Blockchain Papers

Steven Fesmire

I sometimes ask my students if they would be willing to raise their hand and pledge the following: There's a single basis of moral life, and it determines the right way to proceed. I have access to this supreme basis. When others don't agree with me, it's because they have the wrong faith commitments, they aren't analyzing things properly, or they aren't letting conscience be their guide. Agreement with me is a prerequisite to solving our problems. Consequently, I have nothing to learn about these matters from those who disagree with me. Their participation is, at best, an irrelevant distraction and, at worst, an evil to be defeated. My diagnosis of the issue has precisely captured all that is morally relevant. It's exhaustive, hence beyond revision and reformulation.I rarely get any takers. After the students and I swap stories about those who might blithely take such a pledge, we invariably conclude that the pledgers are outnumbered by their counterparts: conservatives, liberals, and radicals who would, upon conscious reflection, reject this outright as closed-minded arrogance. Moreover, it quickly becomes clear that this pledge doesn't speak to the sort of people they wish to be. (I later explain that “ethical monists” accept the first sentence, “moral fallibilists” reject the second, and almost all moral philosophers would reject the baselessness of the rest.)And yet, our class conversation continues, how many of us certified broader-minded souls act as though complex problems come prepackaged with our interpretation of them? Do we prejudge and offhandedly dismiss alternative diagnoses of shared problems? However open-minded we may seem to ourselves, do we habitually react to others as though we're navigating with the one universal moral compass? Are our real behaviors implicated in this pledge that most of us would consciously disavow?At this point, I introduce another classroom activity, inspired by Anthony Weston's A 21st Century Ethical Toolbox. Suppose we wanted to codify rules to sabotage democratic dialogue and make debates as fruitless as possible. The idea here is to spell out rules that maximize the distance between “us” and “them,” ensuring that possibilities for cooperatively setting and achieving social goals—like peace, security, justice, public health, or sustainability—go forever unnoticed. For example, consider things like “stereotype the other side” or “prepare your comeback instead of listening.”I divide students into groups and ask them to develop five more rules. They come up with an excellent tool kit for torpedoing public deliberation: “Approach any debate as a zero-sum game.” “Widen the gulf that separates us.” “Be uncharitable: always present your side at its best and the other at its worst.” “Ignore context.” “Be angrier and talk louder.” “Be smug.” “Trust your anger; it would never steer you wrong.” “Inflate certainty.” “Gaslight.” “Dog whistle.” “Assume your interlocuter is clueless.” “Reject complexity.” “Be visibly offended by any questioning of your conclusions.” “Act as though your values and concerns invariably overrule theirs.”Gradually some of the fun fades. Is there any link between the pledge activity and your new diabolical tool kit, I ask? The sense of the class is that the tool kit clarifies the practical upshot of the pledge, identifying legitimized behaviors. We end up recognizing ourselves, myself included. We purposefully drew up a malicious playbook for undermining democracy, and it mirrored the status quo. Many of my liberal-identified American students interpret the activity as a send-up of conservatives. Their imagined tool kit-users sport “Make America Great Again” hats and threaten DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) advocates. Meanwhile, many conservative students interpret the activity as damning liberal wokeness, “virtue signaling,” and “cancel culture.” Through this discussion, the class gets an experiential introduction to work in moral psychology that bears on moral politics, such as Jonathan Haidt's The Righteous Mind.We conclude this introductory unit of the course with issues that tend to counteract fuzzy relativism by evoking strong condemnation, such as Nussbaum's essay on female genital cutting (“Judging Other Cultures”). Joining millions of ethics students before them, most conclude that extreme relativism leaves much to be desired as a coherent way to express the virtue of tolerance. Most want to show courage. Yet as they reach for their received language, many are now unnerved by their own pledge-like tone. They're habituated to assuming that a kind of moral fundamentalism is the irreplaceable steam that powers activism and advocacy, that resistance to injustice is unintelligible without it, and that the virtues of moral clarity and conviction somehow imply a my-way-or-the-highway approach.Shifting uncomfortably, we pause to explore our dissonance. Perhaps we're merely hypocrites, parading open-mindedness while betraying its opposite. Or perhaps we're beset with a neural vestige of moral tribalism, as Joshua Greene explored in Moral Tribes. Minimally, we're exhibiting what social psychologist Lee Ross studied as the illusion of objectivity, the error of assuming that our perceptions, motivations, and assessments are objective while those who disagree with us are irrational (Ross 751–52). But there are additional philosophically interesting things at work, and they highlight conditions that pour gasoline on our usual hypocrisy and attribution errors. I'll explore some of these today by asking five questions about moral fundamentalism: (1) What is it? (2) Is it really such a bad thing? (3) Isn't it good for motivating social action? (4) Do many theorists inadvertently legitimize it? and (5) Can we educate beyond it?I call this cluster of pledge-and-tool kit-like habits “moral fundamentalism.” The term was used by Mark Johnson (163) as a synonym for moral absolutism, and by Robert Baker (201) as a broad-brush label for any principle-based moral universalism. But, for three reasons, it's helpful to disentangle the term from just any commitment to moral absolutism: Philosophers who are moral absolutists generally condemn pledge-like traits, and their theoretical commitments don't necessarily imply fundamentalist behaviors.A name is needed for the offending habits, whatever one's worldview. Rejecting self-certainty in theory doesn't imply rejecting it in practice.Moral fundamentalist habits thrive today among groups whose outlook seems little troubled by the lack of a final mooring for their beliefs.Moral fundamentalism can be ostensively defined as the cluster of habits exhibited in “the pledge” activity. A moral fundamentalist may be more precisely defined, minimally, as someone disposed to act as if they have access to (1) the exclusively right way to diagnose moral or political problems, and (2) the single approvable practical solution to any particular problem.Although the word “fundamentalism” is contested (Peels 1), it automatically suggests a helpful analogy to rigid religious dogmatism, which carries the idea that a select few have accessed self-evident ideals that should be heeded without public investigation, critique, and reformation. The dogmatist's notion that some statements are inherently and self-sufficiently true (Dewey, “Propositions” 171–72) is diametrically opposed to Peirce's fallibilist notion that a “skeptical element” is involved in any claim that follows on the heels of inquiry. Accordingly, in moral education, the ardent fundamentalist leader is contented only after a young member of the flock arrives safely at a foregone conclusion.Fundamentalists speak authoritatively about all-encompassing essences, including the essence of morality. As pragmatists have long observed, such essentialism freezes creative processes—through which people work things out together—into static things. Pretending to speak for the universal essence of morality turns to stone what should be a collaborative project (cf. Appiah, Lies That Bind 97). Fundamentalism turns moral artistry into moralizing.Fealty to inerrant essential doctrines or principles isn't a promising resource for public dialogue, restoration of trust, or reconciliation. When combined with nationalism, jingoism, xenophobia, racism, massive out-migration, and economic dislocation, it's a resource for reactionary oppression, rage, and fanaticism on all sides. We must find our diverse ways beyond the hell we inflict in the name of righteous certainty.The preceding discussion clarifies, I hope, several senses in which moral fundamentalism is a vice. For a moral fundamentalist, the main moral, social, or political problem is presumed to be that others don't get the problem (Norton 37), as though events carry their own meanings. Or the main problem is presumed to be the failure of others to bow to our brilliant solutions. Never mind that these solutions are ideas that flow from values and purposes, and that have consequences that reshape subsequent facts to be interpreted. And never mind aspects of the situation that are obfuscated by our way of casting the problem or are occluded by our principles. We too readily assume that, unlike their concerns, ours are value-neutral and free of interest-driven rationalizations and biases. We never doctor facts to predetermine results.Moral fundamentalism is a drag on democracy. This drag is to be expected when people feel backed into a corner or when their social position limits opportunities. But fundamentalism anywhere blocks communication and inquiry across differences. Whenever people suppose their reading of a problem is exhaustive, they autocratically