In this paper, we develop an open-economy macroeconomic model of a Proof-of-Stake network to analyze nominal token-price dynamics and the systemic effects of speculative capital. We first consider a network populated solely by active utility users, who finance network activity through a steady exogenous inflow of fiat currency. We prove the existence of a unique, globally asymptotically stable steady-state equilibrium with a well-defined nominal token price and derive a closed-form expression for the network's relaxation time. Calibrating the model using parameters representative of the current Ethereum network, we estimate a relaxation half-life of approximately 46 years. This extreme macroeconomic inertia implies that the token price may remain persistently displaced from its evolving steady-state benchmark, producing sustained price overshooting as the network adjusts to changing fundamentals. We then introduce an Investor class to examine the effects of passive and active speculative capital. We show that passive institutional staking compresses the native staking yield and creates a structural imbalance that systematically raises the nominal token price while shifting consensus ownership away from active utility users. Active speculative capital has a qualitatively different effect. In response to capital shocks, the Consumer class's rigid preference for fiat-denominated consumption generates an endogenous constant-value strategy. This mechanism shifts staked-token ownership from the Investor class toward active utility users, with potentially favorable implications for consensus decentralization.
Bitcoin (BTC) wealth distribution is often studied with macro indicators like wallet balances, prices, network activity, fees, and hashrate. This letter proposes a "Crypto-Microeconomic Observability Framework" to examine micro-level Bitcoin wealth disparities across five labeled agent classes: Service, Abuse, Malware, Individuals, and Benign. Using descriptive, inequality, and longitudinal concentration metrics, we show that Bitcoin wealth is highly concentrated across major classes, consistent with a persistent "Whale-Effect". Service entities hold the largest share of observed BTC (75.15%), while Abuse controls a disproportionately large share relative to its entity count (24.26% of BTC vs. 3.53% of entities). Individuals, Abuse, and Service show near-maximal within-class inequality (e.g., Gini = 0.9993 for Individuals), and time-series analysis indicates these patterns persist. Overall, Bitcoin wealth among labeled economic agents remains structurally uneven and concentrated in a small subset of entities.
Klaus M. Frahm, Leonardo Ermann, Dima L. Shepelyansky
According to the recent Wealth Thermalization Hypothesis (WTH) the wealth inequality in the world is described by the Rayleigh-Jeans (RJ) thermal distribution of interacting agents in a society with social stratification. In this concept, the wealth layers of society are associated with energy levels from a nonlinear dynamical system conserving two integrals of motion being total energy and probability norm. This leads to RJ condensation and the formation of a huge poverty phase of low wealth and a tiny oligarchic phase that captures a main part of total society wealth. This RJ phenomenon has similarities with self cleaning in multimode optical fibers and constraint driven condensation in various physical systems. We analyze real Lorenz and Pareto curves for wealth of households in countries and the world, Gross Domestic Product of countries, market capitalization of companies at stock exchange of Hong Kong, Shanghai, London, bitcoin transactions, world trade between countries and show that the WTH theory gives a good description of these curves. On the basis of this comparison we argue that the RJ thermal distribution provides a universal description of wealth inequality in the world.
Current blockchain research and analytics tend to prioritize observable on-chain transactions, obscuring the processes through which cryptocurrencies are created, publicised, retained, and disposed of. In response, this paper considers distributed ledger technologies from records management principles in ISO 15489-1:2016. Setting off by specifying the parallels -- that is transactions as "records", crypto-asset units as "information assets", and blockchains as "aggregations" -- we introduce a seven-stage lifecycle for blockchain data. We apply the framework to Bitcoin, a fungible token, and a non-fungible token. On this basis, we argue that blockchain systems are not merely transactional infrastructures but record management systems with distinctive characteristics. We discuss how the on-chain/off-chain boundary and privacy-enhancing technologies can complicate lifecycle visibility, with particular relevance for crypto-crime research and investigation. As a meta-level framework, the lifecycle perspective enables positioning existing research, decomposing legal, regulatory, technological, and operational challenges by stage, and informing lifecycle-aware approaches to blockchain governance, analytics, and regulation.
