Abstract The last century was marked by a remarkable improvement in the economic position of women, as reflected in higher labor force participation and wages. This paper extends the Hybrid Tiebout models of residential choice to allow for two-worker households. Our model incorporates both residential choice and labor market choices of households simultaneously and, thus, gives us a unique opportunity to study the impact of changes in the labor market conditions for workers on residential segregation. We develop a general equilibrium model of residential choice with decentralized workplaces in which households face a trade-off among accessibility, space and a public good (education). Education is financed through property taxes, which are determined by majority voting. The quality of education is determined by the spending and the peer group effects. The model is interesting in the sense that (i) households consider the work locations of both male and female working members of the household while making residential choice decisions; (ii) the presence of decentralized workplaces offers an alternative job location to workers; and (iii) the endogenous labor supply decisions for workers. We find that the increase in educational attainment for women and the changes in wages for men and women have had a substantial impact on the spatial distribution of households across metropolitan areas and hence, segregation by income.
Aji Muhammad Fitra Firnanda, Bambang Satriya, Praptining Sukowati
Generally, the problem of housing and settlements is the incompatibility of the number of available housing when compared to the needs and the number of people who live there. The main issues are population, spatial planning and regional development, planning for housing and settlement development that is still not optimal, land and infrastructure, financing, building materials industry technology and construction services, institutions, community participation, and laws and regulations. The East Kutai Regency Government is committed to meeting the housing needs of MBR. However, due to the high number of backlogs where the dominance of the need for housing comes from low-income people at income levels below, a synchronization effort is needed that harmonizesbetween central regulations and local conditions. Therefore, research questions are formulated as follows: 1) How effective is the implementation of the housing grant policy for the MBR in the concept of reinventing the policy?; 2) What are the implementation factors and policy models that are in accordance with the conditions of East Kutai Province after the policy reinventing process? The purpose of this study is to measure the effectiveness of the implementation of the housing grant policy for the MBR in the concept of reinventing public policy, to analyze the driving and inhibiting factors for the implementation of housing finance, to formulate a housing grant policy model . The main theory in this research is public policy, while the supporting theory is the theory of social change, social behavior, functional structural. The concepts used include Reinventing Public Policy, Ecosoc Rights, Regional Autonomy, Synchronization, Residential Housing, Housing Financing for MBR, and Strategies for Acquisition and Acquisition of Houses for MBR. Mixed research methods (mix methods) combine quantitative and qualitative data. The research instruments were questionnaires and interview drafts using data collection techniques through surveys of 135 respondents and in-depth interviews with four informants. Data analysis performed synthesis of quantitative data and qualitative data. The results of this study are that the implementation of public policy on providing financial assistance through the FLPP program is effectively applied to MBR, taking into account the synchronization of the financing. The concept of reinventing describes the complexity of a public policy shifting into social policy in its implementation so as to form social protection originating from local initiatives. The result lies in the strength of MBR in putting forward local initiatives to establish social protection. The position of the MBR and the government are equal in implementing policies so that the concept of development is decentralized and easy to evaluate through synchronizing various things. The driving factor is related to the synergy, cooperation and transparency of stakeholders in interpreting social welfare.While the inhibiting factors underline the integrity and loyalty of stakeholders and MBR to utilize existing resources and adapt to the policy environment. So based on this influence a policy model emerges using the lens of reinventing policies that are based on guaranteeing social welfare and leading to local initiatives. Building a new concept regarding changing the position of public policy into social policy. This change in perspective highlights elements of social welfare guarantees and local initiatives for the implementation of a more autonomous and implementable policy for the MBR
BILL CLINTON WAS THE ONLY US PRESIDENT to visit East St. Louis. Clinton made two trips, the first in 1992 and the second in 1999. Clinton was alert to East St. Louis's visible place on any list of American cities that suffered high unemployment, shuttered factories, deadly pollution levels, profound poverty, widespread drug usage, and violent crime. Still more, as Clinton acknowledged and as any routine newspaper reader would have recognized, deep racial animosities informed virtually every aspect of residents’ lives and politics in East St. Louis and in cities like it. Profound economic distress and ingrained racial anger animated politics in similar places such as Camden, New Jersey, and Youngstown, Ohio. Like in East St. Louis, bankers, corporate executives, small retailers, repair shops, and white, middle-income households had abandoned those cities’ neighborhoods and schools starting after World War II and extending to the end of the century and beyond.During both trips, journalists included in Clinton's entourage wrote positive reports focused on promises to revitalize the local economy. In fact, however, each visit lasted only a