Blockchain Papers

Christian René Sechting, Jonathan Heiss, Axel Kϋpper

No abstract is available for this record.

Ivan Homoliak, Martin Hrubý, Martin Perešíni, Kristián Košťál · 5 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Yanzhen Li, R. Wang

Execution Tickets (ET) have emerged as a leading proposal for mitigating MEV-related centralization risks by internalizing MEV through a protocol-level lottery system. This paper provides an empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) of the ET mechanism under an infinite-supply design, modeled as a Tullock contest. We evaluate a 2-slot lookahead window as a minimal temporal design that limits multi-slot MEV while preserving support for user pre-confirmations. By introducing a forfeiture parameter, we parameterize a continuum between All-Pay and Winner-Pay regimes. We then map the fairness-revenue frontier, revealing a fundamental design tension: higher contest decisiveness and forfeiture rates can improve protocol revenue, but may reduce allocation fairness by entrenching dominant builders. We identify a quantitative Goldilocks zone that balances MEV-capture efficiency with market diversity.

Anusha Jaiswal, Ankita Singh

No abstract is available for this record.

DANIEL GUEDES, Douglas Wegner

Objetivo: propor a Decentralized Autonomous Franchise (DAF) como uma arquitetura organizacional alternativa para redes de franquias, baseada em blockchain, contratos inteligentes e governança tokenizada. Estado da arte: embora o franchising seja amplamente reconhecido como modelo eficiente de expansão, enfrenta limitações estruturais relacionadas à centralização de poder, à incompletude contratual e às assimetrias informacionais. Paralelamente, a literatura científica sobre Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) tem avançado na discussão de governança descentralizada, ainda com pouca articulação com o campo de franchising. Originalidade: o artigo aproxima os campos de franchising e DAOs, propondo a DAF como modelo alternativo que reconfigura mecanismos de coordenação, participação e controle em redes de franquias. Impactos: o artigo oferece um referencial inovador para redes de franquias interessadas em atualizar seus mecanismos de governança, ampliar a participação dos franqueados e incorporar princípios de transparência e descentralização apoiados por tecnologias digitais descentralizadas. ODS: 8 – Trabalho decente e crescimento econômico, 9 – Indústria, inovação e infraestrutura, 17 – Parcerias e meios de implementação.

Angelo Ferrando, Blondelle Kana Zanlefack, Vadim Malvone

The exponential growth of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has underscored the critical need for formal verification methods that can reason about the financial properties of smart contracts. Traditional formal methods such as Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) cannot express liquidity properties—guarantees about users' ability to access assets based on wallet balances. We introduce Wallet ATL (WATL), an extension of ATL with wallet predicates and financially constrained strategic operators. WATL ensures that actions are both strategically and economically feasible. We formalize the semantics of WATL, provide model checking algorithms within the VITAMIN framework, and address scalability through the Meta-Agent Abstraction, which collapses all non-coalition agents into a single meta-agent with a sum-aggregated wallet. This abstraction preserves liquidity properties while significantly reducing the verification space. Through case studies such as a crowdfunding smart contract, we demonstrate how WATL formally specifies and verifies liquidity guarantees. Our results show that WATL, implemented in the VITAMIN tool, bridges the gap between multi-agent strategic reasoning and financial correctness, providing a practical step towards the formal verification of smart contracts with liquidity-awareness.

Radek Koblic

Tato bakalářská práce je zaměřená na problematiku blockchainových oraclů a jejich propojení on-chain a off-chain světa. Výsledné řešení demonstruje hybridní oracle přímo na případu užití parametrického pojistného produktu podmíněného meteorologickými daty. V první, teoretické části jsou popsány principy technologie blockchain, ekosystém decentralizovaných financí (DeFi) a podrobná analýza problematiky oráclů, včetně existujících produkčních řešení, bezpečnostních hrozeb a mechanismů zvyšujících spolehlivost. Následně se práce zabývá analýzou požadavků a návrhem architektury systému. Je zde definována on-chain část v podobě smart kontraktů a off-chain část zajišťující zápis, sběr a agregaci meteorologických dat. V další části je popsána samotná implementace od volby technologií přes klíčové části zdrojového kódu až po off-chain klienty. Součástí je i popis zjištěných problémů a jejich řešení. V poslední části je provedeno shrnutí výsledků testování, analýza spotřeby gasu, bezpečnostní vyhodnocení a srovnání navrženého řešení s referenčním centralizovaným přístupem.