Recent innovation theories on economics remain largely grounded in assumptions of hierarchical firms and closed organizational boundaries, offering limited insight into how innovation unfolds within decentralized, digitally native organizations. Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) represent an emerging form of innovation ecosystem characterized by blockchain-based transparency, open participation, and token-driven governance, in which sustainability can be embedded directly into organizational design. This study compares two standards, ERC-8004 and Google A2A, who address the same agent interoperability question, while the former is governed by DAO and the latter by corporation consortium. They are examined through an LLM-powered comparative pipeline for large-scale governance discourse analysis, integrating automated annotation, neural topic modeling, and multi-layer network analysis to study socio-technical power structures. The study provides evidence-based insights for scholars, policymakers, and designers seeking to align innovation, technological governance, and sustainability in future organizational forms.
Urban decarbonization requires scaling rooftop solar across millions of fragmented producers, yet cities face a fundamental tension: energy data is easily manipulated, and economic incentives often reward speculation rather than actual infrastructure deployment. We present SolarChain, a platform that resolves both problems by anchoring digital accountability to the thermodynamic limits of solar energy conversion. Using real-time meteorological data, geospatial coordinates, and first-principles calculations of solar yield, the system establishes a hard physical boundary for every panel's maximum possible output; any reported generation exceeding this limit is automatically rejected before entering the shared ledger. This trustless verification enables a peer-to-peer marketplace with programmatic reward structures that continuously reinvest value into equipment maintenance and market liquidity, preventing the speculative hoarding that typically destabilizes blockchain-based marketplaces. When electricity is consumed, the corresponding digital credits are permanently retired in direct proportion to physical energy dissipation, creating an auditable one-to-one mapping between urban consumption and carbon accounting. Deployed across heterogeneous city nodes, the prototype demonstrates resilience against data injection attacks while lowering capital barriers for community-level solar expansion. Beyond energy, the framework offers a general model for coordinating economic activity with physical law in any domain where distributed infrastructure demands both data integrity and sustainable investment. We release the data and code as open-access on GitHub.
Bitcoin price prediction has attracted hundreds of academic papers and continuous social media debate, yet the field lacks consensus on even basic questions: can any model beat a naive "today's price" baseline at horizons of one to six months? We survey the peer-reviewed landscape, categorize papers by evaluation methodology, and contrast academic findings with informal but substantive discourse on X/Twitter. The picture that emerges is sobering. At short-to-medium horizons, no peer-reviewed study has shown robust superiority over the naive baseline across multiple market regimes. Daily predictability is real but does not extend to hourly or monthly horizons, and may not survive transaction costs. The stock-to-flow model has failed formal out-of-sample testing, and Metcalfe's Law valuations have been challenged as spurious. The Bitcoin price power law, while empirically compelling, has not been subjected to formal distributional tests. Meanwhile, social media practitioners raise valid statistical critiques -- ordinary least squares (OLS) violations, backtest overfitting, spurious regressions -- that the academic literature has not formalized. We identify open research directions and propose concrete methodological standards for future work -- walk-forward evaluation, multi-regime holdout windows, naive baseline comparison, inclusion of zero in hyperparameter grids, and Diebold-Mariano significance testing -- arguing that the field's primary need is not more models but better evaluation.
This paper develops a model to evaluate the viability of blockchain markets as the sole venue for price formation. Blockchains clear at discrete intervals called block time, and transactions are executed sequentially according to priority fees paid by traders who compete for queue position. We show that these features undermine the viability of markets. Paid-priority ordering induces endogenous selection, where only traders with sufficiently high valuations participate. The participation cutoff rises with competition, which intensifies with lower information costs or higher liquidity demand. This hinders price discovery and biases prices. It also impairs liquidity: the cutoff concentrates trading among aggressive traders and increases adverse selection that liquidity suppliers absorb in a single clearing round. Although longer block times enhance consensus security, they amplify these effects and can cause markets to shut down.
