Blockchain Papers

Januarius Asongu

The Ambazonian conflict in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions has unfolded within an era defined by mobile connectivity, social media, and digitally mediated political contention. This article examines the role of mobile technology in shaping the conflict’s trajectory from early mobilization to prolonged armed stalemate. It argues that mobile technology functioned as both an enabling and destabilizing force: facilitating mass mobilization, diaspora coordination, documentation of abuses, and digital finance, while simultaneously accelerating fragmentation, disinformation, cybersecurity exposure, and state surveillance. Drawing on comparative cases including the Arab Spring, ISIS, Ukraine, Ethiopia, and Myanmar, the article situates Ambazonia within broader patterns of digital contention and digital authoritarian response. The analysis further demonstrates how ungoverned digital visibility and decentralized online fundraising undermined strategic coherence and legitimacy. The article concludes that while mobile technology can amplify resistance, it cannot substitute for political legitimacy, institutional coherence, or negotiated settlement. Durable peace requires a transition from networked resistance to normatively grounded frameworks such as the Alliance for Peace and Justice (APJ) Peace Plan.

Nicolin Decker

No abstract is available for this record.

Sixbert Sangwa, Emmanuel Ekosse, Isaac Museveni, Simeon Nsabiyumva

This study investigates how decentralized, industry-linked learning hubs can address Africa’s enduring higher education challenges of access, affordability, and employability. It proposes a scalable framework combining the African Leadership University (ALU)’s multi-city model with the Community Services Association (CSA) Rwanda’s district-based learning ecosystem. The study is guided by three research questions: RQ1: What systemic enablers support the diffusion of industry-linked university hubs in Africa? RQ2: What key barriers limit diffusion, and how do they vary across countries? RQ3: How can proven models (e.g., ALU, CSA) be adapted and costed for scale? (2)Methodology. A qualitative comparative analysis was conducted using 35 high-credibility secondary sources filtered via a PRISMA-adapted protocol from an initial 245 records (2010–2025). Four cases—ALU, CSA, Ashesi University, and UNICAF—were analyzed through the lenses of Diffusion of Innovation, Triple Helix, and Experiential Learning theory. Although the study relies exclusively on secondary sources, we applied light-touch text-mining in MAXQDA: policy documents were tokenised, stop-words removed, and coded with an unsupervised LDA algorithm (k = 6) to surface latent themes that triaged sources for qualitative comparative analysis; no clustering or association-rule modelling was undertaken. Visual tools—including causal-loop diagrams, scorecards, and a Gantt-style scale-up roadmap—supported synthesis. (3) Findings. Five core enablers emerged: policy alignment, institutional autonomy, Triple Helix linkages, diversified finance, and contextualized curricula. Barriers included regulatory rigidity, funding fragility, governance gaps, and digital divides. The proposed Pan-African Learning Hub Framework blends ALU’s experiential pedagogy with CSA’s grassroots model, enabling vertical progression from district-level cooperatives to regional research hubs. A three-year scale-up plan (USD 400–4,000 per student/year) suggests viability under flexible policy conditions. (4) Research Limitations / Implications. Secondary-data reliance constrains causal attribution and excludes francophone/North African contexts. Field validation and financial modeling are recommended for future work. (5) Practical Implications. Policymakers and institutions can use this framework to pilot scalable, employment-linked hubs without constructing new campuses. (6) Originality / Value. This is the first study to align Africa-wide policy ambitions with operational design and costing of university-linked hub models.

Donald P. Brutzman, Curtis Blais, Hsin-Fu Wu

This research in Ethical Control of Unmanned Systems applies precepts of Network Optional Warfare (NOW) to develop a three-step Mission Execution Ontology (MEO) methodology for validating, simulating, and implementing mission orders for unmanned systems. First, mission orders are represented in ontologies that are understandable by humans and readable by machines. Next, the MEO is validated and tested for logical coherence using Semantic Web standards. The validated MEO is refined for implementation in simulation and visualization. This process is iterated until the MEO is ready for implementation. This methodology is applied to four Naval scenarios in order of increasing challenges that the operational environment and the adversary impose on the Human-Machine Team. The extent of challenge to Ethical Control in the scenarios is used to refine the MEO for the unmanned system. The research also considers Data-Centric Security and blockchain distributed ledger as enabling technologies for Ethical Control. Data-Centric Security is a combination of structured messaging, efficient compression, digital signature, and document encryption, in correct order, for round-trip messaging. Blockchain distributed ledger has potential to further add integrity measures for aggregated message sets, confirming receipt/response/sequencing without undetected message loss. When implemented, these technologies together form the end-to-end data security that ensures mutual trust and command authority in real-world operational environments—despite the potential presence of interfering network conditions, intermittent gaps, or potential opponent intercept. A coherent Ethical Control approach to command and control of unmanned systems is thus feasible. Therefore, this research concludes that maintaining human control of unmanned systems at long ranges of time-duration and distance, in denied, degraded, and deceptive environments, is possible through well-defined mission orders and data security technologies. Finally, as the human role remains essential in Ethical Control of unmanned systems, this research recommends the development of an unmanned system qualification process for Naval operations, as well as additional research prioritized based on urgency and impact.

Aharon Klieman

In crusading against traditional nineteenth century statecraft, Woodrow Wilson always made a point of condemning in the strongest terms possible the basic immorality of secret diplomacy. Foreign relations have always featured ambiguity and risk, but never to the present extent. Nuclear diplomacy deals with grave uncertainty, where so much depends on a mix of situational and motivational factors. Policymakers, to be sure, insist there are valid reasons for maintaining secrecy. Freedom of action must be preserved where national security is at stake. Military-strategic affairs involve the greatest sensitivity. Governments are charged with having an inordinate passion for secrecy. Diplomatic accords may indeed be made public in the end, but only after secret channels and perhaps unorthodox, devious means were used to achieve them. In the absence of conclusive empirical proof one way or the other, semi-private diplomacy-the combination of secret and public-can be given neither unqualified endorsement nor blanket rejection at present.

