Gloria Benny, Jaison Joseph, Hari Sankar, Devaki Nambiar
Abstract Background Palliative care needs are increasing in India, but access remains limited. Kerala is a notable exception, with a widely developed community-based, home-based palliative care approach. Its development coincided with governance reforms, particularly the People’s Planning Campaign (PPC) in 1996, which decentralisation by transferring planning responsibility, decision space, and financial authority to Local Self-Governments (LSGs), while expanding participation in priority-setting. Although Kerala’s palliative care outcomes are well documented, less is known about how decentralised institutions, political priorities, and local histories supported the model’s emergence and scale-up. This study examines how LSG-level decentralisation created conditions for initiatives, what mechanisms sustained them, and how they gained policy legitimacy, from those who witnessed and shaped these developments. Methods We used Witness Seminar (WS) methods, an oral-history approach bringing together people who witnessed or influenced a historical development to reconstruct events and create an archival record. Three WS were held in 2021 with 22 participants from the health department, LSGs, bureaucracy, civil society, and PPC policy spaces. Inductive thematic analysis was applied to English transcripts using ATLAS.ti 9, followed by realist analysis to develop Context–Mechanism–Outcome (CMO) explanations linking decentralisation processes with the evolution of palliative care in Kerala. Results CMO configurations showed how decentralisation created contexts and mechanisms through which palliative care emerged as a community movement and later gained system-level support. The PPC enabled local planning, participation, and ownership, while community-based, volunteer-led home-care programmes developed across several panchayats. LSGs implemented these programmes through government Primary Health Centres transferred under decentralisation. As the value of the model became evident, the state health department scaled up palliative care, with finance and HRH support from the National (Rural) Health Mission proving critical. Conclusion Palliative care came to be viewed by stakeholders as central to health service delivery in Kerala, contributing to the State Palliative Care Policy in 2008. Decentralisation and sustained community participation can generate legitimacy and political commitment to embed such programmes within services. However, durable implementation also requires system-level enablers such as financing, human resources, and administrative support, alongside local relational foundations including trust, leadership, and shared ownership.
This paper examines the impact of decentralization and partial financing of healthcare through local governments (Panchayats) in India on the health status and income of household members. We construct a healthcare and illness dataset from the nationally representative Rural Economy and Demography Survey (REDS) which is comprised of 14,841 adults from 238 villages. Using this dataset, we examine how various forms of decentralization affect the health status, health-seeking behaviour, and welfare of village residents. Choice of public healthcare is shown to have higher welfare impacts compared to other forms of healthcare providers and the out-of-pocket health expenditures. We show that individuals react not only to the supply-side measures by federal and state governments, but also to mechanisms of decentralized health governance. We also demonstrate that efficient choices concerning healthcare made by household members contribute significantly to the village-level economic activity. The traditional instrumental variable estimates are robust to post-double-selection LASSO specifications.
Background: The Ayushman Bharat - Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (AB PM-JAY) is the largest publicly financed health insurance program globally, covering over 12 crore vulnerable families in India. The program empaneled hospitals throughout the country, both government and private. Within the geographical boundaries of a state, State Health Agencies (SHAs) have administered the scheme, however hospitals run by various Government of India (GoI) ministries (e.g., Railways, Defence, Labour/ESIC, Coal, Steel, Petroleum) were directly overseen by the National Health Authority (NHA), creating a dual administrative structure within a state. On 23 June 2025, the Government of India issued a notification transferring the AB - PMJAY operations of all GoI hospitals under AB PM-JAY from the NHA to respective SHAs. Methodology: This review critically analyzes official policy documents, existing literature on federal health governance, and operational guidelines of AB PM-JAY. Comparative assessment was undertaken to examine the pre- and post-policy administrative structures with respect to the above-mentioned notification. Key themes including efficiency, accountability, resource utilization, and cooperative federalism were explored. Results: The transition of administrative authority from the NHA to SHAs is expected to streamline hospital empanelment, claims processing, and grievance redressal by better integration of GoI hospitals into state health systems. Anticipated benefits include improved efficiency, stronger accountability, better beneficiary experience, and enhanced utilization of centrally managed facilities. However, significant challenges were identified, such as inter-ministerial coordination gaps, variation in SHA capacities across states, IT system interoperability issues, claims management delays, and risks of grievance escalation. Conclusion: The transfer of GoI hospital management to SHAs represents a pivotal step in strengthening cooperative federalism in Indian health governance. The policy demonstrates the Government of India’s commitment to decentralization while retaining national-level oversight. Mitigation strategies-including capacity building for SHAs, IT standardization, robust centre-state coordination, and proactive beneficiary communication-are essential for ensuring a smooth transition. If implemented effectively, this reform could serve as a model for integrated governance in large-scale health insurance programs and contribute significantly to India’s progress toward Universal Health Coverage (UHC).