David Mikulík

Tato diplomová práce se zabývá návrhem a implementací nástroje pro statickou analýzu spotřeby plynu ve smart kontraktech napsaných v jazyce Solidity. Cílem je vytvořit nástroj, který v kódu automaticky odhalí vzory zbytečně zvyšující náklady na provádění kontraktu a upozorní na možné optimalizace. Na základě analýzy existujících řešení a běžných optimalizačních vzorů byl implementován soubor detektorů jako rozšíření nástroje Slither, jehož výsledky jsou prezentovány prostřednictvím webové aplikace. Uživatelské rozhraní aplikace bylo navrženo uživatelsky orientovaným postupem a ověřeno pomocí prototypování a uživatelského testování. Funkčnost detektorů byla ověřena na sadě reálných kontraktů a reálné úspory plynu empiricky změřeny.

Aniket Warule, Sana Shaikh, Kunal Darekar, Sudarshan Bankar · 5 authors

The emergence of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) represents a paradigm shift in organizational governance, yet their technical complexity remains a significant barrier to widespread adoption. Creating and managing a DAO requires deep expertise in blockchain development, smart contract auditing, and cryptocurrency operations, which excludes many potential users in non-technical domains. This paper presents DAOship, a novel no-code platform for DAO creation and management deployed on the Avalanche blockchain. The platform provides an intuitive graphical user interface (GUI) that allows users to configure, launch, and operate a fully-functional DAO without writing a single line of code. By leveraging Avalanche's high throughput and low transaction fees, the system enables the deployment of customizable smart contracts for governance, treasury management, and voting. The platform dramatically lowers the technical barrier, empowering communities, startups, and traditional organizations to leverage decentralized governance models easily and securely. Testing on the Avalanche Fuji testnet yielded a 97% reduction in setup time, an average System Usability Scale (SUS) score of 89.2, and zero critical vulnerabilities across all deployed DAOs.

Sanjam Garg, Aarushi Goel, Dimitris Kolonelos, Rohit Sinha

No abstract is available for this record.

Olena Onishchenko

No abstract is available for this record.

Fatemeh Fardno, S. Rasoul Etesami

The Ethereum blockchain utilizes the EIP-1559 algorithm to manage transaction inclusion and block assembly. However, EIP-1559 and much of the existing literature study this problem from a static perspective, focusing on price evolution without modelling transaction dynamics within the mempool. Motivated by this limitation, we study a dynamic transaction scheduling problem in which transactions with heterogeneous sizes and per-unit values arrive over time and remain in the mempool until scheduled. To capture the stochastic mempool evolution, we formulate the problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) whose state represents the mempool configuration and whose actions correspond to block prices. We first provide a primal-dual interpretation of the static EIP-1559 mechanism, showing that block prices arise naturally as dual variables of a social-welfare maximization problem. Building on this perspective, we extend the framework to the dynamic setting and formulate an objective that maximizes long-run discounted reward while incorporating holding costs and overshoot penalties. We then employ a Natural Policy Gradient (NPG) algorithm to compute the optimal policy. Our results show that dynamic pricing stabilizes the mempool while maximizing long-run discounted reward. In particular, as the overshoot penalty increases, the average scheduled transaction volume converges to the target block capacity, and the resulting NPG updates closely resemble the EIP-1559 price update rule. Finally, we study two special cases of the MDP formulation: homogeneous transactions and uniform arrivals. In the homogeneous setting, where the protocol directly controls scheduled volume, we show that the optimal policy has a threshold structure. We then propose a bang-bang pricing mechanism for uniform arrivals and derive a lower bound on the block capacity needed to ensure system stability.

Ian C. Moore

We introduce the State Twin: a typed, in-memory, replayable replica of an on-chain automated market maker (AMM) pool that serves as a substrate for agentic reasoning over decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols. Agentic DeFi stacks today couple reasoning to chain time, since every "what if?" query incurs a new RPC read or a real transaction, so the agent's effective action space is bounded by block confirmation latency and gas. We argue this coupling is a structural problem rather than a performance one, and that the missing layer is an off-chain substrate that preserves the protocol's exact mathematics while admitting the operations on-chain state cannot: forking, replay, branching, counterfactual rollout. We formalize each AMM family (Uniswap V2, V3, Balancer, Stableswap) as a discrete-time controlled dynamical system, prove a quantitative fidelity bound on the divergence between twin and chain, and give the open architecture used in DeFiPy v2, an open-source Python toolkit that ships the State Twin substrate and a reference Model Context Protocol server exposing typed analytical primitives as LLM tools. The same primitive (i.e., one Python class, one calling pattern) serves a notebook quant, a backtest, and an LLM agent without modification. We close with a fork-and-evaluate worked example: a single live RPC read seeds N independent in-memory twins under distinct price-shock scenarios, in sub-second wall-clock time. The contribution is the substrate, not a particular agent, which is what the specification of what an agentic DeFi substrate must look like

