAâs model clauses became the new market standard. The IMF staff proposed to prepare a staff paper for the IMF Executive Board to endorse the key features of the model pari passu and aggregation language. 13 The third and last meeting of the Roundtable was by no means the end of the process. It was critical to develop a strong legal and market consensus behind the new clauses in order for a âfirst moverâ to move without facing market turbulence. Roundtable participants dedicated themselves to this task over the course of the remainder of the an initial and ICMA of proposed model clauses was provided to Roundtable participants for to market participants and their While the of the ICMA model clauses were the same for both the New York and were required to to the of each market. In the of information about the new clauses and their were with leading sovereign debt legal in both New York and Treasury staff also with market In particular, staff with representatives in a series of with of the New emerging market and and also reached out to several London-based Roundtable participants also with debt in potential emerging market sovereign bond issuing especially that had not in the working The IMF an role as The were by IMF staff in a series of and discussions with public debt the basis of a paper in large part by the of the the IMF Board also in the of 2014 the use of modified pari passu clauses in new international sovereign bonds so as to enhance legal and across The Board noted the broad support of for CACs with aggregation features, and in particular considered the limbâ clause with appropriate safeguards along the of forward in the model ICMA clauses as a significant to the sovereign debt-restructuring process. In addition to the IMF the of the market-based contractual framework also the strong of the official The of the G20 Finance and Bank meeting in Cairns, in as well as the G20 Leadersâ in in both the strengthened 16 Most significantly, countries began to sovereign bonds with the new clauses. In particular, Mexico in around the time of the the first public offering with the strengthened CACs under New York in bonds strong and in the in the same leadership as in 2003, the issuance with new CACs the first mover and no pricing impact Mexicoâs issuance was by the of its Finance debt in the Around this time, many other countries from of the followed in was the first mover at the global leading the in the market. While the advent of the new CACs a major it not a and work to be to strengthen the contractual framework. The inclusion of new CACs in bonds will address the future of sovereign but it will not address the large outstanding noted by the that and it will 10 years for per cent to This process could be by Some market participants to be possible The of the new CACs so far been strong in the New York which a in which have more of an and been strong but not as but especially for the market. 17 Several issuers have it to thus over or raising in several than the more work and of a new global But in time, such countries will use new the new clauses. already this continue in some quarters about whether the of a restructuring should be through the required use of a structure, including one in which the to a and pay its This was not by the Roundtable, which was focused from the on in two pari passu and Some country representatives, especially at the United Nations, continue to for of a statutory the statutory approach little support in the IMF and and been by the USA and the key in which over of foreign law bond issuance of the new CACs the of the contractual framework and again work on statutory approaches to be needed or in financial policy The recent of CACs through the of the meaning of the pari passu clause and the advent of single-limb aggregation with strong creditor protections a of the of the international financial time and work needed for the new CACs to their full potential in the orderliness and predictability of the sovereign debt-restructuring process. in a of time, the strengthened CACs already a part of the international financial and have the of the contractual framework, the foundation for which was in the early US Treasury staff and a international in which all up their to of new
Struggles over what a region receives, or should receive, from the budget of the central government are common to many countries. Discussions often focus on the measures of ânet fiscal flowsâ or âfiscal balancesâ provided by the government or other actors. This unique book shows just how these flows are computed then interpreted and clarifies the often misunderstood economic and political motives that explain why some regions receive more monies than others.
This article proposes a secondary analysis of data collected on four French cities as part of an European research project, entitled "Rescaling Social Welfare Policies. A Comparative Study on the Path towards Multi-level Governance in Europe". The field-work provided a profusion of data on the so-called "2nd wave of decentralization" (2004-2005) that hardly fit into the standardized frame designed for international comparisons. It appears that this territorial re-organization combines opposite movements depending on the point of view adopted (bottom-up or top-down) and the type of public action considered (planning, funding, defining eligibility criteria etc.). The rescaling processes that occurred within the four field-sites have ambiguous effects as regards regulation. On the one hand, theoretically speaking, they turn market competition into an attractive model. But, on the other hand, they have practical implications (limited market size and lack of expertise within local governments for example) which prevent this autonomous mechanism of regulation from achieving efficiency. This finally induces constant bargaining which leads case managers to using informal procedures in the selection of beneficiaries within the official target population and give rise to disparities in access to welfare programs across the four field-sites but also within each site depending on the institutional entry point.