Climate adaptation policies in the Global South frequently falter due to the concentration of authority and finance at central institutional levels, which marginalizes local resilience planning. While global frameworks advocate for participation, current systems continue to privilege top-down priorities over community realities. This study proposes Climate Swaraj, a decentralized governance framework that re-conceptualizes adaptation as a political-institutional process rather than a technical intervention. Utilizing a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) across India, Kenya, and Bangladesh—validated by a case study of the Meenangadi Panchayat in Kerala—this research demonstrates that devolved governance significantly enhances resilience. Integrating resilience theory with climate justice and alternative development perspectives, the analysis argues that adaptation outcomes are a function of institutional design. The Climate Swaraj model is operationalized through five interlinked pillars: governance sovereignty, resource decentralization, localized finance, participatory planning, and ethical low-carbon development. By shifting the focus to community autonomy and ecological responsibility, this framework provides a scalable pathway for equitable and durable climate resilience in the Global South.
Social and Economic Development in India
Sustainability and Climate Change Governance
Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
The constitutionalising of local self-government through the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments marked a significant moment in India’s democratic and federal evolution. These reforms sought to deepen democracy by devolving powers, responsibilities and resources to local governments. More than three decades later, decentralization in India has produced institutions that are electorally vibrant but administratively constrained. This paper examines the paradox of extensive formal devolution coexisting with persistent state control. Using the analytical framework of finance, functions, and functionaries (the “3Fs”), it argues that decentralization in India has unfolded as a managed and politically conditioned process rather than a comprehensive transfer of authority. While fiscal transfers and functional assignments have expanded unevenly, control over administrative personnel has remained firmly centralized. The retention of authority over functionaries emerges as the central mechanism through which state governments preserve power over local governance. The paper contributes to decentralization scholarship by shifting attention from constitutional design to political economy, highlighting personnel control as the key constraint on substantive local self-government in India.
The foundation of rural local self-governance in India was laid post-independence, inspired by Mahatma Gandhi's vision of Swaraj. The Indian Constitution institutionalized this vision through provisions like the 73rd Amendment Act, which established the Panchayati Raj system as a three-tier structure for decentralized governance. Articles 243G and 40 emphasize empowering Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) for economic development and social justice, while Articles 243D, 243E, and 243I provide for reservation, periodic elections, and financial autonomy.Despite these constitutional provisions, challenges persist in rural governance. Villagers often lack awareness about government schemes and their legal rights, leading to underutilization of available resources. Administrative inefficiencies, limited participation in decision-making bodies, and issues of transparency undermine the effectiveness of rural governance. Additionally, inadequacies in the selection and training of government personnel hinder productive interactions with elected representatives and villagers.Reforms are needed to address these issues and enhance rural governance. Strengthening awareness campaigns, reforming recruitment and training of personnel, and institutionalizing mechanisms for greater villager participation are essential steps. Leveraging technology through e-governance can promote transparency and accessibility, while robust financial empowerment through State Finance Commissions can ensure PRIs have the resources necessary for development. Accountability mechanisms, such as social audits, can further improve trust and performance in rural governance.The role of new actors like civil society organizations and private sector collaborations is also crucial in bridging gaps in service delivery and promoting participatory governance. While India has achieved significant milestones in its 75 years of independence, consistent efforts and structural reforms are vital to realizing the constitutional vision of Swaraj and ensuring effective rural governance that empowers communities and fosters inclusive development.
