In God the Created: Pragmatic Constructive Realism in Philosophy and Theology, Benjamin Chicka sets for himself some demanding problems. First, how do we say anything at all about a God who is the answer to the ontological question rather than half an answer? Here, Chicka sides with Robert Neville, affirming a wholly transcendent God, the creator of being-itself. However, Chicka finds Neville's God to be too transcendent. Having embraced the transcendent God, Chicka then asks how we can say anything theologically about God. Here, he is inspired by John Cobb's theological project of understanding God in relation to the concerns of the world, and so he seeks a God in intimate and so immanent relationship with the world. However, Chicka finds Cobb's process God not transcendent enough (God cannot be one actuality alongside others), and finally too constraining, such that the urgings of divine aims end up making the adventure of reality more a matter of destiny than of dance. Chicka rejects pansychism, both in the process tradition and in the agapism and evolutionary love of Charles Sanders Peirce. He finds Peirce's agapism too Hegelian. However, having jettisoned pansychism, Chicka needs a way to move from the world back to God. I am not convinced that he ever gets there.Chicka does not seek to resolve the debate between Neville and Cobb but rather to create a “mediating position” that extends the insights of both.1 A crucial move in this effort is his appeal to pragmatic notions of continuity. I find this to be the most exciting dimension of his project because at the very least it suggests ways to move pragmatic responses to Thomism beyond stale accusations of substance theism. Chicka, however, does not go this direction, despite his seeming desire to understand creation from which both the world and God emerge. At the end of the day, Chicka has only continuity to get us to knowledge of God, and this alone is insufficient.This paper is both a critique of Chicka's pragmatic constructive realism as it relates to knowledge of God and an effort to defend a counterproposal that covers much of the same territory as Chicka's proposal. It will begin with a more sustained discussion of Chicka and argue that once he takes metaphysical normativity off the table, he loses any ability to differentiate between good theology and bad theology. I then show that solving the problem of God-talk is essential to any specifically pragmatic theology because without claims about God that are not strictly negative in nature, God becomes a meaningless concept for pragmatism. I will then defend an argument for creation ex nihilo that draws on the work of Robert Spitzer, S. J. This argument places my counterproposal within the ground of being school of metaphysics (and so hopefully keeping the pressure on process thinkers who incorrectly dismiss such arguments), without having the difficulties created by Neville and Chicka's wild God. Finally, I will seek to show how the problem of God-talk can be overcome in a way that leaves the idea of God pragmatically meaningful. I will do so by drawing on the two possibilities for knowledge of God: Spitzer's proposal for “hyperphatic” knowledge of God; and transcendental pragmatism.Chicka argues that our abductive claims about God participate in God. He contends that “God is the sort of creator marked by Peirce's categories and semiotic activity.”2 Further, he writes, “Symbols, as determinate things, are part of God's nature that comes from creating.”3 At least two problems arise with these claims. First, they seem to be non sequiturs. There is no clear reason why claims made by beings must necessarily reveal the ground of being, especially if God is not one actuality alongside others. Emphasizing the continuity of the symbol makers with creation is insufficient for explaining what makes for a good symbol about God. If all symbols as determinate things are part of God's nature, then we do not yet have a way determining which symbols do a better job of revealing God's nature than others. Chicka does offer some clues. For example, he writes, “Neville's theory could gain some concrete traction if instead of finite/infinite contrasts and broken symbols, it is pushed in the direction of finite/infinite growth.”4 However, what constitutes growth is unclear. If, by virtue of its novelty, a symbol grows creaturely expressions of God, then any symbol would do this. If growth obtains come what may, we still do not know the difference between a good symbol of God and a bad one. If all symbols are symbols of God, then to say that a symbol reveals God does not tell us anything at all.There are clues of a strong teleology in Chicka's text. He writes, “God immanently revealed is that toward which everything is developing,”5 but Chicka does not provide a reason, so far as I can see, to believe that everything is developing toward anything at all. At best, nature develops, but that only means it changes. It seems that Chicka wants to maintain the telos found in much process theology—maximal unity in diversity—but never clearly explains why this teleology is warranted.The heart of Chicka's difficulties can be to his to all normativity of our of God and of reality as and then that normativity and theology. Chicka sides with Neville in both the of process and the agapism of Peirce. and agapism a of as a of reality as This is to divine so is For both process and for this means that reality is in the direction of the divine of God's For both and move in this direction, as Chicka sides with Neville in and agapism both to be of as a both and both that normativity can be to from God. of God means that God is metaphysical metaphysical teleology is a one that I am not Neville Chicka in Chicka Neville's metaphysics of essential and things have an essential This for a metaphysical things have that come from to things a metaphysical has an essential this essential is is the problem say that is is to say that it has more than one for a one rather than a all things have a that the of one rather than a God's for this Neville Chicka seem to be to this at least at the and so the of reason in is found in Chicka's to and to the of Chicka is that this is He This is in the because the is not in from the by God. It is a is at least as as and can go There is but it is on our is what it a God all possibilities and is no for all and is still in nature, not in God from is both and yet It is because if the is it is not clear how is from It is