Beyond Moral Fundamentalism

Abstract

I sometimes ask my students if they would be willing to raise their hand and pledge the following: There's a single basis of moral life, and it determines the right way to proceed. I have access to this supreme basis. When others don't agree with me, it's because they have the wrong faith commitments, they aren't analyzing things properly, or they aren't letting conscience be their guide. Agreement with me is a prerequisite to solving our problems. Consequently, I have nothing to learn about these matters from those who disagree with me. Their participation is, at best, an irrelevant distraction and, at worst, an evil to be defeated. My diagnosis of the issue has precisely captured all that is morally relevant. It's exhaustive, hence beyond revision and reformulation.I rarely get any takers. After the students and I swap stories about those who might blithely take such a pledge, we invariably conclude that the pledgers are outnumbered by their counterparts: conservatives, liberals, and radicals who would, upon conscious reflection, reject this outright as closed-minded arrogance. Moreover, it quickly becomes clear that this pledge doesn't speak to the sort of people they wish to be. (I later explain that “ethical monists” accept the first sentence, “moral fallibilists” reject the second, and almost all moral philosophers would reject the baselessness of the rest.)And yet, our class conversation continues, how many of us certified broader-minded souls act as though complex problems come prepackaged with our interpretation of them? Do we prejudge and offhandedly dismiss alternative diagnoses of shared problems? However open-minded we may seem to ourselves, do we habitually react to others as though we're navigating with the one universal moral compass? Are our real behaviors implicated in this pledge that most of us would consciously disavow?At this point, I introduce another classroom activity, inspired by Anthony Weston's A 21st Century Ethical Toolbox. Suppose we wanted to codify rules to sabotage democratic dialogue and make debates as fruitless as possible. The idea here is to spell out rules that maximize the distance between “us” and “them,” ensuring that possibilities for cooperatively setting and achieving social goals—like peace, security, justice, public health, or sustainability—go forever unnoticed. For example, consider things like “stereotype the other side” or “prepare your comeback instead of listening.”I divide students into groups and ask them to develop five more rules. They come up with an excellent tool kit for torpedoing public deliberation: “Approach any debate as a zero-sum game.” “Widen the gulf that separates us.” “Be uncharitable: always present your side at its best and the other at its worst.” “Ignore context.” “Be angrier and talk louder.” “Be smug.” “Trust your anger; it would never steer you wrong.” “Inflate certainty.” “Gaslight.” “Dog whistle.” “Assume your interlocuter is clueless.” “Reject complexity.” “Be visibly offended by any questioning of your conclusions.” “Act as though your values and concerns invariably overrule theirs.”Gradually some of the fun fades. Is there any link between the pledge activity and your new diabolical tool kit, I ask? The sense of the class is that the tool kit clarifies the practical upshot of the pledge, identifying legitimized behaviors. We end up recognizing ourselves, myself included. We purposefully drew up a malicious playbook for undermining democracy, and it mirrored the status quo. Many of my liberal-identified American students interpret the activity as a send-up of conservatives. Their imagined tool kit-users sport “Make America Great Again” hats and threaten DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) advocates. Meanwhile, many conservative students interpret the activity as damning liberal wokeness, “virtue signaling,” and “cancel culture.” Through this discussion, the class gets an experiential introduction to work in moral psychology that bears on moral politics, such as Jonathan Haidt's The Righteous Mind.We conclude this introductory unit of the course with issues that tend to counteract fuzzy relativism by evoking strong condemnation, such as Nussbaum's essay on female genital cutting (“Judging Other Cultures”). Joining millions of ethics students before them, most conclude that extreme relativism leaves much to be desired as a coherent way to express the virtue of tolerance. Most want to show courage. Yet as they reach for their received language, many are now unnerved by their own pledge-like tone. They're habituated to assuming that a kind of moral fundamentalism is the irreplaceable steam that powers activism and advocacy, that resistance to injustice is unintelligible without it, and that the virtues of moral clarity and conviction somehow imply a my-way-or-the-highway approach.Shifting uncomfortably, we pause to explore our dissonance. Perhaps we're merely hypocrites, parading open-mindedness while betraying its opposite. Or perhaps we're beset with a neural vestige of moral tribalism, as Joshua Greene explored in Moral Tribes. Minimally, we're exhibiting what social psychologist Lee Ross studied as the illusion of objectivity, the error of assuming that our perceptions, motivations, and assessments are objective while those who disagree with us are irrational (Ross 751–52). But there are additional philosophically interesting things at work, and they highlight conditions that pour gasoline on our usual hypocrisy and attribution errors. I'll explore some of these today by asking five questions about moral fundamentalism: (1) What is it? (2) Is it really such a bad thing? (3) Isn't it good for motivating social action? (4) Do many theorists inadvertently legitimize it? and (5) Can we educate beyond it?I call this cluster of pledge-and-tool kit-like habits “moral fundamentalism.” The term was used by Mark Johnson (163) as a synonym for moral absolutism, and by Robert Baker (201) as a broad-brush label for any principle-based moral universalism. But, for three reasons, it's helpful to disentangle the term from just any commitment to moral absolutism: Philosophers who are moral absolutists generally condemn pledge-like traits, and their theoretical commitments don't necessarily imply fundamentalist behaviors.A name is needed for the offending habits, whatever one's worldview. Rejecting self-certainty in theory doesn't imply rejecting it in practice.Moral