Water governance is critical to achieving a desirable state of sustainable water management, development and service provisioning in the Global South. However, it is a complex and multifaceted process. India is no exception, with structural deficiencies apparent in water regimes resulting from issues with dated institutional architecture impeding water sustainability transformations. This chapter refers to water governance in India as the social functions that encompass institutions, structures and processes at different levels and scales that guide the system to such a desirable state. Based on water governance literature and scholarship, this chapter discusses the relationships between water governance components to examine the state of water sustainability and challenges to expediting change in India. In this respect, it highlights the importance of legal, policy and institutional aspects of Indian water governance. The chapter then analyzes the national water policy framework and discusses the role of complexity in institutional arrangements in governing water resources by utilizing the institutional analysis and development framework. Using this analysis, the chapter highlights the necessity of implementing stronger legal, policy and institutional frameworks to expedite changes. The results emphasize the need for enhanced coordinated efforts and effective collaborations among stakeholders to develop a comprehensive and holistic water policy framework. The chapter recommends the integration of decentralized and evidence-based approaches, innovative financing, circular economy-focused policies, collaboration with private sector partners and inclusive policies to accelerate transformations towards water sustainability.
This chapter provides a backdrop to the rest of the book, showing how education became the vehicle that linked neoliberalism with Hindu nationalism and allowed to it permeate Indian society. It opens by explaining the origins of India’s national identity and how the Nehruvian doctrine (Lall, 2001) defined Indian citizens after independence in 1947. It engages with the inclusive nature of this approach, showing how India’s key policies and its Constitution embraced this vision and translated it into the education system. The chapter also engages with the Nehruvian vision for an educated India and the development of a higher education system, and briefly engages with the main education policies and reforms that took place between 1947 and the 1990s. The chapter then turns to the economic reforms of 1991 under the leadership of PM Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, which emerged in an increasingly neoliberal global economic climate. The chapter further examines how the increasingly neoliberal reality led to economic disaggregation and deregulation as well as decentralization, the rise of regional parties, and larger inequalities between India’s north and south.
This chapter examines the interplay between existing physical works and social irrigation behavior in a tank system in Madhya Pradesh, particularly the linkages between main system operators of the tank and main canals and farmers. Breakdowns in the organizational interface between farmers and main system managers account for a large portion of diminished productivity of irrigation water. Community development analysts recognized that conflict existed between individual interests and the requirements of collective community development action. The Balwantray Mehta Committee, appointed in 1957 to look into the problems of the Community Development Program, suggested a three-tier system of democratic decentralization known as Panchayat Raj. The Integrated Rural Development Program as implemented did not succeed in decentralizing authority. The traditional village had a more or less autonomous political structure with little direct linkage to state bureaucracy.
Changing the formal structure of Indian federalism may have been difficult, given that altering the Indian constitution requires super-legislative majorities which are harder to mobilize in a fragmented party system than in a one party dominant one. The dynamics of Indian federalism underwent significant change due to the transformation of the Indian party system and economic liberalization. Decentralized spending with centralized financing through grants, from a public finance perspective, serves to help central governments implement redistributive programs. The effect of party politics on federalism is felt most intensely in those sectors of government which are open to direct party political influence. Economic liberalization built on central deregulation and party system fragmentation is likely to generate centrifugal tendencies. With it comes the expectation of more policy divergence across the states.
The passage of the constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992 marked a watershed in the history of Modern India. With this amendment, a uniformity structure of Panchayats emerged throughout the country. Similarly, the passage of the constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992 was a land mark in the history of municipal administration in India. As a result of these amendments, Panchayats and Municipalities are now constitutional bodies forming third tier of the federal policy of India.1 India’s decentralization initiative in the form of seventy-third and seventy fourth Amendments poses challenges and offers opportunities. Tenth Finance Commission onwards every Finance Commission allocated the grants funds to Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs).