crucial because it a very in Chicka's proposal. It is our in this of creation that God is both revealed and realism of Chicka's pragmatic constructive realism comes from the ability of to be in both and all are created are more than and some the of question for Chicka is how to one has a better rather than a about God. Chicka is that not all about God are created He writes, an ever and world, developing the sort of constructive responses more than because God is not we are to be symbols of God as we what makes for a better symbol of God rather than a his of metaphysical Chicka makes of to both the continuity of with nature, some of and to the of within the without to any metaphysical the reality of which emerge. can be and yet can be with any such however, is that the revealed in of is It is to the these There is no way to from alone what a good is as to a bad This would seem an to how to better and claims about to Neville's theory of to this but that theory is not without its For Neville, all things participate in and the that these create are the of in most are in of a of A of being seems to for Neville with what does it to say that create create contrasts rather than things that are to and so create they work to the of that which is In this they be to be of to the of the if that which is this would that is to There would be no such as means the same its If is then is no reason to believe that a of being in a of If a more means more to that it does not that First, if it then it would seem that Neville's would to the same problems of teleology that he finds with and if is to the then what means for one is not to be the same for others. Neville claims that by he means what means by thinkers can the of because of the idea of in God, but this is not for Chicka Neville because they both that anything can be of God's nature beyond the ontological of creation and that this reveals any metaphysical is a in Chicka's theology that is by the difference between revealing God and God. God is created to Chicka because of the continuity of God's with the responses to that responses are not the of found in nature of God. Chicka writes, best, the responses to God's creation the world so that it God's because responses have God in that Chicka is of revealing God, but it is what part of God's nature is revealed God for Chicka and Neville is this seems as we have yet to what the world on an on the is far more than can be He claims that the and of of for the of However, he that this makes his project very on this very He writes, in are no in things, in beings in the things to which they then can be no are who they Chicka makes clear his to Neville's and I would argue that his is on the problem of Having of Chicka needs to very clear how he it to theology. If he cannot this then his will the of one and so our knowledge of the world is at If, as I will in is to and if is no between and then the of are is by most and as an with this understanding will some I get to my proposal for transcendental pragmatism. For the I to and I more dimension of pragmatism. is that which that is to and so to the that John of makes clear the relationship between and For all by the of an a in the of the of between of this takes the of a problem to be in the becomes in the very process of being to a means an to the problem direction and to the a problem is in the a of is to a and the are and as means to the of the they the of in of are of what will are with to the relation of to can that are means in the of the are means to the of problems the of and for is no way to than in its relation to can that as an is the idea of the relation as If that is necessarily to the of then it that any that cannot a difference to the of cannot be an problem for any pragmatic theology that with God as the ground of all reality such as that found in Neville, Chicka, and my proposal. If such must be strictly if God can only be in of what God is at least at about God must be strictly and so could not any difference to the of these would be this it is that with the process tradition God is the of metaphysical rather than the to with Neville in this understanding of God Chicka himself to the problem of anything pragmatically about God. I am not that he this problem in his proposal for pragmatic constructive I too with the ground of being but I am to it the for creation ex nihilo by Robert Spitzer, S. J. First, I will some but not all of Spitzer's for creation ex I will then by two to the problem of for creation ex nihilo drawing on and Here, I in that and I the argument to be the most if only because it does not any in to of and is not a but rather a of by a reality on a I this not to but to its difference from and are that in the world of as expressions of such can A both a and an of to a of by the and to the of such would of an of in the rejects because they very of and the very of thinkers have on the of sets to defend the of reality with divine reality and to creation If a of that proposal the of that seems a to creation ex in claims to a to must for any a and the of of the as a is than the not of an but of the of If, as who creation ex nihilo the world is this so as the of would be I am to defend the but am to that to to it and as as has that he has found no theory that the the argument from the the argument from the of the the and that this is In an such as our of must is is will not within the will be A the would have to that our does not must have an to such as and have that this to as that between and and have to the for why such are to He to the of of the who has as on the of the and the argument from to an to writes, is that an argument is what and a is what it takes to an the in the can no the of a There is no they have to the problem of a we have from and for the of an of has a argument from for an to the argument with a all reality could have no reality one more not not A reality is as reality that is reality for its reality is reality that does not on any reality of any for its is reality on a of an of not not If reality on a of would have to be a most this a but it be a If the most is a reality the most must be a reality are not then makes a crucial a reality are not In argument for the of God for the of a that is crucial to the argument at that this argument does not on the of an it on the that an of on the of is to without a reality that does not on the of is an argument a of as the could not in the if the for of the in the are ever process of the of the world as