André Luis Leite F. Sales, Flávio Fernandes Fontes, Silvio Yasui

Even though "militancy" is frequently used in scientifi c literature and in the daily life of parties and social movements, there are few defi nitions of the term. Our goal is to convert the idea of militancy into a research problem. A Brazilian scientifi c literature review shows that the term is used either as an adjective, either as a noun. We conceptualize militancy as a methodology to produce collective action aiming to intervene, or to interfere, in current social norms. This methodology focuses on organizations such as parties and unions, characterized by strict discipline that aims to produce docility, commitment, and obeisance. Then, we show how New Social Movements (NSM) have created unconventional tactics and organizations, offering an alternative to the militant methodology. Organizing teams using horizontal arrangements, operating with decentralized and autonomous networks, recognizing the diversity of its participants, NSM are occupying the streets and reinventing the repertoires of collective action and protest. We suggest the use of the word "activism" to describe this methodology. By distinguishing militancy from activism we wish to re(frame) some problems in the Brazilian scene of political engagement and protest.

Steffen Eckhard

Focusing on German and EU support with assisting local police reform in the context of international peacebuilding in Afghanistan since 2001, this article scrutinizes whether the two organizations exhibit a strategic fit between their policy mandate and the design of management tasks. Comparison of two vastly different institutions - Germany, a nation state, and the EU, an international organization - sheds analytical light on the way different bodies manage a similar policy problem. By way of empirical research, the paper finds that incremental planning, decentralization and autonomous leadership enhance performance as they enable peacebuilders to respond flexibly to the dynamic challenges they face in the field. This was the case with Germany, however not with the EU. No strategic fit prevailed on evaluation. Strategy review either failed (Germany) or had unintended consequences (EU).

Isobel Roele

I INTRODUCTION The principle of subsidiarity has a logic of legitimacy that strives to allocate responsibility at the national level in order to bring decisionmaking closer to those affected by it. Legitimacy is not the only reason for allocating competence to the national level. In some cases, such as the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) schemes to prevent terrorist financing and the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear (CBN) weapons, decisions about where to allocate responsibility are made for reasons of effectiveness. Treating these security threats as weakest-link goods, (1) the UNSC has aimed to decenter the administration of collective security away from itself by harnessing individual nation-states so as to create a completely regulated international sphere in which terrorists and proliferators are starved of means and opportunities to perpetrate attacks. In pursuit of this goal, the UNSC has sought to create shared frameworks for action by carving out a new quasi-legislative power. In an attempt to quell criticism of this move, the UNSC reassured states that they will retain national control over the implementation of their obligations, thereby satisfying the principle of subsidiarity. In effect, however, subsidiarity has been sidelined by the UNSC's strategy of implementation. The UNSC's strategy employs disciplinary power to generate an infra-law at the level of technical detail and to normalize states according to it. (2) Discipline shares the UNSC's logic of effectiveness and subsidiarity's preference for national responsibility, but it operates below the surface of the formal law and out of the reach of subsidiarity. It offers a notion of national responsibility shorn of national control. The argument proceeds as follows. Subsidiarity's logic of legitimacy is briefly considered in part II, which concentrates on the logic of effectiveness underlying the UNSC's schemes. The disparity between the open-textured norms on the face of the UNSC's quasi-legislative resolutions and the disciplinary work of its subsidiary bodies is the focus of part III. The Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) recommendations on money laundering and terrorist financing are shown to constitute disciplinary infra-law of the legislative resolutions in part IV, which also offers an illustration of discipline's negative effect on national control. A. Logics of Effectiveness and Legitimacy Whereas the principle of subsidiarity has a logic of legitimacy, the UNSC's approach to the prevention of terrorist financing and CBN proliferation has a logic of effectiveness. These logics are incompatible. The UNSC's reasoning is totalizing; it treats the international realm as a bounded space that transnational threats cannot escape as they can the boundaries of nation-states. If this bounded space can be controlled, then, the logic continues, it may be possible to deprive terrorists and proliferators of the conditions they need to succeed, such as financial support, manpower, open borders, lax import-export controls, and corrupt or incompetent criminal-justice systems. The Council has framed the problem of preventing these threats as a weakest link good that makes every gap, deficiency, and malpractice a potential, however remote, impediment to achieving a totally regulated space and thereby preventing international terrorism and CBN proliferation. (3) Achieving this in practice is no easy task. The UNSC cannot regulate the international realm on its own, as it is dependent on UN member states to carry out its decisions. (4) Given this setup and the UNSC's unrepresentative post-World War II composition, it has adopted a strategy of using UN member states as nodes in a decentralized scheme of administering the entire international-- not global--space. Total regulation of aspects of this space is needed to deprive terrorists and proliferators of means of operation and opportunities to operate. …

Steffen Eckhard

Shifting back to a broader perspective, this chapter compares the answer the book’s four case studies provide for the question: How does variation in institutional designs affect peacebuilding outcomes? The answer falls into two parts. First, comparison of the four missions’ performance shows that EU peace operations—characterized by centralization and a high degree of headquarters supervision—perform worse than the two other missions with relatively decentralized and more autonomous operations. Given Afghanistan’s status as a least-likely case for successful peacebuilding, explaining the failure of operations in this context is a less compelling ‘puzzle’ per se. In Kosovo, however, the negative impact of institutional design becomes more clear. As the case of EULEX Kosovo demonstrates, even when all external conditions are ostensibly ideal, poor organizational design and performance can still prevent meaningful progress in police reform. The second set of findings pertains to the performance of differently designed bureaucracies. The case studies’ inductive analysis yielded four hypotheses, relating to specific methods of mission planning, implementation frameworks, leadership styles, and evaluation systems. Comparison of Germany and the two international organizations further suggests that bureaucracies with ‘complex’ principals require different institutional designs than their domestic counterparts. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Radim Tobolka

No abstract is available for this record.