India adopted an ambitious reform policy of rural and urban decentralization in 1992, under which powers and finance are transferred to new local and regional bodies. These are governed by elected councils, in which women and members of disadvantaged groups/castes have a fixed quota of seats. While the legislation is still relatively new, some states have been able to make fast progress in decentralizing tasks, power and funds, while others have been much slower. This article presents an initial review of the decentralization efforts, exploring administrative, fiscal and political dimensions, and the implementation problems at central, state and local levels. Most emphasis is given to development at the local level: the panchayats in rural areas and the ward committees in urban areas, which is where the impact of decentralization should be felt. This article assesses whether increased proximity between citizens and government leads to increased transparency, accountability and participation.
This book documents the effectiveness of decentralization on health and education service delivery in India. The core objective of this book has been to broaden the focus of decentralization away from the restricted debates within the public finance principles of fund function and functionaries. This book broadened the boundary by focusing on the impact of decentralization on public service delivery for two key services, viz. education and health. In a way this book is an attempt to examine the link between decentralization and human development. A study of this category is rare even across countries. The analysis of this book is carried out by distilling the existing studies in this area and the analysis of public finance data at three levels of governments in India. We have also used household survey statistics of consumption expenditure in understanding the utilization or incidence of the public spending on health and education in a decentralized governance system of India. While comparing across states, it is clear that local democracy and institutions of decentralization differ widely across states. The analysis of intergovernmental transfers with a focus on third tier has revealed that multiplicity of channels of fiscal transfers has complicated the transfer system and the untied nature of funds to local level is not adequate enough for local governments to undertake spatially required public spending programme. The commissioning of State Finance Commissions (SFC) though had put an end to the adhocism and arbitrariness in the fiscal transfers to the local bodies in a technical sense, the functioning of SFC and their recommendations in terms of quantum and criteria of devolution is still in a state of flux across most states. The book highlighted that the ‘decentralization’ would be effective only when the principles of public finance are harmonized with the principles of accountability in the design of the decentralization strategy itself. The book further highlighted that increasing participation of the users (‘voice’) and enhancing monitoring by the community or the user group at the service provider level (‘client power’) are the two core ingredients of improvement in service delivery with decentralization.
This paper explores the “Bill of Rights†in the Justice Verma Committee Report as an analytical framework for gender budgeting in justice. Gender budgeting in justice, as a public good, needs effective planning and financing strategies more than just a Budget Head on “Nirbhaya Fund†in national budgets. As gender budgeting in justice is more effective at the decentralized levels, a gender-conscious fiscal devolution, rather than “one size fits all†gender budgeting policies, should be designed as the plausible entry point to integrate gender justice in fiscal federalism. If “climate change†is already integrated in the TOR of Finance Commission in India, can “TOR on gender†in the Commission be far behind?
This chapter examines the issues involved in the continuation of both Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and parallel bodies or merging of these two institutions or convergence of these institutions at the grass-roots level. Andhra Pradesh is one of the first two states in the country to establish the PRIs much on the lines of the Balwantrai Mehta Committee Report. The objective behind establishing the Panchayati Raj system has multi-fold purpose. Apart from providing civic and developmental services the core objective includes strengthening the grass-root democracy by making the people to participate in the decision-making process through delegating the authority to the lowest layer in the society. Most of the parallel organizations are working in the field of agriculture, health, education and finance. Among them some are created by central government through centrally sponsored schemes and by the concerned state governments through state-sponsored schemes. The parallel bodies (PBs) are created for supposedly speedy implementation of rural development policies and greater accountability.
