In the winter of 1989-90 the unintended consequences of Mikhail S. Gorbachev's program of political and economic refonn had become obvious to all but his most optimistic spokesmen. The General Secretary's attempt to create a new ideology of perestroika by grafting "bourgeois" and "social democratic" concepts onto the conventional ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had divided the party, created immense ideological confusion, and led to the formation of non-Communist and anti-Communist political organizations. The attempt to shift authority from party officials to elected soviets on the union and republican levels had led to the emergence of separatist and nationalist movements in many of the USSR's republics, including the RSFSR. The decentralization of the state's administration of the economy and the encouragement of both private and cooperative economic activity had failed to reverse the deterioration of economic conditions. As anxiety swept through the CPSU, orthodox party leaders called for the establishment of an autonomous Communist Party for the RSFSR to counter Gorbachev's policies and to "save Soviet Russia" from destruction.
William A. Wulf, Alec Yasinsac, Katie S. Oliver, Ramesh Peri
Distributed systems have long relied on shared secrets to ensure the authenticity of principals. Public key systems and zero knowledge proofs of identity have reduced this reliance. We offer a method of remote authentication that can be used with no advance shared knowledge by parties, and that allows parties to increase their confidence in the authenticity of a suspicious party to an arbitrary level. Note: Abstract extracted from PDF text
Donald Beaver, Joan Feigenbaum, Rafail Ostrovsky, Victor Shoup
We define the notion of an instance-hiding proof system (ihps) for a function f ; informally, an ihps is a protocol in which a polynomial-time verifier interacts with one or more all-powerful provers and is convinced of the value of f(x) but does not reveal the input x to the provers. We show here that a function f has a multiprover ihps if and only if it is computable in FNEXP. We formalize the notion of zero-knowledge for ihps's and show that any function that has a multiprover ihps in fact has one that is perfect zero-knowledge. Under the assumption that one-way permutations exist, we show that f has a one-prover, zero-knowledge ihps if and only if it is in FPSPACE and has a one-oracle instance-hiding scheme (ihs). 1 Introduction In this paper, we show that every function that has a multiprover interactive proof system in fact has one in which the verifier does not learn the proof, and the provers do not learn what they are proving. Consider interactive protocols involving a proba...
Over the past twenty years, Thailand has undergone rapid economic and health (demographic, epidemiological) transitions. While on the one hand the economic outlook is bright, even to the extent of Thailand's emerging status as a Newly Industrialized Country, persisting health development challenges remain as targets for future research and international support. This paper documents Thailand's current economic and health development situations, their transitions and challenges. Special reference is made towards emerging post-transitional health/epidemiological problems, reorientation of health services and the referral system, community participation, health care financing, public-private health care partnerships, decentralization of the health service system and essential national health research.
In the United Kingdom, despite a stated commitment to community care, centralized planning and financing through the Social Security System, rather than the Social Services Department, resulted in a serious distortion in policy. Social Security funded care in residential and nursing homes, and not community care. As in the United States, central government expenditures for expensive institutional care rose dramatically in the 1980s as a result. By the end of the decade, changes were implemented to decentralize the provision and funding of social care. Several projects were undertaken to demonstrate effective means of applying the new policies. In each instance, case managers worked with relatively small caseloads of the frail elderly and were responsible for allocating funds to purchase the services needed within a fixed budget. In all settings, there was a reduction in the use of institutional care facilities; the quality of life of both the clients and their caregivers improved significantly; and these gains were achieved at no greater cost than for individuals receiving the traditional services without case management. Despite the fact that issues such as what happens to costs when the system is expanded to other target clienteles remain to be resolved, the success of the projects highlights the significant gains to be achieved with case managers who have control of both service selection and budgets.
We argue that the random oracle model—where all parties have access to a public random oracle—provides a bridge between cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice. In the paradigm we suggest, a practical protocol P is produced by first devising and proving correct a protocol PR for the random oracle model, and then replacing oracle accesses by the computation of an “appropriately chosen” function h. This paradigm yields protocols much more efficient than standard ones while retaining many of the advantages of provable security. We illustrate these gains for problems including encryption, signatures, and zero-knowledge proofs.