such has on the of a of Spitzer's argument that this If both God and the world are then would clearly it cannot be the that reality is of only that at least one reality For Spitzer, an reality is a with and things are in as and are in which to in within being the of reality is found to be it would have to be in because an reality must ground the of all the that on that it must do it must be an because it is an ground of the of process theism. A reality would be a that a reality which does not anything from Spitzer's reality the God of process However, that such a reality is and he seems to that such a reality can I will with on divine but I will with at least at the end of this on the question of divine reality must be and it must be that can only be one cannot both be without being the same as would the this reality as have in of creation ex nihilo in part because I would they a for ground of being and process theological of the world and God. Chicka is on the of the problem in with Neville, and who ground of being who would defend the of must do more than appeal to one idea to the of for the God of creation ex we must to the problem of anything about God, a problem that becomes the from within a pragmatic of problem with the that within the of creation ex nihilo any metaphysical cannot be to any metaphysical about God. God is the to not its how then can anything be about God so that the idea of God can be found to be pragmatically I will two for solving this the and the transcendental to making God as an reality the of of and so of claims that this to “hyperphatic” knowledge of God; understanding from the the of being and to the that at the of the of being in relation to everything from the of the of being, one gets a of by all the of by It and not a would be to the of that are not necessarily to would be in and could no difference to would be pragmatically finds of knowledge of God the of understanding and its ability to the of as we can and of reality as more and more is in we can get a of how this with an of understanding that is made in our knowledge of God is revealed in what the of and the claims that the ability love good and to love and the and to and the of is a It to be and in with a of and contends that the love of and the good has He must be to the of who of and the of and the does not seem to have any to its to of and the good God God is as the we know love and we know that the is more to claims about God's nature than Neville Chicka would the of Spitzer's understanding of God, this some for about divine I will this in the of the transcendental for knowledge of God on an of all transcendental transcendental claims must be necessarily in all pragmatic they are necessarily and It is not to one and not are all of pragmatic only any transcendental the of God must be in relation to and in of all transcendental can come to understand God God's transcendental are some of these God of creation ex nihilo is not but is an this as one to the problem of He writes, it seem that the has us to a of knowledge about but this is not the because must be it is the of of everything that has one very it makes all reality and so is for as of is the of of that not have to of are is no of without This is what makes from a pragmatic If can only find in that can a difference to then it needs to that the of and that affirming God as the of all to affirming God as the for the of must process as a of reality as of reality that reality is of reality as not only makes the of by the can no difference to the of it is pragmatically the of that are in any about can no difference to the of and so are pragmatically as such must be a a understanding of is a the most pragmatic transcendental is the in pragmatic as If, as pragmatic understanding and are to the of and so to then one is to the understanding of and one must know how are to the of an and to the of the problem by that understanding of and an of to all and this is the to the of an end in the of a problem is to its that to understanding all to all and a reality by the of end is a means to the of and they in to yet others. the of understanding has no the pragmatic understanding of and has no the is in to the of this is the the becomes the end to which all are It is the end and so a to be pragmatically an end that the would in a have that the is with to the it can be in of this is it is not of the to a end does not that the of that end is with the of the but only with a of its I do not have the to it in this it can be that for John and I would argue for as of the a to for and the from any of the Chicka himself comes to affirming a transcendental in pragmatic as such he the pragmatic idea about is embraced in the of if from is at the of how and that of an rather than as for the ability to know the about any In a to be a such be for the way of This to as much as Chicka's appeal to the idea about This is the of transcendental pragmatism. of transcendental must necessarily be by virtue of the relationship of to two knowledge and transcendental have on some Spitzer's knowledge of God is found in the of reality the of and and transcendental Spitzer's appeal to the love of and the good is to the of the God, and transcendental the of a as for pragmatic as is much we cannot say about the God of creation ex we must say from a transcendental that God is with of the pragmatic God seems to have in all of to the part of this I to two why the idea of transcendental seem to a in First, transcendental with its to a seem the of However, transcendental only to by the of all It a dimension to all but does not its to transcendental is with that all which means that they believe that all knowledge is and It would seem to that an idea is necessarily and at the same I that up the between and I do not so because it is to differentiate between and A transcendental be but not explains this as In making a transcendental I to the and in my I that the of my is and the are because the of in its is from its in the I and I of is not a about the that I to be that it has an this is rather a about the that I be one can say that transcendental claims are that are not necessarily this would not a from affirming as In the could not be to the of the would of could not be In this they of that Chicka never for that the symbols we for God are about God. the idea of symbols about God is to his that God is He writes, and Neville that the only we can about God is God is my is that the symbols of God of God as I this by a way