Advances in quantum computing challenge the hardness assumptions underlying widely deployed public-key cryptography in blockchain systems. Although post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards are emerging, understanding quantum risk remains fragmented across research, engineering, governance, and investment communities. This demo presents Quantum Futures Interactive, a live interdisciplinary demonstration combining educational visualization, participatory interaction, and demonstrative post-quantum artifact generation using a toy LWE-based construction. Participants engage in a structured seven-stage interaction flow covering quantum threat education, sentiment capture, technology prioritization, infrastructure tradeoff exploration across simulators and QPUs, and artifact generation. The system integrates distributed trust concepts and sustainability-aware infrastructure considerations within an interactive decision framework.
Mark C. Ballandies, Florian Spychiger, Uwe Serdült, Claudio J. Tessone
We propose DAO-enabled decentralized physical AI (DePAI), a democratic architecture for coordinating humans and autonomous machines in the operation and governance of physical-digital systems. We (1) synthesize foundations in blockchains, decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), and cryptoeconomics; (2) connect DAO design with digital-democracy research on deliberation and voting, showing how each can advance the other; (3) position DAO-governed decentralized physical infrastructure networks (DePIN) within a vertically integrated stack that links energy and sensing to connectivity, storage/compute, models, and robots; (4) show how these elements specify workflows that couple machine execution with human oversight, enabling enhanced self-organization of techno-socio-economic systems, which we call DePAI; and (5) analyze risks, including security, centralization, incentive failure, legal exposure, and the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation, and argue for value-sensitive design and continuously adaptive governance. DePAI offers a path to scalable, resilient self-organization that integrates physical infrastructure, AI, and community ownership under transparent rules, on-chain incentives, and permissionless participation, aiming to preserve human autonomy.
Strategic competitions in the real world, from wars to geopolitical rivalries, often involve coalitions competing against rival groups. These contests are not simple interactions between unified entities, but multilayered processes in which coalitions face external competition while dealing with internal conflicts over resources and strategy. Existing game-theoretic models typically treat inter-coalition rivalry and intra-coalition competition separately. This paper introduces the Compound Coalition-Attrition Game (CCAG), a unified framework that integrates a war of attrition between coalitions with a simultaneous war of attrition within each coalition. In this model, the endurance of a coalition in external competition is determined by the strategic choices of its members, who compete internally for shares of the outcome. We prove the nonexistence of pure-strategy equilibria and characterize the unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. The analysis reveals feedback effects: external competition intensifies internal conflict, while internal discord weakens external performance. A case study compares traditional commodity markets, including gold, copper, and silver, with cryptocurrency markets, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Solana, using data from 2018 to 2023 in a simulation framework. The results demonstrate applicability in industrial strategy, corporate decision-making, and geopolitical competition. The CCAG framework provides a tool for analysing complex strategic environments.
Daniel Aronoff, F. Christopher Calabia, Anders Brownworth, Ashwanth Samuel · 5 authors
U.S. dollar stablecoins are increasingly used as payment and settlement instruments beyond cryptocurrency markets. With the enactment of the GENIUS Act in 2025, the United States established the first comprehensive federal framework governing their issuance, backing, and supervision. This paper evaluates the financial, technological, and regulatory risks that may arise as GENIUS-compliant stablecoins scale into mainstream use. We show that maintaining par-value redemption may depend not only on backing-asset quality, but also on the functioning of Treasury and repo markets, the balance-sheet capacity of broker-dealers, and the operational reliability of blockchain-based transaction rails. Even conservatively backed stablecoins can face stress from redemption surges, market-intermediation bottlenecks, or technological disruptions. We argue that durable stability will likely require an integrated approach spanning financial-market infrastructure, prudential regulation, and software governance. While grounded in U.S.\ law, the analysis identifies principles that are relevant for regulators in other jurisdictions developing stablecoin regimes.