Murenzi Emmanuel

The Government of Rwanda has adopted many policies for her governance processes. Of the many policies, the Decentralization policy, for purposes of this research project, was taken as a case study. The Policy was adopted on the 26th May 2000 for Rwanda’s various governance approaches. Thirteen years down the road, as evidenced by 100% of all respondents. Some of them include limited finance, poor coordination, poor human resource capacities to mention but a few. More will be discussed in details. The decentralization policy was chosen because it crosscuts all sectors and therefore its ineffective implementation affects all other policies. The researcher took a census of all the 63 employees of the Rwanda Governance Board because this is generally a small number and the researcher tried to have every one respond to questionnaires. The RGB has the overall oversight function of policy implementation not only of the decentralization policy but of all other governance policies and was therefore considered best case study for this reason. The researcher used the descriptive research design. The study was guided by both a general objective and specific objectives. With the general objective, the researcher assessed the hurdles encountered in policy implementation and efficiency in decentralization. With the specific objectives; the research firstly identified the hurdles to policy implementation and efficiency in decentralization, secondly; to determine the efficient strategies toward policy implementation and thirdly; to explore the different policies governing public institutions. Data was collected from respondents to help understand why to date there are yet hurdles in policy implementation and efficiency in decentralization. Findings will be useful to many stakeholders in a number of ways; the academia, the public, learning institutions, and non-government stakeholders. Government will use the findings for appropriate decision making to address the hurdles further. They will also be a basis for further research. In order to ensure policy implementation and efficiency in decentralization, it was therefore recommended that the government increases the funding in public institutions, consider various stake holder participation, increase financial resources, capacity building, and also increased coordination and monitoring to mention but a few.