predefine what's relevant, and they covertly prejudge alternatives. They assume, as a matter of course, that others are stubbornly refusing to accept the interpretation that (in Dewey's words) is staring right out at them (Dewey, Public and Its Problems 38).When we disagree about problems, it's one thing to reflectively conclude that others are willfully refusing to face conditions, as Eddie Glaude explores in Begin Again. It's quite another thing to start with the default assumption that we alone are taking the wide view.Despite these habits—not because of them—moral fundamentalists have historically done many good things through their dealings with opposing fundamentalisms. But what else have they done that might in future be minimized by delegitimizing moral fundamentalism? When we take up the one-way mentality, what happens to opportunities for reflexively learning our way toward a healthier, more just, and more sustainable future across the dynamic spectrum of values, beliefs, and concerns?Does activism require and benefit from moral fundamentalism? In order to motivate actions that restructure conditions and redress wrongs, must people harden their hearts and minds against the clamor of contradictory theories, both speaking and acting as if they're governed by final truths?If so, then perhaps a kind of incorrigibility is a virtue of public philosophizing. To some intellectuals, the international resurgence of gaslighting demagogues and self-seeking cronyism is incontrovertible proof that we can ultimately expect very little of the public. It's assumed by some that the public switch is permanently set to dim, so it's up to intellectuals to take up the civilizing burden of enlightenment. If this requires us to default to moral fundamentalism, then so be it.However, we got here by expecting too little of the public. We've long been running self-verifying experiments in low expectations. Electing or hiring competent executives who are accustomed to complex cognition can help, but it can't solve the deepest problem of all: the failure to create a cultural in which we may in “the kind of people that a about what we can expect of a democratic have a long from to the The of was the debate in the between and that ideas in when they when they have the of right which they as has it, of Public in an of that in a social require and is by the right and are at as as the of class of from the if they to the of the a that many of this have to with Public that the of the and is with that must with by and complex what to be with by who problems so that accept the that is for of public as and nothing democratic more the idea that intellectuals must the burden of inquiry from the and little of the while the of on A outlook all too into the of that demagogues are in order to We and more have been the as the from to but Dewey's of when by in facts to on social can and do to at to a that is for (Dewey, Public and Its are of many but that was about the of those they don't from but from and bad education, these a an or the moral of the and Its Problems the solution to a of the When a in toward the end of in a young a in which up the that would a I the that we should with and if it people would that I and would this If I that the to solving problems in that there is theory people in its and the theory into a In to the illusion of and consciously that was to it, to with their as in moral fundamentalism to the to a end of to be in to but was it the only or most by the an outlook intellectuals at our or moral best Public and Its of of as a to social as the idea that “the of be to and to in moral that if they're to of mind their and be so by and class that the final be and and democratic was of and expected that the of communication can the to predefine problems, as it across and from what been a of and Its Problems this out of a that is to all who it out of a practical that it is our only communication invariably of moral and these be on a of course, to be which or a tone. This may be to a or social to strong moral or or it may be more a matter of cultural or a to or it may be of what in and the Moral an of taking a position here on or what conditions, such might be though this more I that has been to that it's implicated in moral fundamentalist behaviors that are for and political life, and (I that has the strong moral are as to as or of course, this that people in ethics and to the that needed an or needed Moral isn't by The for is to the and that we (Dewey, for philosophers reject any fundamentalism, but in the they to speak for the essence of morality and into a instead of an and collaborative This the one-way on theory of for that matter how one's supreme moral is it rarely one's on all of the that one to and moral the of word after always There's more to any situation can be by a single or just as more to any what us about of that to the to which we're and by our particular and all at the from the of We can but we can't Dewey's of the of moral as with are of that us in This of a practical if are in with then can to that or This is to the of assuming a single for a complex and example, the with some in equity, a in at in the was in and that out more that may have more ethics should be because it must with including social in the virtues such as social issues of to resource as and Do have a to on and and the of and toward public There's experiential basis for a or that with all of these issues of and one of these the and this lack of a is the in ethics the the of the to which of these ways of should Ethical have A alternative is to the assumption that a good theory If we set up our as a to particular conditions and it can practical with complex problems without among values or that can what we to an and (Dewey, and with in that is an essential of moral and merely on the that from the of a or to lack of access to to into our or was that there is and right in conditions, for and about which to make among alternatives. Moral and in and we to about them because they require us to that are best through is without that is most by those who are and the assumption legitimized by is presumed to and (Dewey, A situation may seem to be a the but or to into our or to an just or perhaps to an of would that there been an or best through the all and the or other when it to can the for (Dewey, A of on a is to what we should do on the right but to and that are most for a particular may for But whatever we with their is what is (Dewey, and for by matter that troubled us to in the first aren't we with moral fundamentalism? but its and are Moral fundamentalism is a because it into what's and bad inquiry is more and when learn to be with the of reflection, to and of of the and of any or in and in creative are values of a democratic a after the of and in the of our best for beyond moral When and moral and through that are and students can learn to take in events of by and can to public of what's at and to habits that public the with a of moral and the of the for a a the of and by to own After with the and with the to the Their was to the between the and the of from a an of its liberal the in sustainable to the that separates from the of what they (cf. The idea was that to the of the in which take This can't be by the classroom as a or what to and into the classroom so that students the moral, and of the up with and in their and they into the This that students by and with a of out in and to was by a The out against at of the a for on with these in their They that the was to sustainable to be a or a The economic of a of must work a that doesn't to the would a to in the they that it's more to both of an that been discussion values and among the The the with a that most of the and If was it would be After a the the into the from The The and many other would a in the to international was by a Is the an to the of Is the to for all to and to their an that the To that this would be an of and many several on and students who in the The for a of to from at the was to carry out its the the after the was The a by many as as some the this with students as an in asking them to explore a by would moral The between and sustainable The is and in its while the to moral beyond to to been a for a against what they which is from They for a moral between and We can with a who is a but both in what the to be that we agree that of the of was the only we should agree that and that as must be doesn't name and for who are and this of moral Is the call for a in their way They that can't be so for to with sustainable for and a in the an opposing of righteous A before the a talk at the in which that the must be on if it is to so rules out experiments in or are hypocrites, and the best that can be of is that at they're as a fundamentalist who and a against and by refusing to the of and to these a such as the idea that a best, or can be in of the that require us to make to the of the of a right doesn't imply that all are in their fundamentalism is at with the in any democracy. As that is to “the and conditions of discussion, and That is the problem of the and Its Problems We should students to and to be of both and and and we should them and problem of them to fundamentalism with more of the we a more that is but students are to and when their and have been by problem solving at a They can and the situation at hand (cf. and and and about ways of all to public as the for a more and of social This many by students and to with to the some by and most got used to other (cf. Appiah, In students that they in their to and They and some the of moral to the learning that beyond the but in later stories the they from The them them with a and moral their beyond moral

