The zero knowledge properties of interactive proof systems (IPSs) are studied in the case that the verifier is a 2-way probabilistic finite state automaton (2pfa). The following results are proved: A new definition of zero knowledge is introduced. This definition captures a concept of âzero knowledgeâ for IPSs that are used for language recognition.
An investigation of interactive proof systems (IPSs) where the verifier is a 2-way probabilistic finite state automaton (2pfa) is initiated. In this model, it is shown: Additional results concern two other classes of verifiers: 2pfa's that halt in polynomial expected time, and 2-way probabilistic pushdown automata that halt in polynomial time. In particular, IPSs with verifiers in the latter class are as powerful as IPSs where verifiers are polynomial-time probabilistic Turing machines. In a companion paper [7], zero knowledge IPSs with 2pfa verifiers are investigated.
Energy dissipation in systems with linear viscoelastic damping is examined. It is shown that in such viscoelastically damped systems the use of additional dissipation mechanisms (such as boundary velocity feedback or thermal coupling) may not improve the rate of energy decay. The situation where the viscoelastic stress relaxation modulus decreases to its (positive) equilibrium modulus at a subexponential rate, e.g., like (1 + t)<sup>-x</sup> + E, where α > 0, E > 0 is examined. In this case, the nonoscillatory modes (the so-called creep modes) dominate the energy decay rate. The results are in two parts. In the first part, a linear viscoelastic wave equation with infinite memory is examined. It is shown that under appropriate conditions on the kernel and initial history, the total energy is integrable against a particular weight if the kinetic energy component of the total energy is integrable against the same weight. The proof uses energy methods in an induction argument. Precise energy decay rates have recently been obtained using boundary velocity feedback. It is shown that the same decay rates hold for history value problems with conservative boundary conditions provided that an <i>a priori</i> knowledge of the decay rate of the kinetic energy term is assumed. In the second part, a simple linear thermo-viscoelastic system, namely, a viscoelastic wave equation coupled to a heat equation, is examined. Using Laplace transform methods, an integral representation formula for <i>W(x,s</i>), the transform of the displacement <i>w(x, t)</i>, is obtained. After analyzing the location of the zeros of the appropriate characteristic equation, an asymptotic expansion for the displacement <i>w(O,t)</i> is obtained which is valid for large <i>t</i> and the specific kernel <i>g(t) = g</i>(â) + ĂÂŽtĂ·-1 [over]Ă (Ă·), 0 < Ă· < 1. With this expansion it is shown that the coupled system tends to its equilibrium at a slower rate than that of the uncoupled system.
ASIANPERSPECTIVE, Vol. 16, No. 2, Fall-Winter 1992, pp. 109-140 THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND KOREAN MUNICIPAL FINANCE Robert C. Rickards and Yi Seung-Cheoul How stable are Korean municipal revenue and expenditure patterns? What accounts for observed differences across cities in the level of stability in those patterns? Over time, has the pro cess of democratization begun to have an impact on the stability of municipal budgetary priorities? How does the stability of Korean cities' fiscal priorities compare with that of municipali ties in other systems? The answers to these key questions have important implications for policymakers locally, nationally, and internationally. At present, a New World Order is replacing the Yalta sys tem of international arrangements. As explained below, the three processes shaping this Order are changing the socioeco nomic and political environment of most national and local gov ernments. In its efforts to maintain rapid economic growth, the Republic of Korea finds itself increasingly exposed to such change (Clifford, 1988: 80-81). Shifting budgetary priorities constitute one indicator of a government's response to environ mental change. That makes investigation of the level of stability in Korean cities' taxing and spending patterns especially interesting. The study undertaken here begins by describing the three processes behind the emerging New World Order. Next, it con siders factors affecting municipal governments' ability to 109 110 Robert C. Rickards and Yi Seung-Cheoul respond to changes caused by those processes. After discussing how municipalities formulate their budgets, the study then looks for evidence of systematic shifts in Korean cities' fiscal priorities. In analyzing the evidence discovered, it compares Korean budgetary behavior with that observed in Germany, Japan, and Switzerland. Finally, the study concludes with sever al policy recommendations likely to improve cities' responsive ness to environmental change. The recommendations apply not only to Korean cities specifically, but also to municipalities throughout the developing world in general. The New World Order Beginning with the breaching of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the system of international arrangements in place since World War II has been collapsing. Subsequent years have seen the dissolu tion of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. They also have witnessed: the successful campaign against Iraq undertaken by the United States, together with its European and Arab allies; a tentative settlement in the Cambodian civil war; the initiation of Middle East peace talks, and the first meet ings that eventually may lead to reunification of the Korean nation. In the resultant, radically transformed international environment, three powerful processes are shaping a New World Order. These processes are globalization, localization, and democratization (Suzuki, 1991:1-2; Wun'Gaeo, 1991: 3-5). In the 1950's and 1960's, many newly independent coun tries accepted foreign capital to finance ambitious industrializa tion programs. Often, social dislocation, poverty, pollution, and other unanticipated consequences resulted. Nevertheless, at least along Asia's Pacific Rim, some industrialization programs were quite successful. Accordingly, mutual economic interde pendence deepened, both among countries in that region and with the North American and European regions. This deep, mutual interdependence is a product of the glob alization process. Globalization thus involves the free flow of goods, capital, people, and information. In practical terms, it means opening domestic economies ever wider to the interna tional free-trade system. The New World Order and Korean Municipal Finance 111 Having moved to globalization, the Asian Pacific Rim region came under the influence of another process of environ mental change: localization. In earlier periods of development, almost all the region's nations relied on state control of capital formation and prices, domestic economic management by vari ous government agencies, and the concentration of wealth and decisionmaking in a few urban areas. State control of concen trated capital and production, though, led to corruption and maldevelopment. Today, many countries no longer regard state-led develop ment as a desirable model for economic progress. Instead, they prefer a more decentralized approach based on competition among private businessmen. Hence, governments are starting to sell off state-owned corporations, thereby separating them selves from capital. In addition, they are allowing more room for the interplay of market forces in managing the economy. As entrepreneurs search out economic...