Joshua Landis

Will President Bashar al-Asad make it to 2013? Chances are he will. Despite his regime's rapid loss of legit-imacy, its growing isolation and tanking economy, no countervailing force has yet emerged that can take it down. Many opposition and foreign leaders are predicting that the regime will fall within months. Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Riad al-Shaqfa stated that Bashar would fall “in the next few months.”1 The U.S. State Department has called President Asad a “dead man walking.” Israel's defense minister has insisted that Asad will fall in a matter of weeks. Certainly, the revolutionary process that began to sweep the Middle East a year ago is powerful; most Syrians want change, and many are willing to fight for freedom and dignity. One cannot envision the Asad family retaining power in the long run; all the same, predictions of its rapid demise may be wishful thinking. Four elements are important in assessing the regime's chances of surviving to 2013: its own strengths, the opposition's weaknesses, the chances of foreign intervention, and the impact of sanctions and economic decline. First, let's place the regime in regional perspective. The Asads stand atop the last minoritarian regime in the Levant and thus seem destined to fall in this age of popular revolt. When they do, the postcolonial era will draw to a final close. Following World War II, minorities took control in every Levant state, thanks to colonial divide-and-rule tactics and the fragmented national community that bedeviled the states of the region. It is estimated that, due to their over-recruitment by the French Mandate authorities, Alawis already by the mid-1950s constituted some 65 percent of all noncommissioned officers in the Syrian military.2 Within a decade, they took control of the military leadership and, with it, Syria itself.3 Unique among the Levant states was Palestine, where the Jewish minority was able to transform itself into the majority at the expense of Palestine's Muslims. Neither the Christians of Lebanon nor the Sunnis of Iraq were so lucky or ambitious. Nevertheless, both clung to power at the price of dragging their countries into lengthy civil wars. The Lebanese war lasted 15 years; the Iraqi struggle between Shiites and Sunnis, while shorter, has yet to be entirely resolved. The Alawis of Syria seem determined to repeat this violent plunge to the bottom. It is hard to determine whether this is due to the rapaciousness of a corrupt elite, to the bleak prospects that the Alawi community faces in a post-Asad Syria, or to the weak faith that many in the region place in democracy and power-sharing formulas. Whatever the reason, Syria's transition away from minority rule is likely to be lengthy and violent. Even though the Alawis make up a mere 12 percent of the total population, the regime continues to count on support from other minorities who fear Islamists coming to power and from important segments of the Sunni population who fear civil war. The Asads have been planning for this day of popular insurrection all their lives. Hafiz al-Asad did not make the mistake of Hosni Mubarak, allowing his sons to go into private business, while leaving the military in the hands of others, who ultimately turned against him. The Asads were less trusting, and for good reason. Syria's urban Sunnis looked at the Alawis as interloping aliens when they first took power —muwafidiin, as they were called. It was not long before the Muslim Brotherhood took up arms against them, labeling them as non-Muslim and non-Arab (shuubiyun) — only to be crushed brutally after the notorious Hama uprising in 1982. The use of excessive force was then a clear sign of the regime's determination and sectarian nature; the forces sent to retake Hama were largely Alawi. The Asads tutored their children in the arts of war so they could take command of the military and police their population. They marshaled in-laws, cousins and coreligionists into the upper ranks of the security forces. Despite the rhetoric of Arab nationalism, the Asads were keenly aware that only the traditional loyalties of family, clan and sect could cement their rule. In essence, they upheld the notion that it takes a village to rule Syria, a formula that successfully brought an end to political instability. For over two decades following independence, Syria had been known as the banana republic of the Middle East because of its frequent coups and changes of government. Under the Asads, loyalty quickly became the ultimate qualification for advancement into the upper ranks of the security forces. They packed sensitive posts with loyal Alawis and Baathists. Some analysts estimated that as many 80 percent of Syria's officer corps is Alawi. This is undoubtedly an exaggeration, but it underscores the sectarian safety measures the regime has taken.4 The main strike forces, such as the Republican Guard led by Bashar's brother, are overwhelmingly Alawi. Many of the divisions made up of enlisted Sunnis have not been deployed to quell the uprising. Instead, the regime has built up special forces and irregulars, often called shabiha, which are heavily Alawi or Sunnis of known loyalty. Policing loyalty in order to coup-proof the regime has been a paramount concern. Alawis were placed in strategic ministries other than defense. The foreign ministry is a case in point. Recently a Syrian ambassador who has sought refuge in Turkey told Hurriyet, “There are 360 diplomats within the Syrian Foreign Ministry. Of these, 60 percent are Nusayri [Alawi].” He added, “The number of Sunni diplomats does not exceed 10 percent.”5 Even if these numbers are an exaggeration, there is little doubt that the regime has been careful to staff the upper ranks of important ministries with loyalists and coreligionists. This attention to staffing is a key reason that major defections have not occurred in the top ranks of government and why we have yet to see a repeat of the Libya example, where whole sections of the country fell out of central control and turned to the rebel cause within weeks of the uprising's debut. Ironically, the minoritarian character of the regime makes it more durable than its republican counterparts in North Africa, where the population is largely homogeneous. The sectarian nature of the regime may protect it from major desertions when economic difficulties make paying for the far-flung patronage networks impossible. Patronage serves as essential glue, binding the interests of disparate social groups to the regime. Just as important, patronage frustrates the emergence of corporate groups that might compete with the government. The regime has skillfully doled out jobs and benefits to fragment the opposition and buy off opponents.6 For this reason, opposition leaders hope that sanctions will promote the collapse of the regime. They reason that, once government money runs out, widespread defections will take place, a coup by top-ranking Alawi officers may occur, or a Tahrir Square moment will overwhelm security forces in the major cities. Such hopes have not been fulfilled in 10 months of growing violence and protest. There is little reason to think they will be in the coming months. Despite increasing defections among the military's rank and file, the elite units, special forces and intelligence agencies may have little choice but to rally around the Asad regime, given their bleak prospects in a post-Asad Syria. Heavily Alawite elite units with sizable numbers of loyal Sunnis will likely see no alternative. The broader Alawi community is also likely to remain loyal to the regime, even as the economy deteriorates.7 Almost all Alawi families have a least one member in the security forces as well as additional members working in civilian ministries, such as education or agriculture. Most fear collective punishment for the sins of the Baathist era. Not only do they assume that they will suffer from wide-scale purges once the opposition wins; many also suspect that they will face prison or worse. Opposition leaders have tried to calm Alawi anxieties provoked by hotheaded sheikhs. The most notorious is Adnan Arur, who threatened, “We shall mince [the Alawis] in meat grinders and feed them to the dogs.”8 The head of the Muslim Brotherhood has assured ordinary Alawis that they will be protected. Those guilty of crimes will face proper courts and be tried according to the law.9 Such assurances only go so far in calming Alawi anxieties. Many do not expect an orderly transition of power, just as many remain convinced that a spirit of revenge may guide the opposition, which has been so badly abused. In short, because the Syrian military remains able and willing to stand by the president, whether out of loyalty, self-interest or fear, the regime is likely to endure for some time. The strength of Asad's rule is relative and can only be measured in relation to that of the opposition. Many analysts point out that his regime is brittle, narrow and ideologically bankrupt. All the same, the opposition is weaker. The regime has been able to count on the factionalism and bickering of its opponents to survive. Syria's feeble sense of political community has been the regime's greatest asset. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) being assembled in Turkey under the leadership of Colonel Riyadh al-Asaad is no match for the Syrian Army. Although armed opponents of the regime are an important development, their size, structural limitations and predominantly Sunni character make them a minimal threat. They have limited command and control, no dependable communications, and offensive capabilities that are restricted by their lack of heavy weapons. They do not yet present a real danger or alternative to the Syrian military. In fact, Western authorities have been pleading with the Syrian opposition not to militarize, for fear that the insurgency will actually weaken the opposition rather than strengthen it.10 The political leadership of the Syrian opposition remains divided. The SNC to for the opposition but has been to divisions within its own ranks as well as to with opposition The main political of the Syrian opposition, the Syrian to have control over the which in to have control over some and armed elements in Syria. This by most or the opposition in Syria The has been the to Most doubt that the has the number of it or is for many of the against the Syrian groups in Syria are on civilian as well as from the and do not take from Colonel or other they of the The has in disparate groups is to the regime and protect Syrian from the The SNC did not the leaders of the to its in a to the it has been to the The political leadership of the Syrian opposition remains divided. The SNC to for the opposition but has been to divisions within its own ranks as well as to with opposition The and the SNC as the leader of the opposition and have sought to up its and but they to their hands over its It is of main The Muslim the — members to from elite Syrian families — and members of the who are Syria and cannot their There are also many a of of the and a few of other Alawis seem to be of the SNC often that the Muslim Brotherhood is the real power the there is little for The is a Sunni who at the in Although he is and leadership is but When the SNC was first the could not on the were in a the more members as the because he is an in the but limited his as to months. He told The in only weeks before his was due to that he did not whether he would be given a was for a but the and process for its remain The SNC has to other opposition groups who have its In between the SNC and the for a of led by a of led the with in He stated that the two groups would forces on but his from the more and SNC Even some of in the of the Muslim Brotherhood for being a because he the to the SNC before quickly away from the it a and the SNC leadership against with the The SNC leadership the for being willing to with the regime, for to the Free Syrian and for against foreign number of SNC members and his of working for Asad's For its the the Syrian of Syrians by military that would in widespread a would the regime's which would to heavy civilian Even they that foreign will in an of Syria to the U.S. military in Iraq after the of regime in “The SNC the to and protect them against this a member of the The and many and opposition members to that they may by the as Islamists as in and more opposition and groups are For example, a and member of the most the of a political the itself in in The are on the They do not which has been the nor do they who that for and are but a to an for The minorities remain of the of in the region. Many see the Arab to be a of the the most important among the opposition is not that between the and which but rather the between and on the who are the on the and armed groups are in Most use the in their but few They to Some of this is for are One of the main has been so is that the that their to were being by One opposition that their ranks had been with Opposition is to be The Asad regime and most of civil and for that Syrians it hard to All the same, is a the Syrian opposition can and could be and because their turned against their In Syria, the military is by the and at the All the same, the opposition is more more and armed with Syrians are of the Asad regime. Even many Alawis the in a as he remains convinced he will the uprising and continues to that Syria will be the for Many ordinary Syrians who are on their hands even as they government will not support the opposition they are assured it can a real alternative to the regime and order on the want to the of the uprising on in a opposition leaders are the of their capabilities and to foreign its in on the a to the community the of and In the and the Arab there is only limited support for in Syria. the could also have been in the to in weeks after of that, if had told two months that the U.S. military would be in he would have them they were Although of State has an of Syria and the Western and Arab against it, has the notion that the will Syria will be a to than In some it remains in the of to One U.S. military intelligence officer who in Iraq to that, if Iraq into civil war at the as Syria the region would face a of a is by its and President is his in U.S. from the Middle East as of his He will not want to on his own of by U.S. military and are from an for fear of their Turkey has little to from intervention, democracy and Bashar's is on the and Iraq is less does not a war with Syria. Most important, foreign are to if Syrians cannot and a military force of at the a of Syria on its Many ordinary Syrians who are on their hands even as they government will not support the opposition they are assured it can a real alternative to the regime and order on the want to the of Many that President was when he to on the of the of the Arab have a of percent to be national percent to be and at least 10 percent to be There are in which the might support Arab and to an might be convinced to from if Middle states to The of from Iraq has many the and of the in the of strategic with in Syria with the to regional to weaken or the leadership of one of its key and to the in the the of Syria away from the the Sunni leadership of and Turkey is as it might that it has into All the same, the Syrian opposition is likely to in the and the have stated in no that they will not in Syria. is and have in the to Syria. For these Syria's opposition may be for in at least for the Syria's opposition foreign remain in over the of to Syria is a case of the of the Arab Many have on the economic the Arab and their Syria. the and Arab whether or turned to measures to their rule. In for political and minimal education and The was a and government ministries of of and and a measures but at a They Arab states and them with and population as a that in an of This was Syria the to and more than most Middle Bashar to up the Syrian economy and the were than his the but by measures and All the same, he private and He with private and use of the in an to private and foreign even as Asad sought to private he its the emergence of a that would be largely Sunni and not to the regime, Asad turned to his who became of the Syrian He a majority in many major and and that the Asad family control over the at every rank of the this of by the of from the of major regime — called the of — has notorious for its and economic The has been an of and at the growing and of Syrian The of the last Syrian and an estimated one off the and into urban of which has to jobs or economic security to the has has been in of the The the have been This was the social that the of support for the but it is up in The have in Syria has been on the even as the upper has with from percent to percent between and to the between and the both the and have been on the has the of the Baathist regime and is a in the Syrian uprising. It also why the most of the Syrian have been in such as and Syria's growing is due to The first is the of the last which Syrian and an estimated one off the and into urban a some percent of Syria's is estimated to have been built and in with no or The is estimated to have Syrians in the of the country into according to a The is the price of have been The of Syrian in price by to percent in led by which by Syria's who over their on have been hard by which 15 percent in has been by government to price for In were in its price to percent between and the of the Syrian uprising in has This is a of main foreign the percent on all coming from the of the government to for and The is increasing The Syrian economy has been to jobs for the growing population. The of the Arab is well and Syria has been The last has an the population of the Arab is under the age of Syria is off than than the population is under the age of percent of the population is in the 15 to the one in Arab was with the in and being even Syria's have been the Arab Syrian placed at a In the minister of and social that in the country between and The of the have sent The Syrian has sent the economy but quickly real economic can to regime is the of the many of economic have to of the of Syria, the as in He the the economy is is are and government is In where there are there is no economic — so paying they they are not their — so the are in all this is the Syria's has by percent in the of — from to — as the Syrian has from to to a on the of a to percent fall in as and on all but the most essential has to a a loss of on by in and the in is Syria a have also their on the Syrian economy in with Iraq has been by 10 percent because of is to be to percent of the in This will it well the danger for estimated to be 10 percent of an at the of that next year will be less than of and will for only 60 percent of government He that the will be Syrian out of a total of to or percent of a of The government has no to in order to make up for its it to a it can no This will force the government to to foreign such as or Iraq or to Syria's Some are already that the government special on and President such in to for the war in The government has all ministries to by which have been estimated to the government to have been The government has most of to the and have and in most is off for on end a “The whole has been — and One Syrian that no one in Syria is paying his are to make to on their or of expect will Many are to the is even more he is that some are to make to private they make For are as but the day of cannot be When it will the Syrian can it The on the government are the of the the government was already heavily in order to both the of its and no to the government will have to by remain and by it will on the Syrians of It will also which will to and the collapse of the Syrian one Syrian “The will be with a of at both the corporate and as can no be The economy is not to collapse Even as it the Asad regime may for some if no alternative forces to and It may be able to off the of the for a It is in that regime did not fall due to the economic brought on by war and sanctions in the the of some according to of Syria is not It does not have its and its are in All the same, Syria continues to have Most of its are to its after the is so is Even to Some of are likely to as a for Syrian The Asad regime it will to other such as and for and will undoubtedly so long as its own economy can stand up to Western and the to into the hands of the opposition. The regime the and a of the and it can All the same, the Baathist regime will be a to Alawis and minorities the of the regime with do Sunni and who fear the is the opposition. lack of leadership was an the first months of the but it is a it, the opposition will have difficulties more Syrians to take the of and the of already there is no force that has the or leadership to the regime, at least that is yet One that the Asad regime will remain in power such a force