Phyllis Cole

MARGARET Fuller's essay-letter to William Henry Channing in the summer of 1842, “A Credo,” is her most forthright expression of radical Transcendentalism, affirming an evolutionary process of nature and spirit in both metaphysical principle and Biblical symbolism. Fuller directs her well-established understanding of world religions to comparison with Christianity, and she at least implies the possibility of new roles for women in the world's future. In both respects “A Credo” anticipates her major work, Woman in the Nineteenth Century.1 More immediately, however, she offers her testimony at a moment when competing ideas of Jesus stand at the forefront of the Transcendentalist movement and its related network of Unitarian churches. Fuller's statement of natural religion finds private expression but speaks powerfully within a collective history.Though occasionally excerpted in collections of her writing and commented upon by scholars, “A Credo” has lacked a critical text to stand among her works. This documentary project aims to provide Fuller's complete statement as well as position it within the Transcendentalist movement. The manuscript of “A Credo” has been overlooked largely through circumstances of transmission. Channing included a selection in Memoirs of Margaret Fuller Ossoli (1852), while also censoring its content. However, by 1883 he valued this statement enough to send it to Thomas Wentworth Higginson, then working on his biography of Fuller, as a central expression of her “Prophetic Spirituality & Conscious Communion with the Divine Influent Life.”2 Higginson's more secular study found no place for “A Credo,” though he preserved it among the Fuller papers he eventually donated to the Boston Public Library. Soon a scholar of German Romanticism, Frederick Augustus Braun, transcribed the text as an appendix to his book on Fuller and Goethe; however, he used it only to argue for Fuller as a disciple of the German Romantic writer, “not a Transcendentalist at all.”3 With the recovery of Fuller's work since the 1960s, “A Credo” has been excerpted and commented upon several times, whether from manuscript or from Braun. Always its participation in Transcendentalist discourse is assumed. Most recently, a study of Fuller's religious skepticism in this essay has focused on the constraints preventing a woman writer from publishing such views in 1842.4 None of the recent scholarship, however, proposes publication of “A Credo” for current readers.Fuller's testimony is capacious in scale and perspective, open to examination in more than one way. It offers an important sign of Fuller's growing religious feminism by attributing cosmic origins to a “spirit” that is also “angel mother,” later referred to again as “she.” At the same time, Fuller speaks in primarily masculine terms, even while naming deities and prophets, as she addresses the Transcendentalists through Channing. The shifting narrative perspective of “A Credo” allows these concerns to emerge together. First, she tells in abstract terms of creation, its future unknown to “this being who now writes.” As she envisions it, the human race has no binary separation from either nature or spirit, participating in one pantheistic entirety. Nor is gender a significant internal division; soon she speaks as “we,” the collective humanity that, like the spirit, breaks through obstruction and achieves knowledge. But then an individual, intensely devotional but self-affirming “I” emerges in her account of Jesus: one who has “no objection to the miracles, except where they do not happen to please me,” who finally believes in Christ “because I can do without him.” Fuller implicitly acknowledges this first-person voice as a woman's when she specifies the Biblical text for a sermon “[i]f I were to preach on this subject.” She has no opportunity to preach, but “A Credo” is her laywoman's sermon by letter.All of the issues evoked in this statement—the miracles of Jesus, the status of the Bible, the power of nature and intuition—had defined the Transcendentalist controversy since 1838, when Ralph Waldo Emerson's “Divinity School Address” characterized the church's “noxious exaggeration about the person of Jesus” as “Monster” rather than “Miracle.” In response, conservative Unitarian Andrews Norton blasted Emerson's words as the “latest form of infidelity,” going on to argue for the Bible's verifiable history of Jesus as the only ground for faith. Emerson made no direct response, but colleagues sprang to his defense by affirming truth as perceived by the individual mind. In “A Credo” Fuller was offering her own perspective on the miracles controversy. Earlier she had reported to Emerson on Norton's latest publications as well as describing the “paper-pellet” aimed by a younger critic at “that peculiarly nervous sect styled Transcendentalists.”5 Now, as she wrote to Channing, she composed “A Credo” because a friend had asked specifically for her views of Jesus.6 Fuller's own “infidelity” joined with Emerson and his allies, even as she went beyond them in directly presenting her cosmology of past and future.A long process of self-expression and interchange with others led to her testimony, extending from years before Emerson's manifesto to the moment of writing in 1842. Fuller held a position of quasi-clerical authority among Transcendentalists by this time. The third season of her Conversations with women had just concluded: since 1839 she had been leading path-breaking discussions of the truths suggested by Greek mythology and the fine arts, with frequent cross-reference to the Bible. She had described her first session's theme as a “genealogy of heaven and earth.”7 In the same period that such ruminations on divinity and humanity grew, furthermore, Fuller was serving as editor of the movement's Dial magazine, soliciting and judging work on religious and philosophical subjects from both men and women. All of those to be named in this essay had contributed to it. As editor, she reached out widely to the community of progressive belief. In “A Credo” she quoted a sentiment without identifying its author: “The soul must do its own immortal work.” Such words might have been Emerson's, but instead they were from a poem by Eliza Thayer Clapp, a woman outside Fuller's immediate circle, as published in the Dial a year before.8“A Credo” epitomizes Fuller's vision during this time of double cultural leadership; moreover, it embodies the personal transformation that she claimed amidst such work. At the opening of the second season of Conversations, in autumn 1840, Fuller wrote to Channing that she had found a warm reception from the group after telling of her “great changes,” recent experiences of mystical identification with the divine. In the same letter she also reported on her own writing experiments, “The Magnolia of Lake Pontchartrain” and “Yuca Filamentosa,” which would soon be published anonymously, with her as editor, in the Dial. Along with “Leila,” a third piece of experimental fiction, these appeared throughout the months between Fuller's “great changes” and the beginning of 1842, the year of “A Credo.” In them she affirmed the power of female forms in the natural and spiritual worlds: woman-identified flowers bursting into bloom under the moon's influence; a grand tree, “Queen of the South,” singing to herself in solitary power; the goddess “Leila,” her wild hair blowing in the wind, who embodied the Holy Ghost's descent into matter. And the personal immersion in divine nature that Fuller expressed in such work was confirmed by a contemporary journal entry remembering her earlier self-consecration, when after exiting from church she had found illumination in the sun's glory and vowed to sow “new and immortal plants in the garden of God.”9 The revelations of 1840 and their expression in fictional and autobiographical form offer a direct prelude to her apparently spontaneous essay-letter of 1842.Significantly, Fuller wrote her creedal statement as a letter rather than in published form, even though the Dial had already offered her the possibilities of anonymous authorship. Any statement that directly claimed kinship with divinity apart from Christ and the church was a scandal, all the more, as Caitlin Smith notes, from a woman.10 But in addition, Fuller was prompted to write “A Credo” by particular friends, both the person who initially asked about Jesus and the letter's recipient, Channing, amidst an ongoing dialogue with him. Letters underlay all of the Transcendentalist movement, as texts with a life of their own. Later writing tearfully from Rome, Fuller told Caroline Sturgis of her need to continue “friendships I had paid for with so much heart's blood,” admitting that without letters from her and from Channing, “so many thoughts in the long past seemed to flee from me.”11 “A Credo” lies within that body of thought and feeling. Here I will suggest how four epistolary exchanges anticipate its voice and theological ideas: first those with James Freeman Clarke and Emerson, then those with her even more memorable partners, Sturgis and Channing.From the early 1830s, James Freeman Clarke supported her growth in new German learning, later a strong foundation for “A Credo.” With him she waxed about and of this friend to the about the who the history his by and how and had Fuller also reported to Clarke and Frederick Henry on her immersion in Biblical under the of German She thought of from its expressed in and found in a new to her exchanges and her Biblical immersion directly in “A Credo.” Fuller's of a in as both and have in particular from who had for the of nature and humanity out of Biblical furthermore, to “A Credo,” even as like in the truth of with Emerson was both and through their long In 1840 she the power of his work first him it in four years later she it from the was to how much more I it now than at I the now I the The years do not in “A Credo” was in its of it was also not with however, and after the “great changes” later in 1840, she his her of mystical have I to the central she to her she wrote not the friend I the same year that she composed “A Credo,” in his “The Emerson