The prospect is advanced that school districts which are introducing school-based management now may recentralize their decision-making authority later A study of five decentralized districts revealed many reasons why recentralization could occur. An important distinction between two kinds of decentralization was made: one organizational (in which decisions are delegated),the other political (in which authority is given fully to autonomous groups).Structural reasons for recentralization included lack of provision for accountability, lack of evidence of effectiveness, and the advent of retrenchment. Political reasons for recentralization included the unwillingness of central office staff to share power and the hostility of unions. Such realities suggest that unless districts proceed with decentralization thoughtfully and with commitment, they may abandon the innovation.
The standard definition of digital signatures allows a document to have many valid signatures. In this paper, we consider a subclass of digital signatures, called invariant signatures, in which all legal signatures of a document must be identical according to some polynomialtime computable function (of a signature) which is hard to predict given an unsigned document. We formalize this notion and show its equivalence to non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Appeared in Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Sciene, proceedings of CRYPTO-92, August 1992, Santa-Barbara, California. y MIT. This research was supported in part by NSF-FAW CCR-9023313, NSF-PYI CCR-865727, Darpa N0014-89-J-1988, BSF 89-00312. z International Computer Science Institute at Berkeley and University of California at Berkeley. Supported by NSF Postdoctoral Fellowship. Parts of this work were done at MIT, Bellcore and IBM T.J. Watson Research Center. 1 Introduction Currently, due to the lack of proven non...
<h3>Objective.</h3> âTo examine analytic performance by previously untrained and inexperienced subjects using enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) tests developed for decentralized laboratories. Performance variability between tests assigned to the "simple" and "moderately complex" Health Care Financing Administration laboratory levels was evaluated. <h3>Design.</h3> âA nonrandomized trial of the Surecell Strep-A chorionic gonadotropin ELISA tests. Each subject processed nine unknown specimens (three negative, three weakly positive, and three strongly positive) for each ELISA test. Subjects were blinded to expected test results. <h3>Setting.</h3> âAn elementary school. <h3>Subjects.</h3> âA convenience sample of 52 students enrolled in the sixth and seventh grades. This age group was chosen because of their ability to generally comprehend instructions and remain attentive to the testing task. <h3>Interventions.</h3> âSubjects were either self-trained by reading package insert directions or trained by a manufacturer's sales representative. <h3>Main Outcome Measures.</h3> âPerformance was measured as the percentage of correct test results for the unknown specimens. The sensitivity and specificity for each test by operator group were calculated. <h3>Results.</h3> âSubjects demonstrated an overall sensitivity of 97.1% and specificity of 94.7% for human chorionic gonadotropin unknown specimens and a 95.9% sensitivity and 96.8% specificity for group A steptococcus unknown specimens. No significant differences between the self-trained group and the representative-trained group were observed for either group A streptococcus or human chorionic gonadotropin tests. Performance was so high with the first specimen that improvement over time (ie, a "learning curve") could not be demonstrated. <h3>Conclusion.</h3> âThese ELISA test systems are able to achieve high levels of performance by subjects with no formal laboratory background, no previous method specific experience, and limited self-training. (<i>JAMA</i>. 1992;268:766-770)
<p>Let A and B be n x n matrices the entries of which are affine combinations of the variables a_1,... ,a_m,b_1,. .. ,b_m over GF(2). Suppose that, for each i, 1&lt;= i &lt;= m, the term a_i b_i is an element of the product matrix C = A ⏠B. What is the maximum value that <em> m </em> can have as a function of <em> n </em>? This question arises from a recent technique for improving the communication complexity of zero-knowledge proofs.</p><p>The obvious upper bound of n^2 is improved to n^2 sqrt[3] 3 + O(n). Tighter bounds are obtained for smaller values of n. The bounds for n = 2, n = 3, and n = 4 are tight.</p>
Abstract Privatization has become an international phenomenon. Most attention has been devoted to privatization by stock market flotation or by sales to third parties. Management and employee buyâouts present a third main possibility for transferring assets from the public to the private sector. This paper discusses the scope for privatization buyâouts in LDCs and âpostâcommunistâ economies in the light of conceptual issues and UK experience. The positive aspects of privatization by management and employee buyâouts concern: ownership incentives; the introduction of control mechanisms by institutional investors and various types of financing instruments; indigenous ownership, decentralized privatization; greater incentives in firms where specific skills are involved; the ability to improve trading relationships