few hours, and each comprised one part of multi-city tours. Local officials had played no part in formulating Clinton's economic development proposals. The brevity of those stops suggests that Clinton never ranked East St. Louis or its leaders at or near the top of his legislative agenda. Nor in fact did Clinton bring immediate financial resources to hard-pressed residents or the city's treasury. During his first trip, Clinton promised restored economic growth for the nation including places like East St. Louis. During his second, Clinton had legislation pending in Congress that promised a modest amount of cash alongside tax benefits for business leaders willing to invest in the nation's depreciated cities. Under those austere circumstances, not one or even a dozen presidential visits could have restarted East St. Louis on a path toward revived investments, additional jobs, fewer buried pollutants, cleaner air, or a modicum of racial harmony. Once the president departed for the next stop, moreover, the city's mayors such as Gordon D. Bush (1991–1999) and Debra A. Powell (1999–2003) lacked the cash, credit, political networks, and administrative capacity that were prerequisite to launching East St. Louis's mostly impoverished residents on a path toward a modest prosperity.Clinton and other political leaders valued East St. Louis and similar cities as model workshops for the idea that markets could be made to substitute for direct financial aid. President Ronald W. Reagan and Representative Jack F. Kemp had bequeathed that idea to Clinton, who took it up as his own. Our study of Kemp and Reagan's innovative policies and Clinton's visits to East St. Louis focuses attention on a once-thriving Illinois city during the decades that political leaders directed the nation's political economy away from old-fashioned pursuits such as steel and aluminum manufacturing, hog packing, and heavily unionized railroading and trucking and toward internationalizing bank corporations, financial derivatives, soaring office towers, corporate takeovers, and weekend holidays devoted to shopping, travel, and leisure. Reagan, Kemp, and Clinton, however, explained these developments as natural extensions of markets at work, which clearly was never the case. Saddled with that language, however, policies aimed at creating markets had to produce measurable outcomes in places like East St. Louis. They failed to do so.To explain these developments, we start with Clinton's two visits. Next, we direct our attention to President Reagan, Representative Kemp, Illinois governor James R. Thompson, and to the East St. Louis mayors who inherited the task of converting endless talk about markets and innovative policies into investments, jobs, and the provision of basic urban services such as police and sewage disposal. Presidents Reagan and Clinton and other top officials such as Kemp and Thompson spoke as the state's and nation's chief economic officers. One theme that emerges clearly is the vast disjuncture between their uplifting pronouncements and soaring policy goals and problems such as inadequate revenues that neither market talk nor modest, market-oriented policies could remedy in forlorn East St. Louis. And as such, we are not studying the triumph or failure of markets but the way in which presidents, federal officials, and Illinois governor policy that took of the which East St. Louis officials and residents each as for Clinton and A. his for spoke and to in of at the East St. Louis the as Clinton to the high it which at that for and to the economy of the economic of as Clinton and and with journalists for stops in cities such as was as however, like East St. Louis, was city that had decades only to a of as part of the of and in and of cities like and East St. Louis were to economic their In as of unemployment, and a of economic the at East St. Louis's that at a and a promised of and even in cities like and East St. Louis, for Clinton to to his President W. economic Clinton of his that it could be and idea is that it could be on Clinton, in his second presidential made to East St. Louis. visit similar to the local officials, and to Clinton's or to the president of the in however, such as of and top to Clinton's their to invest in places like East St. Louis. the of in East St. Louis the city as a in the a East St. Louis and Clinton and other for the to a Clinton a of for local even one of Clinton's top economic East St. Louis's growth the as economic in our like the that federal and officials made to impoverished of East St. Louis's economic a was Like his 1992 Clinton's in East St. Louis including a to of East St. on a in that Clinton's as the nation's first president to his the mostly American residents to attention at the of office and business executives, or One of Clinton's that East St. Louis residents of their the who the in St. Louis. Clinton for the of the racial that had two a few in Illinois and one to East St. Louis residents about the of those who suffered anger and Nor did that in decades local business few or comprised part of that for economic In the city's at but in two to Clinton's first During the and one of the city's residents away as their East St. those who were and did not in the local to the that up to Clinton's and the East St. Louis was impoverished in as a of impoverished residents in similar cities and the after Clinton's first visit during the of of were a economic the had to and the St. Louis's was of that to East St. Louis, at a in in 1992 or in the and fact of East St. Louis's and economy at the of each Clinton have for East St. Louis to a local a and Clinton's is the first in Clinton's and his to end racial the for immediate and in their lives and In the near however, Clinton, or any to a and place for in the economic that one Clinton's visit and included no of vast federal for East St. Louis. The was the with Clinton the of Clinton to a to invest in and similar the investments, the would to additional and of growth as however, the president of that of in had promised to invest in the in was a that in for federal legislation to the to bank that and in and financial to the however, cities and could never a of business and jobs, in