the movement him as it in or not she wrote in to her essay found a position by on the of not their to the And where Emerson characterized the Transcendentalist as one who from the for it to offer work of response, Fuller both nature and humanity in and As she had to Caroline she rather than the who seemed to have She but also Fuller's a friend with she both of the beginning Fuller's letters expressed an upon Greek and mythology even while as well about the of Jesus as a friend and of She quoted about the his directly to the rather than the who She was a in these letters by the need for and whether with or with its its its the and the growth would only she do not direct like the But is in the Fuller this friend as the first to of her “great changes” in I is found And at the of is can be no but all the in must be of from Emerson, she found with In both their and their expression of religious Fuller's letters to her directly anticipate the of “A Credo,” where she by as an of within the spirit and by the in Fuller's however, was the friend who directly “A Credo.” with William Henry Channing out of Dial when Fuller from the to to in the grand she a new it on 1840 But their as to the after only grand their letters were to Fuller her own of and to in the before with Channing both the of her and the “great changes” in her first claimed her as a as an to she out in after her personal with the of I were a and then would be I in this of Divine I out into before I it. I I I I More was at for her than a to authority as a as she that with for the particular her to Divine the and that she would soon more in “A Credo.” With an from her to she her own and those of Channing in the of the Unitarian to a sermon that the new to an of and Fuller the instead as for herself to for would now preach the Holy as as have been and instead of the understanding and instead Fuller was her own religious apart from church or of however, not Fuller's for such a among the claimed to the Unitarian than she had James Clarke a for the of the he and Fuller but not And Channing, to this moment his an focused on the of humanity in Christ he claimed a religion that would this is the he wrote to his of Transcendentalist on the Boston that year to the about and Fuller had no as Caroline later an between Fuller told Channing in how much she sermon which with the of Soon such ideas in “A on the and in which to a theological manifesto and in his from the Unitarian of the and authority claimed by their on miracles as of his But he as the of his of and Clarke Channing joined in the of Fuller, while their of his views in the new of also held of her Credo” might be Fuller's statement of to Channing in of Christ had seemed at first a for In early of 1842, Channing wrote to his of an for all At the same time, however, he a of Christianity, Jesus as of the of in And though his from such his letter first a new of the of beyond so as to a which the not the Fuller of this and soon asked Channing to how to At the same time she him as directly as he had just The she had been to him the of the its As “A Credo” would the of that she affirmed had beyond Jesus, both through the and the essay also both directly and was the one contemporary she named in it, to his in and from the as of the had claimed that an like that of to his thought at which with the of In “A Credo,” Fuller both and his of her for But this just after she had affirmed in the even it was rather than the of Fuller his life as of a She of Jesus at the of an by naming and before even the in to be from Jesus and prophets, her evolutionary as form was for future At the of “A Credo,” the sermon that she to preach might have been to both Channing and as she offered as its text to his is for that I he so that the spirit her journal from the Emerson that Fuller wrote in an to “A Credo.” with Emerson, a of letters from Channing, she herself to both must own no to but the Waldo must not in William in the fine that has I have of Channing, she she not need the is at in is to to a to but it is affirmed in the of own and the soul and nature all I have church where I by and Fuller was from the earlier statement as it had both the forms of and her own within it. In vision and “A Credo” is Fuller's most testimony about and the soul and by a and in to exchanges within the Transcendentalist is a spirit and it all is whether of or its it to it is to be an of forms not in the of this being who now of as This is the or publication of spirit upon the like in the This is a a new as for for for the of as through his he the which the divine The is in the of was this second the divine to for for for the in the which the as the of it in the of the of is when he is is as through and has no to this as through and of into the nature of the Divine it is from own though the of where all already is this must has been by the of being must be for and only in time not do him and led by of of then the of the The moment have through an not but by the of to was to the and with soul that is it would that the Divine expressed his to more in than in the forms of and through him the which his forms of nature only in whether from or because he is not to the of the when is in a when he is not so with all as to their spirit, also must be at the form of nature and of the she has been to through those of men in the to one that this and spirit in the human But and is a of enough is through a to the and obstruction on the of through all the of thought the is in I well and many and offer to the whether of whether of do not to an upon the position and of because I of his and the of his The history of the the of the suggest already of being than and which more this of But I do his life to be the in one of in the and that all these to and when on these strong through which on the ground but how the in the to the as he now these forms is a of and a soul of the is to to to be And as the of spirit, a new for its is one in the garden of the his many religion The the history of the human it has into the but its several though expressed the not beyond and a the history of however, have been more and more and so in the history of of the have several is men from only in being made through the and words of is whether as or but its of expression though of it is is As the to its so do to the of do this through the others through the The first second these all all so as they to the of their and so as they to that of their as is a a form is as its as the the and is its as the and within the that is expressed in the as the and the and of and the and his so has of thoughts and its upon it to a a form which stand before it a of the of its It with and it them with it its life of in the it with It one life as as or It has made it has it of the of which humanity is and one of the in respects the it has was the life of Jesus of so much in his history as I own in the long of and the truth of I a in the of Jesus be the of his its and its and I in the as in the I in the prophets, and that they not only their but the of a an one to at the the would have made of the of his a of the of the I that Jesus when the time was that he was peculiarly a and of I have to in the of his the circumstances were in time he was of a and the a truth of the I have no objection to the miracles, except where they do not happen to please not a soul so and new and I can him the and the without of of not in the they is to such a upon and all who have him since on the have their within to it not be when I to that though I all this it is of no to whether it or that the truth such to is and that the of for had the and offered it to as a to as as I it would be just as how the that from the also that I in the history of the and its in as presenting one of spiritual It is to and a of I have no from the of for as it I it as a thought to be expressed by the of not that they who their through the to were and not more than an to Christ has made many of his not place Christ then in a place than for or because his life was not it was and he is a of the But then I the Greek as one men in Christ as a a soul must its for many only when men from and him by the of their own open to of the from can he be as he do not he on his own expression he but this is not in I like to of this in he was not and where men so was and is and where he them to the they not they with him and do not I in Christ because I can do without because the truth he I because it is in the nature of own But I do not to do without him. is and I will not and on him. he to I will when I to by I I do not the church men who can with in it. I I more widely than body of men I And as I than in the apart for that will not to do The the than at a of again that to be and I will they to But that time is not I & in and I with I as to religion in It would be a of But for the I will how it is with as to I as where spirit in It the of it it it But so the and a and the It is only one of the same Jesus breaks through the of the world's like through the & I its I it. But it is a of the is about it, but its will not though I in them one I most men in need of them their their them be them in the of past But of I in these and in as they more, they beyond I would from them to I no from the past to own soul or not to the of Jesus of will of that that was in the it is not but and it must future will like to the and the but to But as an for a & a for a so Christ for a life more complete and than that of have had the to and have a to out all the forms of human life with the and of a Greek with the of a with the & of have not with how the of the in Jesus for a But this as the by to his be of in a letter or essay on the process of in have not of his life as a so that his words all & they to with all the and of the of a divine It is the same with and in a with have not of men to from the same that them so on a or of the of In him the the But this is in as will must do its own immortal friends, from only to when can do without But when can and from to do without them they will no I were to preach on this I would for a text the words of Jesus, I the is for that I for I the will not but I I will send him

