Blockchain Papers

Lexie Marilyn Ford

Due primarily to increases in individuals fleeing violence and turmoil in Central America, over 40% of noncitizens arriving in the United States are put on a fast-track removal process and subsequently claim fear of returning to their home countries. A decade ago, the number was only 5%. This influx of asylum-seekers at the border has led to tension between those who wish to protect them and those who view such migrants as “invaders.” In 2019 and 2020, the Trump Administration proffered sweeping regulatory changes with the aim to substantively and procedurally restrict noncitizens’ access to protection from persecution and torture in their home countries. Although not all of these proposals may ultimately go into effect, it is vital to explore the legality of such provisions lest they reappear in subsequent administrations. Pursuant to domestic and international law, the United States is subject to the non-refoulement obligation, which prohibits forcibly returning a refugee to a country that threatens their life or freedom. All humans have the fundamental right to not be returned to a country where they will be persecuted or tortured, regardless of their legal status in the country where they seek protection. In the United States, noncitizens facing qualifying persecution or torture upon return to their home countries are entitled to protection in the form of statutory withholding of removal (“withholding”) or withholding or deferral of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT protection”). This Comment argues that noncitizens vindicating their non-refoulement rights by seeking withholding or CAT protection must receive stronger procedural protections because of the fundamental interests at stake. Specifically, two issues are addressed. First, the use of the “reasonable possibility” standard of proof at the fear screening stage, a practice expanded in recent years, is inappropriate and a violation of the non-refoulement obligation. This standard is suited for final determinations on the merits, not threshold screenings. Because of the well-documented problems with fear screenings, even absent an increased standard of proof, this practice would result in an impermissible risk that individuals with valid claims would be returned to face persecution, torture, or even death without ever being fairly heard. Second, the unique position of these noncitizens, from legal and humanitarian perspectives, should entitle them to Constitutional Due Process Clause protections. Because their right to non-refoulement is not subject to the discretion of the Executive, the denial of due process cannot be justified by the “entry fiction,” the legal doctrine that gives certain noncitizens inside the United States limited constitutional protections because the law considers them to be detained at the border.

Scott D. Sagan, Benjamin Valentino, Charli Carpenter, Alexander H. Montgomery

Our 2015 survey experiment—reported in the 2017 International Security article “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran”—asked a representative sample of Americans to choose between continuing a ground invasion of Iran that would kill an estimated 20,000 U.S. soldiers or launching a nuclear attack on an Iranian city that would kill an estimated 100,000 civilians.1 Fifty-six percent of the respondents preferred the nuclear strike. When a different set of subjects instead read that the air strike would use conventional weapons, but still kill 100,000 Iranians, 67 percent preferred it over the ground invasion. These findings led us to conclude that “when provoked, and in conditions where saving U.S. soldiers is at stake, the majority of Americans do not consider the first use of nuclear weapons a taboo and their commitment to noncombatant immunity is shallow.”2By 2015, we had been researching American public opinion on the use of nuclear weapons and the ethics of war for several years. Many of our previous findings about the U.S. public's hawkish attitudes had been unsettling. Nevertheless, the levels of public support we found in this study for a strike that so clearly violated ethical and legal principles on the use of force were deeply troubling.We proposed, therefore, that future research on the nuclear taboo and the noncombatant immunity norm focus on interventions that might blunt these disturbing instincts of the American public. We are gratified that Charli Carpenter and Alexander Montgomery have taken up that challenge and are contributing to the emerging debate on this important subject.3 A number of the ideas they advance are important: scholars should study the sources and kinds of information and arguments that citizens would likely receive in real conflicts; the influence of historical analogies; and the differences and similarities among civilian elite attitudes, military views, and public opinion.4Nevertheless, we find Carpenter and Montgomery's main critiques unconvincing. We remain deeply skeptical about how much stopping power legal and ethical norms are likely to exert on the U.S. public if it is ever faced with the kind of terrible dilemmas that can emerge in the crucible of war. We believe that the unsettling findings of our experiments make the effort to understand public opinion, and to discover how to influence it, particularly urgent. Our common goal is to create experiments that illuminate how the public would react in real-world crises, maximizing what is called the “external validity” of experiments. In this response, we propose some novel ways to realize that common objective.We applaud Carpenter and Montgomery's efforts to replicate our findings and assess the degree to which legal and ethical norms affect public opinion. We wish we could replicate their findings in turn to examine related questions, confirm the accuracy of measures, and assess alternative interpretations. Unfortunately, we are unable to do so. For despite agreeing to this debate, and despite us sharing our data with them, Carpenter and Montgomery declined to share their replication data or even their online appendix with us before publication.Nevertheless, a careful reading of their article reveals important reasons to be skeptical of their central conclusions. Carpenter and Montgomery's main claim is that the scenarios we used were “psychologically stacked in favor of atrocity” because we chose “not to mention international law or norms.” They argue that omitting references to law or norms constitutes “priming by omission.”To test this argument, they begin by replicating the conventional attack condition from our 2015 experiment. They report that 57 percent of subjects indicated that they preferred the air strike, 10 percent less than we found. As they acknowledge in footnote 55, however, this difference is not statistically significant. Therefore, they clearly state that “we do not dispute Sagan and Valentino's overall finding.”Carpenter and Montgomery then ran several experiments using an altered version of our original conventional weapons scenario that substituted the words “Iranian Civilians” for “Iranian City” in the headline (a change that might have led some subjects to believe that the United States would target all civilians in Iran).5 In these experiments, subsets of subjects were asked to consider international law and ethical norms before indicating their preference for the air strike or ground war in the Iran scenario, and in others after they indicated their preference. Surprisingly, Carpenter and Montgomery do not report the results of the two direct experiments comparing the pairs of conditions in which subjects were primed or not primed on legal knowledge and ethical sensitivity. They do not report the results from the two groups that received the law question before and after the air strike question at all. They do report a decline in preferences for the strike (from 54 percent to 46 percent) when subjects received the ethics prime before the Iran question, but this decline refers to a comparison between one group that received the ethics prime before the air strike question, and subjects pooled from two different subgroups that did not, although the different treatments these pooled groups received is unclear (Carpenter and Montgomery never explicitly describe each of their nine different treatment groups). In footnote 63, nonetheless, Carpenter and Montgomery acknowledge that even this change is not statistically significant at the conventional p < .05 level.One of the core tenets of experimental research is that researchers manipulate only one variable between any two comparison conditions. Carpenter and Montgomery repeatedly violate that rule in reporting their results. For the sake of transparency, in their reply, Carpenter and Montgomery should report the means and standard errors of their key experimental conditions (at least groups 1, 2, 6, and 7) separately and the results of the direct comparisons between their primed and unprimed conditions for law and ethics.Even if some of Carpenter and Montgomery's results are statistically significant, the effect is substantively small. Unlike Carpenter and Montgomery, we do not find it reassuring that 46 percent of respondents preferred the strike even after being primed to consider the ethics of targeting civilians. Nor are we reassured to read that 39 percent of respondents who “strongly agreed” that killing civilians was wrong nevertheless preferred the strike that would kill 100,000 of them. We were even less comforted after reading in footnote 62 that an additional “80 percent of those who only somewhat agreed with the ethical norm supported the strike.” For the sake of transparency, in their reply, Carpenter and Montgomery should report the total percentages of respondents who supported the strike and clarify which groups received the questions about law and ethics, and in what order, before or after answering the question about Iran.Carpenter and Montgomery do report that subjects who agree that it is never legally permissible to target civilians are less likely to prefer the air strike. They acknowledge, however, that 45 percent of subjects who agreed that targeting “the civilian population” violates international law nevertheless supported doing just that. Indeed, if we include the percentages of subjects who answered the law question incorrectly and preferred the strike, it appears that a majority or near majority of all subjects primed on international law actually preferred the strike. We do not understand how these results make Carpenter and Montgomery “far less pessimistic” about the public's apparent willingness to violate the noncombatant immunity principle.6The relatively small effect of priming subjects on considerations of law is mirrored in studies of torture and drone strikes that Carpenter and Montgomery cite for support. Geoffrey Wallace, for example, finds that telling subjects that torture violates both U.S. and international law reduced support by 6 percent, a drop he describes as “a systematic but substantively modest effect.”7 Sarah Kreps and Wallace report that priming subjects that certain U.S. drone strikes were illegal decreased support by between 6 percent and 8 percent. They acknowledge, however, that “over 40% of the public approves of the strikes even when told they would violate international law, almost twice as many subjects as opposed the strikes,” and that legal priming “does not make the public more willing to put their own troops in harm's way.”8According to Carpenter and Montgomery, our article understated the true force of ethics and law because a “framing effect was created through the either/or structure of the Iran scenario question.” They call this effect “the tyranny of closed-ended questions.” In one “Revisiting Hiroshima” experiment, however, we provided respondents with a third option—a diplomatic settlement in which Ayatollah Ruhollah Khamenei was permitted to remain as a spiritual leader under a democratic government. Forty-one percent of our subjects chose that option, but 40 percent still preferred to launch a nuclear strike.The basic closed-ended design that we have used in many experiments is routinely employed in public opinion experiments, however, including many of those cited favorably by Carpenter and Montgomery. It also forms the foundation of the famous “trolley car” experiments, designed by moral philosophers to assess moral intuitions about killing.9 Closed-ended questions are particularly helpful for testing the strength of competing norms because they force respondents to confront difficult dilemmas. Carpenter and Montgomery, however, argue that this kind of question produced “moral confusion” and exaggerated “public antipathy” to noncombatant immunity.We do not think that subjects who expressed a desire for a third option in their open responses are suffering from “moral confusion.” Instead, they are (understandably) seeking to avoid the moral dilemma that they confront. Carpenter and Montgomery claim that “because norm conflicts can reduce support for prohibition norms in warfare, pitting the protection of Iranian civilians against the protection of U.S. troops could have biased Sagan and Valentino's experiment in favor of striking the city.” Yet, that is exactly what researchers testing for the stopping power of norms should do: “stress test” norms to determine how much they constrain behavior when other values are at stake.Carpenter and Montgomery repeatedly claim that our Iran scenario is a “tough test” for the power of norms. Nevertheless, it is a realistic and relevant test, for it is exactly in such scenarios that the United States might be tempted to violate the principle of noncombatant immunity. As history has shown, and as our experiments have repeatedly found, it is easier for people to voice support for an abstract normative principle (such as whether they believe killing civilians is always wrong or illegal) than it is to uphold that principle when it conflicts with other core values. Violating such principles may produce distress and a sense of tragedy, but for many Americans, these emotions do not possess “stopping power” when U.S. soldiers' lives are perceived to be at risk.We disagree with Carpenter and Montgomery that studies that do not prime subjects on ethics or law are guilty of “priming by omission,” or that this concept constitutes a useful critique of any survey experiment. Although we did not prime subjects to consider ethics or law, neither did we prime them to consider the potential environmental effects of a strike; provide graphic images of the Iranian victims; or discuss the potential that a nuclear or conventional attack would create a horrible precedent, increasing the likelihood of similar attacks against the United States. It that these considerations would support for of noncombatant immunity as much as or more than priming on law or and Montgomery claim that our scenario subjects to target civilians the is not Our did not report that Iran had supported or did not read that were military in the or that the civilians might be contributing to the war effort by to Iranian These considerations would likely support for of noncombatant immunity. are not Carpenter and Montgomery also guilty of “priming by all survey experiments, considerations that might have public opinion one or only that “priming by could be to our results would be if it could be that the of all considerations that citizens would in the real to the air strike. Carpenter and Montgomery have of how these competing considerations would therefore, to claim that our experiment was any less than their believe that Carpenter and Montgomery are to argue that legal and moral considerations would be in real-world public in military We also believe that such would produce competing about the and of different military examine this in we a survey experiment, by to a representative sample of subjects were to one of experimental conditions. condition the main of the 2015 “Revisiting Hiroshima” nuclear In a the was to that the of had that the nuclear attack would violate international of that the U.S. has which have war attacks on In the third the that the about whether the attack violate international of that the U.S. has of the that which have war attacks on civilians. of the however, the strike would be legal is a Iranian military the city and the strike could be against that We believe that this is and and that such an attack would be Nevertheless, it because this kind of has been in the to attacks on the of Hiroshima and and the and results are in As in “Revisiting subjects were asked whether they preferred the nuclear air strike or of the ground war. They were then asked whether they the strike violate the international of Fifty-six percent of subjects the strike would be and percent of subjects preferred the air strike in the percent of subjects who read that the that the strike would be illegal but 40 percent of respondents who read that nevertheless preferred the strike. 8 percent drop in support was not statistically significant When subjects read that the about whether the strike was however, that the strike would be illegal to percent, and preferences for the attack to percent, although the change in preferences also was not statistically significant experiment also the of Although neither our experiments Carpenter and Montgomery's or by the that the of the decline in support from 2015 and was a decreased willingness of in to support a strike they was by In our original 2015 percent of and percent of they preferred the strike by on In however, only percent of supported the strike, percent of still in the survey were percent more likely to support the strike, even when for other such as and would the many that the public would in the real-world Carpenter and Montgomery are that some respondents the to when their but this only the of our experiment, for such would likely in real-world about military It is that the who as in the from to both for an illegal war against and that and to the by the the of the under law in is still and some legal scholars argue that even if a war might still be as the the When with about law and ethics, the U.S. public not always with who an is if those are the of the stopping power of norms is public to the in that the United States had been a as after the the a think the use of torture against in to important information can be percent that torture was never In Americans were to including that was illegal and and that U.S. did not to torture or were even if they As found that support for torture actually after in 2015 when the the used that many consider to be torture on people of these or not percent that they were only percent that they were in 2015, the could still be or the repeatedly that the United States much than In a in we asked a sample of Americans whether they agreed or with the that “the United States should use much than to information from percent for Americans, moral and legal arguments against did not have “stopping strikes such as those in our experiments should never be They would be and the principles of and in the