While the theoretical arguments for fiscal decentralization developed over the past thirty-five years have proven compelling enough for the concept to win great favor, very little empirical work has proven the merits of such policies in the forms governments have actually implemented. We examine the results of educational fiscal decentralization in a developing country with an established framework for fiscal federalism and a concomitant history of intense centralization. The structure of the flow of funds in the Mexican education sector provide an example to study: (1) the importance of the spatial distribution of outcomes resulting from expenditures rather than simply the distribution of the expenditures alone; (2) the distribution of resources to subnational political units; (3) intergovernmental relations and the resulting incentive structure for service provision, particularly with respect to fiscal transfers and grants administration; (4) the effects from decentralization efforts over the past decade, and the resulting implications for probable outcomes from efforts to decentralize; and (5) the interplay of centralized versus decentralized finance and administration. We develop methods to analyze political and socio-economic factors that affect intergovernmental fiscal allocations. The results show that (1) the Federal Government does trade some efficiency for the sake of distributional concerns in the provision of educational resources, but in doing so may discriminate against subnational jurisdictions based on factors like voting behavior or marginalized minority populations; and (2) the pattern of Federal-to-state allocations may not be replicated at the state-to-municipal level, even by Federal agencies at the state level. We also provide evidence that states may not currently be as effective educational providers as the Federal Government, raising concern for efforts to decentralize. Policy implications and recommendations resulting from Mexico's experience revolve around the development of an accountable matching grant mechanism for fiscal transfers that would retain those aspects of centralized financial control beneficial to efficient and equitable service provision, while stimulating the improvements that may result from augmenting regional and local fiscal and administrative responsibilities for education.
Systemic educational policy recommends creating more ambitious instruction in schools through a centralized strategy of mandatory curriculum frameworks, high-stakes student assessments, and coordinated teacher training. This article suggests serious problems with such a strategy and recommends a decentralized alternative involving local choice of curricula, technical assistance, and professional development. Arguments for, problems with, and alternatives to the centralized strategy are examined in eight dimensions of educational policy: curriculum development, curriculum stratification, educational indicators, high-stakes examinations for students, school improvement, educational finance, educational governance, and teacher training. The article concludes with recommendations for policy and research.
Networks are common in financial services. Perfect competition does not decentralize optimality on a network, and coordination of participants expectations and investments is crucial for success. Financial exchange networks exhibit two kinds of externalities: liquidity enhancement by size expansion, and underpriced provision of market price information to outside rivals. We discuss the interaction of these externalities in alternative exchange network structures.
Abstract Equity and solidarity are key issues in the current political debate concerning the Swiss health care system and possible reforms to it. Equal access to medical care has always been a basic principle which has been strongly supported by all political parties and is reflected in the legal framework. Because the health care system is highly decentralized, assigning most of the responsibilities to the 26 cantons, these legal statements exist predominantly on the cantonal level. For example, the communities are compelled by cantonal law to guarantee access to those who need it but cannot afford it (Undritz 1987, p. 21). However, no such consensus exists with respect to health care financing. The conservative parties favour financing schemes which promote efficiency but are regressive (such as a high share of private financing, high co-insurance rates, and deductibles). By contrast, the parties with a strong social committment support financing schemes which are progressive (high share of tax-financing, low co-insurance rates, and deductibles, free care). In the 1980s, the actual development was characterized by a decreasing share of tax-financing and increased co-insurance rates, thus increasing the regressiveness of the financing system. However, this development is likely to be reversed in the near future. A referendum is pending, proposing a massive increase in the share of tax-financed health care, and seems to have a good chance of winning the vote. These developments should be kept in mind when interpreting our empirical findings which related to the situation in 1982.