in which we could say that God is In I to what I to be a for the to God as the ground of is the ability to that God can from Spitzer's argument that the of all that is cannot be If it it would be by a reality and so could not be an If Spitzer's argument is a necessarily God would in one would be with an of and contends Spitzer, in I with that an cannot be this does not the that the could more If the cannot one is with of and such a would have to be pragmatically However, I am not convinced that a reality cannot both in and such an understanding of God and is by Charles and that the of things to be must to God. does not this we can the to the of God's knowledge of the world would be is God cannot know a world could draws on two to how a God can still be of as having is the idea of the For a is a very of suggests of a in which a has a of a world that If this idea is for in it suggests be to an being not in is to that in understanding of an actuality is from the of to the is in the of If it is to say that can be a between and in then it be to say is a between and a is by of his of a God that can more knowledge of the world yet as part of a in of Charles not with I do not find and will only what I to be the in the First, within ground of being God is the ground of but is only of does not to God, and so is he God's of us no to God, then our is if is not God then God not be of as for would be to would it be to understand the of God in of the of the of God is to be the for the of to be that without which no could I do not is he claims that and I have that God must because God must However, and an is not on anything and so it is not is not in this argue for the of of for about how a God can on what that God It is only to that a pragmatic understanding of a God needs to find a way to this idea A of has he would that God's knowledge can the one it would seem that he would the idea that God's knowledge could the would seem to be a on God. For example, he writes, is it cannot be by any because has no as However, means so as God all things to be then it is not a on God to say that God's knowledge of the must the himself that I this to both that can be it and that the does not a on which is not cannot be of as a In Spitzer's is not a that could God's is not at if the of what God the God only with knowledge of things that not have to be but have that one can of growth in God. For example, writes, as does yet have any in does not to say that no not the can know with the as is yet to to God's relationship with the world the of God as a with that this of divine to does not divine He writes, does not that difference in the divine of the world necessarily in to from process thinkers he as I do not how they have the that the divine is to the world in a of that our because we cannot what it would be to know this is not a reason why it cannot be and for metaphysical God's knowledge then the world does create God by This does not that God must be to how the world comes to Chicka is to that God can be better revealed in the world, but that does not that in so one has to God's only that God's has better Chicka our on an in that between ground of being theology and process theology. tradition that he has to in his of this is a tradition in of I that the direction of that growth be in transcendental However, Chicka, I find that a for in theology. to the of that project will be the problem of a question so far in Chicka's pragmatic constructive
The single and combined work of Scott Lash and John Urry have become extremely significant in the social sciences in the UK and beyond. In particular, one of their principal ideas that dominant capitalist countries have made a transition to a ‘disorganized’ and ‘mobile’ era founded on digital networks, global flows of people, objects, images and texts, decentralized and flexible work practices, declining industrialized social classes, and a loss of power for the nation-state to regulate flows of finance, has influenced many researchers. Their work has even helped to establish of a new ‘mobilities’ paradigm in the social sciences. Ernest Mandel has also explored the impact of digital technology on capitalist restructuring. Indeed, he claims that from 1945 onwards, a ‘late capitalist’ wave emerged predicated on the rise of factors like automation, the service sector, and new class identities. Unlike Lash and Urry, however, Mandel applies Marxist theory to investigate these changes. The aim of this paper is to draw on Mandel’s ideas to examine critically the account put forward by Lash and Urry. Five areas in particular will be discussed: theoretical differences between Lash and Urry and Mandel; the transition between different phases in capitalism; the changing composition of social class; whether the workplace is now dominated by decentralized and flexible networks; and the relationship between finance, the state and digital technology.
 Los trabajos individuales y combinados de Scott Lash y John Urry han adquirido una gran relevancia en las ciencias sociales del Reino Unido y de otros países. En particular, una de sus ideas principals y más influyente se fundamente en que los países capitalistas dominantes han realizado una transición hacia una era "desorganizada" y "móvil" basada en las redes digitales, flujos globales de personas, objetos, imágenes y textos, prácticas laborales descentralizadas y flexibles, declive de las clases sociales industrializadas y pérdida de poder del Estado-nación para regular los flujos financieros. Su trabajo, sin duda, ha contribuido a establecer un nuevo paradigma de "movilidades" en las ciencias sociales. También Ernest Mandel ha estudiado el impacto de la tecnología digital en la reestructuración capitalista. En efecto, afirma que a partir de 1945 surgió una oleada de "capitalismo tardío" basada en el auge de factores como la automatización, el sector servicios y las nuevas identidades de clase. Sin embargo, a diferencia de Lash y Urry, Mandel aplica la teoría marxista para investigar estos cambios. El objetivo de este artículo es basarse en las ideas de Mandel para examinar críticamente el relato presentado por Lash y Urry. Se discutirán cinco áreas en particular: las diferencias teóricas entre Lash y Urry y Mandel; la transición entre las diferentes fases del capitalismo; la composición cambiante de la clase social; si el lugar de trabajo está ahora dominado por redes descentralizadas y flexibles; y la relación entre las finanzas, el Estado y la tecnología digital.