to the and by the United States as They would not and could even increasing among and a for future by Our research however, that it would be to that the majority of Americans, or even all American agree with that and Montgomery claim that they find of the kind of instincts we among some subjects in “Revisiting they have not their we on their of We however, against using as the of these In our 2015 experiment and our support for the for was among the of preferences for the strike against Iran that support for war and that for they support using force this of or it people the of they actually favor for just war and the law of not to the public's ethical which are all not We just war and the law of to constrain common We these to the of is important for scholars to their open to common and not to Carpenter and Montgomery that deeply about the civilian immunity norm and the Americans, however, do not have a what these and find that percent of Americans report that they these but not what they percent a about what they only percent a about what they and percent never of such a previous Carpenter and Montgomery that any key from both the study and that we more on the We agree with that We just disagree about how this Sagan and for their to our We their sharing their 2015 data with us after of their which we are in a to of We them and other scholars to the online data and researchers to to this by studies that include direct of the power of we were to that Sagan and do just that in their Although they deeply skeptical about how much stopping power legal and ethical norms are likely to exert on the U.S. we found it that the they in their Iran a change in the of that the is still stacked against these much so that we might have the we of debate between Sagan and and We then discuss their findings and some of our additional research this debate is about how scholars think about the study of norms in international We do not to Sagan and Valentino's findings so much as to to and the important research they have We agree with Sagan and on the of research in this We also agree that attacks on civilians are and and should never be We however, in key we on an about the of in that norms have Sagan and Valentino's original findings support for air strikes against civilian led them to conclude that to noncombatant immunity is we argue that the of ethical norms against nuclear use and civilian one would support for the Indeed, we find that only 54 percent of Americans would even such an and priming with a question ethical norms support to 46 percent, which is a majority and a Sagan and Valentino's results that less than percent of Americans would support such an with a similar of about 8 percent when to information international we disagree on how and how much to on to moral For example, Sagan and that the drop we from 54 to 46 percent support for is not statistically one the for at the of p < As we in our we find a drop of percent p < for the effect of the question and the from to In it sense to and at results if they do not this and them if they we that in our only percent of Americans to the study of questions may be an for survey not only because citizens and are with only two but also because they can their own and moral of might the likelihood that international norms would the of because it is not the public that whether the of war be we disagree with Sagan and on in survey and We agree with them that our study is more or less than that both studies were on a representative this is a should also to be experimental be representative of real-world conditions under which a would be We think that Sagan and Valentino's on the survey to the of these in what can be from survey experiments about the power of were after we our findings at the for International Security and at in Sagan and their own in which the of civilians is at least called question by the of a in our of any on international law Yet, we think that Sagan and Valentino's also and our Sagan and find an 8 percent drop in support for the strike in the condition where the acknowledge it would be a mention of international law in any “stopping power” that legal considerations can have an even in scenarios where one might the Indeed, this a the other forms of we remain the in Sagan and Valentino's experiment, including the of the of relevant and even when the agree that the strike would be they are still it as an to respondents that military believe that international law may be or when than moral a key of the original as citizens from the only voice the is the a war on the this is less an of the norm than of the and to We would any drop in support to be small in such a if not to opinion in the other the of the We were both that strike support and that it as much as 8 the of the in Sagan and Valentino's with to In a real-world scenario, we would such as the United and and to the that it is illegal to target citizens under the Indeed, the might much more in the than the as we have it is that the would make such an and even less likely that they would make an illegal even the of the and even with the of about moral Sagan and Valentino's still an that would the war. As we describe in our the of this experiment is on respondents as the claim that of civilians can It is to that the U.S. military It would still be even if the from the also information that the of the was by the structure of Sagan and Valentino's experiment a for these effects and those that we discuss in our which all the of about real-world public opinion that could be from this We would be to a more version of the experiment where the did not from the at but from the or a where about and were expressed by at least some than the and where it is that the the are than and to the by the of public opinion on that public opinion has not always been by moral We think the they also actually our about the of and in survey questions about to norms. They cite results from a survey question that think the use of torture against in to important information can be their which we argue respondents about the of the torture survey question they cite the claim that is at In each citizens are asked by a or to believe these as a for in It is that they would do forms of can have effects as Charli Carpenter and that and of in of this in can be if those are to A article by Alexander Montgomery, and finds for these respondents to war respondents more likely to believe that international law such in certain those who of studies support for war are to also favor such war such as these are not only of public they are where public of international norms are Although study is we think the use of and the of their results in the are of what the apparent of American public to norms such as the torture are deeply that the could through of civilian the nuclear or other questions, on how they are such as Sagan and and goal is to determine how norms can be than to think about these of this is to that experimental are not one of many useful ways to important questions at the of and moral We this is only the of a on how to this Sagan and and for on of their

Craig Forcese, Kent Roach

UN listing of al Qaeda and Taliban affiliates under the Security Council resolution 1267 system has been controversial, in large measure because of the absence of due process and the secrecy surrounding the decisions made by the sanctioning committee. There have been a number of successful domestic challenges to the implementation of this system at the national and supranational level. If domestic and supranational courts continue to invalidate domestic implementation of 1267 listings, there will be a disconnect between the global 1267 list and certain domestic lists. The 1267 process may be able to survive some domestic challenges and exemptions, but criticisms by domestic judges will erode support for the 1267 system. This may not in itself be a bad development, as 1267 listing, with its focus on al Qaeda and the Taliban, is only a partial response to international terrorism. Even apart from the human rights implications of listing, it is not clear that listing and related terrorism financing and travel ban interventions are particularly effective means to combat today’s decentralized and often homegrown terrorism. Listing may be an example of fighting the last war against al Qaeda rather than deploying tools to forestall the next form of terrorism.This Article explores these issues in four parts. In Part I, we provide a brief overview of the 1267 system and its origins and operations. In Part II, we examine the substantive international law that may apply to the Security Council as well as the jurisdictional basis for (and possible constraints on) the 1267 system. The focus here is on the possibility of applying due process protections derived from various forms of international law to the 1267 listing process. In Part III, we examine some of the “dualist” defenses of due process, examining domestic and supranational court decisions in the European Union, the United States, and Canada. In Part IV, we discuss some of the lessons that can be drawn from both international and domestic attempts to increase the fairness of terrorist listing processes. This includes the common and difficult challenge in both the international and domestic realms of providing for adversarial challenges to secret intelligence that is said to justify listing. Finally, we reflect on the implications of these challenges to the sustainability of listing processes, terrorism financing, and judicial review of counterterrorism actions in general.

