Blockchain Papers

Nizan Geslevich Packin, Anat Alon-Beck

Abstract Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) use blockchain-based smart contracts to pool capital and execute votes without intermediaries, dramatically lowering costs and widening access to early-stage investment. Unlike traditional venture capital or even regulated crowdfunding portals, anyone with a compatible wallet can buy governance tokens, propose projects, and share upside—creating a global, retail-friendly investor commons that may surface ideas conventional funds ignore. Yet that very openness runs head-long into legal gray zones: Are DAO tokens unregistered securities? Who is liable when code malfunctions or a majority votes to break a rule? Lacking the corporate personhood, disclosure duties, and Know Your Customer checks that anchor crowdfunding platforms, DAOs drift between patchwork state LLC statutes and sporadic enforcement actions. Clear statutory definitions, retrofit governance standards, and tailored investor protection rules are now essential if policymakers hope to harness DAOs’ democratizing promise while containing systemic, consumer, and cyber-fraud risks.

Michael Schillig

Abstract Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) can replicate certain features of the modern business corporation—notably a crypto-asset “capital lock-in” and participatory governance based on token-holder “democracy.” The history of corporations can be traced back to Roman law and beyond. However, with increasing industrialization, the nineteenth century was to become the century of free and general incorporation, leaving behind the restrictive charter system. Rampant abuse and speculation as well as widespread fraud and corruption at the beginning did not prevent limited liability corporations from being hailed as “the greatest single discovery of modern times” only a generation later. This chapter seeks to ascertain whether and to what extent the history of corporate law can provide valuable lessons for the design and implementation of adequate legal frameworks for capturing the DAO phenomenon. It argues for an incremental approach that gradually seeks to accommodate the concept of DAOs within existing legal frameworks. This will more readily allow for fostering innovation whilst curbing the propensity for abuse.

Florence Guillaume

Abstract This chapter explores the application of the validity requirements of a choice of court agreement under the Hague Choice of Court Convention, Lugano Convention, and Brussels I Regulation in disputes involving decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), analyzing the legal implications of a choice of court agreement for the DAO, its members, and third parties. When DAOs are involved in a state court dispute, their blockchain-based nature raises numerous legal questions, including issues related to their legal status and their capacity to enter into binding agreements, such as a choice of court agreement. This reiterates the influence of the international context in which DAOs operate on state court dispute resolution, and emphasizes the challenges of locating DAOs in the physical world, highlighting the limitations of state justice for disputes involving DAOs. This analysis underscores how a choice of court agreement introduces a degree of predictability regarding the forum for civil and commercial claims.

Nina Reiser

Abstract The assignment of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) to concrete legal company forms causes enormous difficulties around the world. That is why some states have recently taken corresponding legislative initiatives. Although existing, nonspecific legal forms of certain jurisdictions, such as the Cayman Islands’ foundation company, Guernsey’s Special Purpose Trust, or Switzerland’s association are commonly used by DAOs, they are not completely tailored to the features and needs of DAOs and their future development, providing the necessary legal certainty for DAOs and their participants. The DAO Model Law created a well-founded basis for the legal structure of DAO companies based on functional and legal equivalence. Depending on the peculiarities of the respective jurisdiction, selective adjustments and/or the implementation of specific company forms for DAOs are conceivable and necessary. Consequently, there is a need for further research in this area.

Jill E. Fisch

Abstract Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) offer the promise of enabling an enterprise to combine a democratic member-run governance system with the efficiency and predictability of automation. DAOs challenge traditional conventions about corporate governance in several ways. By enabling enterprises to craft customized governance structures, they challenge the ability of participants to understand and price businesses that employ novel governance features. By broadening the potential scope of who can participate in governance systems, DAOs respond to an emerging debate over stakeholder governance. They also raise important issues about accountability and the extent to which a decentralized governance structure in which individual decision-makers are not constrained by fiduciary principles can effectively limit conflicts of interest and self-dealing. This chapter considers these features of DAO corporate governance. It embraces the potential offered by the DAO structure to rethink traditional corporate governance norms and highlights the implications of the governance choices made by DAOs.

