Transcendental Pragmatism vs. Benjamin Chicka's Pragmatic Constructive Realism: A Comparison of Method and Metaphysics

Abstract

In God the Created: Pragmatic Constructive Realism in Philosophy and Theology, Benjamin Chicka sets for himself some demanding problems. First, how do we say anything at all about a God who is the answer to the ontological question rather than half an answer? Here, Chicka sides with Robert Neville, affirming a wholly transcendent God, the creator of being-itself. However, Chicka finds Neville's God to be too transcendent. Having embraced the transcendent God, Chicka then asks how we can say anything theologically about God. Here, he is inspired by John Cobb's theological project of understanding God in relation to the concerns of the world, and so he seeks a God in intimate and so immanent relationship with the world. However, Chicka finds Cobb's process God not transcendent enough (God cannot be one actuality alongside others), and finally too constraining, such that the urgings of divine aims end up making the adventure of reality more a matter of destiny than of dance. Chicka rejects pansychism, both in the process tradition and in the agapism and evolutionary love of Charles Sanders Peirce. He finds Peirce's agapism too Hegelian. However, having jettisoned pansychism, Chicka needs a way to move from the world back to God. I am not convinced that he ever gets there.Chicka does not seek to resolve the debate between Neville and Cobb but rather to create a “mediating position” that extends the insights of both.1 A crucial move in this effort is his appeal to pragmatic notions of continuity. I find this to be the most exciting dimension of his project because at the very least it suggests ways to move pragmatic responses to Thomism beyond stale accusations of substance theism. Chicka, however, does not go this direction, despite his seeming desire to understand creation from which both the world and God emerge. At the end of the day, Chicka has only continuity to get us to knowledge of God, and this alone is insufficient.This paper is both a critique of Chicka's pragmatic constructive realism as it relates to knowledge of God and an effort to defend a counterproposal that covers much of the same territory as Chicka's proposal. It will begin with a more sustained discussion of Chicka and argue that once he takes metaphysical normativity off the table, he loses any ability to differentiate between good theology and bad theology. I then show that solving the problem of God-talk is essential to any specifically pragmatic theology because without claims about God that are not strictly negative in nature, God becomes a meaningless concept for pragmatism. I will then defend an argument for creation ex nihilo that draws on the work of Robert Spitzer, S. J. This argument places my counterproposal within the ground of being school of metaphysics (and so hopefully keeping the pressure on process thinkers who incorrectly dismiss such arguments), without having the difficulties created by Neville and Chicka's wild God. Finally, I will seek to show how the problem of God-talk can be overcome in a way that leaves the idea of God pragmatically meaningful. I will do so by drawing on the two possibilities for knowledge of God: Spitzer's proposal for “hyperphatic” knowledge of God; and transcendental pragmatism.Chicka argues that our abductive claims about God participate in God. He contends that “God is the sort of creator marked by Peirce's categories and semiotic activity.”2 Further, he writes, “Symbols, as determinate things, are part of God's nature that comes from creating.”3 At least two problems arise with these claims. First, they seem to be non sequiturs. There is no clear reason why claims made by beings must necessarily reveal the ground of being, especially if God is not one actuality alongside others. Emphasizing the continuity of the symbol makers with creation is insufficient for explaining what makes for a good symbol about God. If all symbols as determinate things are part of God's nature, then we do not yet have a way determining which symbols do a better job of revealing God's nature than others. Chicka does offer some clues. For example, he writes, “Neville's theory could gain some concrete traction if instead of finite/infinite contrasts and broken symbols, it is pushed in the direction of finite/infinite growth.”4 However, what constitutes growth is unclear. If, by virtue of its novelty, a symbol grows creaturely expressions of God, then any symbol would do this. If growth obtains come what may, we still do not know the difference between a good symbol of God and a bad one. If all symbols are symbols of God, then to say that a symbol reveals God does not tell us anything at all.There are clues of a strong teleology in Chicka's text. He writes, “God immanently revealed is that toward which everything is developing,”5 but Chicka does not provide a reason, so far as I can see, to believe that everything is developing toward anything at all. At best, nature develops, but that only means it changes. It seems that Chicka wants to maintain the telos found in much process theology—maximal unity in diversity—but never clearly explains why this teleology is warranted.The heart of Chicka's difficulties can be to his to all normativity of our of God and of reality as and then that normativity and theology. Chicka sides with Neville in both the of process and the agapism of Peirce. and agapism a of as a of reality as This is to divine so is For both process and for this means that reality is in the direction of the divine of God's For both and move in this direction, as Chicka sides with Neville in and agapism both to be of as a both and both that normativity can be to from