Helga Varden

Kant's example of lying to the murderer at the door has been a cherished source of scorn for thinkers with little sympathy for Kant's philosophy and a source of deep puzzlement for those more favorably inclined. The problem is that Kant seems to say that it is always wrong to lie—even to a murderer asking for the whereabouts of his victim—and that if one does lie and despite one's good intentions the lie leads to the murderer's capture of the victim, then the liar is partially responsible for the killing of the victim. If this is correct, then Kant's account seems not only to require us to respect the murderer more than the victim, but also that somehow we can be responsible for the consequences of another's wrongdoing. After World War II our spontaneous, negative reaction to this apparently absurd line of argument is made even starker by replacing the murderer at the door with a Nazi officer looking for Jews hidden in people's homes. Does Kant really mean to say that people hiding Jews in their homes should have told the truth to the Nazis, and that if they did lie, they became co-responsible for the heinous acts committed against those Jews who, like Anne Frank, were caught anyway? Because this is clearly what Kant argues, the critics continue, his discussion of lying to the murderer brings out the true, dark side not only of Kant's universalistic moral theory but also of Kant himself. We get the gloomy picture of a stubborn, old academic who refuses to see the inhumane consequences of his theory, and instead grotesquely defends the inhumane by turning it into an a priori, moral command. In this paper, I argue that Kant's discussion of lying to the murderer at the door has been seriously misinterpreted. My suggestion is that this is primarily a result of the fact that the Doctrine of Right with its conception of rightful, external freedom has been given insufficient attention in Kant interpretation. It is in the Doctrine of Right that Kant discusses rightful interaction in the empirical world. Hence it is in this work we find many of the arguments needed not only to understand his analysis of lying to the murderer in “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy,” but also to analyze the added complexity the Nazi officer brings to the example. When we interpret lying to the murderer in light of Kant's discussion in the Doctrine of Right, we can make sense of why lying to the murderer, although a wrong, is not to wrong the murderer, why we become responsible for the bad consequences of the lie, and finally why lying is to do wrong in general. The account of rightful freedom provided in the Doctrine of Right also makes it possible to see why replacing the murderer with a Nazi officer adds philosophical complexity rather than just one more reason to reject Kant's view. The introduction of the Nazi officer requires us to consider the role of a public authority in ensuring rightful relations in general and what happens to the analysis of lying when rightful interactions as a matter of fact are no longer possible. We will see that the only time doing wrong in general by lying is legally punishable is when we lie to or as a representative of the public authority. The Nazis, however, did not represent a public authority on Kant's view and consequently there is no duty to abstain from lying to Nazis. Two further strengths of Kant's account, I propose in the final sections of the paper, lie in its ability to critique how European legal systems aimed to deal with the Nazis after the and in its to our of the of Kant's “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Right to is a to a by in Kant by to The moral is a duty to the if and make We have of this in the consequences from this by a who as to that it be a to lie to a murderer who us a of is has in our It is a duty to the The of duty is from the of duty is that on the of one to the of there are no there are no the truth is a but only to one who has a to the no one has a to a truth that against Kant that if it is always wrong to lie, then is by I that it be to against In or not lying is wrong on the that to we are do not have a to the truth and no one has the duty to the against lying to should not be a The of Kant in the introduction is in line with general on In of it Kant's to in the Right to as more for the if one were to a of Kant's that to the one is to the if have by a lie just on from the then are legally for the consequences that from if have to the then public can against the consequences It is possible after have to the murderer's as to his is at the has out that not the murderer and the not be but if and that is not at and has out are not of that the murderer and his on then can by be as the of his if told the truth to the of then have and the murderer the for his and the have been one who a lie, be responsible for its consequences even a and the for they have for is a duty that be as the of to be on the of is made and if even the to it is be in is a of reason one not to be by to the we should view Kant's to the provided for his account of the moral in In this we that moral be on a that can be and that we do the it is the to from When this the Right to like the one is as it how one to lie as the of lying be and it out the of this moral with to people's and against one Because lying is not a Kant is as lying to the murderer is a of it is this mean not only that one lie to a of the murderer at the but also not to the of as the Nazis. to Nazis is also a are no to the truth be make even in the Kant can be as that if lie despite the of doing are also legally responsible for the bad consequences of the for if the hiding in out are lying to the and as the Nazi from the then are partially responsible for what happens to the even if it not this analysis is clearly absurd and If this is Kant has to say the the critics then the with of reason is the of the of Kant's argument in the Right to and despite the of I it be it seems that an that on of general is wrong, Kant the that is the argument to a discussion of or what Kant in the in the Kant discusses only how lying to the murderer should be from the of view of how public should to Kant discusses and from in this In the only Kant to and to that is not with but only with or in The of Kant of and of and the that is an of general in the and the Kant as with people's of and of their in the people's of on from is to what can in be of external and in the is to what in be of what is one to do although external freedom and freedom freedom as for the view that is an of our or a of our one example of example I to the of lying is not Kant the that not lying or truth as is an duty of the reason is that do in have the fact that and the make Kant as an also a if Kant is wrong, it is that of philosophy that the as a of his theory as The will be to Kant an interpretation. is there an more of Kant on the of turning to what I is the and also and more of Kant's on why of Kant's account of the problem of lying to the murderer are by the one that on Kant's account have to people's just they is to from the the murderer to as it is of his who is in his The is that Kant's account of truth that one has a duty to to just to and that one has no to it is to to the problem by that on Kant's account we can is in the but are not into The then by that if the murderer has with the and the matter of in a public of it is that do not us to that we can lie to the murderer at the are out by the in Kant the example. Kant the at when an of or has the to be The is is to be in a is to make by an in to a to or to Kant that is in is into to to or and in the the door does not have the of asking the murderer to also of to get out of the problem to the that one does not the is in the After one be the is in the and one argue that one can say that one does not Kant also out this in the of the Kant that at is not a to the as this is to that it is a matter of one's will a given is to be or is what is at is or truth to the of if to the of the is in then the is that the is in We that Kant's analysis of lying to the murderer at the door in the Right to is an analysis of the problem from the of view of or and not from that of or and in sense does Kant mean that lying is wrong and punishable from the of view of see us attention to the in lying is and is not a wrong to Kant's Doctrine of In this Kant that is with a to or a to from by another's as it of external can with the freedom of in with a Kant's theory of to is to and one's in and with to do the on Kant's account, to lie as is not to wrong from the of view of do not have a against that the if they they have an to what is and this is with to in to what Kant the that a has a against that the against Kant that with to the of or not a has a against that the it is or not the truth does not have a against that the In the to the Doctrine of Kant the by that the to freedom is to be to do to that does not in what is as they do not to as his to or what is and or and for it is to they to or in general do not have on Kant's view. we will to the general is that I to by I can say I a lie, by I of what is they after what I a and the of view of do not wrong by to of or by lying to it is to what to with and in what say is or as in the of the murderer at the if into a from this not the is why Kant in the Right to as that