Nathaniel E. Baughman, Marc Liberatore, Brian Neil Levine
We explore exploits possible for cheating in real-time, multiplayer games for both client-server and serverless architectures. We offer the first formalization of cheating in online games and propose an initial set of strong solutions. We propose a protocol that has provable anti-cheating guarantees, is provably safe and live, but suffers a performance penalty. We then develop an extended version of this protocol, called asynchronous synchronization, which avoids the penalty, is serverless, offers provable anti-cheating guarantees, is robust in the presence of packet loss, and provides for significantly increased communication performance. This technique is applicable to common game features as well as clustering and cell-based techniques for massively multiplayer games. Specifically, we provide a zero-knowledge proof protocol so that players are within a specific range of each other, and otherwise have no notion of their distance. Our performance claims are backed by analysis using a simulation based on real game traces
Daniel J. Phaneuf, Jared C. Carbone, Joseph A. Herriges
As part of the Resources for the Future Frontiers of Environmental Economics collection of papers, we consider the problem of general equilibrium feedback effects in non-price space as they relate to non-market valuation. Our overall objective is to examine the extent to which nonprice equilibria arising from both simple and complex sorting behavior can be empirically modeled and the resulting differences in partial and general equilibrium welfare measures quantified. After motivating the problem in general we consider the specific context of congestion in recreation demand applications, which we classify as the outcome of a simple sorting equilibrium. Using both econometric and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models we examine the conceptual and computational challenges associated with this class of problems and present findings on promising solution avenues. We demonstrate the relevance of accounting for congestion effects in recreation demand with an application to lake visits in Iowa. Our econometric and CGE results confirm that, for some plausible counterfactual scenarios, substantial differences exist between partial and general equilibrium welfare estimates. We conclude the paper by describing tasks that are needed to move forward research in this area.
This paper studies coalitional strategy-proofness of social choice correspondences that map preference profiles into sets of alternatives. In particular, we focus on the Pareto rule that associates the set of Pareto optimal alternatives with each preference profile of individuals in society, and examine whether or not there is a necessary connection between coalitional strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality. A definition of coalitional strategy-proofness is given on the basis of a max-min criterion. We show that the Pareto rule is coalitionally strategy-proof in this sense. Moreover, we prove that given an arbitrary social choice correspondence with the coalitional strategy-proofness and nonimposition property, all alternatives selected by the correspondence are Pareto optimal. These two results imply that the Pareto rule is the maximal correspondence in the class of coalitionally strategy-proof and nonimposed social choice correspondences.
This paper studies the logical modelling of presumptions and their effects on the burden of proof. Presumptions are modelled as default rules and their effect on the burden of proof is defined in terms of a distinction between the burden of production, the burden of persuasion and the tactical burden of proof. These notions are logically characterised in such a way that presumptions enable a party to fulfil a burden of production or persuasion while shifting a tactical burden to the other party. Finally, it is shown how debates about what can be presumed can be modelled as debates about the backings of default rules.
Anecdote and impression in Australia is that it is race discrimination complaints in particular that consistently fail because complainants cannot discharge this burden of proof. Based on a text analysis of all reported decisions, since 2000, on race discrimination complaints under the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act, and under the Racial Discrimination Act (Cth), my research will provide an empirical answer to the question: 'To what extent do race discrimination complaints fail in courts and tribunals because of this challenging burden of proof?'. The focus is on matters where a complaint is dismissed because the court cannot say what the basis for the other person's conduct was, or says that the basis for the other person's conduct was a ground other than race. This leads to deliberation on the difference it would make to require an alleged discriminator to show they did not discriminate, that is, to shift the burden of proof to the respondent if and when the complainant can establish that there was less favourable treatment. The possibility and permissibility of shifting the burden during a hearing has not been canvassed in recent reviews of anti-discrimination legislation, but is established in the European Union by way of Directive 2000/43/EC, and is being implemented across Europe, including in the UK the Race Relations Act 1976.
Minority acquisitions, involving less than 50% of the target, represent a distinct organizational choice. With a minority acquisition, the target can mitigate some of the incentive problems that arise in contractual relationships. Less is known, however, about the trade-off between minority acquisitions and complete integration. We find minority acquisitions are more common when keeping target managerial incentives intact is important and when the target is financially constrained or can benefit from certification. Minority acquisitions are also more likely where the target’s valuation is especially uncertain; integrating internal capital markets will be costly; and consolidating earning will lower EPS.