Alexander Braun, Niklas Haeusle

A first-order design task in blockchain-based decentralized autonomous organizations is to ensure that malicious actors are sanctioned. We show that, when voters act strategically and the system is insufficiently decentralized, payoff-matching bribes undermine the sanctioning of malicious actors under conventional governance. Our framework formalizes DAO voting mechanisms and lets us identify those that mitigate the problem. Stochastic voting decouples a tokenholder’s influence from the voting behavior of others. Thus, bribery-proofness can be restored in the presence of sufficiently centralized governance tokenholders. Alternatively, masked voting increases resilience against bribery. Our work contributes to the broader debate on the merits and pitfalls of decentralization and highlights the need to align governance mechanisms with the degree of decentralization in blockchain networks.

Peihao Li, Nadia Dahmani, Wenqi Cai

Automated market makers (AMMs) quote prices from pool state rather than from a limit order book. AMM pools often stay close to a reference price because arbitrageurs correct profitable mispricing. A large part of decentralized finance therefore relies on a simple economic premise: once the AMM price drifts away from the reference price, arbitrage incentives push it back. This paper studies when that premise is strong enough to guarantee block-scale stability. We model the gap between the reference price and the AMM price as a stochastic tracking error, treat arbitrage as the corrective input, and place blockchain execution inside the loop through fees, discrete blocks, transaction ordering, delays, and transaction failure. The detailed execution layer is reduced to the total successful correction confirmed in each block. Under a block-level correction condition, we prove geometric ergodicity of the tracking error and obtain explicit one-step bounds that connect tracking quality to liquidity and execution quality. We also show in a constant-product example how fees, fixed execution costs, and local liquidity map into the no-trade band and the optimal corrective trade. Finally, we build empirical proxies for the theorem quantities from realized block data and use them to organize reduced and mechanism-focused simulations whose comparative statics are consistent with the theory. The contribution is to turn a basic economic intuition behind decentralized finance into a quantitative stability statement together with a tractable calibration interface.

Anatoly Krestenko, Mikhail Butov, Rostislav Berezovskiy, Danila Bolotin

We study permissionless spot--perpetual basis trading in decentralized finance as a collateral control problem. The strategy holds spot inventory, hedges directional exposure with a short perpetual, and allocates capital between spot inventory and derivative margin under on-chain liquidity and execution frictions. The paper delivers three results. First, it solves a static control problem for the collateral share and shows that the risk-constrained formulation provides a more robust operating benchmark relative to the economic optimum. In comparative calibration, the required collateral rises monotonically under volatility stress. The collateral is the lowest for BTC and increases significantly for long tail assets such as LINK and DOGE. Second, the paper derives an asymmetric dynamic extension in which the lower boundary of intervention is solvency driven, and the upper boundary is determined by a trade-off between carry-loss and the cost of rebalancing. Monte Carlo simulation shows that the lower boundary remains structurally relevant, whereas meaningful interior upper triggers survive mainly in the regimes with high carry and low costs. Third, the paper validates an execution-aware implementation with live routed execution and historical backtests. The execution layer shows that the realized wedges are significant, but become worse in the case of selling the basis. This justifies a minimum effective rebalancing size and a positive execution buffer. The historical validation shows that in the case of a fixed control rule the realized performance is predominantly explained by the funding environment.

Bhabani Sankar Samantray, K. Hemant Kumar Reddy

Auctions play a vital role in modern commerce by offering a transparent, structured, and competitive method for trading goods, services, and data. However, traditional in-person auctions are limited in terms of accessibility, convenience, security, and efficiency. However existing online auction platforms, while addressing some of these limitations, still face challenges such as limited transparency, centralized control, and insufficient security and privacy protections. Moreover these issues become extremely critical in case of sensitive applications like healthcare, defense and finance. To address these challenges, this article proposes a three-phase trading framework. In the first phase, data generation, anonymization, and storage are performed. In the second phase, an ensemble learning-based price forecasting approach is employed to estimate the asking and bidding prices, which depend on the volume and type of data. Finally, in the third phase, a Monte Carlo-inspired auction-based Non-Fungible Token (NFT) trading mechanism (MCiANT) is incorporated to enable efficient trading between buyers and sellers. The efficacy of the proposed MCiANT framework is compared with three distinct auction algorithms: the Vickrey auction, the Markov-Inspired Stationary Distribution Auction (MISD), and the Two-Phase English–Dutch Hybrid Auction (TPEDHA). The results demonstrate that the MCiANT framework significantly outperforms the others, achieving success-rate improvements of 5%, 5%, and 1% over the Vickrey, MISD, and TPEDHA auctions, respectively. Furthermore, the proposed framework is evaluated using health data by measuring anonymization time, encryption time, InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) upload time, and I/O performance.