the of the murderer at the door one to It is an the murderer at the door does not have a to and to get it lie as is not to wrong from the of view of lying as is not a as a of external freedom ability to and of with In lying does not that to and it does not of external is also from the of view of the only lying as is a wrong against are when the lie of rightful and when it is of a In the lie to of that to or that not be to in are acts of as they of the that is to the external In a of a is of rightful by public for the has are to or has are the the or as if it were in the of instead of a or the liar it as of is to and not only the but also is a punishable In light of the we can in the Right to Kant does not argue that lying to the murderer at the door is a it the of Kant's Kant that lying to the murderer is to a against the the murderer does not have a to by into the of the murderer and the the murderer is the one the not the Kant's account does not for the liar does do wrong, even it is not against the Kant that the liar when The duty not to lie is not a duty of we against say the murderer, but a duty one of us has Kant this also by that by lying in fact wrong no I the of with respect to in general do wrong not I do not wrong in but I wrong by a of rightful interaction in than this lying from the of view of however, Kant it as it more by lying one does not wrong but by in a with rightful interactions as makes it to in a with rightful and and also it the even interaction or people and on are with rightful interactions on truth lying is wrong in general as it is with a of rightful even is the is not a wrong of against this it is to one more of Kant's analysis of the murderer at the is to how a public of should consider in the truth or lie to a The is not to as those Nazis and but on how a just legal should an of a to a is that if a to out of the interaction the murderer and his by the truth to the murderer, then a public of for In only the murderer can be the is only to In when a to with to his of the empirical and in this a of the The is punishable for the bad consequences of the the of Kant's us consider a of lying not to a murderer, but to to if for and lying into an is then are partially responsible for the despite no or of the have to with to the of the in and this in what the to are responsible for the bad consequences of as this example to the of lying to the murderer at the it is to not to what Kant is we should that Kant's analysis as on the that a in The in to be a legal to lie to who has in even into have a legal against the that they be in their truth on the of the out of be If this were the then be as the to to into they lie to rather than the to out of it by the Kant that have an to a public can of its a against to be in this can to respect people's to interactions by the a be as a against a hiding in if refuses to in the lying interaction with the In and this is the by to in the by lying the of the victim, the also responsible for the bad consequences of the The reason is that by lying to in a of by a in is to when lie to the murderer, it is not to the murderer capture the the if makes it possible for the murderer to get to his victim, then are legally responsible can by be for bad It after be the that the who into is on to the and the murderer is the to make to to a for the murderer and his victim, even the of the of by that for the bad see more clearly Kant is we the of the who has in from to lie is not a of the consider the in the can in and will lie for to but in fact have do not to lie for In this become an in the when the murderer lie to one's that one will lie to the the truth to the murderer the and then that one told the truth to the murderer, one is not legally responsible for the bad consequences of the lie to one's is not a in one's to out of a be for there be truth the in to out of as that the that will lie, but as a matter of it out to with the murderer, are that the I that Kant say that are not to be also in this to lie on of a be as legal have the against that that are wrong in as even if not be to with the lie is a that by asking even if to do not legal and final the that and and with the by lying to the despite to the to out of the and is caught by the In this the reason why is is not lie, but to to what the of to do or to despite by to the the and the of The reason I attention to is to that in the Kant is only how a public should analyze a in into to and are what to do as the murderer is on the Kant that if to in what by the fact that do it from a good does as for bad consequences from the in do not in the but it what will the the and to or the murderer as is or the in time to the In if to lie be to the legal consequences if is and lie the murderer capture the victim. I Kant's discussion in Right to is primarily aimed at how a public authority should deal with who have from I do not it the analysis of of In it does not the in the murderer at the door is a Nazi In to deal with this we to arguments in the Doctrine of In the on Kant that to in the of is not to wrong but it always in the In light of this account, we will see on Kant's account, the only general by lying can be legally punishable when we lie or public In the on public Kant that the public although is not Kant's conception of the why we the Nazi officer into the the it is one in rightful interaction is no longer possible at The Nazis did not represent the public but its no one an to the truth and the Nazis did not have the to The of rightful did not the European were to and I will argue that Kant's account seems for their the of those who in the Nazi us with the argument the of in the of In the of the Doctrine of Right, Kant an account of the of the of as the Kant that we are the to freedom us a to our In however, that we an account of how we can of as our to and have empirical as our it is to and of our in the to be Kant of external of of and The general in the of the Doctrine of Right how to an account of the and of external of that is with to Kant's rather is that it is to of the of the of we Kant that to and the and of the of in be in the of by the of a public or is it possible to an account of rightful and the of external of Kant the account of by that we have an duty to and that as one to in the of one does wrong in the Because in the of and the of a public authority is of rightful interaction in the empirical world. by a public we we rightful interactions in the world. for our analysis of the Nazi is that just is in the of is no public authority with to and consequently no rightful can there is why Kant does not as of his of just is in the of is also why Kant's analysis in the Right to the of how an public should the problem of lying when the added complexity when the murderer is a it is also to Kant's that to in the of is to do wrong in the Because rightful is as in the of the of is a of wrongdoing. to in this is to reject the of rightful interaction and is why can be to the of it is to that if of the to then they do not wrong one by to in this Because no to with the they to in that are at of is to if happens to on and is then their interactions are of if they do on and to their with then there is of or not there are and by to in rightful by to a public they the of to do the of rightful to do wrong in the if but one to and the one is to the to do then those who to wrong the one and do wrong in the the the to be and to in the of is not as the one does not have the to be or to in this The one to but In this the one does not have for one is to against who with The final of needed we can to the of the Nazi officer Kant's account of public The in the public of the Doctrine of Right is to the of and the in Kant's account of does not result in an conception of Kant that the public authority be as the of public for on the do the is as a authority and the the of on the and finally there be a to the rightful on with the of by public on their public the for its and it and systems that can systems as and It is to how this account of the of a public authority has for when lying legal that in Right to Kant is how public should who lie to is not how a public should deal with lie to public in to the or to in as a public is also not how public should deal with the from people in their as public are the we should from Kant's account of the public authority with respect to of if one is lying to a representative of the public one is not lying to a but to a public The public authority of us and no one in it is not a but a that we have we a to if one to a public officer or one in then one to and not to in or one a rather than if a in as a public in that then a wrong in doing to represent and no one in lying and the people with respect to the of public the public by and to how the public authority should a can no longer be with a public and can be for the public of the in the fact that no longer does the public represent but only the the on this account lying that that is a in is punishable when the lie from the public authority or when the is to the public authority. the lie one a public against the rather than a against I it that the analysis of the Nazi officer is from that of the general of the murderer in that the Nazi officer to be the public authority or the we are legally to abstain from lying to public if the Nazi the public authority on Kant's