Social enforcement, the decentralized action by organizational actors of monitoring, identifying, and reporting legal violations, is widely recognized as a key factor in ensuring good governance. This article reports on a study conducted in the United States and Israel examining the behavior of individuals when confronting unlawful conduct within their workplaces. The study provides novel insights into the relationships between state-based, organizational-based, and employee-based enforcement. It finds that the likelihood and the manner of reporting will vary depending on the type of illegality and is strongly correlated to perceptions of legitimacy, job security, and voice within the workplace. Comparing illegalities, employees prefer to report clear violations by rank-and-file employees rather than violations by managers. At the same time, external reporting to government or media entities is most likely when violations involve the organization as a whole or implicates top management. The study also finds cultural and gender differences in reporting patterns. Finally, the study demonstrates that social norms are more predictive of social enforcement than expected organizational costs.
In the Accountable Internet: Peer Production of Internet Governance, Cyberlaw-scholars Professors David R. Johnson, Susan P. Crawford, & John G. Palfrey Jr. suggest decentralized governance and user accountability as a means of governing the Internet. While advantageous over existing centralized models, Peer Production model also suffers from significant practical shortcomings that would make it unlikely to be adopted as a global means of Internet governance. A new model, Community Node-Based User Governance (CNBUG), inspired by Peer Production's decentralized model, consists of three principal components that establish its effectiveness: decentralized user-dependent governance, geographic nodal-centered communities, and quorum flagging, similar to that employed by Craigslist.org, an online community information Web site. These three components work together to establish a means of Internet governance that unlike its predecessors, does not chill speech or isolate users, integrates decision-making accountability, allows for the participation and integration of developing nations, represents global community standards, allows for concurrent online and territorial enforcement, and protects users from bad actors; all while preserving the Internet's fundamental purpose and nature, and also leaving intact its considerable business and technical infrastructure.
A common political claim is that decentralized governments undermine policy makers' ability to fight fiscal imbalance. This paper examines how different fiscal institutions influence the likelihood of a successful fiscal adjustment. Using a panel of the Swiss cantons from 1981 to 2001, we first analyze the episodes of tight fiscal policy and their macroeconomic consequences. Then, we empirically investigate the determinants of successful long-lasting deficit reductions. Contrary to the popular claim, we find that fiscal decentralization increases the probability of a successful fiscal consolidation. In addition, the results point to an important role of intergovernmental grants and of the circumstances, in particular the size of fiscal imbalance in the years before the consolidation, in determining a successful adjustment policy. Furthermore, coalition governments and large parliaments are less likely to implement successful fiscal stabilizations. Finally, there is some weak evidence that spending cuts are more promising in reaching a long-lasting fiscal adjustment than revenue increases.
We explore the inter-temporal effects of the pool externalities caused by imperfect screening in competitive credit markets. We find that imperfect screening may, depending on the parameters of the model, generate excessive screening, inefficient duplication of screening or screening cycles. Whenever screening cycles occur they are manifestations of either socially excessive or insufficient screening. We present a full equilibrium characterization and a welfare analysis. The implementation of socially optimal lending decisions requires communication across lenders (i.e. information sharing), which decentralized markets typically cannot achieve.
This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a dynamic matching game with two-sided incomplete information of independent private values variety converge to competitive equilibria. Buyers purchase a bundle of heterogeneous, indivisible goods and sellers own one unit of an indivisible good. Buyer preferences and endowments as well as seller costs are private information. Agents engage in costly search and meet randomly. The terms of trade are determined through bilateral bargaining between buyers and sellers. The paper considers a market in steady state. It is shown that as frictions disappear, i.e., as discounting and the fixed cost of search become small, all equilibria of the market game converge to perfectly competitive equilibria.
Law enforcement is decentralized. It is so despite documented interjurisdictional externalities which would justify its centralization. To explain this fact, we construct a political economy model of law enforcement. Under decentralization, law enforcement in each region is in accord with the preferences of regional citizens, but interjurisdictional externalities are neglected. Under centralization, law enforcement for all regions is chosen by a legislature of regional representatives which may take externalities into account. However, the majority rule applies for decisions made by the central legislature and this implies that the allocation of enforcement resources may be skewed in favour of those who belong to the required majority. We show that the choice between centralization and decentralization depends on the technology of law enforcement and the nature of the interjurisdictional externalities.
This paper analyzes the short run dynamics and relationship between the customer dealer and the interdealer market. The sample covers euro government bonds issued by members of the EMU (European Monetary Union). During the observation period, all bonds were traded on EuroMTS, an electronic interdealer system for euro benchmark government bonds. The focus of the study is to reveal each market's contribution to the price discovery process of these bonds. The empirical results provide evidence that the customer dealer market dominates the price discovery process for euro benchmark government bonds. However, the contribution of the interdealer market to the price discovery depends on bond characteristics. The share in the price discovery process of the interdealer market is larger for less liquid bonds than for liquid bonds.