Lin William Cong, Ke Tang, Yanxin Wang, Zhao Xi

Web3 and DeFi are widely advocated as innovations for greater financial inclusion and democratization. We assemble the most comprehensive dataset to date on the largest Web3 ecosystem and use large-scale computing to investigate the claim. We discuss Ethereum's network structure, time trends, and distributions of transactions, mining, and ownership. Mining income and Ether ownership are concentrated in a few nodes, even after excluding exchange and mining pool wallets, with inequalities more exacerbated than observed in the real economy. Network activities are dominated by large transactions, shifting from peer-to-peer to user-DApps/DeFi interactions, and from Ether-based to ERC-20-token-based. High percentage transaction fees, congestion-induced gas-price fluctuation, suboptimal reserve setting, and large return volatility of tokens disproportionally harm small, unsophisticated, and new nodes, with high failure rates hurting all users. Finally, we present causal evidence that base-fee burning mechanisms (e.g., EIP-1559) and airdrop programs (e.g., OmiseGo Airdrop) promote inclusion and equality through monetary redistribution.

Aid Smajić

Possibility and limits of dialogue between religion and psychology is an interesting topic attracting significant attention of theologians and psychologists today. A century long experience of Catholic Church being in dialogue with modern psychological theory and practice is a proof of complexity and multifacetedness of this endeavor as well as an authentic illustration of its challenges, possibilities and potential solutions for all religious traditions faced with similar dilemmas. The aim of the study is threefold: 1) to offer a short historical overview of attitude of the Catholic Church towards achievements of modern psychological science, 2) to present the main areas and challenges faced by the Church in dialogue with and exploitation of contemporary psychology today and 3) to identify agents and mechanisms of this process. This attitude evolved from the initial suspicion and antagonism to respect towards achievements of healthy psychology and systematic attempt of their integration in Catholic teaching and pastoral work. Seemingly two factors are especially important for the achieved success, namely individual enthusiasm and systematic approach of Catholic theologian-psychologists to the issue at stake and the existence of minimum of official support in the Church for these endeavors, even at the time of the hey-days of anti-modernism in the Catholic circles. These are eventually the useful hints for all religious traditions perplexed with similar dilemmas.

Adam Gregerman

Comparative Christian Hermeneutical Approaches to the Land Promises to Abraham Adam Gregerman While formerly inflammatory topics such as the deicide charge have waned in Jewish–Christian relations, disputes over the land and State of Israel provoke intense controversy and disagreement. Decades ago, in the Christian world, this topic was already widely said to be especially divisive, and today, it remains so. It is not surprising that an issue that provokes intense geopolitical interest and touches on territory of nearly unsurpassed religious significance would be so provocative. The nexus of politics and religion is especially volatile. Among Christians, church organizations and individual theologians in the west (North America, Europe) join diverse religious claims and biblical interpretations to their foreign policy statements and arguments. Sometimes, it seems that the political views trump the religious. For example, Christian disputes over the State of Israel often can be mapped onto existing deep divisions in the American churches over domestic policies or military action, with left and right presenting predictable arguments. It is understandably tempting to see appeals to Scripture and theology as tools to buttress pre‐existing political views. However, a sympathetic reader should also recognize the presence of serious theological reflections on this contested and fraught sacred space. Christians who grapple with the land and State of Israel do so in the wake of highly complex millennia‐old Christian theological traditions about Jews and Judaism, sacred space generally, and the land of Israel in particular. There are profound religious issues at stake that go beyond politics, for the State of Israel as a “Jewish state” inevitably raises religious questions for Christians, especially for those rethinking largely negative historical views of Jews and Judaism. For many centuries, nearly all Christians believed that Jewish powerlessness and exile were divine punishment for Jews’ refusal to believe in and/or murder of Jesus. The ejection of many Jews from the biblical land of Israel and the end to Jewish sovereignty there were proofs of the truth of Christianity. Not surprisingly, then, in the wake of the 1948 creation of the State of Israel, the ingathering of (some) Jews to the land, and the (partial) end of Jewish subordination to Gentile rulers, many Christians struggled to make sense of this event not just politically but theologically. The difficult theological questions raised by this event, and for some subsequent events, such as the Israeli capture of all of Jerusalem in 1967, include as follows: Does the creation of the state—though a result of a United Nations vote—have any religious significance for Christians, as a contemporary act of God in history or manifestation of God's will? Need it prompt changes in Christians’ views about Jewish landedness or landlessness, and if so, how broad might these changes be? Are the policies of the state to be evaluated by Christians using religious criteria different from those used when evaluating other countries? Because these questions rest on underlying (and changing) Christian theological views about Jews and Judaism, they should be situated in a broader context: how do widespread contemporary Christian efforts to understand Judaism in theologically positive ways influence Christian views of the land and State of Israel specifically? This last question provides the context for addressing this topic. Since many western Christian groups and thinkers now reject supersessionism and affirm the ongoing legitimacy of the Jews’ covenant, the biblical promises concerning the land are an unavoidable topic. Even those who deny any contemporary religious significance to the State of Israel must face it, if only to make this separation between biblical promises and the modern nation‐state clear. There have been studies on contemporary Christian views of the religious significance or lack of religious significance of the land and State of Israel. Most have focused on one group or one perspective, such as liberal Christians, Catholics, evangelical/conservative Christians, and even British churches or Canadian churches. Other studies—fewer in number—survey a variety of perspectives. Much attention has been paid in particular to church/Christian activism, such as support for or opposition to Israel and its policies. Surprisingly, less attention has been paid to the underlying religious issues of the covenant between God and the Israelites/Jews and...

Pavlina Nikolova

Abstract This article focuses on the state of Bulgaria. In a geographical area where continents, religions, and influences of power meet, Bulgaria has relied on the traditions of centralism and uniformity to reserve itself as a state. These traditions were first carved by the governing elite of the early Bulgarian state, and later reaffirmed by the nation when under territorial repartitions and foreign invasion. As a result, strong regional identities hardly ever existed in Bulgaria. Communism furthered centralized power and insisted that no minorities could be recognized. Even after communism was abolished, the traditions of constitutionalism and centralization continued. In 1991, a new constitution which conforms to the European standards was adopted. It borrowed democratic experiments elsewhere establishing Bulgaria as a parliamentary republic but with a directly elected president and vice-president. The new constitution was controversial because it was passed by a Great National Assembly dominated by former communists. In conformity to the requirements of EU accession, Bulgaria amended the constitution. This 2007 constitutional amendment led to some decentralization of Bulgaria. It allowed subnational governance, subnational finance, and fiscal decentralization.

