Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door . . . One More Time: Kant's Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis

Abstract

Kant's example of lying to the murderer at the door has been a cherished source of scorn for thinkers with little sympathy for Kant's philosophy and a source of deep puzzlement for those more favorably inclined. The problem is that Kant seems to say that it is always wrong to lie—even to a murderer asking for the whereabouts of his victim—and that if one does lie and despite one's good intentions the lie leads to the murderer's capture of the victim, then the liar is partially responsible for the killing of the victim. If this is correct, then Kant's account seems not only to require us to respect the murderer more than the victim, but also that somehow we can be responsible for the consequences of another's wrongdoing. After World War II our spontaneous, negative reaction to this apparently absurd line of argument is made even starker by replacing the murderer at the door with a Nazi officer looking for Jews hidden in people's homes. Does Kant really mean to say that people hiding Jews in their homes should have told the truth to the Nazis, and that if they did lie, they became co-responsible for the heinous acts committed against those Jews who, like Anne Frank, were caught anyway? Because this is clearly what Kant argues, the critics continue, his discussion of lying to the murderer brings out the true, dark side not only of Kant's universalistic moral theory but also of Kant himself. We get the gloomy picture of a stubborn, old academic who refuses to see the inhumane consequences of his theory, and instead grotesquely defends the inhumane by turning it into an a priori, moral command. In this paper, I argue that Kant's discussion of lying to the murderer at the door has been seriously misinterpreted. My suggestion is that this is primarily a result of the fact that the Doctrine of Right with its conception of rightful, external freedom has been given insufficient attention in Kant interpretation. It is in the Doctrine of Right that Kant discusses rightful interaction in the empirical world. Hence it is in this work we find many of the arguments needed not only to understand his analysis of lying to the murderer in “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy,” but also to analyze the added complexity the Nazi officer brings to the example. When we interpret lying to the murderer in light of Kant's discussion in the Doctrine of Right, we can make sense of why lying to the murderer, although a wrong, is not to wrong the murderer, why we become responsible for the bad consequences of the lie, and finally why lying is to do wrong in general. The account of rightful freedom provided in the Doctrine of Right also makes it possible to see why replacing the murderer with a Nazi officer adds philosophical complexity rather than just one more reason to reject Kant's view. The introduction of the Nazi officer requires us to consider the role of a public authority in ensuring rightful relations in general and what happens to the analysis of lying when rightful interactions as a matter of fact are no longer possible. We will see that the only time doing wrong in general by lying is legally punishable is when we lie to or as a representative of the public authority. The Nazis, however, did not represent a public authority on Kant's view and consequently there is no duty to abstain from lying to Nazis. Two further strengths of Kant's account, I propose in the final sections of the paper, lie in its ability to critique how European legal systems aimed to deal with the Nazis after the and in its to our of the of Kant's “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Right to is a to a by in Kant by to The moral is a duty to the if and make We have of this in the consequences from this by a who as to that it be a to lie to a murderer who us a of is has in our It is a duty to the The of duty is from the of duty is that on the of one to the of there are no there are no the truth is a but only to one who has a to the no one has a to a truth that against Kant that if it is always wrong to lie, then is by I that it be to against In or not lying is wrong on the that to we are do not have a to the truth and no one has the duty to the against lying to should not be a The of Kant in the introduction is in line with general on In of it Kant's to in the Right to as more for the if one were to a of Kant's that to the one is to the if have by a lie just on from the then are legally for the consequences that from if have to the then public can against the consequences It is possible after have to the murderer's as to his is at the has out that not the murderer and the not be but if and that is not at and has out are not of that the murderer and his on then can by be as the of his if told the truth to the of then have and the murderer the for his and the have been one who a lie, be responsible for its consequences even a and the for they have for is a duty that be as the of to be on the of is made and if even the to it is be in is a of reason one not to be by to the we should view Kant's to the provided for his account of the moral in In this we that moral be on a that can be and that we do the it is the to from When this the Right to like the one is as it how one to lie as the of lying be and it out the of this moral with to people's and against one Because lying is not a Kant is as lying to the murderer is a of it is this mean not only that one lie to a of the murderer at the but also not to the of as the Nazis. to Nazis is also a are no to the truth be make even in the Kant can be as that if lie despite the of doing are also legally responsible for the bad consequences of the for if the hiding in out are lying to the and as the Nazi from the then are partially responsible for what happens to the even if it not this analysis is clearly absurd and If this is Kant has to say the the critics then the with of reason is the of the of Kant's argument in the Right to and despite the of I it be it seems that an that on of general is wrong, Kant the that is the argument to a discussion of or what Kant in the in the Kant discusses only how lying to the murderer should be from the of view of how public should to Kant discusses and from in this In the only Kant to and to that is not with but only with or in The of Kant of and of and the that is an of general in the and the Kant as with people's of and of their in the people's of on from is to what can in be of external and in the is to what in be of what is one to do although external freedom and freedom freedom as for the view that is an of our or a of our one example of example I to the of lying is not Kant the that not lying or truth as is an duty of the reason is that do in have the fact that and the make Kant as an also a if Kant is wrong, it is that of philosophy that the as a of his theory as The will be to Kant an interpretation. is there an more of Kant on the of turning to what I is the and also and more of Kant's on why of Kant's account of the problem of lying to the murderer are by the one that on Kant's account have to people's just they is to from the the murderer to as it is of his who is in his The is that Kant's account of truth that one has a duty to to just to and that one has no to it is to to the problem by that on Kant's account we can is in the but are not into The then by that if the murderer has with the and the matter of in a public of it is that do not us to that we can lie to the murderer at the are out by the in Kant the example. 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