Özkan İMAMOĞLU

Bu çalışma, 2020–2025 yılları arasında DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organizations) yapılarıyla ilgili literatürü incelemek amacıyla SCOPUS veri tabanından elde edilen 3.113 akademik çalışma üzerinde bibliyometrik analiz gerçekleştirmiştir. “decentralized autonomous organization”, “DAO”, “smart contract”, “on-chain governance” gibi anahtar kelimelerle yapılan tarama sonucunda, literatürün blockchain ve akıllı sözleşmeler temelli teknik altyapı etrafında yoğunlaştığı; buna karşılık yönetişim modelleri, token ekonomisi, oylama süreçleri, güvenlik, veri gizliliği ve hukuki statü gibi konuların araştırmalarda öne çıktığı belirlenmiştir. Bulgular, DAO çalışmalarının çok disiplinli bir yapıya sahip olduğunu, ülke ve kurum bazlı yayın yoğunluklarının küresel olarak hızla arttığını ve kavramsal çeşitliliğin yüksek seviyede olduğunu göstermektedir. Analizler, DAO’ların yönetişim ve denetim açısından standartlaşmamış, teknik olarak karmaşık ve hukuken belirsiz bir yapı sergilediğini; bu nedenle geleneksel finansal denetim modelleriyle uyum sorunlarının bulunduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Sonuç olarak, DAO ekosisteminin sürdürülebilir ve denetlenebilir bir yapıya kavuşması için yönetişim protokollerinin netleşmesi, teknik güvenlik standartlarının geliştirilmesi ve hukuki çerçevelerin güçlendirilmesi gerekmektedir.

Shiliang Zuo

Linear contracts are ubiquitous in practice, yet optimal contract theory often prescribes complex, nonlinear structures. We provide a distributional robustness justification for linear contracts. We study a principal-agent problem where the agent exerts costly effort across multiple tasks, generating a stochastic signal upon which the principal conditions payment. The principal faces distributional ambiguity: she knows the expected signal for each effort level, but not the full distribution. She seeks a contract maximizing her worst-case payoff over all distributions consistent with this partial knowledge. Our main result shows that linear contracts are optimal for such a principal. For any contract, there exists a linear contract achieving weakly higher worst-case payoff. The proof introduces the concavification approach built around the notion of self-inducing actions; these are actions where an affine contract simultaneously induces the action as optimal and supports the concave envelope of payments from above. We show that self-inducing actions always exist as maximizers of the gap between the concave envelope and agent's cost function. We extend these results to multi-party settings. In common agency with multiple principals, we show that affine contracts improve all principals' worst-case payoffs. In team production with multiple agents, we establish a complementary necessity result: if any agent's contract is non-affine, the unique ex-post robust equilibrium is zero effort. Finally, we show that homogeneous utility and cost functions yield tractable characterizations, enabling closed-form approximation ratios and a sharp boundary between computational tractability results.

Vabuk Pahari, B. Chandrasekaran, Johnnatan Messias, Krishna P. Gummadi · 5 authors

A decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) is a governing entity that empowers its stakeholders (i.e., users who hold one or more of its tokens) to manage blockchain-based protocols (i.e., smart contracts) collaboratively. The governance of a DAO is explicitly encoded in the DAO's governance contract, which defines how stakeholders participate in governance and how much influence (or voting power) they have in any decision. While decentralization and autonomy are the fundamental tenets of a DAO's design, empirical evidence suggests that in practice governance is often highly centralized. In this work, we study the designs and implementations of 48 public and actively used DAOs, with substantially large capital, deployed on Ethereum. We identify how three key governance mechanisms--token registration, staking, and delegation--originally introduced to improve security or participation, contribute to the concentration of voting power. Unlike prior work on centralization of voting power in specific DAOs, our findings reveal that these governance mechanisms of DAOs themselves systematically reinforce centralization. By elucidating the relationship between governance design and voting centralization, this work advances the understanding of DAO governance structures and highlights the inherent trade-offs between decentralization, security, and usability of DAOs.