In the established landscape of research in the social sciences, populism is seen as a type of politics that chiefly revolves around the distinction between the “people” and the “elite”.1 Within this, different forms of populism can be distinguished—ranging from right-wing and authoritarian to liberal-centrist and religious varieties. In the camp of the political left, populism is often cast as essentially a democratic endeavor. Drawing on a conception of inclusive peoplehood, which is not opposed to other vulnerable social groups “below” but solely to the “elite above”, many authors emphasize that it is crucial to pursue a populist strategy in order to overcome existing hegemonies, democratic deficits, ossifications, and class-rule (Grattan, 2016; Howse, 2019; Kempf, 2020; McCormick, 2001; Mouffe, 2018). Throughout the past few decades, the landscape of research on left populism has grown considerably. Various studies have investigated the history of anti-establishment popular movements of the 19th century, such as the Narodniki in Russia or the American Populist Party (Canovan, 1981; Kazin, 1995). Further, research has also looked at how, from the 1990s, anti-neoliberal alliances in Latin America had their momentum, entered governmental office, and established a far-reaching renewal of constitutional orders (Linera, 2014; Weyland, 2013). And in particular, in the last decade, the rejuvenation of left politics in Europe and the United States has often relied on populist approaches (Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis, 2019). Taking a more systematic stance, theories of radical democracy have sought to demonstrate that politics in modern societies is structured around the embodiment of the “people” as an empty signifier. From this perspective, it is not by accident that left varieties of populism can be recurrently observed; their persistence reflects that politics is, at its heart, not only concerned with policy-issues but with “constructing the people” (Laclau, 2014). Thus, populism may not be episodic, accidental, or a specific ideology that brings the vital interests of ordinary people to the fore. Rather, it must be seen as a generalizable discursive strategy—in the words of Ernesto Laclau: the “royal road”—when it comes to the strive for political power (Laclau, 2005, p. 67).2 In recent years, a neo-Machiavellian strand of research has emerged that is not so much concerned with the discursive construction of peoplehood, instead focusing on the materiality of social power. Drawing inspiration from the political philosophy of Early Modernity and Niccolò Machiavelli's insights on the exercise of political rule, these approaches assume that societies are constantly split between the “plebian” people and the ruling elites (McCormick, 2001; Vergara, 2020a). Against this backdrop, populism amounts to a plebian politics that “springs from the politicization of wealth inequality in reaction to systemic corruption and the immiseration of the masses, an attempt to balance the scales of social and political power between the ruling elite and the popular sectors” (Vergara, 2020a, p. 238). However, the historical balance sheet of left populisms remains ambivalent. Though recurring attempts to change society through mobilizing the people against the elite can be observed, they have often revealed self-defeating dynamics:3 the collapse into authoritarian government once populism is in power, the inability to account for how complex modern societies actually operate by adhering to an all-too simple people/elite binary distinction; and the arising incapacity to identify reasons for political failure and success apart from stressing that popular mobilizations played a key role (when successful) or were diluted (when unsuccessful). In the current debate on left-populism, however, a broader camp of anti-populist critiques mainly advances objections from a normative angle (Arato, 2016; Cohen, 2019; Urbinati, 2019; Müller, 2014). It is argued that populist forms of politics are, in principle, incompatible with central achievements of liberal democracy, such as pluralism, the separation of powers, or parliamentary representation. They seem to be unavoidably entangled in authoritarian politics and, therefore, in need of being rejected as a course of political action. This article aims to move beyond the rigidified divide between appraisals and rejections of left populism by shifting the field of inquiry: instead of investigating the relation of populism and the political as such or evaluating whether populism is compatible with principles of liberal democracy, it conducts a reconstruction of discussions in the broadly conceived camp of European Social Democracy in the “long 19th century” (Hobsbawm). Thereby, it focuses on how the leading intellectuals of this political current were reflecting on the practical potentials and limitations of a politics that is centered on the popular will. As emphasized by contemporary discourse theoretical approaches to the study of populism, politics in modern societies largely revolves around the role of the people and the conflicts that surround its articulation.4 Therefore, a wide range of people-centered politics can be identified—popular, populist or folky. While the article echoes the definition of populism as people-centered politics that opposes the elites, it stresses not only its inevitability but also its limitations. It scrutinizes populism's internal pitfalls and how it reacts to the contradictions and problems inherent to the structure of the given societal order. Thereby, the article aims at circumventing a transhistorical per se perspective and at a closer examination of the respective social circumstances. The ambition is not to provide an encompassing investigation of the whole theoretical landscape of social democracy, but to look for how some of the leading intellectuals grappled with the problems of a people-centered politics in the light of practical experiences in political struggle. It will be argued that we can identify an intellectual trajectory that dealt with the question of whether a politics that is centered on the popular will as opposed to the elites is able to incite social transformation and collective learning processes or, to the contrary, thwarts them. Admittedly, one should not overlook that there are severe differences between the social democratic mass parties of the 19th century and the contemporary disorganized party landscape. However, the article encourages an investigation that overcomes the juxtaposition of left populisms and other variants of progressive politics such as social movement politics (Arato & Cohen, 2021) or class-politics (Seferiades, 2019). Drawing on the recent work of the historian Christina Morina, European Social Democracy is understood in the following as a broader social movement that extended from the mid-19th century to the First World War (Morina, 2022).5 It was characterized by the advent of new forms of political organization, most notably trade unions and social democratic mass parties. Despite severe internal conflicts, it was driven by a shared approach to history and society that was drawn from the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The defining feature of European Social Democracy was located in a specific mode of social inquiry. As stressed by Morina, activists and intellectuals may have engaged in controversies around a whole set of issues. They all assumed, however, that modern societies take part in the course of historical evolution and that a sound type of political action must be derived from a comprehensive inquiry that clarifies the scopes for social transformation at a given historical moment. The common denominator that constituted coherence within the movement was the that societies a historical as and that a conception of political action must to the problems and contradictions inherent in this to Morina, the not in a perspective, but in the to the They leading intellectuals and activists of European Social