This paper examines the relationship between organization science and managerial practice. Science and practice are viewed as interdependent, yet semiautonomous, domains which engage in their own specialized forms of discourse or “language games.” The paper examines both the internal dynamics of these language games and the relationship between them. The analysis suggests a reinterpretation of the role played by organizational scientists in relation to practitioners. Organizational scientists should be viewed not as engineers offering technical advice to managers but as providers of conceptual and symbolic language for use in organizational discourse. This view's implications for enhancing the relationship between organization science and managerial practice is discussed.
Summary This article analyses the structure and organization of RDRS, one of the largest rural development NGOs in Bangladesh. RDRS's Comprehensive Project works with 120,000 households, through small groups of about 15, motivating and educating people on joint savings and investment, agricultural and off-farm income generation, primary health and family planning, literacy, social awareness, and women's development. Groups have access to credit provided by RDRS or banks. No free inputs are given. The Comprehensive Project's Community Health Unit runs 55 antenatal centres and a leprosy treatment service. The Rural Works Project plants 250,000 trees per year, and supervises construction of schools, markets and small bridges and culverts in isolated rural communities. RDRS has almost 1,700 staff. Field implementation is decentralized to area-based units, within a common policy, activity, financial and personnel framework. Six sectoral advisory units are responsible for innovation, quality control and coordination across the whole programme. Résumé Les ONG: le cas du Service rural de Rangpur Dinajpur Le présent article contient une analyse de la structure et de l'organisation du RDRS, l'une des plus importantes ONG (Organisation non gouvernementale) rurales du Bangladesh. Le Comprehensive Project du RDRS intervient auprès d'environ 120 000 ménages sous forme de petits groupes d'environ 15 personnes; le RDRS a pour rôle de motiver et d'éduquer les participants quant aux économies et investissements conjoints dans le ménage; la génération de revenus fermiers et outre-fermiers; les soins de santé primaires et le planisme familial; les campagnes d'alphabétisation; les programmes de sensibilisation sociale; et le développement des femmes dans la population. Les groupes ont accès au crédit fourni par le RDRS ou par les banques. Aucune contribution n'est gratuite. Le groupe des Soins de santé communautaires du Comprehensive Project organise 55 centres de consultation prénatale, ainsi qu'un centre pour le traitement des lépreux. Le service des prestations rurales plante environ 250 000 arbres par an et contrôle la construction des écoles, des marchés et des petits ponts et caniveaux dans les communautés rurales isolées. Le personnel du RDRS compte presque 1700 effectifs. Les antennes exécutives rurales sont décentralisées en unités à base géographique, or elles restent liées par une organisation de gestion commune des politiques, des activités, du financement, et du personnel. Six groupes de conseil sectoral se chargent des programmes d'innovation, de contrôle de la qualité et de coordination du programme au niveau de l'ensemble. Resumen Organizaciones no gubernamentales: el caso del Servicio Rural en Rangpur Dinajpar El artículo analiza la estructura y organización del RDRS, uno de los proyectos de desarrollo rural más grandes de las Organizaciones no gubernamentales en Bangladesh. Este proyecto exhaustivo comprende 120.000 familias, en grupos de quince familias, motivando y educando a la población en áreas como: ahorro colectivo e inversiones, producción de ganancias fuera de la granja, salud y planificación familiar, alfabetización, conciencia social y el desarrollo de la mujer. Los grupos tienen acceso a créditos provistos por RDRS o instituciones bancarias. No se otorga dinero gratis. La Unidad del Proyecto de Salud Comunitaria maneja 55 centros pre-natales y un servicio para el tratamiento de la lepra. El Proyecto de Trabajos Rurales planta 250.000 árboles por año, y supervisa la construcción de escuelas, mercados, puentes y alcantarillas en comunidades rurales aisladas. RDRS tiene un personal de casi 1700 empleados. La implementación de base se descentraliza en forma de unidades en cada área, que sin embargo siguen una línea común en cuanto a a criterios, actividades y estructuras financieras y de personal. Hay seis unidades consultivas responsables por las innovaciones, control de calidad y coordinación de la totalidad del programa.