Wolfram Lacher

Since the outbreak of the February 17 Revolution, Libya's political map has changed beyond recognition. Where before, few players and institutions seemed to matter outside the opaque informal networks and security apparatus centered around Muammar al-Qadhafi and his extended family, a multitude of actors has emerged to lead the revolution. With the regime's collapse, power struggles among the heterogeneous coalition of revolutionary forces have intensified — including within the political leadership, the National Transitional Council (NTC). In addition, groups that were not part of the revolution are voicing their demands for a stake in the transitional process. While the mass mobilization associated with the revolution may recede and the scene may become less crowded, the fundamental transformation of the political arena has only just begun. From the outset, the emergence of the NTC triggered a heated international debate about the identity, interests and objectives of the revolutionary forces, as well as the role of tribal and regional rivalries in the conflict. Did the political leadership of the revolution represent a cross-regional popular movement or the interests of a narrow elite? Was the conflict between revolutionary forces and the regime in reality a tribal civil war? Or is the talk of tribal loyalties in the Libyan conflict wholly misplaced? As Libya enters the transition towards the establishment of a new state, the controversy continues. This article analyzes the composition of the forces that led the revolution, and traces their social origins. It argues that the interests of prominent families, as well as tribal and local loyalties, played a key role on both sides of the Libyan revolution. This does not mean that the conflict represented a tribal civil war or a contest among Libya's regions for political supremacy. However, political mobilization and military organization largely occurred along tribal or local lines. The revolutionary coalition is fragmented along family, tribal and local interests, and these divisions are becoming more pronounced since the common goal — the overthrow of the regime — has been reached. But while such parochial elite interests are set to compete for influence during the transition, they are unlikely to be the only factor defining the politics of post-Qadhafi Libya. Broader political forces and coalitions are likely to emerge and could crystallize through an emerging debate on a set of polarizing issues. These include the role of former regime officials and longstanding exiles during the transition; the way in which the crimes and corruption of the regime should be approached; conflicting views on the function of Islam in the constitutional and legal framework of the state, as well as the choice between a centralized, federal or decentralized model for the state. The fragmented nature of the post-Qadhafi political scene, coupled with the fact that it is undergoing a profound transformation, also has implications for external actors. States that were deeply involved in the civil war through the NATO-led intervention are reluctant to disengage now that the country has entered its transition. However, external attempts at picking winners are likely to backfire and, while the balance of power is in flux, even support in areas such as security-sector reform could deepen existing rifts and trigger negative reactions. External actors should step back to avoid damaging the domestic legitimacy of the transition. In the four weeks after the eruption of protests on February 15, 2011, the Libyan uprising evolved from spontaneous unrest into a full-blown civil war between the regime and a rebel leadership intent on toppling it. These developments can be adequately understood neither in terms of class nor of state institutions. If anything, they demonstrate the difficulty of applying either category to the Libyan case. In contrast to the events in Tunisia and Egypt that preceded and triggered the Libyan uprising, the protests in Libya were not driven by young, well-educated members of an expanding middle class, although a handful of lawyers and university professors did initiate the first small protests in Benghazi. Private-sector development faced persistent constraints under Qadhafi. The majority of the population lived on a combination of badly paid public-sector jobs and subsidies, with young people being particularly affected by widespread unemployment. Consequently, leaving aside the narrow elite that benefited disproportionately from the economic boom of the past decade, income differences among the majority of the population remained small. The working class consisted almost exclusively of migrant labor from North and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as Asia. By and large, the unorganized unrest of the first two weeks was driven by underemployed young men whose education level and access to information technologies were substantially below those of their Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts. Moreover, while established opposition forces played only a limited role in both Tunisia and Egypt, the absence of organized movements and institutions was even more striking in Libya. While trade unions and labor movements helped increase the pressure on Ben Ali and Mubarak, they were completely absent during the Libyan uprising. There is no evidence that the calls by exiled opposition activists for protests played any significant role in triggering the uprising, and since no opposition parties or movements existed inside Libya, the decisive developments of the first weeks had already occurred by the time the exiles returned. Perhaps the most remarkable difference, however, was the lack of institutions capable of managing the crisis. Instead of pressuring the leader to resign and initiate a transition of power, as the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries did, the Libyan army and other state institutions disintegrated rapidly. Senior officers, ministers and diplomats rallied to the uprising, and in the northeast, entire army units defected. By defecting, senior officials protested against the regime's brutal repression and began organizing their communities’ protection against regime forces. Two factors explain the rapid disintegration of state institutions: first (as discussed below) the importance of tribal loyalties; second, the weakness of the institutions themselves. State institutions generally were deliberately weakened by Qadhafi, who centralized power in the informal networks surrounding his extended family and tribe and constantly rearranged the confusing patchwork of institutions with unclear and overlapping remits. The regular army was purposely kept weak to minimize the possibility of a coup d'état, and an elaborate system was established in which numerous security agencies, paramilitary and special forces watched over each other. This structure was headed by close relatives of Qadhafi, and its personnel were recruited primarily from Qadhafi's tribe (the Qadhadfa) as well as two allied tribes, the Warfalla and Magarha.1 The security apparatus and its brigades — most notoriously the 32nd Reinforced Brigade headed by Qadhafi's son Khamis — led the fight against the revolutionary forces and, unlike the regular army, remained largely intact until the fall of Tripoli. With the disintegration of state institutions and defection of senior officials, an elitist political leadership established itself at the top of a hitherto uncoordinated popular movement. Until the fall of Tripoli, two main groups dominated the NTC, its representatives abroad as well as, to a lesser extent, the local councils emerging in liberated areas. On the one hand, defectors from the former regime elite played a leading role in the NTC. This was hardly a monolithic group. It included senior officers and diplomats who had been companions of Qadhafi since the 1970s, such as Interior Minister (later chief of staff of the revolutionary forces) Abdelfattah Younes; his successor as chief of staff, Suleiman Mahmoud; and UN Ambassador Abderrahmane Shalgam. There were members of the Free Officers, who led Qadhafi's coup in 1969, but were later arrested or exiled, such as Arab League Ambassador Abdelmonem al-Houni and NTC member Omar al-Hariri. There were also reformists and technocrats who had only briefly held senior positions under Qadhafi, such as NTC head, Mustafa Abdeljelil and the NTC's “prime minister,” Mahmoud On the other hand, of the or opposition who the NTC are of the and who had dominated Libya during the — of which were already players during — and were and exiled under Qadhafi. and member for and to from a family of tribal that dominated the both during the and under the The family of member for played a role in Abderrahmane from a family that the in has leadership and established as an for and and NTC member for legal and from a family that was associated with the was the family of NTC member The of the Libyan and exiled in the also such as Minister Mahmoud or and Minister Ali The NTC representatives of the such as lawyers and university who and in the country but were not part of the among groups that were not part of the former it is to prominent of who had been among the members of the in during the have emerged as players during the revolution. Ali an with the has in the against leading NTC including Mahmoud is one among key of revolutionary brigades in and has also for the NTC's to step has former members of the regime on the NTC during by in its from the of the country were in the NTC and its and have remained to a lesser particularly in the since the fall of The main in the of Libya and the of other revolutionary from the the fact that the former of the had held more influence during the and were particularly by Qadhafi also played a regional the two main of the revolutionary leadership in — of the former elite of the Qadhafi regime and the of the — are from each since Qadhafi the While their leading were of the of the the Qadhafi most members of the Council from and during the first two new were recruited through the revolutionary and security as well as members of leading and There are a few to such as NTC whose was a senior under both the and the Qadhafi members of the former elite also to Libya during the of since The elitist nature of the revolutionary leadership and its from the movement of the first as well as the between the and in or the are Since the NTC was a it was not that members of the one to lead the close the former had while in The is their also explain these interests in the post-Qadhafi There is no significant support for the among members of who part of the former tribal elite and social also does not that one should their extent, the of the former to the can be by the fact that they have and abroad and are of the leading players of are in their or held senior positions in the although have of their past political and economic importance and among other they have to be as the interests of their These may in under Qadhafi or in their role as leading political players in their regions and the family interests were also on the regime they are less from tribal in the of the prominent of the This is by the generally of the regime whose had in during the of in the and and included few of the more longstanding under the While Qadhafi's and Khamis were at the of the regime's war were other close relatives and members of the Qadhafi such as a senior in Qadhafi's brigades who with the revolutionary forces in the fall of the of who to in and Qadhafi's the role of family interests in among the elite is not only in the of Qadhafi's chief who is to the of Qadhafi's and a longstanding of Qadhafi who led the regime's repression in the and both had who were senior in the From the of the revolution, was controversy among over the role of tribal While have the