Blockchain technology introduces asset types and custody mechanisms that fundamentally break traditional financial auditing paradigms. This paper presents an autoethnographic analysis of cryptoasset auditing challenges, build on top of prior research on a comprehensive framework addressing existence, ownership, valuation, and internal control verification. Drawing from lived experience implementing blockchain systems as an engineer, smart contract auditor, and CTO of a publicly traded cryptoasset firm, we demonstrate how autoethnographic methodology becomes necessary for understanding technical complexities that external analysis cannot capture. Through detailed examination of token airdrops, multi-signature smart contracts, and real-time on-chain reporting, we provide experimental approaches and common scenarios that auditing firms can analyze to address blockchain innovations currently considered technically insurmountable.
Alexander Kropiunig, Svetlana Kremer, Bernhard Haslhofer
Crypto Key Opinion Leaders (KOLs) shape Web3 narratives and retail investment behaviour. In volatile, high-risk markets, their credibility becomes a key determinant of their influence on followers. Yet prior research has focused on lifestyle influencers or generic financial commentary, leaving crypto KOLs' understandings of motivation, credibility, and responsibility underexplored. Drawing on interviews with 13 KOLs and self-determination theory (SDT), we examine how psychological needs are negotiated alongside monetisation and community expectations. Whereas prior work treats finfluencer credibility as a set of static credentials, our findings reveal it to be a self-determined, ethically enacted practice. We identify four community-recognised markers of credibility: self-regulation, bounded epistemic competence, accountability, and reflexive self-correction. This reframes credibility as socio-technical performance, extending SDT into high-risk crypto ecosystems. Methodologically, we employ a hybrid human-LLM thematic analysis. The study surfaces implications for designing credibility signals that prioritise transparency over hype.
Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are designed to disperse control, yet recent evidence shows that effective governance is often concentrated in a small number of participants. This note studies one simple mechanism behind that pattern. Because decentralized governance is monitor-intensive, rising proposal flow may eventually outpace the capacity of broad-based participation. Using a DAO--quarter panel, I estimate a fixed-effects kink model with DAO and quarter fixed effects and find a statistically significant decline in the marginal responsiveness of active voters once proposal activity crosses an interior threshold. I then study realized voting concentration using kink specifications with data-driven cutoffs. Across specifications, decentralization gains do not persist indefinitely once governance workload becomes sufficiently high, and load-based measures show especially clear evidence of a transition toward more concentrated realized control. The results provide reduced-form evidence consistent with a ``too big to monitor'' mechanism in DAO governance: when proposal flow grows faster than broad participation can keep up, effective control may drift toward a smaller set of highly active participants.
Using on-chain Polygon data, we analyze Polymarket's 2024 U.S. Presidential Election market and develop a transaction-level accounting framework with two components: a volume decomposition that separates exchange-equivalent turnover from share minting and burning, and trader-level disagreement measures. Naive aggregation reports $958M of October Trump-market volume, compared with $391M under our decomposition. Market quality improved as arbitrage-deviation half-lives fell from hours to under a minute and Kyle's λ dropped from 0.53 to 0.01. During October's large-account episode, capital flowed into both sides simultaneously, consistent with heterogeneous-beliefs trading rather than one-sided manipulation. The framework generalizes to other tokenized prediction markets.
This paper investigates systemic risk transmission across stablecoin markets using Quantile Vector Autoregression (QVAR). Analyzing eight major stablecoins with day data coverage from 2021 to 2025, supplemented by minute-level event studies on three additional coins experiencing major depegs until 2025, we document three findings. First, stabilization mechanism dictates tail-risk behavior: fiat-backed stablecoins function as "stability anchors" with near-zero net spillovers across quantiles, while algorithmic and crypto-collateralized designs become risk amplifiers specifically under extreme market conditions. Second, the theoretical risk isolation between fiat and crypto markets breaks down during stress: direct volatility channels emerge between the US Dollar Index and Bitcoin that bypass stablecoin intermediation. Third, Forbes-Rigobon contagion tests across four depeg events show heterogeneous transmission: after adjusting for volatility, algorithmic stablecoins exhibit significant residual contagion while fiat-backed coins show flight-to-quality effects. These findings imply that uniform stablecoin regulation is inappropriate; regulatory capital buffers for extreme losses should be 2--3x higher for non-fiat-backed stablecoins than median-based measures indicate.