East St. similar during that in East St. Louis, Clinton his of the In of the US Congress and President the The to in cities and their were And Clinton's top bank on bank to those of the Clinton to his East St. Louis the in for the was that such as the of of a with a toward their to had financial and political for the and other that in cities like East St. Louis. Clinton and the nation's top additional had a of bank as a in economic In only a few after his first in East St. Louis, the a with of the nation's top bankers, and business leaders in federal that Clinton of his and mostly in to with the economic growth that would bank Clinton's 1992 to in was similar to his to East St. Louis's hard-pressed residents in 1999. is no and in fact neither the nor to any to the as and impoverished as to the local made it that and residents were for East St. of decades of Clinton never to or East St. Louis's mostly residents to the of and In Clinton's market at as the top like and of executives, as a in their a of as American urban politics was not about and like Clinton their with market They did to their to the and the to and growth into the In its urban of market talk to policies that and and one to every Illinois and in the of Illinois the of a for In a similar Clinton and his top growth aimed at about cities and developments did not with the political and in East St. Louis. and business could never of their city a a place in the as a or like to that market talk into urban policies aimed at places like East St. Louis was never a East St. Louis business and political leaders their in Camden, New Jersey, and cities the lacked financial resources and in and political In leaders in and New to the cash and that were prerequisite to creating of and with bank and in St. Louis, with its visible and the city officials and business leaders had to each the to to to a a and a those St. Louis's hard-pressed leaders to corporate the of and on their as a in for East St. Louis's of market talk had to of abandoned in every and who lacked with in St. Louis, and other his East St. Louis Clinton's market talk as his markets that in the Clinton with a of the way those markets were to of the would invest one Clinton at the would that a tax valued at The Clinton of the tax credit, on the for only Clinton's markets like other federal such as to to During a few in the markets the attention of journalists and a small of to the of in the nation's such as East St. Louis. as Clinton made to his the markets did not in had in East St. Louis to bring to his markets In the that any Clinton legislative a of in Clinton was his for a US New Clinton his to President presidential of Clinton's one or both we not Clinton's to the that during his in office and his to that growth on a in Clinton's of impoverished to about his and for economic growth on and a idea about for the In fact, however, Clinton's markets was a in of Congress and not a of tax to Still more, Congress had not Clinton in which East St. Louis was to fact, Clinton in East St. Louis with During the failure to the markets and the comprised only two of the leaders in East St. Louis to a of the federal to not even President Ronald Reagan's market talk was to legislation to start East St. Louis's toward a modest Like Clinton, Reagan had focused on the of could of that in these would a federal tax the would and to jobs, and a in on a in Reagan the and their for these that of Under the Reagan each top officials in the US of and would between and for as on such as economic and the of In Reagan's of the with but direct federal tax was a tax which few or as East St. Louis was on Reagan's list of first alongside Camden, New Jersey, and Illinois cities such as and Reagan's list as In Reagan but of Congress and business leaders about the as explain legislative that the idea had and urban with in policies to a of and in their cities and In mayors of and other cities to to with Reagan and his pending in like East St. Louis, were During the next Illinois business and political with and in their the Illinois business Reagan officials in to and other federal of was a spoke about steel and In to in a of the Illinois of and a in East St. Louis to explain the to business In a the the at the end of the for cities. leaders of cities with high their with Reagan to of One those cities as the and East St. Louis ranked that The was on to however, not even President Reagan was to of Congress to his to of the Illinois of in with to be in each Like Reagan's the Illinois of tax and fewer in the cities that The legislation a local political leaders to the state's as one of the The East St. Louis of the city's and of and of the In and the had to included the city in their In the to with its path to economic local officials and any that was at officials the of a between and the East St. Louis the city in the that would be East St. economic development in the the federal up in Congress and with about both the federal and the East St. Louis their have to have a the of to the legislation of in the the and urban In the of the idea one to that included a to police and and to In the who a and two including one in a did that the city lacked to as part of a the federal to and the East St. Louis officials on federal in the of to the of and such American in cities as in and even in a city business of levels, and a that was inadequate to police and In those circumstances, or any in for East St. Louis's Illinois governor James R. Thompson East St. Louis's as one of cities to the first of with two additional in including the of the city's and steel In only the had from the steel corporations, the cities that made the but did In a East St. Louis the in a the state's cities and two of few in East St. Louis and to problems that the of had In the fact that leaders small cities were problems have the modest capacity of a of officials to and of the East St. Louis in about these were to have attention to their failure to pending legislation local Nor did the state's legislation financial to East St. Louis and the other cities for the factories, and that up and and abandoned and city's racial animosities comprised in the city's Representative St. about the of