Libyan civil war in exclusively tribal terms and that it be by tribal loyalties, have the that the young men who led the revolution on the could any importance to tribal views the conflict should not be as a tribal civil tribal loyalties were significant in the of the uprising and In the of senior officers and in the first weeks of the uprising their to against Qadhafi. The first to were the of the northeast, regime repression of that had been in the and had a in the such as the — Interior Minister Abdelfattah and of the military Suleiman Mahmoud — as did the and their from Qadhafi, such as a who on to from the regime repression The of the were also to and the uprising and played a decisive military role in the conflict. the the in Libya's had from and political under Qadhafi and the revolution from its are influence in the new of their support for the revolution. most of these remained and may have been or not by tribal the fact that these to the positions of any other social category is to tribal loyalties to with the regime and the NTC organizing representatives of the leading of the most were in their positions towards the revolution — as was for the one of the that the of Qadhafi's security a Warfalla leader had on in the first of the uprising, Qadhafi was a and on to the did not Warfalla from the security to the Warfalla in support of the revolution The fact that into the regime's security apparatus had been largely on tribal to its against revolutionary forces even after the fall of Tripoli, the of Qadhafi's brigades their in the of the Warfalla and with a stake in the security apparatus also the revolutionary such as the at the of the and of the in the of the between revolutionary forces and the in as well as small Arab such as the in the their positions on sides of the conflict but were also in between these However, to the conflict as a power between be tribal loyalties were not the only factor at for the revolutionary largely occurred on the of and Moreover, support for the revolution most regions and of the whose members the of the Qadhafi both the and the of tribal politics in post-Qadhafi Libya, it is to tribal loyalties and rifts played such a prominent the fact that Libyan had been by the of since the and the population from in to of the population in The most is that Qadhafi, after the power of tribal by units to tribal had tribal divisions and loyalties as of This had been since the in the establishment of with through family and of senior officials, particularly in the security in tribal to for the as by in in or by in in and The political function was during the through the establishment of the in which tribal were represented and which were among other to tribal for by members of their the political mobilization tribal through parties or was In addition, state and economic transformation had in tribal loyalties The nature of Libyan state tribal loyalties to attempts to tribal and state into the of the during the of the were as military and political players during the The but to tribal which were by during the and military played a leading political role under the Qadhafi, tribal were at first to state institutions to tribal including in Qadhafi's of by state institutions has been by as being and of Libya's transformation into an was from with tribal since it officials to and on and Moreover, at until the Qadhafi's economic deliberately to social into that have a to tribal in to with close relatives to each While over the past it remained for of to with the regime or the on the tribal the This the of regime forces in the of and Warfalla had as well as in the of which is dominated by in contrast to the tribal loyalties have been in with a longstanding including and other of the as well as and prominent played a leading even during the of rapid and were at as as the as the units of mobilization for the revolutionary In the of in which a tribe as in the and the in the northeast, the between local and tribal is In the liberated local transitional councils emerged to their under In the of and the these councils at only to the NTC, from which they at in the first four of the conflict. the one or more revolutionary brigades in each liberated with the to a forces in the of even and by army officers, or tribal these brigades were generally recruited among the population of a or tribal In addition, brigades were recruited among people close to the Libyan which had led a against the regime during the that the had been in and the of and even these brigades had a local From the outset, these brigades largely to the NTC but not by it. the local military councils under the of the local as well as each in the had their military at the of the NTC in the remained between the units of the former army, headed by Abdelfattah and later Suleiman Mahmoud; a coalition of revolutionary brigades with the NTC, and by a of former officers in the army, and as well as brigades that outside both among the brigades on the over developments on the absence of centralized The first was the of Abdelfattah on the to have been by members of a revolutionary As of an by the NTC had to any on the that the to the was being deliberately to avoid within the revolutionary forces from The development was the power among revolutionary brigades over the of Tripoli. to with an uprising in the local brigades led an on the from including the and a Brigade headed by a of the and former also on the from in the In the weeks the these brigades the into of with each to have been to fall and the role of brigades from other Council was under but its was by brigades from and the attempts to the brigades in under the NTC's as did attempts to In between the as a Council emerged to the headed by while the NTC a to the brigades and to at the time of the brigades had to its The loyalties to first and with their and the NTC. and they and from their military power as a of political influence to be of the brigades have already the of to the NTC's and to in the transitional to be after the fall of Brigade from for Mahmoud to and the of a prominent for the of from the that their the and should key in the But in to their local of these developments also that the brigades had emerged as a new and significant political or military from the and generally did not from the that dominated the NTC. on the political scene by of their military a at a that the former had until for themselves. The in the political scene the nature of politics during the transitional actors are likely to the transition, and along which political mobilization The by the NTC for the transitional a transitional to be within one of which was on 2011, after and had and Qadhafi had been after the for a are to the the NTC and a new as well as a the has a by the a constitutional is to be held within two from the are to be held in with the new In the the transition to a and constitutional at it may well The to be during to less the establishment of a new state. Qadhafi's Libya had no and are no state institutions that could The transitional fundamental about the nature of the state to be any possibility of to the This is one the developments since February can already be as a revolution. The transitional is likely to be by a profound transformation of the political and not only of the transitional with its in which new are and new struggles are emerging between the representatives of prominent families, and the political scene after the fall of Tripoli. the most of these rivalries have been the by and the family on leading NTC including former Mahmoud as well as those by military from and the on the of mobilization on the of family, tribal or local interests during the it is likely that such power struggles be a defining of the transitional other leading families, and in and Libya to the influence held by representatives of the in the NTC and its This does not mean that regional rivalries are likely to post-Qadhafi the fact that the weak development of and led to the of a federal under the The of mobilization during the civil war that rivalries are emerging at the — local and tribal — as well as between the regions of and The of the former regime — in the and — also to be into the political their with for political is to be This has been the more by the and by the on and other and other by revolutionary forces the for local against the new But it is unlikely that politics during the transitional only be by parochial The political arena is likely to the emergence of political and coalitions of of the rivalries can also be in other such as power struggles between and or between former regime officials and members of the or With to political and social the political almost groups as well as small parties have already been the to close as a to the of political as as the from Qadhafi's security apparatus the have been in Tunisia and Egypt, and at the of the transitional have to into The has and members within the NTC and its but as an organization it until 2011, it that it a political Ali who is among the most and is close to the but does not represent nor does at the time of lead any other political organization — has that to a political members of the including they have a new organization the for but organization is not The emergence of parties and movements is set to the political While it is that of may the interests of or tribes, coalitions could emerge through over a of key These include the choice between of and political on the role of Islam in the new support outside an elite of former are the longstanding exiles and former regime officials should be to in the transition and in the the of corruption and crimes by the security forces of the former regime should as well as should be a centralized, decentralized or federal debate and centered on these after the fall of In over such — as well as the rivalries among parochial groups — are likely to power struggles over the and of the key at The entire in the of and subsidies, on Since the fall of Tripoli, rifts within the coalition that led the revolution are becoming is the for the elitist political leadership to more political forces, they were at the of the revolution, the revolutionary on the or the as of tribal The emergence of new political forces is set to the political of the leading who as the of diplomats are likely to actors are likely to These power struggles be and but for the to have domestic external attempts to influence it should be The NTC's have already players within the revolutionary is to have emerged as a key military with has that a former close of Qadhafi, should be part of the political leadership during the transition; and the to a leading role for the with they have close and who their access to the Libyan and But support for players or groups within the revolutionary forces and be against has been as his influence from support inside and former exiles such as Ali have been as being associated with interests and their of particularly interests is widespread the fact that a majority likely the In international in the transitional can become a This also to the security which has been by the UN and as a for external support to In a in which among the are the of rivalries and the role of former regime officials is a political external support for security-sector reform one against or at being as The by negative to external attempts to influence the political almost the since external influence be limited by the fact that Libya or a small part of the Libyan abroad the NTC to the state and until an and has to In the the NTC's access to could a for the of the The of a leadership, however, is unlikely The and fragmented nature of political and military as they emerged during the revolution, that the transition be led by a and coalition of interests, any political or local to in the of local councils and revolutionary during the conflict. and leading in the transition.