God. of God means that God is metaphysical metaphysical teleology is a one that I am not Neville Chicka in Chicka Neville's metaphysics of essential and things have an essential This for a metaphysical things have that come from to things a metaphysical has an essential this essential is is the problem say that is is to say that it has more than one for a one rather than a all things have a that the of one rather than a God's for this Neville Chicka seem to be to this at least at the and so the of reason in is found in Chicka's to and to the of Chicka is that this is He This is in the because the is not in from the by God. It is a is at least as as and can go There is but it is on our is what it a God all possibilities and is no for all and is still in nature, not in God from is both and yet It is because if the is it is not clear how is from It is crucial because it a very in Chicka's proposal. It is our in this of creation that God is both revealed and realism of Chicka's pragmatic constructive realism comes from the ability of to be in both and all are created are more than and some the of question for Chicka is how to one has a better rather than a about God. Chicka is that not all about God are created He writes, an ever and world, developing the sort of constructive responses more than because God is not we are to be symbols of God as we what makes for a better symbol of God rather than a his of metaphysical Chicka makes of to both the continuity of with nature, some of and to the of within the without to any metaphysical the reality of which emerge. can be and yet can be with any such however, is that the revealed in of is It is to the these There is no way to from alone what a good is as to a bad This would seem an to how to better and claims about to Neville's theory of to this but that theory is not without its For Neville, all things participate in and the that these create are the of in most are in of a of A of being seems to for Neville with what does it to say that create create contrasts rather than things that are to and so create they work to the of that which is In this they be to be of to the of the if that which is this would that is to There would be no such as means the same its If is then is no reason to believe that a of being in a of If a more means more to that it does not that First, if it then it would seem that Neville's would to the same problems of teleology that he finds with and if is to the then what means for one is not to be the same for others. Neville claims that by he means what means by thinkers can the of because of the idea of in God, but this is not for Chicka Neville because they both that anything can be of God's nature beyond the ontological of creation and that this reveals any metaphysical is a in Chicka's theology that is by the difference between revealing God and God. God is created to Chicka because of the continuity of God's with the responses to that responses are not the of found in nature of God. Chicka writes, best, the responses to God's creation the world so that it God's because responses have God in that Chicka is of revealing God, but it is what part of God's nature is revealed God for Chicka and Neville is this seems as we have yet to what the world on an on the is far more than can be He claims that the and of of for the of However, he that this makes his project very on this very He writes, in are no in things, in beings in the things to which they then can be no are who they Chicka makes clear his to Neville's and I would argue that his is on the problem of Having of Chicka needs to very clear how he it to theology. If he cannot this then his will the of one and so our knowledge of the world is at If, as I will in is to and if is no between and then the of are is by most and as an with this understanding will some I get to my proposal for transcendental pragmatism. For the I to and I more dimension of pragmatism. is that which that is to and so to the that John of makes clear the relationship between and For all by the of an a in the of the of between of this takes the of a problem to be in the becomes in the very process of being to a means an to the problem direction and to the a problem is in the a of is to a and the are and as means to the of the they the of in of are of what will are with to the relation of to can that are means in the of the are means to the of problems the of and for is no way to than in its relation to can that as an is the idea of the relation as If that is necessarily to the of then it that any that cannot a difference to the of cannot be an problem for any pragmatic theology that with God as the ground of all reality such as that found in Neville, Chicka, and my proposal. If such must be strictly if God can only be in of what God is at least at about God must be strictly and so could not any difference to the of these would be this it is that with the process tradition God is the of metaphysical rather than the to with Neville in this understanding of God Chicka himself to the problem of anything pragmatically about God. I am not that he this problem in his proposal for pragmatic constructive I too with the ground of being but I am to it the for creation ex nihilo by Robert Spitzer, S. J. First, I will some but not all of Spitzer's for creation ex I will then by two to the problem of for creation ex nihilo drawing on and Here, I in that and I the argument to be the most if only because it does not any in to of and is not a but rather a of by a reality on a I this not to but to its difference from and are that in the world of as expressions of such can A both a and an of to a of by the and to the of such would of an of in the rejects because they very of and the very of thinkers have on the of sets to defend