This paper seeks to assess the feasibility of utilizing Bitcoin as a currency within Türkiye. To achieve this, the research analyzes long-term cointegration relationships between Bitcoin and both the US Dollar and Euro, employing monthly data from November 2017 to February 2025 and utilizing the Fourier Shin cointegration test. The results of the cointegration tests, bolstered by Fourier series analysis, reveal significant long-term cointegration relationships between Bitcoin and both the USD and Euro. The DOLS analysis indicates that a 1% rise in Bitcoin leads to a 14% decrease in the USD price and a 17% increase in the Euro. These results imply that Bitcoin exhibits a high sensitivity to ex-change rates, positioning it as a speculative investment in the short term. The pronounced inverse correlation between the US Dollar and Bitcoin raises the possibility of Bitcoin serving as a substitute for the US Dollar.
This study empirically aims to analyze the impact of primary monetary policy stance and transmission mechanisms of the European Central Bank (ECB)—such as the total assets of the ECB, long-term interest rate based on the government bond yields, and the EURUSD exchange rate—on major volatile cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum, as well as the leading stablecoin Tether. To this end, the study employs the linear Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) and the Bootstrap ARDL (BA-ARDL) procedures, robust approaches with limited data in time series analysis. The dataset consists of monthly data over the period from January 2019 to December 2025. We summarize the novel and robust primary empirical results of our study as follows: First, (i) it is revealed that the ECB’s balance sheet expansion has encouraged Bitcoin and Ethereum, yet has also, to a limited extent, suppressed Tether. Secondly, (ii) while the ECB’s long-term interest rate negatively impacts the prices of Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Tether, the negative impact on Tether is relatively weaker. Finally, (iii) the EURUSD exchange rate positively affects Ethereum, while its effect on Bitcoin is not statistically significant. On the other hand, at a 10% significance level, EURUSD has a weak negative effect on Tether. In conclusion, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the primary monetary policy stance and transmission mechanisms of the ECB influence the leading digital assets in distinct ways. Taking our findings into account is crucial for designing the digital euro in terms of financial stability and regulatory framework. Finally, we offer sound policy implications for the ECB based on empirical findings.
The purpose of this study is to examine the potential safe-have properties of the two most popular cryptocurrencies, i.e., Bitcoin and Ethereum, against equites, government bonds and gold. To do so, the paper makes use of a daily dataset ranging from 2018 to 2022 acknowledging both the COVID-19 and the potential halving effect in the cryptocurrency market. To robustly assess the research question, the paper employs a quantile GARCH model with non-parametric diagnostics, dynamic Local Projections and rolling window estimations for robustness. The findings of the paper suggest that both assets act as diversifiers against equities and against each other, whereas the halving effect is statistically insignificant and the COVID-19 effect is statistically significantly positive only for the returns of Ethereum. The results imply that cryptocurrencies could contribute to portfolio diversification under stress market conditions.
Der Text analysiert den tiefgreifenden Wandel des Finanzsystems in Zeiten der Digitalisierung. Er zeigt, wie private Fintechs und Krypto-Emittenten das staatliche Monopol der Regulierung und der Geldbereitstellung infrage stellen. Marktmacht entsteht durch Regulierungsversagen.
In today’s world the way people handle money and carry transactions is changing. For centuries, people were dependent on physical coins and paper notes issued by governments. Now, we are moving towards digital banking, using apps and various platforms. But a new innovation called cryptocurrency is now gaining importance. It is promising a massive change in the global financial system.In simple words, cryptocurrency is a form of digital money. It does not exist as physical coins or bills but it relies entirely on the internet. it uses "cryptography" (a way of using complex math to keep information secret and secure) and "blockchain" (a digital record-book that everyone can see but no one can easily change). The money in your bank account is controlled by a central authority like a bank or a government, many cryptocurrencies are "decentralized." This means they are run by a global network of computers instead of one single boss.Because more people are shopping online and sending money to other countries, everyone is looking for a faster, cheaper, and safer way to pay.
This chapter examines the current inefficacious condition of cross-border payments and the challenges they pose to users and oversight authorities. In particular, it analyses the causes and implications of the ongoing decline in correspondent banking. It distills the Building Blocks in the G20 Roadmap to Cross-Border Payments , the progress made at the transnational level in their implementation, and the remaining obstacles. The discussion encompasses recommendations that are exploratory in nature, including the feasibility of new multilateral cross-border payment platforms and arrangements, the soundness of global stablecoin arrangements, and factoring an international dimension into the design of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). The chapter suggests that, while the G20 Roadmap is comprehensive, it lacks certain elements, including the potential for utilising distributed ledger technology (DLT) to enhance the efficiency, speed, and safety of cross-border payments. It draws on theories of technology and innovation adoption to analyse DLT adoption for cross-border payments and the regulatory approach that should be taken to facilitate its use. Alongside the benefits of stimulating economic growth and enhancing financial inclusion over the long term, it explores the regulatory, legal, and institutional barriers that DLT infrastructure may present for cross-border payments.