from work a of to the and not a in the only to was actually a study of the (Morina, p. This was the of European Social Democracy that from the works of Marx and to different activists and such as Karl and It to be that the was a political the and were in many and the theories of Marx and were not the only intellectual at the of the 19th However, it comes to the that the controversies within the European the of played a crucial This article how this political movement dealt with the potentials and of populist the Marx and of the and a on people-centered with the movements of their they that to for social In to this in European Social Democracy in its as as its more radical to the popular will from the how of European Social to the of politics and society through a of social democracy as around the This populism was to the but it should also overcome the by collective learning the that European Social trajectory can be seen as a learning with to potentials and pitfalls of left controversies should be to these insights and in more on the history of populism demonstrate that social movements have often relied on the distinction between the people and the from the different attempts to the of against the of in the to the popular in and from to of the the to the people as opposed to the elites has played a role 2001; As the intellectual historian has the 19th century was a for the of a people-centered was and for its a central of political how to of the popular will and how it can be to a the and the the people in the and the people in the of social and the of the democratic were p. Though at the constitutional established forms of popular and as being by the people as power. the to the people was a of within a politics that the of and The with as was the in to power that democratic in and the for a of popular and p. However, the to the people was only one part of the From the 19th century, a with popular be as at this into the works of the of but it was other in of a on popular an inquiry into the of social such as the the and the for a that should the of modern society instead of to the will of the the to and, by a political that the historical achievements within these social popular as of which are on a of the people” popular the of on it was to the of the this set the for a whole strand of discussions around the between politics and popular Admittedly, it was not of the but the on historical through a people-centered politics that were by and and into From attempts to change society had to with a on the one society be characterized by a of social Against this backdrop, approaches to this as a whole were as being to on the other society was conceived as a and, a politics for or of that the whole The question to is a politics that on the popular will a course of action for the societal contradictions of modern Marx and works the intellectual for European Social a in evaluating popular It has a in recent political philosophy to of in order to democracy and social 2016; However, there is from the that Marx political action. to from the that societies are by an of different forms in politics and Thus, Marx not only a conception of p. in but was also in an for how the of the and its were through a of the the and the This of had it to the role of political action. the of modern a people-centered politics not be seen as the for social This to political within the of the as by Marx and p. from of more or p. Marx on the one democracy as the of the and popular against conception of in the p. the was of approaches to political action that at the of the This can be from of in the one has to the of by in the and for was to incite an in the of and, a the of the will of the people” p. central was the to political in of and from on to an political strategy Marx and argued that the the of they on the of the the for a & p. They the as of the of of which are to be all the more and in as their is & p. In the to on the in this the as in the which relied on with but to be as they not with the central of modern society p. The political is a political it within the of The and more it is, the more is it of social The of political is the The of politics is the will. The more and, therefore, the more the political is, the more it in the of the the more is it to the and of the and the more is it of the of social p. The more and the more comprehensive is the political of a the more the will its in the of the that will be in it in political it the will as the of all and and the of a of the as the the of the p. The approach into an the political that the for in the for social As this approach revolves around the of the it that society is by the between and not by the contradictions between and within social This can be as a of people-centered the popular will as the that in the political is not able to the of historical however, not solely through political but also through other of social to the of the this popular to a and it comes to and strategy approaches that the of the people is the strategy of This that must be to a of popular it was not it was not or it was the radical activists and the and so with more and However, they in many not to of will but to the of social adhering to a political they have of the for they this Marx rejected as as popular to the It may be to at this in Marx a to a political of the p. one can identify an in people-centered instead of in and, in many attempts to change society through collective action centered on the popular will it in the of or one must take in the more question how political action is able to to the transformation of the systemic of modern societies at in of the existing power and of the a political be It this political as it and its its its comes to the the political p. In this the a conception of politics to the that an to It was by the social democratic current in the to overcome the it more to an perspective on societies and a politics centered on The of history the the are on on and The parties of as they are the by They with is the of this and and look p. As to democracy and its role in the not it a more part in in with an that not the the of of its a as the most radical party has played as such in and as the of the whole and such a the whole mass in it and which to be as In Marx and a approach and their to the at However, as it the of the popular will and popular not be by it to the and The more that social democratic mass parties emerged in different the more the conflicts around the of the the Marx in and with of the movement the of the is to be in the to the of As by this was mainly to with the of in that to structure From the European Social Democracy had its unions and social democratic parties emerged which were to a of and a conception of Marx was in of a from popular to In particular, European Social around the for the political in the of the the and by the of parties were to government by the people and political the First World War and to a parties the of democratic in p. The movement largely to people-centered politics and around the for As has in study on European Social one can a from politics to popular from the activists were to the as a by it from the of the from the the people as mass the central of p. one in it all all have from or from a they the of the of this be a of different of that have more differences had the “people” of as as the of are have more at p. that the the within the people” and different of the to the that the and the p. the social should not be the trade but the of the is able to to of and it or of the people it is able to all these and a of and p. was to a was the need to the of society to a and the popular will. between and the question how to of the between the and the of a people-centered politics in European Social to the of political from the political to the the political a in the 19th Though part in the of social the constitutional its role in that to and society as a In encompassing of the advent of modern the constitutional has that of constitutional were in most European of as