then one be to abstain from lying to the Nazi even one is to lie to the is not for the Nazi not as a public authority. see why the Nazi be to represent the public authority on Kant's we by Kant's the and the to Kant the of the the and the the of the public of and the in the is by the of public The is a public authority on a to of its to the in of their to their their and their In the of the public authority as a is made with the of The Nazi not a on it and public to of the the it to a legal that not only the of but also the of to their The Nazi did not represent but no one in by on the the and as it not a public authority. is to Nazi not but at Kant in the from a of the or is with freedom and in is and Nazi at its this in to be to the Nazi Kant further from an even is freedom and that the Nazi after the not only not a but is than the the Nazi but aimed at the of rightful for the is not a of one a against as those who in the Nazi in an to rightful relations as It an to a in there is no to freedom at on the is at its as the Nazis were in the of and the European not only in a of but in a of the lying or not to wrong is in fact than the of rightful in by the Nazis in fact of or like the Nazis The analysis does not however, as it is to be that from the of view of the Doctrine of Right the rightful of the of European by the Nazis the that the even the of the of the the were the that interactions the of that the European their rightful in the the of the European legal systems to the of by those who the The and to the were the as those that been and the of the analysis is that it the for a critique of what the European legal systems aimed to the to the of by the committed this by Nazis or as those who in the Nazi and committed public against the the one a Nazi or be legally for committed against the in line with Kant's account the European legal systems did not the Nazis as the and consequently the of against were as of one against the those in the Nazis were punishable for in a against the is to say that they were also to be with their public against the Because the public of in a to the rightful is the of public Kant it for the is no European legal after of its responsible for not in the against the Nazis, for not lying to Nazis. who to out of it by the truth when were and to Kant should not have The reason those who to by were not is that people be legally to to or for to do that are wrong in as lying and I like to by out what I to be further of Kant's our of It is to that there is no to by moral is an of and a duty of and not a duty of to the of however, of acts against a the of as a The people in the in were their by against the Nazis in an to the that rightful were possible in the this is a duty of a duty of to a is not can be legally or to is why many of those who in the were of of after the Kant's account makes sense of why we see as or and that this analysis brings to light an of that more to make good sense to more to are and to capture the moral or those who against it is a fact that of with and and on in the more this is at the After did what they by the on the more it seems that or even to good what one has a of people as good as they or In the view I have can make sense of this to the a of reason why of find their to deal with from their of committed against the Nazis, the did not wrong the Nazis, but they did wrong in the by against rightful interaction and rightful as by a public authority and public they were in their only to with a rightful although they no or for their as they were into their by the Nazis the is at a in the sense of we can be into from there are no even if we to by the there is a moral as it in with rightful many of the their to with is not a of their of but rather a of their to and in rightful interaction I like to and the at the for for their on the and of this also to the at the and to the and at the for their to of this

Adrian Reuben

At first thought, there would appear to be little or no obvious connection between Landmarks in Hepatology and the essay recently published in the New England Journal of Medicine by 1986 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Elie Wiesel.1 In 40 articles published over the past 4 years, the Landmarks series has not only documented the background of numerous discoveries in hepatology that have resulted from observation and experimentation, but it has also celebrated the physicians and investigators who brought us these new hepatological insights, investigations, and therapies. The Landmarks essays have been embellished with play on words and other attempts at humor, biography, history, politics, and the arts, and have presented for the readership abstruse facts and historical trivia to enhance the appreciation and enjoyment of the science and clinical innovation of hepatology. In contrast, Professor Wiesel's essay reminded us of one of the saddest eras in medical experimentation that serves as an archetype for inhumanity perpetrated by physicians, often but not always in the name of science, on hapless human subjects who had no choice but to participate in the most cruel and brutal experiments. It goes without saying that there was no semblance of informed consent. Wiesel refers, of course, to the medical experiments carried out by Nazi physicians and their henchmen and lackeys during the Dark Age known as the Third Reich. Out of this sordid experience, portrayed in the accounts of survivors and eyewitnesses, historical documents, and in the testimonies of those physicians who faced the Nuremberg Tribunal, ethical rules for experimentation on patients and volunteers were codified2 (Fig. 1). Surely, however, there is no connection between the celebration of hepatological discovery and the perversion of Nazi medical brutality—but there is. And because there is we have the opportunity, justification, and, in fact, the duty to confront the memory of these events so as to reinforce our vigilance and determination to uphold the highest ethical standards in hepatology and, indeed, in all of medicine, be it experimental science or routine clinical practice. This connection between discovery in hepatology and cruel experimentation was personified by one of the most prestigious and prodigious investigators in liver disease in the 1920s and 1930s; namely, Hans Eppinger. Observant and perceptive readers of Landmarks in Hepatology will surely have noticed that until now there has been no mention of Hans Eppinger nor any reference to his many contributions in the field. This purposeful exclusion came about, rightly or wrongly, because I felt unable to honor this physician-scientist for his early discoveries, knowing full well about his later utterly ethically unacceptable activities as a medical leader, physician-scientist, and human being. This month's article will therefore redress the balance with respect to both components of that man's extraordinary career, which ended ignominiously in self-destruction. My decision to revisit those tragic events was not taken lightly; it is also in full keeping with the commitment expressed in the first paragraph of the very first article in this series,3 which promised enlightenment in order to avoid repetition of past mistakes. Whereas it is hard to believe that anything as terrible as occurred under the auspices of Nazi medicine could happen now or in the future, we can never be reminded too often of the needs for obtaining true informed consent, for full disclosure in explaining the likely outcome of our actions as physicians, and of partnering with rather than patronizing our patients and study volunteers. Physicians have an abiding responsibility toward their patients and experimental subjects, whose rights must be protected and championed even when the good of the community, of the state, and of humankind appears to be at stake. It is timely to address this issue now in the closing days of the year that simultaneously commemorated the 60th anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi extermination camps at the end of the Second World War and saw the wide distribution and acclaim of the movie Hotel Rwanda, which poignantly and painfully chronicled a recent modern genocide so graphically. We have yet to learn the full extent of physician participation and complicity in the abuse and torture of detainees at Abu Ghraib.4, 5 To paraphrase Elie Wiesel in his interview with Professor Georg Klein6 on December 10, 2004, in connection with the Nobel Peace Prize that he was awarded for his work on genocide and for his message of peace, atonement, and human dignity, "It was not hatred that perished at Auschwitz….only the victims died." Hans Eppinger was born in Prague in 1879 supposedly into a part-Jewish family of so-called "Privileged Jews"7-10 who, thus entitled by the Emperor, enjoyed social, civil, and professional liberties that were out of reach to their less favored co-religionists. It may appear paradoxical that Eppinger was also apparently accredited years later as an "Official Aryan" by the National Socialist authorities, a designation that was clearly linked to his joining the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei (NSDAP); i.e., the National Socialist German Workers' Party, nicknamed the Nazi Party. Yet it was not uncommon that exemptions to the 1935 Nuremberg Racial Laws were granted to certain