the of reality with divine reality and to creation If a of that proposal the of that seems a to creation ex in claims to a to must for any a and the of of the as a is than the not of an but of the of If, as who creation ex nihilo the world is this so as the of would be I am to defend the but am to that to to it and as as has that he has found no theory that the the argument from the the argument from the of the the and that this is In an such as our of must is is will not within the will be A the would have to that our does not must have an to such as and have that this to as that between and and have to the for why such are to He to the of of the who has as on the of the and the argument from to an to writes, is that an argument is what and a is what it takes to an the in the can no the of a There is no they have to the problem of a we have from and for the of an of has a argument from for an to the argument with a all reality could have no reality one more not not A reality is as reality that is reality for its reality is reality that does not on any reality of any for its is reality on a of an of not not If reality on a of would have to be a most this a but it be a If the most is a reality the most must be a reality are not then makes a crucial a reality are not In argument for the of God for the of a that is crucial to the argument at that this argument does not on the of an it on the that an of on the of is to without a reality that does not on the of is an argument a of as the could not in the if the for of the in the are ever process of the of the world as such has on the of a of Spitzer's argument that this If both God and the world are then would clearly it cannot be the that reality is of only that at least one reality For Spitzer, an reality is a with and things are in as and are in which to in within being the of reality is found to be it would have to be in because an reality must ground the of all the that on that it must do it must be an because it is an ground of the of process theism. A reality would be a that a reality which does not anything from Spitzer's reality the God of process However, that such a reality is and he seems to that such a reality can I will with on divine but I will with at least at the end of this on the question of divine reality must be and it must be that can only be one cannot both be without being the same as would the this reality as have in of creation ex nihilo in part because I would they a for ground of being and process theological of the world and God. Chicka is on the of the problem in with Neville, and who ground of being who would defend the of must do more than appeal to one idea to the of for the God of creation ex we must to the problem of anything about God, a problem that becomes the from within a pragmatic of problem with the that within the of creation ex nihilo any metaphysical cannot be to any metaphysical about God. God is the to not its how then can anything be about God so that the idea of God can be found to be pragmatically I will two for solving this the and the transcendental to making God as an reality the of of and so of claims that this to “hyperphatic” knowledge of God; understanding from the the of being and to the that at the of the of being in relation to everything from the of the of being, one gets a of by all the of by It and not a would be to the of that are not necessarily to would be in and could no difference to would be pragmatically finds of knowledge of God the of understanding and its ability to the of as we can and of reality as more and more is in we can get a of how this with an of understanding that is made in our knowledge of God is revealed in what the of and the claims that the ability love good and to love and the and to and the of is a It to be and in with a of and contends that the love of and the good has He must be to the of who of and the of and the does not seem to have any to its to of and the good God God is as the we know love and we know that the is more to claims about God's nature than Neville Chicka would the of Spitzer's understanding of God, this some for about divine I will this in the of the transcendental for knowledge of God on an of all transcendental transcendental claims must be necessarily in all pragmatic they are necessarily and It is not to one and not are all of pragmatic only any transcendental the of God must be in relation to and in of all transcendental can come to understand God God's transcendental are some of these God of creation ex nihilo is not but is an this as one to the problem of He writes, it seem that the has us to a of knowledge about but this is not the because must be it is the of of everything that has one very it makes all reality and so is for as of is the of of that not have to of are is no of without This is what makes from a pragmatic If can only find in that can a difference to then it needs to that the of and that affirming God as the of all to affirming God as the for the of must process as a of reality as of reality that reality is of reality as not only makes the of by the can no difference to the of it is pragmatically the of that are in any about can no difference to the of and so are pragmatically as such must be a a understanding of is a the most pragmatic transcendental is the in pragmatic as If, as pragmatic understanding and are to the of and so to then one is to the understanding of and one must know how are to the of an and to the of the problem by that understanding of and an of to all and this is the to the of an end in the of a problem is to its that to understanding all to all and a reality by the of end is a means to the of and they in to yet others. the of understanding has no the pragmatic understanding of and has no the is