as to the and of p. existing it these to popular The to the people was a reaction to the that was established to the of the political The existing order was by the role of the people against the ruling constituted for renewal from the on to the that this As European Social Democracy part in the of modern it established internal of from the in and to the trade unions that to on with the was of social democracy to p. of advances in these different a political strategy that at mobilizing the through a p. an such collective action not as as the following a that was to incite collective learning Thereby, beyond the was not solely concerned with the of will but with the of within the social Admittedly, the with the as will be argued of all of societal However, one can identify a move from a left to a the new of social in modern societies and emphasized the role of new popular movements historical for forms of popular movements and new of and the of the with the p. was that they were not and by party or trade They relied on mass and their of the a systematic of this in from Taking from the movements in Russia and the in the role of collective The few in Russia at that were not the only to in the as there was complex of of the a of p. this popular movement to a for European Social that the of politics must be the mass was the the social democratic transformation of societies As a of the separation of the political and the and the of is but an of the the one in the course of the is split into a of in and in of the other the political is not by the in a but in with the of the in a by the of representation. p. focusing its politics on or on the trade unions and in the social democracy a The was as a of being within the respective of and not as a for a new societal but as a between different parties in the political for or as a between specific groups of the and It into of The mass however, as a course of action that the ambition into it should the whole of social democracy into a its from simple and so that a popular in society as a only and at these p. which the constituted and of societal of societies into a the mass or mass and the mass are to be they must a that is, the of the must be drawn into the p. It is not the of a of that can the for action within the the contrary, this can only be through into the and of the at it can only from political and intellectual from a for on the part of the by Social Democracy p. a against populist politics have cast the that within of the “people” as an of for and the for the was the for how as an encompassing societal it is the social can that from a as the people in order to political and in the for political a it should a of collective learning and overcome the that in the of are the historical of the and the p. The modern comes of historical and its are for to it the to is its only to is not only with but also with The of its on whether the can from its p. Thus, politics is not only political will. It is the of an and an of to a of on which the should be able to from of in a collective learning this the between the and the and the of the to the The only role of the in social democracy is to the their historical The the of the in Social Democracy only in to the of they in this that is, in to how they the of all the of the masses, in in a to how they of their the and of mass action. p. In these argued that an role in the learning however, is to as it thwarts at the that the role of and is in the to a conception of in the course of the the their from being to of Admittedly, it remains how this can be However, to the that the of political action can be the is on an that the limitations of it the of political will on social or the role of be often in with crucial are the for movements that can we of collective learning from the to its be a This should not to overlook the that approach can be as an it can be seen as a in a learning it from the of existing experiences from and the limitations of class-politics to the in As we have it is to the that the advent of social democratic mass parties as some of left European Social Democracy as a movement that to a of popular Despite these it to the popular will. should be to European Social Democracy with the recent of left populisms the in as by studies & Kioupkiolis, 2019; Kioupkiolis, a can be from social movement and the to a people-centered politics in such as or were As in this the of populism should not be seen as an between and populism, but as a learning The of a learning in the of social movements was by the in study on the advent of the movement from to In this how the practical of in the and with intellectual advances in from these leading to a and of political In of and was able to identify at the of political action and intellectual p. The that this article has through it with one in the mid-19th century, Marx and from the of They that a sound conception of politics should take the structure of modern society into This to the of of political action to the and its inherent contradictions In in the century, European Social Democracy in all its and to a politics that at social transformation through the popular will. This was largely to the of the political that was to take and it to overcome In from the problems of by of a on the one it should overcome the through a as the it should overcome the through an on collective learning The was not only the of but also of the of and Thereby, the for a a populism that should not only simple or but should also society and the to the the contradictions and societal of modern society are take on collective learning processes was It beyond the of this article to provide a comprehensive account of the relation of populism, and collective learning However, some of account must be has political approaches from the that social as such with society and rejected it in all its a perspective, and instead of mass in of the inquiry is, from the constituted and of social are seen as in a it through into social or through a sound perspective on the social to the of the of social European Social which was concerned with a more of modern it has in this that processes can in a progressive and that must be overcome from within the internal contradictions of social not solely through a on the social the that there can be many and movement may not be to social the conception the of the collective learning as it to of action that may to be in many Thereby, populism of the to learning of are in order to the with the of and the into mass the can collapse into a the learning is from the In light of the against the of a that must be It remains to or more complex of The of learning is as is not the of mass of populism have to on a more mode of inquiry that the of a perspective, but not of from the a is that to the of social of constantly the of movement a must be in order to populist approaches seem for social transformation in a given or the of left populism or per it is to with more of left populisms in as as in contemporary and whether they incite or collective learning whether they to or whether they from past to and as as to the for on of this It is within the of the research by the for and and by is of at the of of
Blockchains and distributed ledgers, like records of all kinds, can be viewed as socio-informational-technical ecosystems, not just technical artifacts. As such, they are governed by principles, procedures, and rules created by social actors. These “epistemic rules of the game” – and the version of social “truth” that results from their operation – are deeply interrelated to epistemic and social trust, and with power and authority. When peer disagreements arise within blockchain and distributed ledger ecosystems, much can be learned from how such epistemic disagreements are resolved (or not) about what version of “truth” concerning a state of affairs will be accepted in the face of two alternate justified true beliefs, and about the basic character and cohesiveness of these ecosystems and the socio-epistemic realities they constitute.