Judith Butler

If one wants to begin with most common of beginnings, namely, with the claim that one would like to be able to consider sexual politics during this time, a certain problem arises. Since, it seems clear that one cannot reference ‘this time’ without knowing which time, where that time takes hold, and for whom a certain consensus emerges on the issue of what time this is. So if it is not just a matter of differences of interpretation about what time it is, then it would seem that we have already more than one time at work in this time, and that the problem of time will afflict any effort I might make to try and consider some of these major issues now. It might seem odd to begin with a reflection on time when one is trying to speak about sexual politics and cultural politics more broadly. But my suggestion here is that the way in which debates within sexual politics are framed are already imbued with the problem of time, of progress in particular, and in certain notions of what it means to unfold a future of freedom in time. That there is no one time, that the question of what time this is, already divides us, has to do with which histories have turned out to be formative, how they intersect – or fail to intersect with other histories – and so with a question of the how temporality is organized along spatial lines. I'm not suggesting here that we return to a version of cultural difference that depends on cultural wholism. In fact, I oppose any such return. The problem is not that there are different cultures at war with one another, or that there are different modalities of time, each conceived as self-sufficient, that are articulated in different and differentiated cultural locations or that come into confused or brutal contact with one another. at some that be a it would namely, that of progress and a temporality that they for the of the what time are we are of in the and has in and has are in the of The cannot be to a my that sexual than to the of this is in the of and that to or sexual are that of – within – that would try to and the of as the where sexual and not the claim is that such a of freedom be the with that claim for the it with it a of that be trying to in this But the that this is a one that is a that to notions of sexual and of within a that and into the of freedom and In my the problem is not that there are different in different cultural locations we to cultural to more and That of the and for each of these and then question about how they might the problem is that certain notions of – the spatial of – are this of a certain notions of what ‘this time’ and be are on the of the of I make clear that I not notions of and not of that I if not means for progress and the time of the and that that is of what I to on a of sexual I to a of sexual politics of that is my is that there be no of sexual politics without a of the time of the now. claim will be that the problem of temporality and politics in this way a different to cultural one that the of and The is not just to of the and spatial of some of the that if not of But to that of what is is with a certain on the of the and a to what to of time if we the problem of the the and what and the means and of that or to be to any of The of sexual politics is I would with and that the time of sexual politics as a the of progress is one within that and it is one that for come into is to on how certain of and of what is a within politics on a of freedom that is to time, and which is in and freedom and progress is what is when and to like I to that this is they I do to that a certain of freedom is as a and for certain of and this of have as a sexual politics in a In this I to to a of sexual politics and that that certain of the progress of a sexual politics and the and the of the issues that such a is that a certain version and of be as of and most when sexual freedom or the freedom of and for and is to cultural on that we freedom and in the of or we is not to freedom as a to about and to consider how it be if it is to in the and have that might for a In the for for are to at of and to are they are to and the are to in a that the of to and are in of the claim that of is the as in such how is as sexual and the sexual freedom of is to a as to one that would be It would seem that the has for a of are The the are to the and more than are of the and where is not to be or In the of this has for some time. The of politics with cultural and within politics the and a in the of in the work and the of to not for sexual for of and I in of such it seems that I such for which I have and to are to a cultural in a that as a for into the as In what I will to what this cultural is, how it as and and how it any we might have the and the In this a of cultural are articulated that are of might the that there are such and that and cultural for of or sexual be such But are such not articulated in to and cultural that other of is not to this cultural it is the the of the of and freedom is articulated a of that come to for what freedom and so a certain in which the of certain cultural a for into a that as the of the in of and sexual and would it such a on the such as are on with and have for a to out the it to and to make they are not the of If the of a effort to cultural about and sexual for a one that and for to this we might then cultural in a different not if it is In this the question the the means for or it out of a effort on the of the to that they of and in to into the this a of my freedom for which I be or is my or is my freedom as of one that to and in that do not the that that I to be able to in – But do I to that and they of I If the of the cultural or a of cultural then the is as to a of cultural that are as and are not in to in contact with other or in a in which a of – or fail to – in The is that is a and of and not of this if it is or and that is for to and we already that this of that it is a and that already we are to a of that to a this the freedom of the of a and of cultural and that the issue clear how in cultural as it to I do not in of the as they in my for the most and to be and different different I the way they in these and my to of It to the of – which is other than a In this it seems to as a of cultural of that are or in and not as a of cultural or the that and sexual freedom are as of this version of and are conceived as that are a of we are to for sexual freedom and is no such within a such as the one I have just we of to that this to this the for sexual the and of of we are to within the and so we of within the of But it seems to that more is namely, that are to a one that is and on a certain of of that as a for freedom in the cultural for of cultural and and is not to sexual for to question the that that there be no that to and in that this of is or not there be a or such or the the cultural and If that of – one that is I would a of that is with a of progress – then it would that there are no of cultural contact sexual and that are not of and But in the of a of we on the of and the of we at one that not of of the time, the in which we It in The that has not suggesting that is in a of cultural and that the of is more such as In this is conceived as not of this time or time, as time, one that in this time. But is not such a the to of this time not as one time, as one as a of histories that have not and or a of that might be to be of is to be in where of sexual politics in some with there are differences as In the that is on that debates on sexual of that have sexual politics at the time that it of when they to and to of of and of work and one how a certain of sexual politics