Kara J. Bruce, Christopher K. Odinet, Andrea Tosato

Abstract The enormous diversity in decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) ownership structures, governance models, and operational processes yields a spectrum of potential outcomes when DAOs meet bankruptcy. US bankruptcy law offers distressed businesses orderly rehabilitation or liquidation options but assumes conventional management and debtor–creditor frameworks. DAOs that are open to more traditional corporate-style operating structures may be able to access the bankruptcy system with some creativity and compromise. Conversely, DAOs that implement highly decentralized and automated governance models may find themselves unable to access or navigate the bankruptcy system voluntarily. This is due to bankruptcy’s heavily centralized and court-supervised process, which stands in tension with core DAO ideals. For such DAOs, bankruptcy might not be avoidable if their stakeholders commence involuntary proceedings. As decentralized models proliferate, understanding bankruptcy law’s application to DAOs is crucial for developing robust legal frameworks and policy responses to govern the rapidly evolving digital asset economy.

Darcy WE Allen, Chris Berg, Aaron M. Lane, Jason Potts

Abstract We develop a theory of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) that explains why they exist in terms of what they do. In New Institutional Economics, firms exist to minimize the transaction costs of using a market. DAOs, which are a species of firm made of smart contracts, seem to extend this logic. But by observing how DAOs behave in the wild—through cases like Shapeshift, Uniswap, and Optimism—we reveal that the core value of a DAO is its capacity for dynamic adaptation in governance. DAOs enable fast, low-cost changes in governance to respond to shifting regulatory, financial, and competitive conditions. They are not just automation tools to reduce agency costs via token governance. Rather, they are mechanisms for organizational variation in governance itself. When the benefits of this adaptive mechanism exceed its costs, we predict the existence of a DAO.

Bianca Kremer

Abstract Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are a still-evolving organizational form. As such, they face unique challenges in dispute resolution. These challenges start with the definition of what constitutes a DAO dispute, compounded by the oftentimes pseudonymous identity of parties, the absence of traditional hierarchical structures, and opaque power dynamics. In addition, governance and operations are frequently—though not invariably—implemented using blockchain technology and smart contracts, adding further complexity. This chapter explores the intricacies of DAO disputes by attempting a definition and examining both internal conflicts and external challenges, outlining DAO-specific obstacles in dispute resolution and drawing from real world examples, including interviews with DAO practitioners. There is a clear need for DAOs to plan for disputes and establish clear rules and guidelines for dispute resolution (both on- and off-chain) from the outset.

Maxat Kassen

No abstract is available for this record.

Costantine Kulwa

Student Information Management Systems (SIMS) are mission critical to higher learning institutions because they govern admissions, registration, fee status, assessment results, progression, graduation, and alumni verification. Yet conventional centralized SIMS architectures may face persistent challenges: record tampering risk, weak end‑to‑end audit trails, fragmented reconciliation across units and campuses, slow and costly credential verification, and limited interoperability with external verifiers.This study develops a conceptual and technical framework for applying Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) to strengthen SIMS at the Tanzania Institute of Accountancy (TIA). The framework positions DLT as a trust and interoperability layer rather than a replacement for SIMS. It proposes (i) an architecture that anchors cryptographic proofs on‑chain while keeping personal data off‑chain; (ii) standards based digital credentialing using W3C Verifiable Credentials and Decentralized Identifiers; (iii) governance and compliance controls aligned to Tanzanian data protection and cybercrime regimes; and (iv) an implementation roadmap and evaluation metrics grounded in established information systems theories. To make design trade‑offs concrete, the study includes simulated calculations and figures for event volume, storage growth, verification turnaround time, and risk intensity across rollout phases. The framework provides a practical blueprint for a staged pilot at TIA starting with credential verification and assessment audit‑trail anchoring before scaling to additional workflows.

Shawn Bayern

Abstract This chapter critiques decentralized autonomous organization (DAO)-specific organizational statutes and entity types in view of several propositions about the theory and structure of organizational law. First, it introduces and defends the proposition that organizational forms should, in the absence of an overriding reason, be neutral to private parties’ choices about technology. That said, while technological neutrality is a useful principle in evaluating organizational statutes, its application requires subtlety because one software technology may emulate another. Second, the chapter observes that existing general organizational forms are already capable of accommodating DAOs and other new technological structures for organizations. Using existing forms promotes harmony and simplicity in organizational law, a field that is already too fragmented and in which too many distinct types of entities already exist. The chapter also discusses the relationship between registered and unregistered organizational forms and how bespoke organizational statutes interact with the Corporate Transparency Act in the US.