between a privatized supplier (the buyâout) and its former parent, which remains in the public sector where the supplier is heavily dependent on its former parent; and the general contribution of buyâouts to a redrawing of a state firm's spread of activities to create a more viable entity. The potential problems with buyâouts concern such issues as: absence of entrepreneurial skills; the scope of their applicability; the potentially restrictive effects of debt and debtâlike finance; the need to deal with investment requirements of firms; the lack of personal wealth; the use of inside information by managers to purchase a firm at a price which is to the detriment of the public interest; and the possibility of social and political problems if individuals are perceived to enhance their personal wealth significantly as an accident of where they work. There are means by which many of these potential problems can be dealt with and the paper addresses these.
The British National Health Service (NHS) has, since its inception, aimed to make health care available to all regardless of income, and it has managed to achieve this goal while keeping costs lower as a proportion of the gross domestic product than many Western countries and at the same time assuring equitable distribution of resources regionally. Until the reforms introduced by the 1989 White Paper, the NHS was characterized by centralized financing and regulation; despite some problems in the delivery and management of care, the system was a popular one. The new reforms hope to enhance efficiency in the NHS by stimulating competition and further decentralizing the management of health care. However, it is not at all certain that in practice the reforms will have the desired effect. Initial costs will be high, people may not respond to incentives as predicted, and the quality of care and access to it could well deteriorate. Nations planning to use the U.K. system as a model are advised to use caution.
The health care system of the Federal Republic of Germany relies on the private sector for the financing, delivery, and payment of care. However, the private sector is regulated by the government to ensure that broad societal interests are being fulfilled. The system has managed to achieve comprehensive coverage and equal access for all citizens, freedom of choice for patients, high-quality medical care, and cost containment. The reason for this success is a combination of decentralized power and decision making and the establishment of an effective negotiation system that takes place at federal, state, and local levels. The system suffers from some problems, however, which will have to be addressed: the present structuring of hospital and ambulatory care results in excessively long lengths of stay in hospital; drugs are overprescribed; the supply of health professionals does not meet the country's needs; more nursing homes are needed; and eastern Germany must be fully integrated into the system.
The feasibility of the policy of perpetual debt financing, given a particular path for expenditures and taxation, has been questioned over the years. Sargent and Wallace [17] argue that such a policy is not feasible in the sense that the debt/GNP ratio will explode. McCallum [8] and Darby [2] argue that this policy will be feasible if and only if the long-run growth rate of GNP exceeds the after-tax real interest rate. This particular condition was derived under the assumption of Ricardian equivalence, where the growth rate of GNP and the interest rate are exogenously given, and are not affected by the path of debt. Miller and Sargent [9] and Weil [20] make the point that once the assumption of Ricardian equivalence is dropped, then simple comparisons of long-run growth rates and interest rates are not sufficient to determine stability. Tirole [19] and O'Connell and Zeldes [10] demonstrate in Diamond's [3] model, without Ricardian equivalence, that Ponzi games such as this are feasible if and only if the economy is dynamically inefficient without debt. All of these studies assume that the long-run growth rate of GNP is exogenously given. This assumption is particularly strong in the absence of Ricardian equivalence. In a separate literature, a new generation of equilibrium growth models has recently been developed with positive sustained growth in the long-run equilibrium. In these models, long-run growth is endogenously determined, rather than being imposed on the model as some exogenously given process [7; 11; 12; 14; 15].1 All of these models find some way of introducing increasing returns to scale into the neoclassical growth model and yet preserving the fact that it can be interpreted as a decentralized equilibrium. This paper considers the feasibility of perpetual debt financing in an economy where the growth rate of GNP is endogenously determined and is a function of debt levels. The model of endogenous growth presented here is a modified version of the one given in Prescott and Boyd [12]. This particular model is chosen for two reasons. First, agents live for finite lengths of time; so Ricardian equivalence will not hold, in general, in this model. Also, the production function is linear in the capital stock; as will become clear below, this implies that the equilibrium paths of the state variables can be characterized as first order linear difference equations.