The rise of the network as a form of economic organization renders problematic our standard understanding of how capitalism is governed. As the governance of production shifts from vertical integration to horizontal contract, a puzzle arises: how do contracts, presumed to be susceptible to hold-up problems due to incompleteness, control production arrangements that by their nature invite opportunism? Relying on publicly-available contracts taken from a number of industries, I argue that firms govern their collaborations through a number of new contract mechanisms, the summation of which is a novel governance system. Because traditional theories of contractual control struggle to fully explain this new behavior, I re-conceptualize contracting as an effort, inter alia, to establish a pragmatic learning process between collaborators. Such a learning process must be formally instituted among parties because of the unique, endogenous, and pervasive uncertainty that characterizes bilateral experimentation. Thus, to standard accounts of incomplete contracting, this article provides an alternative (but complementary) explanation of how contract governs inter-firm networks, not by downplaying the importance of hold-ups or by inflating the role of relational norms but by explicating a new positive theory of contract design.
The paper is written during master studies program at University of Prishtina Law Faculty, the language of the paper is in Albanian and treats the problem of codification of European Contract Law.
This Article offers a novel interpretation of contract law, which I call “contract as empowerment.” On this view, contract law is neither a mere mechanism to promote efficiency, as many economists suggest, nor a mere reflection of any familiar moral norm — such as norms of promise keeping, property, or corrective justice. Contract law is instead a mechanism of empowerment: it empowers people to use legally enforceable promises as tools to influence other people’s actions and thereby to meet a broad range of human needs and interests. It also empowers people in a special way, which reflects a moral ideal of equal respect for persons. This fact explains why contract law can produce genuine legal obligations and is not just a system of coercion. This Article introduces contract as empowerment and argues that it offers a theory of contract with distinctive advantages over the alternatives. Contract as empowerment is an interpretive theory: it is simultaneously descriptive, explaining what contract law is, and normative, explaining what contract law should be. To establish the theory’s interpretive credentials, this Article identifies a core set of doctrines and puzzles that are particularly well suited to testing competing interpretations of contract law. It argues that contract as empowerment is uniquely capable of harmonizing this entire constellation of doctrines while explaining the legally obligating force of contracts. Along the way, contract as empowerment offers (1) a more penetrating account of the expectation damages remedy than exists in the current literature, (2) a more compelling account of the consideration requirement, and (3) a concrete framework to determine the appropriate role of certain doctrines — like unconscionability — that appear to limit freedom of contract. The whole of this explanation is greater than the sum of its parts. Because of its harmonizing power, contract as empowerment demonstrates how a broad range of seemingly incompatible surface values in modern contract law can work together — each serving its own distinctive but partial role — to serve a more fundamental principle that is distinctive to contract law. These surface values include the values of fidelity, autonomy, liberty, efficiency, fairness, trust, reliance, and assurance. Although many people think that contract law must involve trade-offs between these values, contract as empowerment suggests that surface tensions between them are not always fundamental or real. So long as the complex system of rules that govern contracts is fashioned in the right way, these doctrines can work together to serve a deeper and normatively satisfying principle that is distinctive to contract. This framework can therefore be used to guide legal reform and identify places in which market regulation is warranted by the principles of contract in many different contexts of exchange — from those involving consumer goods to labor, finance, credit, landlord-tenant arrangements, home mortgages, and many others.
The law of contracts and consumer protection has been dominated in the recent past by the ideology of rational choice theory. As a descriptive project, rational choice theory holds that consumers express their preferences and maximize their expected utility by making choices in the marketplace. As a normative project, rational choice theory has promoted deregulation of contract terms, based on underlying values of utilitarianism and autonomy. Legislators, judges and agencies have internalized these norms and adopted the deregulation program. The behavioral economics literature has seriously undermined rational choice theory as a description of consumer and seller behavior. In the real world, consumers use abbreviated and biased reasoning and short cuts, are heavily influenced by affect and channeling factors, and respond to framing and endowment effects. Sellers study and understand consumer behavior, and exploit this knowledge. The result in a deregulated marketplace is seller exploitation and consumer harm. Numerous empirical examples of irrational" consumer behavior and seller exploitation are explored. Law and economics scholarship has been reluctant to face the normative implications of the improved understanding of consumer and seller behavior. Soft paternalism" seeks to retain the ideal of a perfect market by fixing the information and bias problems, clinging to the values of utilitarianism and autonomy. The insights of behavioral economics may enlighten lawmakers as to how better to strive for genuine autonomy, and genuine utility maximization. Viewing contract law as a tool for justice, however, requires doing more than improving the means without rethinking the ends. A deeper notion of justice requires that we return to the prevention of exploitation of the weak by the powerful, an equity-based value, as one of lodestars for what the law of contracts ought to be.