In the early twentieth century British colonial authorities continued their efforts to decentralize the governance and financial system of British India by providing greater administrative and financial authority to provincial governments, which required delineation of powers and the financing of the government of British India and the provincial governments. Governor-General of India, Lord Curzon tried to escape the disadvantages of the "Ripon scheme" and introduced a scheme of "quasi-permanent nature", based on three principles. The basic idea of the scheme was to raise the interest of the provinces to increasing of their income. The lack of success of the reforms led to the establishing by Edward VII in September 1907 of "Royal Commission on Decentralization of India", which was to examine the situation on the ground and then to make suggestions. In February 1909 the Commission submitted a report, which laid out the arguments both in favor of centralization of governance and in favor of decentralization. In order to enhance the decentralization they proposed measures for increasing of the powers of provincial governments and authorities subordinate to administrative units, governance of public services on a wide range of issues, primarily "provincial" and "subordinate" parts of the Indian Civil Service, the police, as well as medical, sanitation and so on. Particular emphasis was placed on the need to develop local government throughout India, particularly in rural areas. The most important role among them was assigned to panchayati. They envisaged the establishment of self-government at the district level and at the lowest level - a village or a group of villages. Accordingly, the proposed redistribution of competences between different levels of government and self-government. To implement the changes, the commission recommended to redistribute sources of financing government bodies at each level and discussed specific taxes thoroughly enough. They also mentioned some situations when the income did not cover the costs of provinces, districts and villages. The report revealed the need for changes in the cost structure of different levels of authorities. The article suggests some measures for implementation of recommendations of the Commission, the assessment of its activities by a number of researchers and sources, and makes a brief conclusion.
Open access
Social and Economic Development in India
Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
The interconnectedness of financial deepening and income inequality has been a highly controversial discussion which has not been concluded despite many empirical and theoretical studies up to date. One of the basic building blocks for many research designs is the reliance upon the Kuznets inverted U-shaped curve which postulates that in the first phase of economic growth income inequality increases, peaks and then decreases to a tolerable level in the later phase after a certain income level had been attained. The role of financial deepening in financing economic growth is an indispensable and necessary condition enabling us to easily draw an analogy between financial deepening and income inequality in a financial version of the Kuznets curve. In spite of 30 years of economic and financial reforms in China, which represents a fairly young history of economic growth and development, there are many indicators that Chinese experience significantly deviates from the presupposed inverted U-shaped curve trajectory and its final equalizing effect. This paper relies on financial deepening data measured by monetary aggregate M2/GDP and domestic banking credit/GDP ratios in its claim that they significantly correlate with rising income inequality. The author’s intention consists not in claiming that financial deepening per se causes income inequality, but provides a political economy analysis of the specific institutional and power configuration which leads to their positive relationship. This configuration is determined by the prevailing banking model, the hukou system, financial repression and the decentralized authoritarian system. On the other hand, the absence of inequality-narrowing institutitons further aggravate the problem. All the aforementioned factors are geared at avoiding mechanical and spurious claims that financial deepening increases or decreases income inequality across countries. A historical institutionalism approach to explain China’s path related to the Kuznets curve prediction shows the central validity of open and inclusive institutions in generating inequality-narrowing benefits of financial deepening.