Mischlinge; i.e., Jewish half-breeds, and incongruously many Deutschblütigkeitserklärüngen (Certificates of German Blood) were actually signed by Adolf Hitler himself, thereby officially classifying the recipients as Aryans when such outright hypocrisy suited the Führer and his kind.11 An astounding number of these Mischlinge were promoted to high rank in the German Armed Forces, and some even prospered politically.11 It should be noted, however, that the truth about Eppinger's ethnicity is still not known, and more discovery about it is needed. In 1902, more than 30 years before these grotesque events transpired, Eppinger was awarded his Doctorate in Medicine in Graz, where 20 years earlier his father, Hans Eppinger senior, had been appointed Professor of Pathological Anatomy. After staying for a few years, Eppinger moved to the famed Allgemeine Krankenhaus (General Hospital) in Vienna, where he rose to become First Assistant in the First Medical Clinic, which was headed by the internationally acclaimed cardiologist Karel Frederik Wenckebach. Later, when he was a full Professor of Medicine, Eppinger accepted the position of Chair of Medicine in Freiburg im Breisgau, after turning down offers from Strassburg, Halle, Königsberg, Leipzig, Frankfurt, and even Berlin. He left for Cologne in 1930, but it was there that in April 1933—ironically, probably because of his part-Jewish heritage—he fell foul of the Brown Shirts, Hitler's Sturmabteilung (SA or Storm Division). He hurriedly returned to Vienna to head the First Clinic but, importantly, because of his tussle with the German Reich, this appointment was permitted only after the intervention of Kurt von Schuschnigg, the Austrian Education Minister, who was to succeed Engelbert Dollfuss as Chancellor when the latter was assassinated in July 1934. Eppinger's professional interests and expertise ran the gamut of internal medicine and pathology, and he published extensively on topics as diverse as bundle branch block, diaphragmatic defects, cardiac asthma, circulatory dysfunction, nephrosis, hemolytic anemia, the inflammatory reaction, parathyroid disease, and many more besides.7 He was a fanatical and overzealous experimenter and at the same time a much sought-after clinical consultant for monarchs, heads of state, and other notables, including Josef Stalin and the Dowager Queen Marie of Rumania. It was rumored that he had also attended Adolf Hitler, but this possibility was dismissed by the late Fritz Redlich (1910-2004) in his biography of the German dictator,12 on the grounds that Hitler did not like famous and overbearing academic physicians and was pathologically as secretive about his health as he was over other details of his personal life and history. By coincidence, Redlich, who was Chair of Psychiatry (1950-1967) and Dean of the Medial School (1967-1972) at Yale University, had been a medical student and resident in Vienna when Eppinger was Chair of Medicine, before he emigrated to the United States in 1938. There are several associations between Eppinger and modern hepatology. First, of course, was his fascination with liver disease, in which he undertook many studies. Arguably his most important—one could say "Landmark"—contribution was in helping to dispel the myth that jaundice in hepatitis, so-called "catarrhal jaundice," is due to biliary obstruction caused by ascending duodenal inflammation, swelling of the ostium of the bile duct, and mucus biliary plugging, as Gabriel Andral and his many followers maintained.13, 14 Eppinger reasoned instead that toxins absorbed from the intestines injured the endothelium in the liver ("capillaritis"), causing intralobular edema and allowing serum to escape from the blood and deposit in the space of Disse.15 Eppinger's monograph on liver pathology and therapy, in which this hypothesis of "serous hepatitis" is also discussed,16 was, in its time, the handbook or bible for anyone interested in liver disease. The second link between Eppinger and modern hepatology was his mentorship of and complex relationship with the late Hans Popper (1903-1988), the undisputed father of hepatology in the latter part of the 20th Century.8-10, 17 Hans Popper worked in Eppinger's laboratory both in Vienna as a medical student and later in Freiburg in 1928.9, 10 When Eppinger returned to Vienna in 1933, he persuaded Popper to transfer from the Institute of Pathology to the First Medical Clinic as an Assistant Physician. Next, Eppinger appointed Popper and Hans Kaunitz (who, like Popper, was Jewish) to supervise a new ward that he opened. During all of his activities, Eppinger's brilliance and achievements were indelibly stained by defects of personality and character, which were well recognized by all who knew him and of him. Notwithstanding Popper's admiration for him as a scientist and his profound debt to him as a mentor and supporter, these flaws alone were grave enough to mar Eppinger as a role model for young scientists and physicians. As John Cornwell points out in the opening of his book on Hitler's scientists,18 quoting François Rabelais,19 "Science without conscience is the ruin of the soul" — Science sans conscience n'est que ruine de l'âme — a warning that might have been written with Eppinger in mind. Eppinger had no scruples10; he stole case histories from other physicians and had to be supervised while watching operations in case he stole instruments as well. He was banned from the University library after being caught cutting pages out of books and bound journals. He stole gallbladders from Wenckebach's laboratory and later, using these specimens without due acknowledgment, he published the phenomenon of gallbladder edema in patients who died of beriberi. Eppinger's callous handling of his patients was no less dishonorable or overt. In his autobiography, the esteemed German theologian Helmut Thielicke described the cruel, dangerous, and demeaning treatment he received from Eppinger, whose advice he had sought for severe tetany following inadvertent parathyroid injury.20 Otto Fleming, who had been a medical student in the 1930s in Vienna and who later was a general practitioner in south Yorkshire, UK, recalled how he and all his fellow students were shocked by Eppinger's brutality when he reduced a patient to tears by explaining to those present in the lecture theater that this man with nephritis was in the "final act of the tragedy" of his disease.21 Apparently even those in NSDAP circles in Vienna complained about, among other criticisms, Eppinger's brutality to his patients and his reckless driving.22 Werner Creutzfeldt, Professor Emeritus and former Chair of Medicine at the University of Göttingen for 28 years, recalled Hans Popper inferring that Eppinger had a hole in his brain where other people have a conscience. Creutzfeldt also related to me that even almost a score of years after Eppinger's departure from Freiburg, senior nurses still in practice there vividly remembered Eppinger's heartless attitude towards his patients, a contrast to the warmth of their nostalgia for Siegfried Thannhauser, who succeeded him briefly. There is no doubt that Eppinger was an ardent Nazi, as Redlich described him,12 and played a key role in the dastardly Sea Water Experiments in the Dachau concentration camp.22-24 However, these signature activities in his curriculum vitae are either glossed over euphemistically or omitted completely from the many available, albeit brief, biographical accounts of Eppinger's life.7-10, 25, 26 Eppinger was dismissed from his position in the University of Vienna after the war, in June 1945, because he had been a member of the then-illegal Nazi Party in Austria before the Anschluss; i.e., the annexation of Austria by Germany.27 He had also been a clandestine member of the nationalistic Deutschen Klub, to which he had paid dues since November 1937.22 He stood idly by when 153 of the 197 medical faculty in Vienna were sacked within weeks of the Anschluss, mostly for being Jewish.28 Eppinger may not have been driven by extreme racist views per se—after all, he had appointed several Jews like Popper and Kaunitz to high positions in his Clinic. Rather, Eppinger fervently believed that the goals of the Third Reich offered the best future for Germans everywhere. Whether this was the main philosophy of so many other physicians, who it must be remembered represented the highest enrollment (45%) in the NSDAP of any professional group,29 is far from clear. Also, by joining forces with the NSDAP he sought to further his own megalomania for research opportunities and material support. Whatever his motivation, Eppinger did abet the militantly prejudiced, recently appointed Dean, Eduard Pernkopf, in ruthlessly promoting the Nazi medical ethos in the Vienna school. Hans Eppinger even celebrated the first anniversary of the "cleansing" of the faculty by authoring an upbeat newspaper article in the Neues Wiener Tagblatt, in which he declared, "Now that all disease (my italics) has been eradicated, the Viennese School of Medicine can in future dedicate itself to its great task without inhibition."28 Pernkopf, incidentally, rose to become the Rector of the University in 1943; after spending 2 years imprisoned by the Allies after the war, he was free to complete his notorious "Atlas of Topographical and Applied Human Anatomy," for which