from neither of talk about the capacity to growth nor the of legislation of was the politics in which East St. Louis every reports about the for a place on list of from In their not local business and political had in those in for a the in benefits for urban In similar a with on the modest in cities. in and of jobs, and the to steel jobs, local officials could not from its as And in other the growth virtually to that city officials was a place on the list of however, the modest of development in the other had a business to East St. East St. Louis's first to two to the East and East was a it would of of into and with on Once up and moreover, the would of the in the St. Louis including and the into the into a like the the amount of in the In the those were to East St. Louis, with its as a the East St. Louis's air, and residents had one of the city had lacked to repair a sewage into the for a And in to that his city's as their in had the as as a the the the legislation the In however, the to the politics of and on his the was never to the who and mostly American had willing to the that to cities like East St. Louis. had a in in as a to in East St. Louis. The to a and a the the would jobs, a the of in East St. Louis. were not to and a of in the in the city's the each in the in the city's including a aluminum that had its East St. Louis his in with a of the state's of and to a St. and to a as in to the our in the near a of city leaders in for the East St. Louis was only city to additional During the next two in the failed to The for that was and local leaders the US those promised valued at and the of the of to one of the for the first In a small of one would bring of to East St. Louis. in however, at a to a in East St. Louis. In the a a both and as for a and a that however, to one or even both of their East St. Louis to the Still more, had not to of tax their in one included legislation that cities to tax East St. Louis would any in tax revenues that took place at the with the were about in the the and about the had not business leaders to to East St. Louis's its and its to basic urban such as sewage The market its about had animated President Reagan and business and political leaders at every in Illinois and was as on to the city's in Jack Kemp and other market were in the political presidential the idea and Kemp had for a presidential and was a for the In his Kemp a and at a of racial in and Kemp for Kemp about politics and economic about in as a of Congress a near that Kemp with of Congress and were to to business additional jobs, and every In Kemp legislation to the in high a of and of unemployment, a that journalists about and and his and on their a In Kemp his for the presidential the were like the a in Kemp would clearly be a Kemp the to W. his in his to as of at a to Bush economic growth and the to their a market talk the Kemp, had a from which to to have a in the Kemp a of mayors in on the was the one who a of in the and In Kemp, in office only a few in with the and the the of the federal Kemp, as in that the would to business to the federal tax would the in the of and tax the the of included in his to of two and of Congress had legislation to Congress in a In and to a for East St. Louis leaders to federal for In the after the Bush legislation that failed to cash for a additional in after Bush and Kemp took Clinton and had made a economy their Congress to like the legislation and administrative at a Clinton's had a of cities to federal that Congress the of and the and visible of urban such as the for in Clinton's Congress had the of each to urban who city officials or urban was to that such a would be for that business to invest in and and in a city like East St. Still East St. Louis in and had to it the city's took place the of the East St. Louis a in the of Illinois as part of the state's had to that to and and St. Louis into a into the In the city officials to the city's to the of of in 1992 and extending for the next Gordon D. East St. Louis's with the for including business development in the federal development had not in the city during that a in Bush In with St. Louis to a for a of St. Louis had failed to one of the in other cities had cities the for his with depreciated East St. Louis, to his city's of a for his the positive that with a city to alongside a of business and political one toward East St. Louis into such a in of the of Bush a and with the of St. Louis would of a small and East St. Louis on its way toward as a city corporate towers, racial and a The Bush was we have to economic and the in East St. to that however, the a on the to East St. Louis, about of the city's The and its of and had not to East St. Louis and the that were urban leaders in cities such as and had the visible place the or to in the the moreover, of the with development had not the tax and not the and A. place on the had places a city on and a was to a way toward on the In a to East St. Louis's place in that Bush to Clinton during a his with a was in President Bush and to the in of the in with ranked second like East St. Louis, was a city with a American of St. Louis the in his spoke about a The of had place on the idea of a the cities to and one in federal and tax during the next of the in a small near East St. Louis, the of their at a for on and to the St. Louis for that of about and failed to that Congress had not to the nation's The Clinton East St. Louis, those in the US those East St. Louis's Debra A. had few with which to like up in East St. Louis and was a in high and at the of on city in one of first as to the city with a of with to American to In the of the next to the Powell in a its the was the first in East St. Louis in of the the the of our a the city of St. Powell spoke about a and a with to the but near East St. Louis, would the that in as model for as did a small as a place for to and to during do Powell East St. would business to East St. Louis, Powell were the city's residents would for the a at and was to be in visible and in Powell a for a in East St. Louis to of the St. Louis The office with a and a mostly lacked the to East St. Louis's as a place to and the In as Clinton's second to a Congress his and promised