Samela Kivilo, Alex Norta, Marie Hattingh, Sowelu Avanzo · 5 authors
In recent years, tokenomic systems, decentralized systems that use cryptographic tokens to represent value and rights, have evolved considerably. Growing complexity in incentive structures has expanded the applicability of blockchain beyond purely transactional use. Existing research predominantly examines token economies within specific use cases, proposes conceptual frameworks, or studies isolated aspects such as governance, incentive design, and tokenomics. However, the literature offers limited empirically grounded, end-to-end guidance that integrates these dimensions into a coherent, step-by-step design approach informed by concrete token-economy development efforts. To address this gap, this paper presents the Token Economy Design Method (TEDM), a design-science artifact that synthesizes stepwise design propositions for token-economy design across incentives, governance, and tokenomics. TEDM is derived through an iterative qualitative synthesis of prior contributions and refined through a co-designed case. The artifact is formatively evaluated via the Currynomics case study and additional expert interviews. Currynomics is an ecosystem that maintains the Redcurry stablecoin, using real estate as the underlying asset. TEDM is positioned as reusable design guidance that facilitates the analysis of foundational requirements of tokenized ecosystems. The specificity of the proposed approach lies in the focus on the socio-technical context of the system and early stages of its design.
Do online narratives leave a measurable imprint on prices in markets for digital or cultural goods? This paper evaluates how community attention and sentiment relate to valuation in major Ethereum NFT collections after accounting for time effects, market-wide conditions, and persistent visual heterogeneity. Transaction data for large generative collections are merged with Reddit-based discourse measures available for 25 collections, covering 87{,}696 secondary-market sales from January 2021 through March 2025. Visual differences are absorbed by a transparent, within-collection standardized index built from explicit image traits and aggregated via PCA. Discourse is summarized at the collection-by-bin level using discussion intensity and lexicon-based tone measures, with smoothing to reduce noise when text volume is sparse. A mixed-effects specification with a Mundlak within--between decomposition separates persistent cross-collection differences from within-collection fluctuations. Valuations align most strongly with sustained collection-level attention and sentiment environments; within collections, short-horizon negativity is consistently associated with higher prices, and attention is most informative when measured as cumulative engagement over multiple prior windows.
Open access
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econ.GN
Consumer Behavior in Brand Consumption and Identification
Maxime Nicolas, Francois Sicard, Marion Laboure, Zixin Sun · 5 authors
This study investigates the transmission of monetary policy narratives to Bitcoin prices, distinguishing the impact of ex-ante expectations from ex-post interest rate implementation. We introduce a high-frequency Monetary Policy Expectations (MPE) index, using a Large Language Model (LLM)-based classification of 118,000+ market messages to achieve a precise hawkish/dovish decomposition. Results from a framework combining Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks with SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP) indicate that Bitcoin functions as a sensitive barometer of central bank signaling; specifically, hawkish narratives consistently trigger negative price responses independently of actual Federal Funds Rate adjustments. We demonstrate that the MPE index Granger-causes Bitcoin returns at short-to-medium horizons, establishing linear predictive causality, while the LSTM-SHAP framework reveals pronounced non-linear, macroeconomic regime-dependent interactions. These findings highlight Bitcoin's structural sensitivity to global monetary discourse, establishing LLM-derived sentiment as a potent leading macroeconomic indicator for the digital asset landscape.