This study focuses on cryptocurrencies. At the beginning it explains what cryptocurrency is, its main features and main areas of its significance for the economy. In this section it deals with the possibility of cryptocurrency one day replacing traditional money, trading opportunities cryptocurrencies offer, possibility to finance a business with digital coins and its availability to people without the access to banking services. A brief overview of cryptocurrency history and a definition of the technology of blockchain are also provided. The practical part of the thesis is analysing cryptocurrencies Bitcoin, Ethereum and Litecoin. Firstly, these are described in terms of their origin, emission, circulation, price development and process of mining. Secondly, the impact of selected factors on the price fluctuation of selected cryptocurrencies is evaluated using statistical methods and econometric models. The analysis showed the cryptocurrency prices are more dependent on the internal factors such as the transaction volume, transaction fee, total supply, demand and hashrate, than on the external factors such as interest rates, exchange rates, stock prices and the price of gold.
The European Union's Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA) and the United States' GENIUS Act of 2025 both prohibit stablecoins from offering interest. However, this restriction has failed to curb the demand for yield on digital dollars. Instead, capital has migrated to functional alternatives, including decentralized finance lending protocols, offshore stablecoin issuers, and tokenized Treasury funds. This paper analyzes the economic impact of restricting yield in digital currency markets. It focuses specifically on tokenized Treasury funds, which are SEC-registered money market funds that now manage over $15 billion in assets. Because these funds offer blockchain-based yields, they compete directly with non-interest-bearing stablecoins for the same investors. This regulatory inconsistency creates a significant opportunity for regulatory arbitrage, raising significant questions about the coherence of current digital asset frameworks. Furthermore, data from the Council of Economic Advisers indicates that the macroeconomic benefits of banning stablecoin yield are modest compared to the associated welfare costs. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for future financial stability and policy design.
John Manuel Barrios, Christoph Bertsch, Linda Schilling
A stablecoin is two things at once, a claim on U.S. Treasury bonds and the money of decentralized finance. That dual role makes the coin a conduit that carries runs in both directions. We build a model in which the coin is fully backed by Treasuries, pays no interest, and is the gateway to DeFi lending, so that the peg, the liquidation value of the issuer's reserves, and the run on a DeFi protocol are determined jointly rather than fixed in advance. Contagion then runs both ways. A shock that begins in crypto sets off withdrawals, redemptions, and reserve sales, fire-selling Treasuries that would otherwise have stayed calm. A shock to Treasury values runs the other way. It weakens the peg, strips the dollar value from DeFi claims denominated in the coin, and pulls lenders out of a protocol that was never in trouble. The mechanism is a no-interest paradox. Promising only par and paying no interest is what makes a stablecoin look safe on its own; it is also what forces it to depend on DeFi returns, and that dependence carries the shock in both directions. Full backing does not buy safety, because the threshold at which the peg breaks is set by a market the issuer does not control.
Tansaya Kunaratskul, Ashley Lannquist, Andre Reslow, Nicolas Zhang
How should central banks explore tokenized reserves? Central banks are increasingly exploring how to make their reserves available to selected banks using distributed ledger technology, referred to as tokenized reserves. This chapter covers policy objectives for tokenized reserves, operating models and roles of central banks, implications for monetary policy implementation, alternative solutions, and implementation strategies. Ultimately, central banks’ strategic decisions and policy options will vary across jurisdictions, reflecting differences in available resources, legal systems, and policy priorities.