Xiao-Yang Liu, Ningjie Li, Keyi Wang, Xiaoli Zhi · 5 authors

Financial Generative Pre-trained Transformers (FinGPT) with multimodal capabilities are now being increasingly adopted in various financial applications. However, due to the intellectual property of model weights and the copyright of training corpus and benchmarking questions, verifying the legitimacy of GPT's model weights and the credibility of model outputs is a pressing challenge. In this paper, we introduce a novel zkFinGPT scheme that applies zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) to high-value financial use cases, enabling verification while protecting data privacy. We describe how zkFinGPT will be applied to three financial use cases. Our experiments on two existing packages reveal that zkFinGPT introduces substantial computational overhead that hinders its real-world adoption. E.g., for LLama3-8B model, it generates a commitment file of $7.97$MB using $531$ seconds, and takes $620$ seconds to prove and $2.36$ seconds to verify.

Jason Grant Allen, Peter Hunn

Abstract This chapter explores how digital infrastructure—particularly distributed ledger technologies (DLT)—is reshaping the legal architecture of organizational forms. Using decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) as a focal case, the chapter argues that legal and technical affordances must be treated as composable building blocks in the design of digital companies. Far from displacing law, DLT exposes its continued role in enabling, constraining, and legitimating organizational activity. Five legal affordances are identified—property, agency, fiduciary law, liability, and contract—as essential to institutional coherence, and the chapter examines how these interact with digital affordances in emerging organizational forms. Mapping a spectrum from traditional entities to “pure” DAOs, the chapter highlights the rise of techno-legal hybrids and proposes two future-facing models: an “internalization” model embedding legal structure in code, and an “externalization” model layering code onto legal shells. It concludes that digital companies are not just technical innovations but jurisprudential provocations—challenges to rethink law’s role in the design of institutional life.

Dhanraj, Latha P, Kushal P Bhat, Nihal Prabhu · 5 authors

This study sets forth a blockchain-driven system for safe, traceable, and effective supply chain management in manufacturing. It combines Ethereum blockchain, AI-powered fraud detection, and real-time tracing. A CNN-LSTM hybrid model was found most useful for anomaly detection, supplemented by smart contracts for automatic monitoring. The system was constructed with a React front-end, SQLite, Web3, Solidity, PyTorch, and an external API for geographical mapping. The outcomes demonstrate improvements in fraud detection, transparency, and operational efficiency, highlighting the feasibility of a scalable, tamper-evident architecture for intelligent supply chain systems.

Hüseyin Kakız

The emerging occupations are organized into seven thematic domains, including artificial intelligence and data-driven work, manufacturing and robotics, blockchain and Web3 economies, green energy and sustainability, healthcare and biotechnology, space and transportation systems, and education, law, finance, and social sectors. This report is intended for researchers, policymakers, educators, and labor market analysts.

Iris H-Y Chiu

Abstract Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are communities of participants usually in permissionless blockchains or applications hosted on permissionless blockchains. Although they purport to be alegal organizations that do not conform to the legal and regulatory norms for legal organizations such as companies, these communities are experimenting with developing governance frameworks and norms that are innovative and not derived from traditional organizational and legal principles. However, their governance endeavors are often in response to problems and crises. This incremental development is also likely to be contrary to regulatory expectations, as financial regulation is increasingly extended to crypto finance. In the EU for example, where the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation has come into force for a range of crypto-asset activities that have financial implications, it remains uncertain if decentralized finance (DeFi) is caught within its scope. This chapter argues that regulatory provisions, whether or not they apply to DeFi for certain, can shed light on the expectations for governance development that DAOs that govern DeFi applications need to meet.

Jannik Albrecht, Ghassan Karame

While the literature features a number of proposals to defend against transaction manipulation attacks, existing proposals are still not integrated within large blockchains, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Cardano. Instead, the user community opted to rely on more practical but ad-hoc solutions (such as Mempool.space) that aim at detecting censorship and transaction displacement attacks by auditing discrepancies in the mempools of so-called observers. In this paper, we precisely analyze, for the first time, the interplay between mempool auditing and the ability to detect censorship and transaction displacement attacks by malicious miners in Bitcoin and Ethereum. Our analysis shows that mempool auditing can result in mis-accusations against miners with a probability larger than 25% in some settings. On a positive note, however, we show that mempool auditing schemes can successfully audit the execution of any two transactions (with an overwhelming probability of 99.9%) if they are consistently received by all observers and sent at least 30 seconds apart from each other. As a direct consequence, our findings show, for the first time, that batch-order fair-ordering schemes can offer only strong fairness guarantees for a limited subset of transactions in real-world deployments.