Context & Problem Overview - There is a great necessity for improved sanitation practices in the developing world. Forty percent of the world’s population practice open defecation or lack adequate sanitation facilities. In urban areas throughout the developing world, where household and community toilets are available, 2.1 billion people use toilets connected to septic tanks that are not safely emptied or use other systems that discharge raw sewage into open drains or surface waters resulting in a greater incidence of waterborne diseases, poor drinking water quality, and contaminated water sources. In the Philippines, poor sanitation infrastructure and disease costs the economy $1.94 billion a year. Improved sanitation practices and infrastructure are difficult to implement and sustain. Public services, treatment systems, and sanitation practices in the developing world often require sufficient land, capital, and energy resources that are often scarce. Low cost, sustainable improvements and innovations, as well as local acceptance and ownership, are necessary to develop and implement alternative technologies that can help reuse waste, improve water treatment and improve overall quality of sanitation services. \nResearchers at Research Triangle Institute (RTI) International have developed and tested a secondary waste water treatment filter that can be appended to existing decentralized waste water treatment systems (DEWATS) and collection facilities. Using a cocopeat filter, the discarded dust and coir generated from coconut processing plants, an effective bio-filter unit can be constructed. This simple device can easily be connected to existing septic tanks or other primary treatment components to filter effluent waste water and meet national discharge standards. This filtration technology has the potential to improve health and positively impact sanitation services for urban poor communities. Although successful pilot programs have been launched through grant funding and self-financing, RTI would like to explore alternative implementation models to deliver this technology to a larger audience in the Philippines. \n\nPolicy Question - What implementation models could RTI International consider for scaling up cocopeat bio-filtration systems to improve access to safe water and sanitation in urban poor areas of the Philippines?\n\nData and Methodology - To assess and recommend potential implementation model options the following data and methodology was used: 1) Sanitation Sector Landscape Analysis – I conducted a literature review of the Philippines sanitation sector to assess the most significant institutional factors related to implementing DEWATS projects. 2) Case Study Analysis – I collected and reviewed relevant case studies related to DEWATS projects implemented in urban Philippines locations to determine key lessons learned, potential implementation models, and project financing structures. 3) Integrated Financial and Economic Analysis – From the financial and economic data collected in the case studies, I analyzed cocopeat filter technology system costs with comparable secondary treatment systems. Additionally, I analyzed potential cost distributions of a cocopeat filter system using four different implementation models. \n\nFindings - \t1) Cocopeat filter technology is a proven low cost, sustainable, and effective alternative to other secondary waste water treatment technology options with comparable efficiency. 2) The Community Participation model shows the most potential for mitigating institutional risks and constraints within the sanitation sector. 3) Efficient DEWATS implementation using a cocopeat filter has the potential to improve benefit to cost ratios (BCRs), reduce cost burdens on direct users, and introduce sanitation treatment systems to urban areas where space constraints are a key limiting factor. \n\nRecommendations - RTI could pursue Community Participation models for implementing cocopeat filter DEWATS projects with support from local government units (LGUs) and NGOs. This model shows the most promise for mitigating institutional risks, promoting awareness of sanitation benefits, driving ownership by end users, and enabling technology adoption. Given that technical implementation, social marketing, and sanitation training expertise resides predominantly with NGOs, RTI should also continue to promote the benefits of cocopeat filter technology through these subject matter experts.
Krishna M. Singh, Meena Meena, Burton E. Swanson, M.N. Reddy · 5 authors
This In-Depth Study of the Pluralistic Agricultural Extension System in India is a full analysis of the pluralistic extension system in India, how it has changed over many years and the direction it is currently moving. \n \nChapter-1 outlines the Evolution of the Pluralistic Agricultural Extension System in India and the changes that have occurred since about 1871, including the establishment of the Department of Agriculture in 1882. Following independence in 1947, many changes have happened as outlined in this first chapter, including the Community Development Program (CDP), the Intensive Agricultural District Program (IADP), including dissemination of high-yielding varieties during the Green Revolution, the Training and Visit (T&V) approach and then the move to the decentralized, farmer-led and market driven approach influenced by the Agricultural Technology Management Agency (ATMA) model. \n \nChapter-2 gives an Overview of the Public Extension System within the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), the State Departments of Agriculture and then provides more detailed information about the Krishi Vigyan Kendra (KVK) and the public extension system in India. It starts with an overview of the organizational structure at the national level, including the Department of Agricultural Research and Extension (DARE), then