the bodies of almost 1,400 people executed by the Gestapo, mostly for "political" reasons, served as artists' models.30 To Eppinger, who threw in his lot wholeheartedly with the philosophy, doctrines, policies, and hierarchy of the Third Reich, it was but a small step to invest his medical research expertise in the planning and conduct of human studies for the benefit of the German military effort. Although Eppinger's other activities have not yet been exhaustively researched, there has been no evidence presented thus far that he also participated medically in the sickening racial hygiene work that aimed to perfect techniques of mass extermination and sterilization, nor in studies that sought to document and preserve the anatomical characteristics of inferior racial groups, those people referred to as Untermenschen, or "subhumans," considered to have Lebensunwertes Leben, i.e., lives unworthy to be lived, and other individuals, such as the enfeebled, retarded, and those with neurological or physical defects. Neither did he seem to engage in futile sadistic experiments, such as excruciatingly painful attempts at muscle, bone, and even whole limb transplantation. In this context, it is chilling to point out that numerous German physicians had already played key practical roles in forcible sterilizations (some 300,000 to 400,000 victims) and in legalized killings, mostly by gassing and cremation, of individuals with mental or physical handicaps. Therein was the prototype for the extermination process of the Final Solution of the Jews, which physicians not an of the German physicians to the Nazi the and the or and were of using their medical such as the early of the so-called of and have been The of how to and and in the for of time the and military The to in and studies were to this end on both of the military To a at the German over the of the of with an so-called which some already was true with an Eppinger and from that a be to the of and with that of or complete for to to the best of health and even may be by the Eppinger also that his recently promoted in Vienna, conduct the which had to be at the Dachau concentration because the of volunteers at the medical were so late in the The experiments were in the of but the of including the of a liver without not to mention that the experimental subjects of would and other in attempts to some The of and including between the of the Medical of the and Reich of the and Reich of the it that Eppinger was no but was instead a key the offered on was the that there was no of during the of the the that the physicians were only following the of their or the of the the that the Allies and other had experiments the that the victims were to and the that there were no or for human experimentation that could The also that to as would the of medical and it that their among some of the and on the Although it is true that human experiments have been in almost even after the Nuremberg was have the and human of the Third Reich. act of not Also, or not the no with or or the this responsibility has been expressed in all over the Also, the was recognized in where for human experimentation also had been before During his to with his was and his that there had been any of the that had and Eppinger's to that on his was to years of the other physicians and in the were of were to by 5 to life 2 to for years, and to 10 were Eppinger was not but he was to appear before the However, on the of 25, one before the of the was he and it not for the extraordinary events that occurred almost 40 years later, the of Hans Eppinger may well have with him. However, in the late the and of the that he in Freiburg in and the of many and in liver research that and to a for and in liver studies. he to his Hans Popper, the father of hepatology of the for advice on a for the and Popper the name of Eppinger. Werner Creutzfeldt, for was at the in the of Eppinger's and from other than Hans Popper himself, and so he Popper the Popper was on of his for Eppinger as a liver scientist and his to After all, when Popper Vienna in under the of the Gestapo, among the he with him were his his his and a signed of that he later to that of his own the it must be that it was and that Popper knew of Eppinger's role in and did as he his for The must be however, that Popper's was At the very he should have his mentor more knowing well of his and the that he had on in Vienna in the medical even when its faculty had been by The Eppinger which Popper to a Nobel Prize of was awarded first to in but he nor recipients were likely to have had any as to Eppinger's name In the early Professor of Medicine at Yale University and of the for in Medicine at the Yale University School of Medicine, of the and it with the Eppinger whose he had as a medical student and about he had later in the of The case was taken by the and Eppinger's name was from the but only after the on the of the New on November The New article caused great to who were the of the for the of in that very Armed with few facts at that time, were and between those who of the and those who were and that was The the years of Hans Popper's as he was of his earlier of but he no over the of the As he me while on a to he knew that when he to work for Eppinger in he had a with the years later, the for for the same to the name of Eppinger from a that had received its designation by the in on the anniversary of its latter and, we the between Hans Eppinger and modern us full to the at the of this namely, how to with the flaws of the when these are related to the conduct of the science itself and human and life are In this can be considered under the of which often to from studies that were or like the at who recently published that no from experiments should be by in the that experiments by such are likely to be as well as being there was evidence that even in Dachau the were this is not a since some and investigations, like the Nazi and for the link between and were even were on the same racial hygiene that to and have that the benefit of the research is of such that it more lives than were the and the could not or would not have been in any other without such human we should and the and at the same time the highest and to the time the are This the however, of on the and by our we their To between these is too a to As might be by such the to medicine would be for This was to the in the when the of the New England Journal of Medicine to the of Nazi studies that were to be in In the case of Eppinger, the decision is an of his earlier work is clearly it can be to have been and ethically yet at the same time and at one should him and for the he did and one should never his name to be as an for or as a role The more by however, and one that is both more and more to is so many physicians the and in so many have the their of and a commitment to Yet for all Wiesel still in us as a I in that medicine is still a he the highest ethical the still for And for us all, We to him. in of this the was of Professor that there was no evidence that Eppinger had any Jewish It was a that Eppinger's was of from the on both of Jewish of of the of The with and by and with and and with Werner Creutzfeldt and Elie Wiesel The also the for his and in the of this essay in Whereas the and of these the his a of and documents, the are his

Benjamin J. Priester

No abstract is available for this record.

Richard B. Miller

RECENT STUDIES Christian ethics have uncovered a of convergence between pacifist convictions and just-war tenets. Although it is easy to assume that just-war ideas and pacifism are wholly incompatible approaches to the morality of warfare, James Childress argues that pacifists and just-war theorists actually share a common starting point: a presumption against the use of force. Childress uses W. D. Ross's language of prima-facie duties to show how pacifism and just-war thought converge. The duty not to kill or injure others (nonmaleficence) is a duty within each approach. For the pacifist, nonmaleficence is an absolute duty admitting of no exceptions. For just-war theorists, nonmaleficence is a prima-facie duty, that is, a duty that is usually binding but may be overridden exceptional circumstances— particularly when innocent life and human rights are at stake. Primafacie duties are not absolute, but place the burden of proof on those who wish to override them when they conflict with other duties, in virtue of the totality of... ethically relevant circumstances. War poses just those exceptional circumstances which the duty of nonmaleficence may be overridden. In this way Childress both highlights the point of contact between pacifism and just-war tenets and reconstructs the essential logic of the jus ad bellum. To override a prima-facie duty, however, is not to abandon it. Such duties continue to function the situation or the subsequent course of action. That is, a prima-facie duty leaves residual effects or moral traces; after overriding such a duty, our conduct must be affected by it. In the context of war, this means that the duty of nonmaleficence exerts a pressure upon the conditions and methods of war. War must be a last resort, pursued for the ends of peace, declared by a competent authority, carried out by limited means, etc. In other words, Childress reconstructs the logic of the jus bello without departing from his