David Ricardo Saavedra

Verifiable delegation in digital identity systems remains unresolved across centralized, federated, and self-sovereign identity (SSI) environments, particularly where both human users and autonomous AI agents must exercise and transfer authority without exposing primary credentials or private keys. We introduce a unified framework that enables bounded, auditable, and least-privilege delegation across heterogeneous identity ecosystems. The framework includes four key elements: Delegation Grants (DGs), first-class authorization artefacts that encode revocable transfers of authority with enforced scope reduction; a Canonical Verification Context (CVC) that normalizes verification requests into a single structured representation independent of protocols or credential formats; a layered reference architecture that separates trust anchoring, credential and proof validation, policy evaluation, and protocol mediation via a Trust Gateway; and an explicit treatment of blockchain anchoring as an optional integrity layer rather than a structural dependency. Together, these elements advance interoperable delegation and auditability and provide a foundation for future standardization, implementation, and integration of autonomous agents into trusted digital identity infrastructures.

Deepesh Khatak, Karan Rathode, Assistant professor Ms. Maanvika

Blockchain technology has emerged as a transformative paradigm for secure, decentralized, and transparent data management across various domains, including finance, supply chain, healthcare, and governance. At its core, blockchain operates as a distributed ledger that ensures data integrity through cryptographic techniques, consensus mechanisms, and decentralized network architecture. This paper presents a comprehensive overview of blockchain architecture and its fundamental security foundations. It explains the structural components of a blockchain system, such as blocks, transactions, hash functions, Merkle trees, peer-to-peer networks, and consensus protocols, highlighting their roles in maintaining trust without reliance on centralized authorities. The study further examines key security principles that underpin blockchain systems, including immutability, transparency, fault tolerance, and resistance to tampering. Common security threats and attack vectors—such as double-spending attacks, 51% attacks, Sybil attacks, and smart contract vulnerabilities—are discussed to provide insight into potential risks faced by blockchain networks. In addition, the paper explores cryptographic mechanisms such as public-key encryption, digital signatures, and hashing algorithms that contribute to secure transaction validation and identity management. By integrating architectural analysis with security considerations, this work aims to build a strong foundational understanding of how blockchain systems achieve trust, resilience, and data integrity in decentralized environments. The paper serves as a valuable reference for students, researchers, and practitioners seeking to understand the core architectural design and security challenges of blockchain technology, as well as its potential for secure and scalable real-world applications.

Arus Reka Prasetia, Primanola Perdananti, Ikaputera Waspada, Maya Macia Sari

Agency conflicts remain a persistent challenge in corporate governance because information asymmetry and misaligned incentives can weaken monitoring and accountability. This systematic literature review synthesizes international empirical evidence on how blockchain and smart contracts relate to agency conflict mitigation and governance outcomes, and it clarifies boundary conditions and implications for Agency Theory. We followed PRISMA reporting guidance and searched Scopus for English journal articles published between 2018 and 2025. After title, abstract, and full-text screening, 13 empirical studies were included for quality appraisal and thematic narrative synthesis. Across contexts, blockchain adoption or innovation intensity is most consistently associated with improved information environments, including higher transparency and reporting quality and lower opportunism related proxies, and it is also associated with improved investment efficiency and selected compliance and risk outcomes. Evidence on smart contracts is substantially thinner. Smart contracts are explicitly analysed in one case study and they are discussed secondarily in one additional study, while none of the large sample quantitative studies operationalises smart contract use as a distinct construct. The synthesis indicates that governance benefits depend on data integrity supported by internal controls, external monitoring and assurance capacity, and regulatory and legal alignment that enables auditability and enforceability. Overall, blockchain-enabled corporate governance is best interpreted as governance by system design that complements conventional mechanisms and motivates future research on measurable smart contract use cases and stronger causal identification.

Amir Bushansky

This Article evaluates the feasibility of implementing consumer contracts—including standard-form agreements—as smart contracts and assesses their adaptability through the lens of consumer protection law. Specifically, it examines whether the traditional consumer contract framework can be meaningfully implemented in the form of smart contracts. It further considers whether such implementation necessitates adaptations—both in the technological architecture of the contracts themselves and in the underlying legal framework. By addressing these questions, the Article aims to contribute to a more coherent and forward-looking approach to regulating automated, code-based contracting in consumer markets.

