Why do local elected representatives facing similar institutional constraints choose different strategies? This dissertation develops a theory of strategy choice under incomplete decentralization, where municipal councilors remain electorally accountable but depend on bureaucratic and higher-level political actors for implementation, finance, and approval. Administrative, fiscal, and political constraints define the institutional setting, while leverage, the capacity to induce response, and cover, protection from sanction, capture councilorsâ unequal positions within it. Drawing on more than 450 interviews, 67 municipal council meeting transcripts, and an original survey of 506 current and former councilors in urban India, I distinguish collaborative strategies based on coordination and follow-up from combative strategies based on public pressure and cost-imposition. Collaboration overwhelmingly dominates. Perceived bureaucratic discretion is the strongest correlate of movement toward combativeness, while leverage and cover do not reliably predict the binary shift between strategies. Instead, leverage more clearly distinguishes procedural from discretionary forms of collaboration. These findings show that incomplete decentralization does not eliminate local representation. It channels representation through continued dependence on actors councilors do not command and shifts attention from whether councilors collaborate to how they collaborate and when they escalate.
Abstract Since their 1994 uprising, Zapatista communities have built social, political, and economic alternatives within autonomous territories, setting an example for multiple Transformation Initiatives and social movements globally. Focusing on economic solidarity through coffee distribution, this article investigates how the boundaries between being inside, beyond, or against the state and the market are relationally conceived and performed by autonomous peasants and European activist networks. The study is based on multiple fieldworks between Europe and Chiapas and years of engaged research. Beyond dual rationalizations between silent and loud resistance, I argue that anticapitalist worlds surrounding Zapatismo connect everyday forms of struggle with broader, structural hopes for change through transnational alliances. It is the existence of an organized infrastructure that allows this form of trade to reproduce its own antagonism, in constant tension against the state, reified as the ultimate perpetrator of the neoliberal order. Revisiting informality through the lenses of anti-systemic movements allows us to decentralize resistance, encompassing non-hegemonic processes from below (and to the left) that cannot be reduced to Western categories nor trivialized as the sole weapons in the hands of voiceless and powerless societies. Articulating Marxist anthropology with decolonial thought through the framework of Zapatista autonomy suggests that it is not enough to categorize resistance as visible or invisible, formal or informal. The study of economic solidarity surrounding the Zapatista experience provides an understanding of the complex realities of anticapitalist resistances today, where collective organization is as much about survival as it is about reimagining power and economy.
Purpose This paper argues that decentralization reforms in Colombia, implemented since the 1980s, have led to the decentralization of political clientelism rather than its demise. Clientelism is a system of political and economic institutions that turns every local democracy into an extractive political institution. The authors theoretically demonstrate that an increase in public resources will increase corruption. Design/methodology/approach The authors develop and test a subnational public choice model, where clientelism in elections and corruption in public administration constitute a stable long-term institutional equilibrium. The model comprises two linked subgames: electoral tournament and corruption in public policy. The model makes two predictions that currently oppose predominant approaches: (1) increasing the severity of jail sentences to electoral crimes increases their price and the predominance of machine politics, instead of improving the quality of electoral tournaments and (2) increasing local governments' public finance increases clientelism in elections and corruption in public administration. Findings The authors find evidence in favor of the theoretical model of curse of public resources, using difference-in-differences estimation with a database 2016â17 of Colombia's 1,034 municipalities. This country is well-suited for our analysis because it has a long-term commitment to formal democratic processes (since 1958), while plagued by endemic corruption and clientelism problems. Originality/value (1) The theoretical approach is innovative and disruptive of current models on the problem, (2) the model builds upon the Colombian situation, a country with prominent corruption and political violence problems regardless of its relatively long-term commitment with free elections (since 1958) and (3) the theoretical discussion is tested using a comprehensive set of difference-in-differences estimations.
This article examines how teachers in postâcoup Honduras approached implementing neoliberal school finance reforms with which they disagreed. The laws in question decentralize national public education and demand that teachers secure funding for basic school infrastructure and academic programs from private businesses. I show how teachers reluctantly engaged aspects of this legislation, but for their own reasons, and suggest that their partial compliance is illuminative of how teachers in other contexts may approach policy implementation.
This article aims to discuss the competitive viability of candidacies by third or independent parties for the presidency of the United States with the adopted electoral system, the federal decentralization, the existing legal order for competing and receiving campaign financing, the consequences of gerrymandering, the analysis of legislative behavior and strategic interaction. From a rational institutionalist perspective, the hypothesis defended is that the institutional constraints of the American political system restrict competition to the two main parties, Democratic and Republican, which reinforce this tendency by choosing to interact only with each other.
This research focuses on the analysis of the Colombian multiculturalism through an operative characterization. In this sense, the assessment of multicultural policies goes beyond the traditional discourse analysis, and instead it empirically reviews the implementation of differential rights translated into concrete public policies. To meet this goal, this study first explores the different symbolic schemes of the relationship between the State-Nation and the indigenous populations. In a second stage, it analyses how the policies that recognize cultural difference since 1991, are articulated with a project of state modernization of neoliberal characteristics, that is exemplified by the territorial decentralization phenomena. Finally, this research presents an analysis of the actual effects of multiculturalism in the fields of health, education, economic production and political governance for the Misak people, specifically for the Resguardo Mayor de Guambia, an indigenous reserve located in the department of Cauca. From this case study, readers will be able to discover how in the Colombian context, there are un-meet aspects (des-encuentros) and paradoxical effects between the Governmentâs neoliberal vision on public policies, the dynamics of ethnic recognition promoted by the state and the communitarian autonomous processes advocated by indigenous organizations.