The case study of the linkages between departmental-level and national organizations in Peru shows how linkages can play a significant role in national reform. A general overview of current articles on interorganizational linkages and decentralization pertinent to the Peruvian context of control oriented public sectors is provided. The Peruvian institutional context and the constraints faced by decentralized development agencies called departmental development corporations (CORDES) are identified. CORDES members were provincial mayors, representatives of private sector professional and economic organizations, and heads of ministerial field offices, autonomous agencies, and public enterprises. Microregional offices were established and received public funding. USAID channeled funding through the national organizations to the CORDES in the Integrated Regional Development Project (IRD) between 1979-86, and the Disaster Relief, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction (DRR) Project between 1983-87. The IRD and the DRR are described in addition to the decentralized organization support network established by the 2 projects. There is an analysis of how these interorganizational linkages contributed to conventional uses of linkages and unconventional or institutional reform. Reforms were facilitated by direct persuasion of central agencies to change their administrative regulations, policies, and operating procedures, and extensive lobbying by the support network to pass budgetary reform favoring CORDES and bureaucratic reorientation. Conclusions were reached on 1) the importance of assistance linkages for hastening implementation, building capacity, and overcoming organizational weaknesses (conventional wisdom); 2) the usefulness of vertical linkages in resolving administrative or technical weaknesses (unconventional wisdom); and 3) the usefulness of reinforcing project related units within key national level agencies which increases access to power while specific objectives maintain assistance orientations. Politically marginal agencies are not considered viable. These projects demonstrated that linkages are useful in supporting institutional reform and respecting country self-determination.
In response to the problems faced by large, centralized organizations, many developing countries are exploring ways to decentralize the management of their road networks in order to use funds more efficiently and to reduce the size of central government. This note discusses taxonomy of administrative and financing decentralization options and proposes a framework for analysis.
In Germany, small firms are financed chiefly by small banks, which are grouped into two systems: the savings banks (Sparkassen) and the credit cooperatives. The government actively supports the financing of investments in small industry - especially business start-ups. The author explains how small firms are financed in Germany. The author contends that small and meduim-size firms contribute a lot to the German economy. Small firms are not subject to the control institutions - such as supervisory board seats, proxy voting and equity holdings - that shape the relationships between large firms and large banks. The author also points out that small banks, which are part of a decentralized market structure, over come imperfections in the financial market by building institutions that supersede the market mechanism. The savings bank and credit cooperatives systems have each developed an internal capital, not unlike those within large banks operating nationwide. Only central institutions participate in the domestic money market, to place the system's excess liquidity or to raise funds to cover the systems deficits. Also, the funding programs of the government banks can be seen as a refinancing mechanism that especially helps small banks. The same is true for rediscountable trade bills.
Discusses the effect of a decentralized approach to research and development facility location in the multinational corporation. Presents the comparative advantages of locating R&D facilities in strategic locations around the world. Examines the commitment required by a corporation to have an effective and flexible international research organization. Suggests that, if a company wants truly to be a âplayerâ in the international marketplace, one that is able to compete on both product quality and cost, a decentralized structure which allows for the establishment of autonomous R&D entities is necessary. Substantial risks are involved. Presents research and actual company histories to suggest that these risks could be offset with benefits from the strategic placement of research and development centres on a worldwide basis.
Abstract Papua New Guinea decentralized a wide range of health functions to provincial governments between 1977 and 1983. The national Department of Health (DOH) was given no role in provincial budget and staffing decisions, and the national health budget was fragmented into the health components of provincial budgets. The impact of decentralization on health workforce development was particularly severe and largely unforeseen. Many difficulties were inherent in the manner in which decentralization regulations structured power relationships. Others arose as a result of the administrative confusion and inflamed relationships that accompanied the forceful transfer of power from a very reluctant national DOH to the provinces. Even though policy formulation and planning were retained as national functions, decentralization hampered their effective execution. Human resource data bases deteriorated, responsibility for planning became confused, and the ability of the DOH to implement its planning decisions was compromised. In reality, health workforce planning was carried out by the Departments of Finance and Planning, and Personnel Management through the annual budgetary process of provincial financial limits and staff ceilings, without any attempt to assess health service needs, either in the country as a whole or between the provinces. Decentralization brought a need for new management skills, and it complicated administrative relationships between training institutions and the provinces. The Papua New Guinea experience has shown that in a decentralized health service, there is a great potential for conflict between national goals and the aspirations of individual provinces. To achieve an equitable, appropriate and effective staffing of services, standards must be formulated as the basis for planning and conflict resolution. Effective linkages between central government departments and between the national and provincial health authorities must be developed, and management and technical skills of health managers improved.