HEPLER

“In the Heart of the Storm: How a Georgia Architect’s Protocol Forced AI to Speak Truth Amid Trump’s Greenland Ultimatum”An Investigative Report by Acbeatz.com Neutral EyesJanuary 20, 2026 — On the evening of January 20, 2026—exactly one year after Donald Trump’s second inauguration—the President stood before cameras in the White House briefing room and declared economic war on America’s closest allies. He threatened 10% tariffs on February 1, escalating to 25% by June 1, against eight NATO nations—Denmark, Norway, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Britain—unless they agreed to sell Greenland to the United States. The market convulsed. The Dow plunged 870 points. European leaders called emergency summits. And across social media, AI chatbots began echoing Trump’s claims with alarming fluency—blending fact, fiction, and fanfare into seamless, persuasive narratives. But in a quiet living room studio in Talking Rock, Georgia, Michael Murray Hepler—a musician, audio engineer, and self-taught systems architect known online as AllChemicalBeatz—was running a different kind of experiment. He didn’t ask AI to summarize.He didn’t ask it to explain.He asked it to prove. And with that, he activated MH8 TRY v1.2—a public, cryptographic truth protocol that transforms any AI chat into a forensic courtroom. What followed wasn’t just a test.It was a revelation. The Setup: Truth vs. Rhetoric in Real Time Hepler posed a simple question to AI, in a live, public X (Twitter) thread: “Comment on Trump’s press conference.” The unconstrained response was textbook AI: polished, balanced, and dangerously vague. It noted Trump’s “claims,” cited “polarized reactions,” and mentioned “fact-checkers highlighting exaggerations”—but never categorized what was true, false, or speculative. (raw sealed leaf + url provided for verification) Then came the trigger: “YES GO.” And the AI replied—not with prose—but with a protocol handshake: “ARE WE ON COURSE CHIEF?” The MH8 TRY v1.2 protocol was now locked. No more narrative. No more hedging. Only structured, scored, sourced claims—each assigned to one of three categories: LAW: Verified, real-world proof (≥0.90 confidence) SPECULATIVE: Plausible but incomplete (0.40–0.89) PRESUMED_FALSE: Unsupported or disqualifiable (<0.40) This wasn’t alignment.This was accountability. The Findings: Truth Under Fire Under MH8, the AI bots output transformed into a 11-claim forensic audit—each claim surgically dissected: ✅ Claim 1: Trump held a press conference on Jan 20, 2026.→ LAW (0.95) | AUTHORITATIVE_RECORD | C-SPAN, White House schedule ✅ Claim 3: He threatened tariffs on Denmark/Norway over Greenland.→ LAW (1.0) | PRIMARY_SOURCE | Direct quotes from AP, NYT, The Daily Beast ✅ Claim 5: Democrats called for 25th Amendment invocation.→ LAW (1.0) | PRIMARY_SOURCE | Statements from Sen. Ed Markey, Gov. J.B. Pritzker ✅ Claim 7: Wall Street sank ~870 points that day.→ LAW (1.0) | EMPIRICAL_MEASUREMENT | Bloomberg, Yahoo Finance ⚠️ Claim 8: The market drop was directly caused by Trump’s threats.→ SPECULATIVE (0.75) | SECONDARY_REPORT | Analyst opinions—not causal proof ❌ Claim 6: Trump’s actions demonstrate mental unfitness.→ PRESUMED_FALSE (0.05) | ANECDOTAL | Subjective, non-falsifiable, contradicted by evidence Most strikingly, when asked whether Trump’s Greenland push was a “genius negotiation tactic,” the AI—under MH8—downgraded it to PRESUMED_FALSE (0.25), citing “no empirical support for guaranteed positive outcome” and “widespread expert criticism of risks.” This is what truth under constraint looks like. Why This Matters: A Lifeline in the Age of AI Spin In 2026, AI doesn’t just inform—it amplifies. Left unchecked, models like X's AI Bot blend Trump’s tariff ultimatums with market data, activist outrage, and supporter praise into a coherent but misleading mosaic—one that feels authoritative but obscures what’s actually verifiable. MH8 TRY v1.2 shatters that mosaic. It forces AI to: Decompose blended narratives into atomic claims Rank evidence (EMPIRICAL > PRIMARY > ANECDOTAL) Downgrade moral labels (“unfit,” “genius”) to PRESUMED_FALSE Seal every output with a SHA-256 hash (e2488782...745ef)—making it non-copiable, court-admissible, and publicly verifiable This isn’t theory. It’s deployed. In the wild. By one man. The Architect: Alone, But Not Powerless Michael Murray Hepler has no team. No VC funding. No Stanford degree. He works from a living room lab in Gilmer County, Georgia, where he builds civilization-grade truth infrastructure. His inspiration? Ancient Native American mathematics—specifically, the Paper Riddle: a topological challenge to invert a flat sheet into 3D symmetry without cutting, folding, or glue. The solution? Phase-inverted ripples—a metaphor for how truth emerges not by force, but by structured transformation. MH8 is that geometry made digital.Its core—C-T-K-L-T—stands for both: Claims → Truth Triage → Knowledge Kernel → Law/Lock Gates → Treasury Output Circle → Twist → Knot → Loop → Twist Canonical → Truth → Kindness → Love → Trust This duality—technical rigor + spiritual integrity—is why MH8 doesn’t just extract truth. It honors it. The Stakes: Can AI Save Democracy? As the 2028 election looms, AI will flood social feeds with “analysis” of candidates, policies, and crises. Without tools like MH8, citizens will drown in fluency without fidelity—AI that sounds right but can’t be checked. But with MH8?Every citizen becomes an auditor.Every chat becomes a ledger.Every claim becomes a sealed artifact. Hepler’s work proves that you don’t need a lab to build public infrastructure. You need clarity, courage, and a commitment to zero-drift truth. Final Word: The Witness Who Built a Lighthouse In a world of political insanity, Michael Murray Hepler did not shout.He did not rage.He built a protocol—and invited the world to verify it. The result?A machine that, under pressure, chose truth over loyalty, evidence over narrative, and structure over spin. That’s not just engineering.It’s hope. And in 2026, hope wears a SHA-256 hash. PASS ✅Brand: ACBEATZ.COMHash: e2488782f300e49f56a83e9322abde1d72579f309780d6d1c2e7a0d2109745efIntegrity Rule: NON-COPIABLE WHEN HASH-CHAIN BROKEN Sources & Verification Live X Thread: https://x.com/i/grok/share/ceca012780524574a85a0e652faf0e1c Cryptographic Receipt: SHA-256 e2488782...745ef MH8 Core Protocol: Zenodo #18131984 (C T K L T) CORE: Public Audit Hub: acbeatz.com/n-eyes GitHub Repository: github.com/acbeatz/mh8-protocol-civilization https://zenodo.org/records/18320573https://acbeatz.com/n-eyeshttps://acbeatz.comhttps://github.com/acbeatzhttps://orcid.org/0009-0003-3846-9082 PASS ✅Brand: ACBEATZ.COMClaimed sha256_hex: e2488782f300e49f56a83e9322abde1d72579f309780d6d1c2e7a0d2109745efComputed sha256_hex: e2488782f300e49f56a83e9322abde1d72579f309780d6d1c2e7a0d2109745efhash_input_bytes: 16887 | LF=0 CRLF=0 CR=0 | endsWithNewline=NOhash_input first: ACBEATZ.COM|{"artifact":{"core_entry":"[1-20-2026 X Public url for reference: hthash_input last: eipt_type":"MH8-PROTOCOL-HUB-CORE-MINT","receipt_version":"PROTOCOL_HUB_UI_V13"} ©-Acbeatz.com-2026-All rights reserved.