Dennis Dijkzeul

As a self-financing organization, which did not expect project acquisition to increase in the near future, UNOPS had to keep its costs carefully in check. This could only be done with the full cooperation of all employees in the field, decentralized offices, and headquarters. As before, these employees would need to implement reforms in addition to their normal work. The proposed merger, the separation from UNDP, and the early stages of the reform process took attention away from improving staff-management relationships. As the reform progressed, the relationship between staff and management received more attention, in particular with regard to the self-financing principle. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Richard B. Miller

RECENT STUDIES Christian ethics have uncovered a of convergence between pacifist convictions and just-war tenets. Although it is easy to assume that just-war ideas and pacifism are wholly incompatible approaches to the morality of warfare, James Childress argues that pacifists and just-war theorists actually share a common starting point: a presumption against the use of force. Childress uses W. D. Ross's language of prima-facie duties to show how pacifism and just-war thought converge. The duty not to kill or injure others (nonmaleficence) is a duty within each approach. For the pacifist, nonmaleficence is an absolute duty admitting of no exceptions. For just-war theorists, nonmaleficence is a prima-facie duty, that is, a duty that is usually binding but may be overridden exceptional circumstances— particularly when innocent life and human rights are at stake. Primafacie duties are not absolute, but place the burden of proof on those who wish to override them when they conflict with other duties, in virtue of the totality of... ethically relevant circumstances. War poses just those exceptional circumstances which the duty of nonmaleficence may be overridden. In this way Childress both highlights the point of contact between pacifism and just-war tenets and reconstructs the essential logic of the jus ad bellum. To override a prima-facie duty, however, is not to abandon it. Such duties continue to function the situation or the subsequent course of action. That is, a prima-facie duty leaves residual effects or moral traces; after overriding such a duty, our conduct must be affected by it. In the context of war, this means that the duty of nonmaleficence exerts a pressure upon the conditions and methods of war. War must be a last resort, pursued for the ends of peace, declared by a competent authority, carried out by limited means, etc. In other words, Childress reconstructs the logic of the jus bello without departing from his

Martin Hill

The organizational structure of the League of Nations' non-political work–on economic and financial matters, on communications and transit, on health, on narcotic drug control and certain other social problems–was essentially a centralized one, although each technical ‘organization’ enjoyed a considerable degree of independence. The Expert Committees in each organization reported to the League of Nations Council and were served by members of the League secretariat; and the work was financed from the budget of the League. That budget also financed the work of the International Labour Organization (ILO), which had been established, in accordance with Chapter 13 of the Treaty of Versailles, ‘at the seat of the League of Nations as part of the organisation of the League’. The proposals made in August 1939 by the Special Committee of the League of Nations on the Development of International Co-operation in Economic and Social Affairs (the Bruce Committee) would have replaced in this field the League Council–a body consisting largely of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and concerned primarily with political issues–by a Central Committee for Economic and Social Questions, composed in large part of ministers and high officials directly involved in such questions and in which non-Members of the League could participate on a basis of equality with Members. The Central Committee was to exercise, as the League Council had done, ‘direction and control’ over all the League's economic and social activities.