The building of the blockchain is predicted to harken the end of the contemporary sovereign order. Some go further to claim that as a powerful decentering technology, blockchain contests the continued functioning of world capitalism. Are such claims merited? In this paper we consider sovereignty and blockchain technology theoretically, posing possible futures for sovereignty in a blockchain world. These possibilities include various forms of individual, popular, technological, corporate, and techno-totalitarian state sovereignty. We identify seven structural tendencies of blockchain technology and give examples as to how these have manifested in the construction of new forms of sovereignty. We conclude that the future of sovereignty in a blockchain world will be articulated in the conjuncture of social struggle and technological agency and we call for a stronger alliance between technologists and democrats.
The increasing collective use of distributed application software platforms, programming languages and crypto-currencies around the blockchain concept for general transactions may have radical implications for the way in which society conceptualises and applies trust and trust-based social systems such as law. By exploring one iteration of such generalised blockchain systems – Ethereum – and the historical lineage of such systems, it will be argued that indeed their ideological basis is largely one of distrust, decentralisation and, ultimately, via increasing disassociation of identity, a fear of the body itself. This ideological basis can be reframed as a crypto-legal approach to the problems of human interaction, one whereby the purely technological solutions outlined above are considered adequate for reconciling many of the problems of our collective existence. The article concludes, however, by re-iterating a perspective of law more so as an entirely embodied and trust dependent notion. These aspects go some way to explaining the necessarily centralised role it takes on within societies. They also explain why the crypto-legal approaches advanced by systems like Ethereum – or even the co-opting of blockchain technology by law firms themselves – will only ever be at best efficiency exercises concerned with the processing of data relating to legal affairs, and not the more radical, ambiguous and difficult process of actual legal thought or, indeed, engagement with trust.
Reviewed by: Max Weber’s ‘Objectivity’ Reconsidered John Veugelers (bio) Laurence H. McFalls. Max Weber’s ‘Objectivity’ Reconsidered. University of Toronto Press. viii, 390. $75.00 ‘All the analysis of infinite reality which the finite human mind can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that only a finite portion of this reality constitutes the object of scientific investigation, and that only it is “important” in the sense of being “worthy of being known.” But what are the criteria by which this segment is selected?’ These words come from ‘The “Objectivity” of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy’ by the great sociologist Max Weber. Like his better-known The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, this essay was published in 1904, when Weber became the co-editor of the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik. His practical task was to lay out the [End Page 327] standards by which the journal’s editors would judge submissions. In doing so he entered the Methodenstreit, the debate among German historians and political economists over the goals and methods of the human sciences. The advocates of a scientistic and law-seeking approach (the followers of the Manchester school) argued against those for whom the uniqueness of historical individuals and events meant that knowledge could only be particular (and certainly not valid ‘across cases’). Weber disagreed with both sides. To stake out an alternative, his essay promotes the concept of the ideal type, analyzes the relationship between knower and known, defines the realm in which values belong in social science, and elaborates upon the kind of knowledge toward which social science might legitimately aspire. In my opinion, Weber took an overly restrictive view of the possibility of arriving at non-trivial generalizations that hold under specific social and historical conditions. With its mix of discernment, depth, and passion, his essay remains riveting nonetheless, and even today we can gain much from reading it. The hundredth anniversary of the essay’s publication provided the occasion for the conference that gave birth to this edited volume. Questions its fourteen chapters address include: What does objectivity mean for Weber? How do his ideas relate to those of others (Durkheim, Mannheim, Gramsci, Parsons, Wittgenstein, Winch, Kuhn)? In his substantive research, did Weber follow his own prescriptions on method? What are the advantages or disadvantages of applying a Weberian approach to the study of European as well as non-European societies? In general the answers this volume gives to the first two questions are insightful. The opening chapter by John Drysdale argues convincingly that Weber’s essay says more about what objectivity is not than what it is. Yet Weber does cast doubt on the assumption that the knower (subject) can know anything without also holding presuppositions about the known (object). Further, we can learn what Weber means by objectivity (as well as ideal types, historical individuals, and cultural significance) when he puts these concepts to work in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. John B. Gunnell’s chapter draws on Kuhn to show that Weber’s argument that social science can provide valid knowledge rests on the implicit notion that the categories used by social scientists and those they study are different. Oddly, Gunnell does not really develop the Kuhnian insight that Weber’s portrait of how science works (in the selection of problems, methods, evidence, and rules of proof) is fixed on the practices of the individual researcher and thus quite unsociological. Just as strange in Weber’s essay is the neglect of power. Typically his sociology gives much attention to social conflict. In the essay on [End Page 328] objectivity, however, Weber argues that knowledge arrived at impartially can help policy makers to make responsible decisions. Drawing on Mannheim and Gramsci, Peter Breiner’s chapter points out practical limits to the implementation of ‘impartial knowledge’: the barriers put up by incommensurate ideologies and antagonistic political forces. Among other outstanding chapters, that by Catherine Colliot-Thélène provides an adept comparison of Weber and Durkheim (though contemporaries working to institutionalize sociology in their respective countries, apparently they never read each other’s work). And the chapter by Jeffrey Kopstein poses a riddle. Elsewhere...