during Clinton's visit in was at in East St. Louis's in St. the of the Illinois of legislation to East St. Louis the mayors of impoverished East St. Louis, and cities to as the part of the to the residents would have as East St. Louis's of such markets and direct was to a in to the growth markets as the in East St. Louis's the and markets was officials like Powell and never the and resources to for their city's in Nor were their city's to or to the one would the for or at that no to as a in the politics of East St. Louis's politics of with market talk and for a place in East St. Louis's The politics of had in the in Illinois officials the to the city's The had to for a of the in officials that the for had the a that the were in however, the a of was one newspaper in to East St. Louis, a that would the way for officials to the of racial between East St. Louis's residents and the mostly residents who would officials could the city to its and a of a the would place the in of the city's The politics of residents in took in talk about a a the state's made the city's growth Powell of cash and did not to In in of with American and the in the Powell for at The and the both the and the of every American to for the to a or the however, on the of a US of study that for every of between at the end and next on the East St. Louis as a shopping, and In a to to and to a on St. Louis. residents of East St. Louis for They to the between the and During those however, only the a had for of were as in the that idea was a for to and and for and to East St. Louis as a place to a have of we are Powell a newspaper that the we are after Congress failed to the Powell was to restarted but the local and cash for any urban a city talk about was in the air, no of a shops, and officials in fact to financial in the President Clinton promised to East St. Louis to restored mostly the old-fashioned idea of revived in tax to and to cities like East St. Louis. for the of and of had the idea that would to as a in market the was to about measurable on one in the to a to a like East St. Louis to in a that any business was in a of and that cities and and the and the Clinton in fact legislation creating the American the of like and the and the of and in East St. Louis and similar and had departed those or In the to for American and to the of in the East St. Louis, moreover, was not a on the of the had for East St. Louis's leaders were with the to their way to The of in Reagan, Clinton, Illinois East St. Louis and other American leaders to the and of to the of cash or the of East St. Louis that city Clinton had residents next to were the political of who and market American residents of abandoned were to the of tax and cash to and was a have in East St. Louis, a local in a after Clinton's the Clinton spoke in was in the the had in at the included for and a of at that to and a that tax to the of the a local the had with to a the next to and the the and the as place for to local business was the to East St. Louis's into a a office and shopping, and about of the city's In East St. Louis, the between and development was a old-fashioned the East St. Louis had a with the and to federal cash, the and for in one it to one or two on the East St. Louis and economy. even a like the and resources to a few to East St. Louis's as a and place to do During in the of a a in East St. Louis in that not only have any but to The city's and the for growth in the In in to a that to widespread and in New the US of the that East St. Louis as In local like Powell and like had their on the as a growth the had a place for a and it was next to a city into the St. Louis was a city that households not one in the business and white, East St. Louis. urban who in and mostly white, never St. Louis or East St. Louis as cities to for a first after St. Louis, a city that had vast and business starting in the could not to East St. Louis. the of jobs, and from East St. Louis the the at East St. Louis's of racial anger and Clinton's two tax and and political market talk
We examined what happened in the policy structure in Seattle（WA), USA, gazing at the institutional abolition by mayor's Executive Order (in 2016) of the Neighborhood Council ("District Council" in Seattle) system, an "inner-city decentralized" organization. We investigated the support-allocation for this system by the city (Neighborhood Service Centers, staffing of Neighborhood District Coordinators) over years, as well as as a basis for that the shift in the "policy attitude" of the mayor and uconventional city council members,who who emerged en masse in 2015. As a result, a new framework was required to respond to the overwhelmingly rapid and unprecedented changes in urban structure (population, inequality, and housing prices) that hit Seattle since around 2010. The energetic response was a radical-left coalition of radical mayor Ed Murray and a new phase of new city council members, many of whom had emerged as a result of the primary election reforms. A "policy structural shift" was underway that attempted to implement a policy mix of housing policy, finance, and taxation measures, with the concept of housing expansion in conjunction with affordable housing (ap-zoning). In the process, it turned out that in the eyes of these political leaders, the Neighborhood Council's system, the inner-city decentralized system was an old and useless structure to face the new challenges of urban policy and was to be discarded.
Abstract The Housing Choice Voucher Program assists low‐income families to afford decent housing and provide them with better economic opportunities. There is growing evidence that public transportation plays an important role in shaping the residential location choices of low‐income households. However, transportation has not been a major focus of the research related to housing voucher programs. We develop a general equilibrium model of a city with multiple districts, decentralized employment, multiple commuting modes, and locally financed education. We compare housing vouchers with transportation vouchers with respect to poverty deconcentration, educational quality in each district, unskilled employment in the suburbs, and welfare.