is as the of a of freedom at the time that the of as a to or to the of and and the of and and the is more the of with a of is as the freedom to into is to the freedom of and or to the of to the of The that the for the into which any of are on of to on the of and the cultural of that freedom are the to – or – that cultural on the of a of in and that there is a for and the of a The for the has the on the of the any to or to the In the and that or – and this would as – to the that a in to and sexual difference and to in the cultural The is that if a has no that will not come to in the if it is a that will have no way to or is the that the of is the or major cultural for the of if we to the claim that a to be there are to question this any has to a of that are and a of cultural The as it in effort to a to the cultural on the any of and the or and with But in as the of a of is to be the this is or the of of or of no at has to not to into this on these the the issue at But if one to into the one of make the that be and a of if I that I the that the is and be the cultural for the and of and that would be a to the that without a for there be no cultural as a the of the into the of than and as a of and cultural this it is to that of in are in the of the that on it so the as the of the debates on sexual politics with the politics of on of that the of If we these of as then it seems to that we not have a for the which these of are – and which they to be – or for the which they are It here clear that the of that the of the of that the of the of the in that the in the the of a in The of a certain in this as such that we are to the of as of of the that articulated in to where the as a is here as the the of the to the that at the of version of odd in which on the freedom In other be to any of – the of the that has for and But such have to be and the of are the which in and it is this that has to be as it be a or not such is is, in my there are to question it and certain for in the work of on that the is and a of The to for in with to a cultural that to a of conceived as and is if to be in that fail to the and of the which in the of and the of a within that what is most about this of the in the is not that it be and that it to that is for in certain the has to to and to for some have so as to that the of the one such for a on cultural and has that the in to the of the not conceived as a of the the of and of and In this is the way to the cultural of that is, the cultural that are for the of a certain of the that in to in to and to the as of are and such such as that in at and not and they as the and of certain the and the and the as a in such a That the then a of for and in the is that the to such and in to and at we might that at a the to a of freedom that is on is that might the that is, to the of the cultural of In other in or in that do not the of and the of and that in the of the that that cultural which a that is The that as the are that the for into in this is the of and the for to a certain cultural for the of it is not the of the of and on common the question of the of this of as of in particular, the is a if what this about the of In particular, it the question of this as a and of that in with is not the that the is what in a that a in the of is what the of sexual as the difference and in we that the not is to and sexual difference as a cultural and In to the of the in the of and in the and the to The to The seems to to the politics that takes to be a this of with the In to the of one or the differences to be as of and cultural In this is the cultural is to the and to be The of the difference or of the has on a of of the to for of has in for into question the in of and and make and in a of to that this to issues is in a as to be to this in not in and to as they they are to In the that is the is the that a without will not be without will be the cultural and of in able to of the of the to oppose effort to It is, as I to the that a and that of to of some this to the that the into the of the where it is that do not has to the of and one that in of the and the if it means If the to the of when and and to when of In of we the The a that the of just what that and there will and such as to the the that this not that if one it clear that and then it to issue a about the to that there are to this most to the which to the But like to to the it is with and we have already what the about the cultural of the as as the is as a means of in the it a of in this to whom the when it in the of if not to are not the of in a they a time, a and the of I on at I here to out the of that the and the of the as that which is a and the and that a that as that the that when and the of the turned and and in for the to this are than we have to what and of is in this a of at that with what it to and the of this and in It is as if I I not I and so it has this is this is my I have no The which I the of is a of at which and the to the and it is that that the to to make to without a of a But with the way and the The has a and it seems to a certain of and progress here that one has to and for of that the in the of of at the to a of and it be in to the of that we try to make a for a But I that of do not already and that we with any of these be that be in the which it to that is a question that I in this I would that has a of and of of and that are as as that on In fact, a not with the and that it is the of in the a of that as which in with the the on there are to the a that that we not to as the of and as the of If as a for the of and if most of the in this to to on such we would make a in that to be in each and that is not a of or a of a for is not in a for the and of and a of it do to as if it a the of the of the they make with the of a that and and I the of the for this this at for in the of within in is and the of into of The on be the in to this into The of the to and of the is other than the of the that are to or the with at which a way not of or cultural a way of a of cultural that the and of cultural If I this about the of progress as a for about the sexual politics during this time, like to that what is at issue is any and of out for – I to of in which not so as of of and the one the of we are in and the that it in the which is In the of we a different to a and that is at cultural and suggesting of one in the are not the as the of there are that are The problem is, of not progress the in which certain and at the and of framed as and as in such a of what of of a and of the and what and the that the for within the I this as one is trying to come to a and a to the on that is the That to that of the and there is not time to try to here or to with these other I have trying to It is in that the takes to be a of and is and for this is the that at to if not It would that the and the are as the that to notions of to are as have not into the of the and notions of are or to and The as it has is a of and The that the what is to have to have at that and that are more and more more of and the of that are that the of a a that that other are the of that and claim to the If the in the and war are then or the cultural for the of the then they to a time of cultural or to a time that is time as we In they are as not at the of the It such a that the of such and and the of what the not the It is this of a that the as the of the – are are and as a on and to the question of temporality and the of cultural that the of when it of The of a the which that there such a that it be in with to the and sexual of The to that of cultural that 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Bernard McGinn