fundamentalist habits thrive today among groups whose outlook seems little troubled by the lack of a final mooring for their beliefs.Moral fundamentalism can be ostensively defined as the cluster of habits exhibited in “the pledge” activity. A moral fundamentalist may be more precisely defined, minimally, as someone disposed to act as if they have access to (1) the exclusively right way to diagnose moral or political problems, and (2) the single approvable practical solution to any particular problem.Although the word “fundamentalism” is contested (Peels 1), it automatically suggests a helpful analogy to rigid religious dogmatism, which carries the idea that a select few have accessed self-evident ideals that should be heeded without public investigation, critique, and reformation. The dogmatist's notion that some statements are inherently and self-sufficiently true (Dewey, “Propositions” 171–72) is diametrically opposed to Peirce's fallibilist notion that a “skeptical element” is involved in any claim that follows on the heels of inquiry. Accordingly, in moral education, the ardent fundamentalist leader is contented only after a young member of the flock arrives safely at a foregone conclusion.Fundamentalists speak authoritatively about all-encompassing essences, including the essence of morality. As pragmatists have long observed, such essentialism freezes creative processes—through which people work things out together—into static things. Pretending to speak for the universal essence of morality turns to stone what should be a collaborative project (cf. Appiah, Lies That Bind 97). Fundamentalism turns moral artistry into moralizing.Fealty to inerrant essential doctrines or principles isn't a promising resource for public dialogue, restoration of trust, or reconciliation. When combined with nationalism, jingoism, xenophobia, racism, massive out-migration, and economic dislocation, it's a resource for reactionary oppression, rage, and fanaticism on all sides. We must find our diverse ways beyond the hell we inflict in the name of righteous certainty.The preceding discussion clarifies, I hope, several senses in which moral fundamentalism is a vice. For a moral fundamentalist, the main moral, social, or political problem is presumed to be that others don't get the problem (Norton 37), as though events carry their own meanings. Or the main problem is presumed to be the failure of others to bow to our brilliant solutions. Never mind that these solutions are ideas that flow from values and purposes, and that have consequences that reshape subsequent facts to be interpreted. And never mind aspects of the situation that are obfuscated by our way of casting the problem or are occluded by our principles. We too readily assume that, unlike their concerns, ours are value-neutral and free of interest-driven rationalizations and biases. We never doctor facts to predetermine results.Moral fundamentalism is a drag on democracy. This drag is to be expected when people feel backed into a corner or when their social position limits opportunities. But fundamentalism anywhere blocks communication and inquiry across differences. Whenever people suppose their reading of a problem is exhaustive, they autocratically predefine what's relevant, and they covertly prejudge alternatives. They assume, as a matter of course, that others are stubbornly refusing to accept the interpretation that (in Dewey's words) is staring right out at them (Dewey, Public and Its Problems 38).When we disagree about problems, it's one thing to reflectively conclude that others are willfully refusing to face conditions, as Eddie Glaude explores in Begin Again. It's quite another thing to start with the default assumption that we alone are taking the wide view.Despite these habits—not because of them—moral fundamentalists have historically done many good things through their dealings with opposing fundamentalisms. But what else have they done that might in future be minimized by delegitimizing moral fundamentalism? When we take up the one-way mentality, what happens to opportunities for reflexively learning our way toward a healthier, more just, and more sustainable future across the dynamic spectrum of values, beliefs, and concerns?Does activism require and benefit from moral fundamentalism? In order to motivate actions that restructure conditions and redress wrongs, must people harden their hearts and minds against the clamor of contradictory theories, both speaking and acting as if they're governed by final truths?If so, then perhaps a kind of incorrigibility is a virtue of public philosophizing. To some intellectuals, the international resurgence of gaslighting demagogues and self-seeking cronyism is incontrovertible proof that we can ultimately expect very little of the public. It's assumed by some that the public switch is permanently set to dim, so it's up to intellectuals to take up the civilizing burden of enlightenment. If this requires us to default to moral fundamentalism, then so be it.However, we got here by expecting too little of the public. We've long been running self-verifying experiments in low expectations. Electing or hiring competent executives who are accustomed to complex cognition can help, but it can't solve the deepest problem of all: the failure to create a cultural in which we may in “the kind of people that a about what we can expect of a democratic have a long from to the The of was the debate in the between and that ideas in when they when they have the of right which they as has it, of Public in an of that in a social require and is by the right and are at as as the of class of from the if they to the of the a that many of this have to with Public that the of the and is with that must with by and complex what to be with by who problems so that accept the that is for of public as and nothing democratic more the idea that intellectuals must the burden of inquiry from the and little of the while the of on A outlook all too into the of that demagogues are in order to We and more have been the as the from to but Dewey's of when by in facts to on social can and do to at to a that is for (Dewey, Public and Its are of many but that was about the of those they don't from but from and bad education, these a an or the moral of the and Its Problems the solution to a of the When a in toward the end of in a young a in which up the that would a I the that we should with and if it people would that I and would this If