F amilies , T ribes and C ities in the L ibyan R evolution

Abstract

Since the outbreak of the February 17 Revolution, Libya's political map has changed beyond recognition. Where before, few players and institutions seemed to matter outside the opaque informal networks and security apparatus centered around Muammar al-Qadhafi and his extended family, a multitude of actors has emerged to lead the revolution. With the regime's collapse, power struggles among the heterogeneous coalition of revolutionary forces have intensified — including within the political leadership, the National Transitional Council (NTC). In addition, groups that were not part of the revolution are voicing their demands for a stake in the transitional process. While the mass mobilization associated with the revolution may recede and the scene may become less crowded, the fundamental transformation of the political arena has only just begun. From the outset, the emergence of the NTC triggered a heated international debate about the identity, interests and objectives of the revolutionary forces, as well as the role of tribal and regional rivalries in the conflict. Did the political leadership of the revolution represent a cross-regional popular movement or the interests of a narrow elite? Was the conflict between revolutionary forces and the regime in reality a tribal civil war? Or is the talk of tribal loyalties in the Libyan conflict wholly misplaced? As Libya enters the transition towards the establishment of a new state, the controversy continues. This article analyzes the composition of the forces that led the revolution, and traces their social origins. It argues that the interests of prominent families, as well as tribal and local loyalties, played a key role on both sides of the Libyan revolution. This does not mean that the conflict represented a tribal civil war or a contest among Libya's regions for political supremacy. However, political mobilization and military organization largely occurred along tribal or local lines. The revolutionary coalition is fragmented along family, tribal and local interests, and these divisions are becoming more pronounced since the common goal — the overthrow of the regime — has been reached. But while such parochial elite interests are set to compete for influence during the transition, they are unlikely to be the only factor defining the politics of post-Qadhafi Libya. Broader political forces and coalitions are likely to emerge and could crystallize through an emerging debate on a set of polarizing issues. These include the role of former regime officials and longstanding exiles during the transition; the way in which the crimes and corruption of the regime should be approached; conflicting views on the function of Islam in the constitutional and legal framework of the state, as well as the choice between a centralized, federal or decentralized model for the state. The fragmented nature of the post-Qadhafi political scene, coupled with the fact that it is undergoing a profound transformation, also has implications for external actors. States that were deeply involved in the civil war through the NATO-led intervention are reluctant to disengage now that the country has entered its transition. However, external attempts at picking winners are likely to backfire and, while the balance of power is in flux, even support in areas such as security-sector reform could deepen existing rifts and trigger negative reactions. External actors should step back to avoid damaging the domestic legitimacy of the transition. In the four weeks after the eruption of protests on February 15, 2011, the Libyan uprising evolved from spontaneous unrest into a full-blown civil war between the regime and a rebel leadership intent on toppling it. These developments can be adequately understood neither in terms of class nor of state institutions. If anything, they demonstrate the difficulty of applying either category to the Libyan case. In contrast to the events in Tunisia and Egypt that preceded and triggered the Libyan uprising, the protests in Libya were not driven by young, well-educated members of an expanding middle class, although a handful of lawyers and university professors did initiate the first small protests in Benghazi. Private-sector development faced persistent constraints under Qadhafi. The majority of the population lived on a combination of badly paid public-sector jobs and subsidies, with young people being particularly affected by widespread unemployment. Consequently, leaving aside the narrow elite that benefited disproportionately from the economic boom of the past decade, income differences among the majority of the population remained small. The working class consisted almost exclusively of migrant labor from North and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as Asia. By and large, the unorganized unrest of the first two weeks was driven by underemployed young men whose education level and access to information technologies were substantially below those of their Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts. Moreover, while established opposition forces played only a limited role in both Tunisia and Egypt, the absence of organized movements and institutions was even more striking in Libya. While trade unions and labor movements helped increase the pressure on Ben Ali and Mubarak, they were completely absent during the Libyan uprising. There is no evidence that the calls by exiled opposition activists for protests played any significant role in triggering the uprising, and since no opposition parties or movements existed inside Libya, the decisive developments of the first weeks had already occurred by the time the exiles returned. Perhaps the most remarkable difference, however, was the lack of institutions capable of managing the crisis. Instead of pressuring the leader to resign and initiate a transition of power, as the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries did, the Libyan army and other state institutions disintegrated rapidly. Senior officers, ministers and diplomats rallied to the uprising, and in the northeast, entire army units defected. By defecting, senior officials protested against the regime's brutal repression and began organizing their communities’ protection against regime forces. Two factors explain the rapid disintegration of state institutions: first (as discussed below) the importance of tribal loyalties; second, the weakness of the institutions themselves. State institutions generally were deliberately weakened by Qadhafi, who centralized power in the informal networks surrounding his extended family and tribe and constantly rearranged the confusing patchwork of institutions with unclear and overlapping remits. The regular army was purposely kept weak to minimize the possibility of a coup d'état, and an elaborate system was established in which numerous security agencies, paramilitary and special forces watched over each other. This structure was headed by close relatives of Qadhafi, and its personnel were recruited primarily from Qadhafi's tribe (the Qadhadfa) as well as two allied tribes, the Warfalla and Magarha.1 The security apparatus and its brigades — most notoriously the 32nd Reinforced Brigade headed by Qadhafi's son Khamis — led the fight against the revolutionary forces and, unlike the regular army, remained largely intact until the fall of Tripoli. With the disintegration of state institutions and defection of senior officials, an elitist political leadership established itself at the top of a hitherto uncoordinated popular movement. Until the fall of Tripoli, two main groups dominated the NTC, its representatives abroad as well as, to a lesser extent, the local councils emerging in liberated areas. On the one hand, defectors from the former regime elite played a leading role in the NTC. This was hardly a monolithic group. It included senior officers and diplomats who had been companions of Qadhafi since the 1970s, such as Interior Minister (later chief of staff of the revolutionary forces) Abdelfattah Younes; his successor as chief of staff, Suleiman Mahmoud; and UN Ambassador Abderrahmane Shalgam. There were members of the Free Officers, who led Qadhafi's coup in 1969, but were later arrested or exiled, such as Arab League Ambassador Abdelmonem al-Houni and NTC member Omar al-Hariri. There were also reformists and technocrats who had only briefly held senior positions under Qadhafi, such as NTC head, Mustafa Abdeljelil and the NTC's “prime minister,” Mahmoud On the other hand, of the or opposition who the NTC are of the and who had dominated Libya during the — of which were already players during — and were and exiled under Qadhafi. and member for and to from a family of tribal that dominated the both during the and under the The family of member for played a role in Abderrahmane from a family that the in has leadership and established as an for and and NTC member for legal and from a family that was associated with the was the family of NTC member The of the Libyan and exiled in the also such as Minister Mahmoud or and Minister Ali The NTC representatives of the such as lawyers and university who and in the country but were not part of the among groups that were not part of the former it is to prominent of who had been among the members of the in during the have emerged as players during the revolution. Ali an with the has in the against leading NTC including Mahmoud is one among key of revolutionary brigades in and has also for the NTC's to step has former members of the regime on the NTC during by in its from the of the country were in the NTC and its and have remained to a lesser particularly in the since the fall of The main in the of Libya and the of other revolutionary from the the fact that the former of the had held more influence during the and were particularly by Qadhafi also played a regional the two main of the revolutionary leadership in — of the former elite of the Qadhafi regime and the of the — are from each since Qadhafi the While their leading were of the of the the Qadhafi most members of the Council from and during the first two new were recruited through the revolutionary and security as well as members of leading and There are a few to such as NTC whose was a senior under both the and the Qadhafi members of the former elite also to Libya during the of since The elitist nature of the revolutionary leadership and its from the movement of the first as well as the between the and in or the are Since the NTC was a it was not that members of the one to lead the close the former had while in The is their also explain these interests in the post-Qadhafi There is no significant support for the among members of who part of the former tribal elite and social also does not that one should their extent, the of the former to the can be by the fact that they have and abroad and are of the leading players of are in their or held senior positions in the although have of their past political and economic importance and among other they have to be as the interests of their These may in under Qadhafi or in their role as leading political players in their regions and the family interests were also on the regime they are less from tribal in the of the prominent of the This is by the generally of the regime whose had in during the of in the and and included few of the more longstanding under the While Qadhafi's and Khamis were at the of the regime's war were other close relatives and members of the Qadhafi such as a senior in Qadhafi's brigades who with the revolutionary forces in the fall of the of who to in and Qadhafi's the role of family interests in among the elite is not only in the of Qadhafi's chief who is to the of Qadhafi's and a longstanding of Qadhafi who led the regime's repression in the and both had who were senior in the From the of the revolution, was controversy among over the