On 10 March 2005, Professor Bernard McGinn delivered the William James Lecture on Religious Experience at the Harvard Divinity School. The founding bequest of this annual lectureship was made for the purpose of having an outstanding scholar or scholars lecture on some aspect of this subject, which received classic treatment in William James's The Varieties of Religious Experience . James's aim was not to defend religion by scientific proof, but to stake out his own position as a “piecemeal supernaturalist, one who admits miracles and providential leadings, and finds no intellectual difficulty in mixing the ideal and real worlds together” to locate where the “ideal region” interacts with “the real world's details” to cause experiences—prayer, epiphany, or visions—that generate faith.

Shinichi Miyakawa

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and especially after passage of the 1990 law on freedom of conscience, Russian people showed increased interest in religion, moral values, and national cultural traditions. Such a phenomenon is quite understandable because the ideology of socialism had failed. Every other state also has come to bear various aspects of a multicultural society nowadays. Elements, which constitute society, such as ethnicity, culture, and religion, have become far more diversified than expected. As a result, every state is compelled to restructure its educational system, so that it may better accommodate to this growing diversity. While the specific contents of value education differ from country to country, it can generally be stated that those in advanced countries involve citizenship education, multicultural education, or education aimed at developing autonomous value judgment. On the other hand, those in developing countries involve moral education, religious education, or education aimed at developing national identity.From the early 1990s on, we have observed the decentralization of the system of education in Russia. School curricula are being revised, new elective and local initiatives in education are being encouraged, and private schools are appearing. Thus the system of education has become more flexible and there is a favorable situation to introduce religious education as an elective. In the early 1990s, the Russian Ministry of Education made the decision to introduce religious studies in Russian schools by means of curricula stressing Christian ethics and morality. High officials from the Russian Ministry of Education also approached Western Christian educators for help. The response was a collaborative effort of over 80 Western mission groups called the CoMission, which instructed Russian public school educators in the teaching of Christian ethics and morality. The CoMission was to teach those Christian beliefs that were common to all Christian denominations, but its curriculum represented a Protestant approach to Christian ethics and Scripture. In 1995 the Ministry of Education suspended the Protocol of Intention with the CoMission.By virtue of its title Alla Borodina's textbook “Basics of Orthodox Culture” became the symbol of the proponents of introduction of BOC. The textbook has the stamp “Recommended by the Coordinating Council on Cooperation of the Ministry of Education of Russia and the Moscow patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church.” The discussion about the teaching of the “Basics of Orthodox Culture” in public schools began as a reaction to a circular letter by Russian Minister of Education Vladimir Filippov to regional offices of administration of education in October 2002. To the letter was appended sample contents of education in the academic subject of “Orthodox Culture.” Two camps arose; on one hand were those who approve the introduction of basics of Orthodox culture into the curriculum of secondary education; on the other hand are those who categorically oppose it. Two members of a human right organization made an attempt to initiate criminal investigation against Borodina. They accused her of anti-Semitism. More than ten court sessions took place in Moscow concerning this matter. Nevertheless the “Orthodox Culture” has already become a regular school subject in several cities and provinces of Russia: Voronezh, Kursk, Smolensk and others.It will be a great loss for Russia's children if either the path of indoctrination or an irreligious school education is pursued. In the former case, while trying to preserve national identity and the consolidation of Russian society, they potentially lose democratic principles and freedoms. In the latter case, while trying to preserve freedoms, they lose all connection with their national spiritual tradition and,