I that the to solving problems in that there is theory people in its and the theory into a In to the illusion of and consciously that was to it, to with their as in moral fundamentalism to the to a end of to be in to but was it the only or most by the an outlook intellectuals at our or moral best Public and Its of of as a to social as the idea that “the of be to and to in moral that if they're to of mind their and be so by and class that the final be and and democratic was of and expected that the of communication can the to predefine problems, as it across and from what been a of and Its Problems this out of a that is to all who it out of a practical that it is our only communication invariably of moral and these be on a of course, to be which or a tone. This may be to a or social to strong moral or or it may be more a matter of cultural or a to or it may be of what in and the Moral an of taking a position here on or what conditions, such might be though this more I that has been to that it's implicated in moral fundamentalist behaviors that are for and political life, and (I that has the strong moral are as to as or of course, this that people in ethics and to the that needed an or needed Moral isn't by The for is to the and that we (Dewey, for philosophers reject any fundamentalism, but in the they to speak for the essence of morality and into a instead of an and collaborative This the one-way on theory of for that matter how one's supreme moral is it rarely one's on all of the that one to and moral the of word after always There's more to any situation can be by a single or just as more to any what us about of that to the to which we're and by our particular and all at the from the of We can but we can't Dewey's of the of moral as with are of that us in This of a practical if are in with then can to that or This is to the of assuming a single for a complex and example, the with some in equity, a in at in the was in and that out more that may have more ethics should be because it must with including social in the virtues such as social issues of to resource as and Do have a to on and and the of and toward public There's experiential basis for a or that with all of these issues of and one of these the and this lack of a is the in ethics the the of the to which of these ways of should Ethical have A alternative is to the assumption that a good theory If we set up our as a to particular conditions and it can practical with complex problems without among values or that can what we to an and (Dewey, and with in that is an essential of moral and merely on the that from the of a or to lack of access to to into our or was that there is and right in conditions, for and about which to make among alternatives. Moral and in and we to about them because they require us to that are best through is without that is most by those who are and the assumption legitimized by is presumed to and (Dewey, A situation may seem to be a the but or to into our or to an just or perhaps to an of would that there been an or best through the all and the or other when it to can the for (Dewey, A of on a is to what we should do on the right but to and that are most for a particular may for But whatever we with their is what is (Dewey, and for by matter that troubled us to in the first aren't we with moral fundamentalism? but its and are Moral fundamentalism is a because it into what's and bad inquiry is more and when learn to be with the of reflection, to and of of the and of any or in and in creative are values of a democratic a after the of and in the of our best for beyond moral When and moral and through that are and students can learn to take in events of by and can to public of what's at and to habits that public the with a of moral and the of the for a a the of and by to own After with the and with the to the Their was to the between the and the of from a an of its liberal the in sustainable to the that separates from the of what they (cf. The idea was that to the of the in which take This can't be by the classroom as a or what to and into the classroom so that students the moral, and of the up with and in their and they into the This that students by and with a of out in and to was by a The out against at of the a for on with these in their They that the was to sustainable to be a or a The economic of a of must work a that doesn't to the would a to in the they that it's more to both of an that been discussion values and among the The the with a that most of the and If was it would be After a the the into the from The The and many other would a in the to international was by a Is the an to the of Is the to for all to and to their an that the To that this would be an of and many several on and students who in the The for a of to from at the was to carry out its the the after the was The a by many as as some the this with students as an in asking them to explore a by would moral The between and sustainable The is and in its while the to moral beyond to to been a for a against what they which is from They for a moral between and We can with a who is a but both in what the to be that we agree that of the of was the only we should agree that and that as must be doesn't name and for who are and this of moral Is the call for a in their way They that can't be so for to with sustainable for and a in the an opposing of righteous A before the a talk at the in which that the must be on if it is to so rules out experiments in or are hypocrites, and the best that can be of is that at they're as a fundamentalist who and a against and by refusing to the of and to these a such as the idea that a best, or can be in of the that require us to make to the of the of a right doesn't imply that all are in their fundamentalism is at with the in any democracy. As that is to “the and conditions of discussion, and That is the problem of the and Its Problems We should students to and to be of both and and and we should them and problem of them to fundamentalism with more of the we a more that is but students are to and when their and have been by problem solving at a They can and the situation at hand (cf. and and and about ways of all to public as the for a more and of social This many by students and to with to the some by and most got used to other (cf. Appiah, In students that they in their to and They and some the of moral to the learning that beyond the but in later stories the they from The them them with a and moral their beyond moral