Kunal Kumar, Mohammad Malik, Gujju Koushik, Nujetti Abinandhan

The evolution of blockchain technology has introduced innovative approaches for managing digital assets and transforming fundraising models through Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs). However, many existing charity platforms continue to operate on centralized systems that restrict transparency, limit accountability, and fail to provide donors with verifiable proof of their contributions. In such systems, donors often have minimal visibility into fund utilization, and there is no direct linkage between their contributions and any traceable digital asset. Moreover, traditional charity and auction mechanisms rely heavily on intermediaries for transaction validation, data management, and operational control, making them susceptible to data manipulation, reduced auditability, and diminished user trust, while also lacking mechanisms to encourage active participation. To address these limitations, this research proposes a decentralized charity auction framework that integrates Blockchain technology with NFTs to ensure secure, transparent, and verifiable transactions. The system is developed using the Django Web Framework and leverages Web3 Technology along with Smart Contracts to automate and manage auction processes. Each auction item is uniquely tokenized as an NFT, guaranteeing authenticity and non-replicability. Users can register as donors or auction organizers, create NFTbased auctions, and participate through bidding or direct contributions. All transactions are permanently recorded on the blockchain, and NFT ownership is automatically transferred to the highest bidder or contributor, serving as a verifiable digital proof of participation. By removing intermediaries and ensuring immutable record-keeping, the system enhances trust, strengthens security, and introduces an incentive-driven participation model, thereby improving transparency, accountability, and efficiency in modern charity and fundraising ecosystems.

Yulin Liu

This study presents a structured dataset of blockchain-registered artificial intelligence agents under the ERC-8004 standard on Ethereum. The dataset integrates on-chain identity records, minting transactions, transfer events, reputation summaries, and individual feedback records, together with resolved off-chain metadata where available. Data were collected from Ethereum mainnet using Web3 RPC queries and processed into tabular form to enable reproducible analysis. The dataset covers 10,000 agents within a defined block range and includes both event-level records and aggregated summaries. It enables empirical research on agent identity formation, reputation systems, service exposure, and early-stage decentralized AI ecosystems. This resource supports studies in blockchain analytics, decentralized trust infrastructure, and the emerging agentic economy.

Ömer Tuğsal Doruk

In this study, a novel theoretical framework is provided for the potential effect of smart contracts on reducing transaction costs in financial markets to increase corporate investment. The theoretical model considered in this paper is based on Williamson’s transaction cost approach and considers how an important blockchain technology such as smart contracts can induce corporate investment through its potential transaction cost reduction effect. The findings obtained show that smart contracts minimize transaction costs and increase future growth opportunities for firms to corporate investment. This study sheds new light on smart contract-based finance and its impact on business investment within the Williamson’s transaction cost framework.

Tiago Ferreira Cavazin

Este artigo apresenta um esboço estruturado sobre “Dinâmica de Arbitragem entre DEXs e CEXs: Velocidade e Lucratibilidade.”. O objetivo é analisar os fundamentos técnicos e econômicos da arbitragem entre <i>centralized exchanges</i> (CEXs) e <i>decentralized exchanges</i> (DEXs), com foco em como velocidade, latência e estrutura de taxas condicionam a lucratividade dessas estratégias no ecossistema Web3 contemporâneo. Estudos empíricos recentes medem, em detalhe, a economia por trás da arbitragem CEX‑DEX e do MEV associado, mostrando que a maioria dos lucros é capturada por poucos <i>searchers</i> profissionais e que as oportunidades de arbitragem desaparecem em janelas de tempo de frações de segundo. Análises de mercado indicam que, em média, operações bem‑sucedidas de arbitragem CEX‑DEX podem exibir margens brutas em torno de 30–40% sobre o capital efetivamente arriscado por trade, mas que a competição e os pagamentos a <i>block builders</i> comprimem esses retornos ao longo do tempo, caracterizando um mercado altamente monopolizado. Pesquisas teóricas sobre <i>latency arbitrage</i> e sobre o <i>timing</i> ótimo de arbitragem entre CEXs e DEXs modelam explicitamente o efeito da latência de blockchain, da ordem “first‑come, first‑served” e da vantagem de co‑location em data centers, demonstrando que a maior parte do <i>excess return</i> se concentra em janelas de 0,5 a 2 segundos após o surgimento de um desvio de preço entre venues. Trabalhos que estudam a dinâmica de preços em AMMs mostram, ainda, que taxas de swap introduzem uma banda de não‑arbitragem em torno do preço de referência em CEXs, restringindo as oportunidades de arbitragem a desvios acima de um certo limiar e conectando diretamente estrutura de taxas, liquidez e frequência de arbitragem. Conclui‑se que a arbitragem CEX‑DEX é hoje um jogo de alta frequência e forte competição, em que velocidade de execução, acesso a canais privados (MEV‑Boost) e otimização de custos determinam quem captura a maior parte das oportunidades de lucro.<br>