The article examines the historical stages of the formation and development of financial control over local finances in Ukraine. The origins of financial control since the times of Kyivan Rus are investigated, the role of “Ruska Pravda” in the formation of the first legal principles of financial control is characterized. Particular attention is paid to the functioning of treasury chambers, control departments and state control bodies during the period of the Russian Empire, starting from the 18th century. The transformations of the financial control system in the conditions of imperial, Soviet and independent Ukrainian statehood are analyzed. The key regulatory legal acts that regulated financial control at different stages of history are identified – from the “Temporary Regulation on Control Institutions” (1866) to the Budget Code of Ukraine. It is proposed to define the following historical stages of the formation of financial control over local finances in Ukraine: 1) the Old Russian stage (X–XIII centuries) – primary forms of financial control, when the financial system was based on in-kind taxes and fees, and financial control was carried out through the princely administration, in particular through the “princely treasury”; 2) the pre-reform period (XIII century – until 1864) – financial control at the local level was weak, carried out through the governor’s office, the main attention was focused on collecting taxes and ensuring revenues to the empire’s budget; 3) the period of the zemstvo reform (1864–1917) – the creation of zemstvos – local self-government bodies with the right to draw up local budgets, the emergence of the first institutions of financial control at the local level; 4) the Soviet centralized stage (1918–1990) – complete centralization of finances, local budgets were integrated into the national budgets; 5) the beginning of independent financial control (1991–2000) – the formation of the legal foundations of local self-government, the emergence of a regulatory framework for local financial control, the formation of financial powers of local authorities; 6) codification and systematization of regulatory and legal acts regulating financial control (2001–2010); 7) the stage of decentralization and digital transformation (2010 – to date) – the activation of local self-government, digitalization of budget processes, the introduction of public control tools.
ABSTRACT The article argues that the European Central Bank's (ECB) regulatory stance toward cryptocurrencies was underpinned by efforts to preserve legitimacy and monetary sovereignty. Triangulating a content analysis on the ECB's policy statements on cryptocurrencies, examination of European macroeconomic data, and price dynamic analysis of Bitcoin from 2014 to 2025, this article traces an evolution in the ECB's regulatory stance toward cryptocurrencies through two phases that inadvertently abetted cryptocurrency adoption: neutralization (2018–2019) and cooptation (2020‐present). From 2018 to 2019, the ECB assumed a hostile stance toward cryptocurrencies, attempting to neutralize its influence. However, its market‐oriented approach to regulation created a lack of controls over cryptocurrencies and a deregulation of payment processing that enabled their expansion. By 2020, the ECB shifted toward tolerance and even cooptation when unsuccessful policy attempts to contain economic precarity amid the pandemic subsequently incentivized household adoption of cryptocurrencies which, still unregulated, gained notoriety as a prospective alternative source of income. During this period, the shift to digital payments, global isomorphic pressures from the SEC's history with cryptocurrencies, and global currency competition against the Euro energized the ECB's aspirations for a digital Euro, for which it sought to coopt cryptocurrency stablecoin designs and popularity to secure public legitimacy.
Krypto-Assets sind mit der zunehmenden Beliebtheit von Kryptowährungen ein verbreitetes Anlageprodukt geworden. Das Ziel der Arbeit besteht darin, das Konzept der Blockchain mit entsprechender technischer Umsetzung zu erläutern, die Investitionseigenschaften anhand einer Analyse aufzuzeigen und die Auseinandersetzung mit häufigen Kritikpunkten. Die empirisch‑quantitative gewonnenen Daten liefern im Betrachtungszeitraum von 01.02.2018 bis 31.01.2025 folgende Erkenntnisse: Kursentwicklung: Bitcoin (1010%) weist die höchste Performance auf und übertrifft damit Ethereum (211%) um das Fünffache, den S&P 500 (114%) um das Neunfache. Tether (2%) fokussiert keine Rendite, sondern Stabilität, dient daher nur als Referenz. Volatilität: Ethereum (1.9) hat den höchsten Spitzenwert für die rollierende Volatilität im 30-Tage-Fenster, gefolgt von Bitcoin (1.5). Einem vergleichbaren Bewegungsmuster folgen der S&P 500 (0.85) und Tether (0.15) und finden ihre Extremstelle ebenso im ersten Halbjahr 2020. Die deutlich geringere Schwankungsanfälligkeit des S&P 500s ist auf die höhere Diversifizierung durch die dahinterstehenden Wertpapiere zurückzuführen, bei Tether aufgrund der direkten Wertkoppelung an US-Dollar. Rendite-Risiko-Verhältnis: Bitcoin (35%) weist in der jährlichen Betrachtungsform