A legal ideology emerged in the 1870s that celebrated contract as the body of law with the particular purpose of facilitating the formation of productive exchanges that would enrich the parties to the contract and, therefore, society as a whole. Across the spectrum of intellectual property, courts used the legal fiction of implied contract, and a version of it particularly emphasizing liberty of contract, to shift control of workplace knowledge from skilled employees to firms while suggesting that the emergence of hierarchical control and loss of entrepreneurial opportunity for creative workers was consistent with the free labor ideology that dominated American thinking on the subject of work. Based on original archival research, this paper explores the stories behind two influential court decisions about employee inventions in the 1890s. In one, a court held that dye recipes were trade secrets owned by a Philadelphia textile mill rather than the human capital of skilled dyers. In the other, a court upheld a contract assigning future patents to the Duke tobacco companies of North Carolina. The paper examines the disjuncture between the rhetoric and doctrine of the court decisions, which assimilated notions of employee dependence and loyalty with the new laissez faire contract, and the norms of the business world in which creative workers operated. It tells the neglected story of how new legal rules transformed entrepreneurship and what that meant for creative workers. These cases, and others like them, rejected the nineteenth century notion that skilled workers and inventive employees were to use their knowledge and ingenuity entrepreneurially. Henceforward, employee knowledge and creativity were deemed to be transferred by an employment contract from employee to firm. The transformation of the employment contract dramatically changed the nature of entrepreneurship by employees, making it much more difficult for inventors to parlay their technical knowledge and business acumen into a successful firm as had been the model of business development to that point. Independent inventors who negotiated carefully for control of their intellectual property rights could remain entrepreneurial. Others would have to pin their hopes on the fortunes of their corporate employers.
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack aims to deprive legitimate users of a resource or service provided by a system, by overloading the system with a flood of data packets, thus preventing it from processing legitimate requests. This article analyzes the doctrines governing the allocation of liability among key players in a DDoS attack. The doctrines are well established and based on common law tort principles and policy considerations. The main contribution of the article is the adaptation of these principles to the novel technological environment in which DDoS attacks occur. The analysis shows that detailed understanding of the technologies and analysis of their role in DDoS attacks are essential to effective judicial decisionmaking.
The objective of this study is to know the implementation of internal control system of fee payment at PT. Jamsostek (Persero) Branch Malang. The data were analyzed by qualitative analysis in accordance with the kinds of data, which to know the organization structure implementing, system of authority and accounting procedure, job practice, and the quality of the employees and their responsibilities also. The consideration is whether the implementation of the system and procedure of fee payment runs well or not, with analyzing and comparing the theory and management policy. Results showed that the implementation of organization structure have run well, but sometimes in finance department faced problem in the technical of administration. It is about recording of data payment through the bank. The data paid by the entrepreneur is not detail yet and also there is no enclosure data. System of fee payment through the cashier of bank is decentralized by the head office of PT. Jamsostek (Persero), therefore payment acceptance is transferred at account of fee in the head office by bank which have been arranged in an IKS because investments location handled by the head office of PT. Jamsostek ( Persero). The analysis result showed that generally PT. Jamsostek (Persero) has done the system and procedure of fee payment well according to its procedure. The problem faced in is only occurring in certain entrepreneurs who do not obey the administration rule, but it does not obstruct the finishing of financial statement because financing and marketing coordination for solving the problems is well done. From the data above, it can be concluded that the staff of marketing department is responsive to solve all problems deal with finance particularly in making the financial statement accurately and on time.
Since the reform policy,the central-local finance carry out insurance system,which has the characteristic of decentralization.In the early nineties in the 20th century,the reform of decentralization has its obvious defects,which resulted in the reform of tax seperated system,reorganizing the base-root fianacial revenue.However,under the stress of outside competition and the over-productivity,the increase of the income of population in rural areas becomes obviously less and less,the counties's fiscal revenue cannot meet the need of their public expenditures,and the problem of argriculture,villages and farmers turns to be sharpened.All these dilemma need the innovation of the system,including the uniform of fiscal revenue and expenditure,the reform of budget management,transformed payment system reform and the efficient solution to local fiscal debets.