into the Department of Agriculture and Cooperation (DAC) and Directorate of Extension within DAC. Then, it moves into the KVKs, which are a critical linkage at the district level between research, extension and farmers. In short, KVKs focus on the specific agro-ecological conditions within each district and then, after conducting research on these different crops, livestock and other farming systems. Then it moves into the development of the ATMA model through two World Bank projects, which is now expand across all Indian districts. \n \nChapter-3 outlines the Directorates of Extension Education within each State Agricultural Universities (SAUs). India is unique in having Extension units established within each SAU, since this extension approach was first introduced by selected US Land Grant Universities into these SAUs in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This chapter outlines the historical development of the extension within each SAU and then outlines the mandate, organizational structure, human resources and methods used within these SAUs and their relationship with the public extension system. \n \nChapter-4 outlines the Private Sector Advisory Services being provided in India, especially in the provision of good advisory services through private Agri-Business Companies through the sale of inputs to farmers. In India, there are over 280,000 input supply firms, but many do not have sufficient knowledge and experience in providing good advisory services to farmers. At first, the public and private sector did not want to work together but through the ATMA approach, the public and private sector started working together and then, in 2004, the National Institute of Agricultural Extension Management (MANAGE) started training and giving diplomas to the participants from these private sector firms, especially in Andhra Pradesh (see: http://www.manage.gov.in/daesi/daesi.htm). \n \nChapter-5 summarizes the role and activities of the different Commodity Boards currently operating in India, including: Central Silk Board (CSB), Coconut Development Board (CDB), Coffee Board, Coir Board, Rubber Board, Spices Board, Tea Board, Tobacco Board, National Dairy Development Board (NDDB), National Horticulture Board (NHB), Cashew Export Promotion Council (CEPC), National Jute Board (NJB), and the National Federation of Cooperative Sugar Factories (NFCSF) and how each of these boards carry out extension and advisory services to the farmers being served. \n \nChapter-6 outlines the Institutional Mechanism for Capacity Building to strengthen the pluralistic extension system in India. This chapter starts with an overview of the National Institute of Agricultural Extension Management (MANAGE), which is an autonomous organization that has had the most impact on strengthening the extension system in India. Next, it discusses the paradigm shift within the National Institute of Agricultural Marketing (NAIM) in India; and then outlines the role of the Extension Education Institutes (EEIs). Finally, it moves to outline the role and structure of the State Agricultural Management and Extension Training Institutes (SAMETIs), especially in strengthening the ATMA model in India. \n \nChapter-7 is the conclusion chapter that outlines the Strengths and Weaknesses of India’s Pluralistic Extension System. It starts by outlining the Policy Framework and Reforms for strengthening the pluralistic extension system in India. Next, it outlines how to strengthen research-extension linkages as well as capacity building among extension workers. Next, it addresses how to empower farmers, including women farmers. It also outlines the use of Information Technology (IT) and how to strengthen it through different approaches. This chapter also outlines the changing role of government in extension and how the ATMA model can be strengthened following very specific details. The other issue is how to strengthen the SAMETIs, since they still need to be strengthened in providing service to district and block level extension workers. This chapter ends with a brief summary the key role that the public extension system can play in India.
Emerging economies are building up their education systems by overcoming the major challenges of finance, infrastructure and planning and control of resources and internal processes through ‘school-based management’ reforms. To achieve relative competitiveness, school management must deal with these challenges. Governments consider decentralization as an indispensable step in efforts to provide quality education. Many successful schools set up committees and undertake improvements in planning. The Indian school education sector is not an exception. This study sought to explore the nature of planning function being practiced at the school level as a source of competitive advantage. A sample of 188, among the population of 557 secondary schools in Krishna district of Andhra Pradesh in India, was selected through stratified sampling. The primary responses were collected through a structured questionnaire administered to the respective school heads and analyzed with chi-square and simple descriptives. Decentralization is a management strategy which demands flexible implementation with a balance between the autonomy and the characteristics of its beneficiaries. Improvement of the quality of education needs the functioning and management of schools to improve. The findings indicate that the planning framework is either nonexistent or inactive in a majority of public sector schools. The inclusion of community members in school management is comparatively better in the public sector schools run by the State government of Andhra Pradesh than those run by private managements. The academic, infrastructure and financial planning activities are highly centralized, giving no scope for innovation and autonomy at the school level.