die höchste annualisierte Rendite auf, gefolgt von Ethereum (15%), dem S&P 500 (10%) und Tether (0.003%). Die annualisierte Standardabweichung beschreibt das Risiko und wird von Ethereum (2.11) angeführt, darauffolgend Bitcoin (1.21), der S&P 500 (0.19) und Tether (0.008). Im sich daraus ergebenden Rendite-Risiko-Verhältnis führt der S&P 500 (0.39), danach folgen Bitcoin (0.26), Ethereum (0.04) und Tether (-3.21). Somit liefert der S&P 500 trotz geringerer Performance das beste Verhältnis aus Rendite und Risiko, was auf das deutlich geringere Risiko zurückzuführen ist. Korrelation: Bitcoin und Ethereum haben die höchste Korrelation (0.81), da beide als Kryptowährungen den gleichen Marktbedingungen ausgesetzt sind. Die Differenz zu 1 ist auf Einflüsse zurückzuführen, die das Asset selbst betreffen. Der S&P 500 korreliert leicht mit Ethereum (0.3) und Bitcoin (0.28). Die geringste Korrelation weist Tether auf, im Zusammenhang mit Bitcoin (0.01), dem S&P 500 (0.01) und Ethereum (0.02). Maximum Drawdown: Ethereum (90%) hat den höchsten Verlust im Vergleich zum Höchststand. Darauf, ebenso zu Jahresende 2019, folgt Bitcoin (70%), der S&P 500 (30%) zu Beginn des Jahres 2020 und Tether (5%) Ende 2019. Gesamtbewertung: Statistisch weist Bitcoin im Vergleich zu Ethereum höhere Renditen bei geringerem Risiko auf. Die geringere Korrelation von Bitcoin mit klassischen Anlageprodukten wie dem S&P 500 kann eine Diversifikationsfunktion begründen. Haftungsausschluss: Diese Thesis dient ausschließlich akademischen Zwecken. Trotz größter Sorgfalt bei der Erstellung kann keine Gewähr für die Richtigkeit und Vollständigkeit der enthaltenen Informationen übernommen werden. Der Autor übernimmt keine Haftung für Folgen, die sich aus der Verwendung dieser Arbeit ergeben. Disclaimer: This thesis is intended for academic purposes only. Although care has been taken to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the information, no guarantee is made that it is free of errors or omissions. The author assumes no responsibility for any consequences arising from its use.
Tarun Chitra, Theo Diamandis, Nathan Sheng, Luke Sterle · 5 authors
Decentralized perpetuals protocols have collectively reached billions of dollars of daily trading volume, yet are still not serious competitors on the basis of trading volume with centralized venues such as Binance. One of the main reasons for this is the high cost of capital for market makers and sophisticated traders in decentralized settings. Recently, numerous decentralized finance protocols have been used to improve borrowing costs for perpetual futures traders. We formalize this class of mechanisms utilized by protocols such as Jupiter, Hyperliquid, and GMX, which we term~\emph{Perpetual Demand Lending Pools} (PDLPs). We then formalize a general target weight mechanism that generalizes what GMX and Jupiter are using in practice. We explicitly describe pool arbitrage and expected payoffs for arbitrageurs and liquidity providers within these mechanisms. Using this framework, we show that under general conditions, PDLPs are easy to delta hedge, partially explaining the proliferation of live hedged PDLP strategies. Our results suggest directions to improve capital efficiency in PDLPs via dynamic parametrization.
In the case of Federated Learning (FL) there's a problem.Most existing systems require a central coordinator or permissioned ledgers, restricting the transparency of the data and leaving the prevention of Sybil attacks in a grey area.We have addressed these issues by using a permissionless Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchain to coordinate FL, and making it difficult for Sybil attacks to be carried out by putting model lists and updates directly onto the blockchain.Large amounts of data are instead stored offchain, using InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) which takes care of the problem of storage space.Our system has a training process that is split into rounds, with clients updating a shared model locally, sending out IPFS content identifiers to the network and a designated 'lister' pooling the updates and publishing the new global model.The idea is that the blockchain would be based on Proof of Stake with longest chain, highest stake finality, but our prototype mimics this with a tiny light-weight proof-of-stake mechanism.
Kryptovalutor har under det senaste decenniet vuxit fram som en viktig del av det globala finansiella systemet. Samtidigt har debatten om deras miljöpåverkan blivit allt mer intensiv, särskilt med avseende på den höga energianvändningen hos kryptovalutor baserade på Proof of Work (PoW). I denna studie undersöks och analyseras skillnaderna i miljöpåverkan mellan PoW och den alternativt utvecklade mekanismen Proof of Stake (PoS). Syftet är att visa hur PoS erbjuder en betydligt mer hållbar modell för framtida blockkedjebaserade system. Arbetet baseras på en litteraturstudie av vetenskapliga källor och innehåller även en känslighetsanalys för att bedöma robustheten i resultaten. Slutsatsen visar att PoS har en avsevärt lägre energiförbrukning och koldioxidpåverkan, vilket gör den till ett attraktivt alternativ ur ett hållbarhetsperspektiv.