This paper documents inequitable transit-based accessibility to sectoral jobs among population groups with different educational attainment and hukou status in Beijing, China. A cumulative transit-based job accessibility measure is applied and multiple data sources are used, including the transit travel-time data from a Chinese web mapping service and the population and employment distribution data from the 2010 Population Census and the 2013 Economic Census of Beijing. We find clear differences in transit-based job accessibility among employment sectors and among population groups in Beijing. On average, jobs in the finance sector are the most accessible by transit, and jobs in the manufacturing sector are the least accessible by transit. Despite having the highest transit dependency, the low-educated migrant population has the lowest transit-based job accessibility regardless of employment sectors. The disparities are especially large when tying specific populations with specific sectors. Within 60 minutes, the low-educated migrant population using transit, on average, can only access 4.6% of total manufacturing jobs in Beijing. In contrast, the same measure for the highly educated local population accessing jobs in the finance sector is as high as 48.3%. The findings suggest that general transit improvements and jobs and population redistribution efforts, without specific sectoral and population considerations, are unlikely to create equal access to job opportunities. In Beijing, greater attention must be paid to connect the low-educated migrant population to low-skilled and decentralized jobs in the manufacturing, construction, and transportation and storage sectors.
THE POLICIES OF THE NEW DEAL DRAMATICALLY changed political economy of nations urban areas, initiating, as one urban historian aptly characterized, the overdevelopment of suburbs and underdevelopment of cities.1 In very quick succession, federal government adopted new and sweeping policies-regulation of financial industry, extensive public works programs building all manner of infrastructure, a dramatic increase in public employment, creation of nationally funded relief for unemployed, financial assistance to states and cities, a national industrial planning effort, an emergency program to refinance homes, development of a national housing program, and many others-each responding to one or more of host of daunting problems brought on by Depression.2 Many of these new federal programs became permanent fixtures in American administrative landscape, laying foundations for new (and different) patterns of economic development in future.Housing policy was especially important in creating basis for wide scale shifts of investments and population as well as dramatic changes in demography of urban core and its suburban rings. New Deal policies, designed to re-establish investment confidence in housing sector as well as to restore employment in home construction in depths of Depression3, achieved these objectives (sometimes, much later) but in so doing brought about large scale disinvestment from housing markets across urban cores of American metropolitan areas while at same time creating a powerful set of incentives for developers to construct, financial institutions to lend, realtors to sell, and large swaths of American social strata to purchase newly developed housing that were located in increasingly decentralized areas away from America's central cities.4One particularly important outcome of these policies is home mortgage redlining-the publicly created disinvestment of a surprisingly large portion of standing housing stock across wide swaths of central city neighborhoods. Historical redlining was geographic in character and resulted from public policies formulated at national level and actions of federal agencies that implemented these policies.5 Federal agencies established empirically based risk assessments of community housing markets based on both quality, amenities, basic structural features, and upkeep of housing stock as well as social class, ethnic, and racial makeup of residents of a neighborhood.6 On basis of these assessments, a large portion of nation's neighborhood housing markets were determined to pose too high a risk for newly established long term, fully amortized mortgages that were created by New Deal legislation. These areas were denied mortgage insurance and redlined. Relatively few neighborhoods, communities where housing at that time was relatively new, had a full complement of amenities and were in good repair, were deemed an acceptable risk. In these areas, mortgage insurance was granted and conventional mortgages were available to purchasers to facilitate exchange of real estate. Additionally, almost all newly constructed housing from this time forward-in suburban locations-would be beneficiaries of this federal insurance program.The New Deal Policy Sources of Mortgage RedliningTwo pieces of New Deal legislation transformed regulation of financial institutions and revolutionized housing financing in U.S. These were Banking Act (1933) and National Housing Act (1934) that respectively created a national system of deposit guaranty and mortgage insurance, and new agencies, Federal Deposit Insurance (FDIC) and Federal Housing Administration (FHA), to implement these programs. The FDIC (and later Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation [FSLIC]) and FHA were established as public corporations that were financed not from appropriations from Congress but from fees these agencies were permitted to charge to financial institutions and mortgagees. …
I n 1988, a group of reformers—blacks and whites, Democrats and Republicans, business and labor—forged a well-financed and apparently powerful political coalition to take control of the Detroit Board of Education. Running as the HOPE coalition (the anagram made up of the first letter of the last name of the three candidates: Hayden, Olmstead, and Patrick for Education), these reformers promised to change the Detroit schools in ways that were quite similar to those the “new Progressives” had implemented in other cities. Upon their election to the board, the HOPE candidates worked diligently to place the school system on a firm financial footing, to run it in a more efficient manner, to establish closer ties with the city’s business community, to decentralize the district by empowering principals and local schools, and to create schools of choice that would enable parents to have alternatives to neighborhood schools. Despite some notable successes in these areas, in 1992, the HOPE initiatives abruptly ended as voters turned most of the reformers out of office following a series of bitter confrontations and crises. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Policy and its consequences pervade outcomes within cities. Whether through initiatives and incentives on behalf of urban economic development, political control in support of environmental protection or reinforcements of as well as constraints on spatial advantages and disadvantages, governments at higher levels have affected outcomes in all three domains. Yet mapping even these measures forward from above demonstrates how important the local influence on them has been. Politicians, businesspeople, activists and electorates within metropolitan settings often play as crucial a role as national, regional and supranational policy elites. Higher-level governments may finance vast expansions in physical infrastructure, education and research, but local initiatives often decide which places receive these assets. Higher-level governments may legislate protections on land, but local decisions determine what land is in fact protected. Higher-level officials may allocate funds for new public housing, but local choices can decide whether that housing will create ghettos. In all of these areas, and in urban regions across the advanced industrial world, localized decision making has proliferated even as policy making at higher levels has in many respects expanded. What has become known as regulation theory has analyzed these actions as essentially the consequence of capitalist interests in economic production. Yet not only interests besides those of business but also institutional logics inherent in government and policy give shape to these policies. Beyond formal devolution from above, the localization of policy has also grown directly out of expanding state activity. The more that national, intermediate and transnational governments have tried to shape urban political economies, the more that governing from above has depended on governance from below.
