Fairness-Revenue Trade-offs in Ethereum Execution Tickets: An Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis

Abstract

Execution Tickets (ET) have emerged as a leading proposal for mitigating MEV-related centralization risks by internalizing MEV through a protocol-level lottery system. This paper provides an empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) of the ET mechanism under an infinite-supply design, modeled as a Tullock contest. We evaluate a 2-slot lookahead window as a minimal temporal design that limits multi-slot MEV while preserving support for user pre-confirmations. By introducing a forfeiture parameter, we parameterize a continuum between All-Pay and Winner-Pay regimes. We then map the fairness-revenue frontier, revealing a fundamental design tension: higher contest decisiveness and forfeiture rates can improve protocol revenue, but may reduce allocation fairness by entrenching dominant builders. We identify a quantitative Goldilocks zone that balances MEV-capture efficiency with market diversity.