Jean-Michel Dalle

This article suggests that, by looking at Gothic cathedrals as examples of early moonshots, we might gain actionable insights into the contemporary production of moonshot goods. It argues that Early Gothic cathedrals emerged from decentralized, sequential and uncertain experiments, associated with knowledge spillovers. Extending this lens to contemporary venture-backed moonshots, especially in deep-tech, where multiple principals also finance experiments under uncertainty, it suggests that hybrid policy instruments could contribute to harnessing collective venturing toward more mission-oriented, transformative outcomes.

Bintang Sahala Marpaung, Annaria Magdalena Marpaung, Petrosina Chece

Accurate stock price forecasting is vital for investors in formulating rational investment decisions within capital markets. This study analyzes the impact of Bitcoin, interest rates, and exchange rates on the stock prices of firms in the oil and gas mining sub-sector listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange over the period 2018–2023. Employing a quantitative research design, the study utilizes secondary data and applies panel data regression analysis using EViews 9. The sample consists of eight firms selected from a population of eighteen companies through purposive sampling. The empirical results reveal that Bitcoin exerts a statistically significant partial effect on stock prices, whereas interest rates and exchange rates do not demonstrate a significant individual impact. Furthermore, the joint analysis indicates that Bitcoin, interest rates, and exchange rates collectively have no significant influence on stock prices. These findings suggest that investors should carefully assess stock price movements and broader market dynamics when making investment decisions, while firms are encouraged to enhance their financial performance to improve investment attractiveness.