While the issue of school finance has been studied extensively, relatively little effort has been devoted to understanding how school finance policies impact the nature of communities. This is peculiar in light of substantial evidence that public school quality – at least in the U.S. – has much to do with residential choices by households, and in light of increasing empirical evidence that residential segregation perpetuates income inequality. In this paper, I emphasize in particular the importance of considering not only the level of government that is funding public schools but also the role played by the private sector as well as its interaction with the existing public school system. Somewhat surprisingly, simulation results based on U.S. data suggest that, in terms of producing spatial income segregation, the role of centralization versus decentralization of public school financing is quite secondary to the role played by the private sector. A purely public school system – regardless of the degree of centralization of school finance – results in substantially more spatial segregation than a purely private system. However, it is the combination of a (centralized or decentralized) public system with a private school market that yields the least residential segregation as housing price distortions from the capitalization of the public system generate incentives for middle and high income private school attendees to live with lower income public school attendees. Motivated by this insight, additional simulations involving explicit government support for private schools in the form of vouchers are reported, and the sensitivity of results to alternative school production models is tested. 1
Pluralism and elitism are the two prevailing theories of policy making in the United States. The purposes of this article are to suggest an alternative framework linkage political economy and to evaluate that framework against both pluralist and elitist policy explanations. The evaluation will take place within the medium of a case study on housing policy. The linkage political economy framework addresses some of the weaknesses evident in both pluralist and elitist studies of public policy. For example, in the housing policy field, elite theorists assert that policy making is dominated by a cohesive, politically powerful corporate bloc made up of the construction, finance, and realty industries.I But the elite theorists are then hard pressed to explain policy failures of this dominant coalition such as the passage of the 1937 public housing program or the original low-income thrust of the 1949 urban redevelopment program. On the other hand, pluralist analysts find a much more open and balanced policy process with a wide spectrum of interests able to be heard through multiple channels available in a decentralized political process.2 Yet, this pluralist analysis cannot adequately explain the consistent bias in U.S. housing policies and out-
This paper investigates corporate headquarters relocation in the United States for the period 1957-1980. Corporate relocations are one explanatory element in the overall spatial process of headquarters evolution within post industrial urban systems. All major corporate relocations, mergers, bankruptcies, and new incorporations that effectively transfer corporate decision making to or from any metropolitan area are recorded for the five major sectors of the economy. A series of cartograms and bargraphs provide a summary of corporate headquarters relocations for the resource, manufacturing, and service, as well as utility and financial sectors of the economy. The cartographs indicate the magnitude and direction of all headquarters relocations as well as the location of major bankruptcies and new incorporations. The bargraphs indicate the relative gains and losses through move and merger activity for all members of the urban system. The findings indicate that, in contrast to other Western economies, the dominant national center, New York, is in absolute decline as a home for corporate headquarters. This decline and decentralization is seen as a response to the general maturation of the American urban system and emergence of an entire system of urban centers rapidly acquiring large corporate headquarters status. The decentralization process is evident in all sectors of the economy except finance.