in to the of this is the the becomes the end to which all are It is the end and so a to be pragmatically an end that the would in a have that the is with to the it can be in of this is it is not of the to a end does not that the of that end is with the of the but only with a of its I do not have the to it in this it can be that for John and I would argue for as of the a to for and the from any of the Chicka himself comes to affirming a transcendental in pragmatic as such he the pragmatic idea about is embraced in the of if from is at the of how and that of an rather than as for the ability to know the about any In a to be a such be for the way of This to as much as Chicka's appeal to the idea about This is the of transcendental pragmatism. of transcendental must necessarily be by virtue of the relationship of to two knowledge and transcendental have on some Spitzer's knowledge of God is found in the of reality the of and and transcendental Spitzer's appeal to the love of and the good is to the of the God, and transcendental the of a as for pragmatic as is much we cannot say about the God of creation ex we must say from a transcendental that God is with of the pragmatic God seems to have in all of to the part of this I to two why the idea of transcendental seem to a in First, transcendental with its to a seem the of However, transcendental only to by the of all It a dimension to all but does not its to transcendental is with that all which means that they believe that all knowledge is and It would seem to that an idea is necessarily and at the same I that up the between and I do not so because it is to differentiate between and A transcendental be but not explains this as In making a transcendental I to the and in my I that the of my is and the are because the of in its is from its in the I and I of is not a about the that I to be that it has an this is rather a about the that I be one can say that transcendental claims are that are not necessarily this would not a from affirming as In the could not be to the of the would of could not be In this they of that Chicka never for that the symbols we for God are about God. the idea of symbols about God is to his that God is He writes, and Neville that the only we can about God is God is my is that the symbols of God of God as I this by a way in which we could say that God is In I to what I to be a for the to God as the ground of is the ability to that God can from Spitzer's argument that the of all that is cannot be If it it would be by a reality and so could not be an If Spitzer's argument is a necessarily God would in one would be with an of and contends Spitzer, in I with that an cannot be this does not the that the could more If the cannot one is with of and such a would have to be pragmatically However, I am not convinced that a reality cannot both in and such an understanding of God and is by Charles and that the of things to be must to God. does not this we can the to the of God's knowledge of the world would be is God cannot know a world could draws on two to how a God can still be of as having is the idea of the For a is a very of suggests of a in which a has a of a world that If this idea is for in it suggests be to an being not in is to that in understanding of an actuality is from the of to the is in the of If it is to say that can be a between and in then it be to say is a between and a is by of his of a God that can more knowledge of the world yet as part of a in of Charles not with I do not find and will only what I to be the in the First, within ground of being God is the ground of but is only of does not to God, and so is he God's of us no to God, then our is if is not God then God not be of as for would be to would it be to understand the of God in of the of the of God is to be the for the of to be that without which no could I do not is he claims that and I have that God must because God must However, and an is not on anything and so it is not is not in this argue for the of of for about how a God can on what that God It is only to that a pragmatic understanding of a God needs to find a way to this idea A of has he would that God's knowledge can the one it would seem that he would the idea that God's knowledge could the would seem to be a on God. For example, he writes, is it cannot be by any because has no as However, means so as God all things to be then it is not a on God to say that God's knowledge of the must the himself that I this to both that can be it and that the does not a on which is not cannot be of as a In Spitzer's is not a that could God's is not at if the of what God the God only with knowledge of things that not have to be but have that one can of growth in God. For example, writes, as does yet have any in does not to say that no not the can know with the as is yet to to God's relationship with the world the of God as a with that this of divine to does not divine He writes, does not that difference in the divine of the world necessarily in to from process thinkers he as I do not how they have the that the divine is to the world in a of that our because we cannot what it would be to know this is not a reason why it cannot be and for metaphysical God's knowledge then the world does create God by This does not that God must be to how the world comes to Chicka is to that God can be better revealed in the world, but that does not that in so one has to God's only that God's has better Chicka our on an in that between ground of being theology and process theology. tradition that he has to in his of this is a tradition in of I that the direction of that growth be in transcendental However, Chicka, I find that a for in theology. to the of that project will be the problem of a question so far in Chicka's pragmatic constructive