Abstract Around three-quarters of Bitcoin transactions occur off-chain. While most empirical studies focus exclusively on on-chain transactions, only few papers analyse off-chain transactions. The empirical evidence of Bitcoin market considering both types of trading strategies remains limited. This paper is one of the first to present an empirical analysis of both on- and off-chain demand and supply-side factors and their short- and long-run relationship with the Bitcoin price. Employing the ARDL approach with daily data from 2019 to 2024, we demonstrate a differentiated contribution of on-chain and off-chain drivers to the Bitcoin price. In the long-run, off-chain demand pressures have a significant relationship with the Bitcoin price. In the short-run, both off-chain demand and supply factors are statistically significantly related to the Bitcoin price. The relationship between blockchain transactions and the Bitcoin price is also present, albeit likely operating through a different channel than off-chain trades. These findings confirm the dual nature of the Bitcoin market, in which price movements are related to both market fundamentals and speculative considerations captured by on- and off-chain trades, respectively.
Real-world asset (RWA) tokenization has emerged as a prominent application of blockchain technology, enabling off-chain financial and non-financial assets to be represented through blockchain-based instruments. However, deployed RWA systems remain difficult to compare because legal claims, custody arrangements, token mechanics, verification processes, and on-chain integrations are often described separately. This paper develops a systems-level taxonomy of RWA tokenization to classify how off-chain assets are legally, economically, and technically represented on-chain. Following an iterative taxonomy-development method, we organize twenty-three dimensions into five components: governance, asset structure, token properties, distributed ledger technology, and economy. We apply the taxonomy to twenty major RWA systems selected by market capitalization and compare their design choices across asset classes and implementation models. The classification shows that current RWA tokenization is predominantly implemented through hybrid architectures: blockchain tokens support representation, transfer control, redemption workflows, pricing, and composability, while core legal guarantees remain anchored in off-chain legal wrappers, custodial arrangements, compliance processes, and verification mechanisms. The analysis also reveals recurring documentation gaps concerning voting rights, dispute forums, burn mechanics, supply constraints, and reserve verification. Overall, the taxonomy provides a structured basis for comparing RWA systems, identifying design patterns and limitations, and supporting future research on blockchain-based financial infrastructure.
In traditional banking, repeated deposit-and-lend cycles let a single dollar of reserves support multiple dollars of claims. Decentralized finance produces an analogous structure with tokens. Constructing a Token Graph of 10,200 tokens across 200 blockchains, this paper maps the resulting hierarchy and shows that, by late 2025, each dollar of base assets supports $4.7 of total claims. An embedded yield correction disentangles two channels that raw data conflates: a compositional channel, where lending protocols concentrate in deeper tiers and mechanically raise average yields; and a liquidity channel, where each derivation step reduces secondary-market depth and depresses yields in liquidity-sensitive pools. The liquidity channel concentrates in DEX pools and vanishes in lending pools. A yield decomposition shows that the tier gradient operates entirely through fundamental protocol yields, not incentive-token emissions; quantile regressions reveal that the structural associations concentrate in the upper tail of the yield distribution, with near-zero effects at the median. These findings reframe DeFi's "double counting" as a structural risk question and identify liquidity fragmentation as the primary mechanism associated with yield variation across the token hierarchy.
Stefano Balietti, Pietro Saggese, Markus Strohmaier
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) use token-weighted voting to allocate resources, set protocol rules, and legitimate collective decisions. Yet, support in DAO voting is strikingly concentrated. What happens inside the ballot that produces this concentration? We study DAOs' governance at the proposal-choice level, linking each choice's voting-power share to three observable features: whether it expresses an approval-oriented stance, where it appears in the choice list, and whether it is selected by the proposal author. We find that (i) author-selected choices show the strongest and most robust association with voting-power share, with a 58.8% increase relative to non-author choices; (ii) approval-oriented choices retain a positive but slightly less consistent advantage (27.1%); and (iii) first-listed choices also attract systematically higher shares, consistent with position and order effects (7.7%). Results are robust across several specifications, which include subtracting an author's own voting power from computations. We use bias descriptively, to denote systematic associations rather than proven causal distortion. The results shift attention from proposal outcomes alone to the interface and social signals through which choices are presented. In DAO governance, ordering, author signals, and vote visibility should be treated as institutional design choices, not neutral implementation details.