SINCE 1954 nearly all vestiges of legal segregation of public schools in the South have been eliminated. But, at the same time, the suburbanization of households in Southern cities has contributed to the de facto resegregation of some schools. Just as the Tiebout hypothesis (1956) suggests that households locate according to their preferences regarding local public goods, there is some evidence to indicate that preferences for segregated schools may have contributed to this resegregation. Glantz and Delaney (1973) found that, by one measure, metropolitan residential segregation increased more during the 1960's in Southern metropolitan areas -where city schools were substantially desegregated than in the Northern metropolitan areas studied. And for some organizations, a primary reason for supporting recently ordered metropolitan desegregation plans which would effectively combine city and suburban school systems is the belief that desegregation of city schools alone merely contributed to white flight from the city.' But, because there are other factors which may also cause suburbanization of whites, such as employment decentralization and the growth of Negro ghettos, it is not clear whether school desegregation has had an independent effect on the demand for housing by households. This paper presents an analysis of housing prices to determine whether desegregation has an independent effect on the price paid by whites for housing. Since the supply of housing is relatively inelastic in the short run, an effect of this kind would support the hypothesis that desegregation affects households' demand for housing. While shifts in demand will result primarily in price effects in the short run, quantity changes and locational rearrangement will be most important in the long run. In order to determine if shifts in demand have accompanied desegregation, this paper will examine such price effects. The metropolitan area studied is Atlanta, Georgia, a Southern city which experienced school desegregation and apparent white flight during the 1960's. In 1960, a year before desegregation was begun, 37.2 % of the students in the city school system were Negro. By 1970 this figure was 67.1%. During the decade the proportion of Negro families in the city rose from 34.0% to 47.7%o. These changes reflect a number of different locational trends, one of the most important of which was a rapid growth in the city's Negro population. In order to assess the independent effect of school desegregation on housing demand, it is above all necessary to separate the effect of school racial composition from that of neighborhood racial composition, as well as other supply and demand factors affecting housing prices. The analysis presented in this paper uses data on housing prices and characteristics drawn from 1960 and 1970 census tract reports for Atlanta. The comparatively rapid end to de jure segregation in that city during the decade of the 1960's provides a unique opportunity to separate the effects of neighborhood and school integration. The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that school desegregation does have a significant effect on housing prices, independent of neighborhood racial change. Section I discusses the use of housing prices in determining the effect of public service characteristics on housing demand. Sections II and III describe the data and the empirical findings. Section IV summarizes the analysis. Received for publication December 3, 1973. Revision acaccepted for publication July 30, 1974. * I am grateful to Professors Martin Feldstein, John Kain, Richard Freeman, and Gregory Ingram, members of the public finance and urban economics seminars at Harvard, and referees for this Review for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Financial support was provided by the Ford Foundation. 1 See, for example, the testimony of William L. Taylor, Director of the Center for National Policy Review in hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, November 30, 1971, p. 10475 or Junie Brown, City School Case: No End in Sight, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, December 31, 1972, pp. IA, 6A.
An attempt was made to relate variations in metropolitan characteristics to those in rates of commutation between central cities and rings of 95 SMSAs that contained 250,000 inhabitants or more in 1960 based on the data drawn from the U.S. Census of Population. Net commutation rate and ring-to-city commutation rate were employed as dependent variables and twelve independent variables reflecting demographic, socioeconomic, and industrial characteristics of each SMSA were used for the analysis. Multiple stepwise regression and correlation techniques were utilized in order to identify the relevant variables linked to the commutation rates. Several metropolitan characteristics have been found to explain significant portions of variation in commutation rates after controlling for the effect of the location of the line between central city and ring. Factors showing a positive association are manufacturing job concentration in the central city, percent Negro in the central city, median earnings of SMSA workers, and percent of workers in centralized industries. Those showing a negative association are population size of SMSA and percent of workers in extractive industries. Findings of this study clearly indicate that the level and direction of the commutation between the central city and ring of SMSAs are largely determined by the industrial and socioeconomic structure of SMSA and the locational pattern of manufacturing jobs between the city and ring. The growth of the metropolitan areas has been a dominant feature of urbanization in America since the beginning of the twentieth century. The number of metropolitan areas as well as the population living in them have increased greatly. By 1960 there were 212 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) containing 63 percent of the American population. During this period, a combination of technological and other factors has contributed to complex changes in the functions and structures of the cities and suburbs. Prominent among these are: centralization of such activities as wholesale trade and finance; decentralization of heavy manufacturing activities and of high-income residences; and an increasing separation between home and workplace over greatly extended spatial areas in the metropolitan community. This trend in home-and-work separation has resulted in a tremendous volume of daily commuter movements between the central and surrounding areas of modern metropolis. A basic understanding of commuter movements is essential for a sound urban, regional, and transportation planning. A number of analyses of commuting have been made for the United States and for European countries. Most investigations are confined to one city or region. Thorough analyses of nationwide commuting patterns are rare. Many studies are mainly concerned with direction, distance, cost and volume of commuting, and have not attempted to relate the commuting patterns to social and economic characteristics of the area being studied (Schnore, 1960). Despite the abundant data on journey to work available from the 1960 census (Bureau of the Census, 1963c) there has been little comparative analysis of the patterns of commutation in metropolitan areas in the United States. The present study therefore attempts to relate variations in metropolitan characteristics to those in rates of commutation that were taking place between the central city and the ring of the large metropolitan areas of the United States at the time of the 1960 census. * This is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, Atlantic City, New Jersey, April 1969. The paper is based on the author's Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania, May 1969. I wish to express my appreciation to Hope T. Eldridge, Edward P. Hutchinson, Ralph Thomlinson, and Eli S. Marks for their advice and comments.