role of tribal While have the Libyan civil war in exclusively tribal terms and that it be by tribal loyalties, have the that the young men who led the revolution on the could any importance to tribal views the conflict should not be as a tribal civil tribal loyalties were significant in the of the uprising and In the of senior officers and in the first weeks of the uprising their to against Qadhafi. The first to were the of the northeast, regime repression of that had been in the and had a in the such as the — Interior Minister Abdelfattah and of the military Suleiman Mahmoud — as did the and their from Qadhafi, such as a who on to from the regime repression The of the were also to and the uprising and played a decisive military role in the conflict. the the in Libya's had from and political under Qadhafi and the revolution from its are influence in the new of their support for the revolution. most of these remained and may have been or not by tribal the fact that these to the positions of any other social category is to tribal loyalties to with the regime and the NTC organizing representatives of the leading of the most were in their positions towards the revolution — as was for the one of the that the of Qadhafi's security a Warfalla leader had on in the first of the uprising, Qadhafi was a and on to the did not Warfalla from the security to the Warfalla in support of the revolution The fact that into the regime's security apparatus had been largely on tribal to its against revolutionary forces even after the fall of Tripoli, the of Qadhafi's brigades their in the of the Warfalla and with a stake in the security apparatus also the revolutionary such as the at the of the and of the in the of the between revolutionary forces and the in as well as small Arab such as the in the their positions on sides of the conflict but were also in between these However, to the conflict as a power between be tribal loyalties were not the only factor at for the revolutionary largely occurred on the of and Moreover, support for the revolution most regions and of the whose members the of the Qadhafi both the and the of tribal politics in post-Qadhafi Libya, it is to tribal loyalties and rifts played such a prominent the fact that Libyan had been by the of since the and the population from in to of the population in The most is that Qadhafi, after the power of tribal by units to tribal had tribal divisions and loyalties as of This had been since the in the establishment of with through family and of senior officials, particularly in the security in tribal to for the as by in in or by in in and The political function was during the through the establishment of the in which tribal were represented and which were among other to tribal for by members of their the political mobilization tribal through parties or was In addition, state and economic transformation had in tribal loyalties The nature of Libyan state tribal loyalties to attempts to tribal and state into the of the during the of the were as military and political players during the The but to tribal which were by during the and military played a leading political role under the Qadhafi, tribal were at first to state institutions to tribal including in Qadhafi's of by state institutions has been by as being and of Libya's transformation into an was from with tribal since it officials to and on and Moreover, at until the Qadhafi's economic deliberately to social into that have a to tribal in to with close relatives to each While over the past it remained for of to with the regime or the on the tribal the This the of regime forces in the of and Warfalla had as well as in the of which is dominated by in contrast to the tribal loyalties have been in with a longstanding including and other of the as well as and prominent played a leading even during the of rapid and were at as as the as the units of mobilization for the revolutionary In the of in which a tribe as in the and the in the northeast, the between local and tribal is In the liberated local transitional councils emerged to their under In the of and the these councils at only to the NTC, from which they at in the first four of the conflict. the one or more revolutionary brigades in each liberated with the to a forces in the of even and by army officers, or tribal these brigades were generally recruited among the population of a or tribal In addition, brigades were recruited among people close to the Libyan which had led a against the regime during the that the had been in and the of and even these brigades had a local From the outset, these brigades largely to the NTC but not by it. the local military councils under the of the local as well as each in the had their military at the of the NTC in the remained between the units of the former army, headed by Abdelfattah and later Suleiman Mahmoud; a coalition of revolutionary brigades with the NTC, and by a of former officers in the army, and as well as brigades that outside both among the brigades on the over developments on the absence of centralized The first was the of Abdelfattah on the to have been by members of a revolutionary As of an by the NTC had to any on the that the to the was being deliberately to avoid within the revolutionary forces from The development was the power among revolutionary brigades over the of Tripoli. to with an uprising in the local brigades led an on the from including the and a Brigade headed by a of the and former also on the from in the In the weeks the these brigades the into of with each to have been to fall and the role of brigades from other Council was under but its was by brigades from and the attempts to the brigades in under the NTC's as did attempts to In between the as a Council emerged to the headed by while the NTC a to the brigades and to at the time of the brigades had to its The loyalties to first and with their and the NTC. and they and from their military power as a of political influence to be of the brigades have already the of to the NTC's and to in the transitional to be after the fall of Brigade from for Mahmoud to and the of a prominent for the of from the that their the and should key in the But in to their local of these developments also that the brigades had emerged as a new and significant political or military from the and generally did not from the that dominated the NTC. on the political scene by of their military a at a that the former had until for themselves. The in the political scene the nature of politics during the transitional actors are likely to the transition, and along which political mobilization The by the NTC for the transitional a transitional to be within one of which was on 2011, after and had and Qadhafi had been after the for a are to the the NTC and a new as well as a the has a by the a constitutional is to be held within two from the are to be held in with the new In the the transition to a and constitutional at it may well The to be during to less the establishment of a new state. Qadhafi's Libya had no and are no state institutions that could The transitional fundamental about the nature of the state to be any possibility of to the This is one the developments since February can already be as a revolution. The transitional is likely to be by a profound transformation of the political and not only of the transitional with its in which new are and new struggles are emerging between the representatives of prominent families, and the political scene after the fall of Tripoli. the most of these rivalries have been the by and the family on leading NTC including former Mahmoud as well as those by military from and the on the of mobilization on the of family, tribal or local interests during the it is likely that such power struggles be a defining of the transitional other leading families, and in and Libya to the influence held by representatives of the in the NTC and its This does not mean that regional rivalries are likely to post-Qadhafi the fact that the weak development of and led to the of a federal under the The of mobilization during the civil war that rivalries are emerging at the — local and tribal — as well as between the regions of and The of the former regime — in the and — also to be into the political their with for political is to be This has been the more by the and by the on and other and other by revolutionary forces the for local against the new But it is unlikely that politics during the transitional only be by parochial The political arena is likely to the emergence of political and coalitions of of the rivalries can also be in other such as power struggles between and or between former regime officials and members of the or With to political and social the political almost groups as well as small parties have already been the to close as a to the of political as as the from Qadhafi's security apparatus the have been in Tunisia and Egypt, and at the of the transitional have to into The has and members within the NTC and its but as an organization it until 2011, it that it a political Ali who is among the most and is close to the but does not represent nor does at the time of lead any other political organization — has that to a political members of the including they have a new organization the for but organization is not The emergence of parties and movements is set to the political While it is that of may the interests of or tribes, coalitions could emerge through over a of key These include the choice between of and political on the role of Islam in the new support outside an elite of former are the longstanding exiles and former regime officials should be to in the transition and in the the of corruption and crimes by the security forces of the former regime should as well as should be a centralized, decentralized or federal debate and centered on these after the fall of In over such — as well as the rivalries among parochial groups — are likely to power struggles over the and of the key at The entire in the of and subsidies, on Since the fall of Tripoli, rifts within the coalition that led the revolution are becoming is the for the elitist political leadership to more political forces, they were at the of the revolution, the revolutionary on the or the as of tribal The emergence of new political forces is set to the political of the leading who as the of diplomats are likely to actors are likely to These power struggles be and but for the to have domestic external attempts to influence it should be The NTC's have already players within the revolutionary is to have emerged as a key military with has that a former close of Qadhafi, should be part of the political leadership during the transition; and the to a leading role for the with they have close and who their access to the Libyan and But support for players or groups within the revolutionary forces and be against has been as his influence from support inside and former exiles such as Ali have been as being associated with interests and their of particularly interests is widespread the fact that a majority likely the In international in the transitional can become a This also to the security which has been by the UN and as a for external support to In a in which among the are the of rivalries and the role of former regime officials is a political external support for security-sector reform one against or at being as The by negative to external attempts to influence the political almost the since external influence be limited by the fact that Libya or a small part of the Libyan abroad the NTC to the state and until an and has to In the the NTC's access to could a for the of the The of a leadership, however, is unlikely The and fragmented nature of political and military as they emerged during the revolution, that the transition be led by a and coalition of interests, any political or local to in the of local councils and revolutionary during the conflict. and leading in the transition.