Abstract Political decentralization has been promoted as a way to devolve responsibility, bring government closer to citizens, and improve accountability. The shift prompted new local elections, but were the elected officials responsive to citizens or to national party elites? This study examines unique survey data from 125 Colombian mayors to identify the factors they believe were critical in their victories and thereby to identify the people to whom they believe they owe loyalty: citizens or party leaders. Examining the relative value mayors assign to their own actions versus those of the party, combined with information on how they financed campaigns, sheds important light on subnational electoral dynamics in Colombia.
Charles R. Hankla Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Georgia State University PO Box 4069 Atlanta, Georgia 30302-4069 chankla@gsu.edu Phone: 404-413-6172 Fax: 404-413-6156 Abstract What political factors influence the allocation of economic patronage in democracies? Answering this question is vital to improving our knowledge of how states and markets interact. In this paper, I argue that changing levels of party centralization can drive important changes in the allocation of state largess. When governing parties are centralized, national party leaders will control sources of patronage, targeting benefits to particularly influential regions and industries. By contrast, when governing parties are decentralized, influential sub-national party leaders will advocate for their constituents, allocating patronage evenly through a national logroll. I find evidence for these relationships by comparing Indiaâs distribution process for industrial licenses and government finance under a decentralized Congress Party (1954-61) to its distribution process under a centralized Congress Party (1969-75).
This dissertation explores the politics of fiscal decentralization in comparative perspective. Case studies of Argentina and Spain are used to provide insights into the way that the distribution of institutional and economic resources in multitiered polities shapes the extent to which the policy of transferring revenue and revenue authority to subnational governments can be exploited for political gain. This approach draws attention to the political conditions that inhibit the coordination of fiscal reform efforts between the different levels of government and perpetuate the financing of subnational spending with revenue collected by the national government. This political context undermines national fiscal adjustment efforts and leads to economic catastrophes such as those experienced in Argentina throughout the last two decades. Specifically, this study uses statistical analyses and empirical institutional theory to show how patterns of territorial representation and bargaining strategies hindered revenue decentralization in Argentina but advanced it in Spain.The research suggests, first, coalition-building goals drive national executives in Argentina to reach out legislators of the opposition by means of allocating larger shares of federal transfers to the provinces the latter belong to. However, all else equal, legislatively overrepresented, i.e. economically marginal and sparsely populated, provinces will be targeted first. Second, the increasing role of regionalist parties in Spanish national politics and their acceptance in joint-policy mechanisms tilts the allocation of chosen federal transfers slightly in favor of economically developed and densely populated autonomous communities, which are generally governed by regionalist forces. Third, whereas Argentine subnational interests are "locked-in" at the Senate level and intergovernmental negotiations are conducted bilaterally, open-ended institutional arrangements and a relatively impotent senate in Spain boosted the redressing of regional concerns through informal intergovernmental fora and increasing multilateral collaboration Fourth, such differences in patterns of institutional representation and bargaining strategies explain the paucity of fiscal decentralization in Argentina and its relative progress in Spain.
Latin America's Emerging Local Politics Jonathan Fox (bio) Does local democratization really matter for national politics? For those who value accountable government and civic participation, democracy at the local level is obviously important in and of itself. This essay makes a different point, howeverâthat the degree of democratization of local government affects the prospects for national democratic governance. Most Latin American nations made the delicate transition from authoritarian to elected civilian regimes in the 1980s, but in the 1990s many still have not firmly consolidated their democratic gains. The wave of regime transitions in the 1980s created opportunities for experimentation with more honest and effective styles of governance, but so far most of the new regimes have failed to produce successful results at the national level. Traditional centralized, top-down approaches dominated national governance thoughout the region during the 1980s. Key characteristics included centralized and militarized police powers, appointed rather than elected mayors and governors, and extreme fiscal and bureaucratic centralization. These problems of top-down governance were compounded by systemic defects such as the lack of independent judicial authority and highly opaque, discretionary policy processes. Remarkably, most of these practices could be found across the entire political spectrum, from the moderate civilian governments of Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia to revolutionary Nicaragua and Cuba on the left and military-dominated El Salvador, Guatemala, and pre-1989 Chile on the right. The view that policy solutions should necessarily be national is now [End Page 105] widely questioned throughout Latin America. The role of national governments is changing in two ways: international economic integration is limiting the scope for market regulation, while on the domestic front national authorities have begun to devolve major responsibilities to local governments. For example, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Colombia all began decentralization programs in the 1980s. Many of these decentralization plans were enshrined in new or recently reformed constitutions, though the actual resources and autonomy ceded to local authorities varied greatly.1 Decentralization does not necessarily involve the democratization of local government, however. In Chile, for example, General Augusto Pinochet's military dictatorship gave huge policy responsibilities to appointed mayors. Local democratization has two dimensions. First, it involves opening up territorially based subnational governments to electoral competition (mayors and governors had traditionally been chosen by the president in many Latin American countries). Second, it entails the elimination of exclusionary political practices, including fraud, unfair limits on voter registration, the lack of ballot secrecy, voter intimidation, and vote buying. These are issues of electoral freedoms, as distinct from issues of electoral fairness (e.g., media access, campaign financing, etc.). This essay focuses on exclusionary political practices in "local" politics because that is where most citizens either gain access to or find themselves excluded from the state more generally. But authoritarian local politiciansâespecially those challenged from belowâusually need national allies to survive. Local democratization affects the prospects for national democratic governance in four interrelated respects. First, elected civilian regimes cannot be considered democratic until authoritarian enclaves are eliminated and the entire citizenry is effectively enfranchised. Second, pluralist politics must be learned, and subnational governments make a good school. Third, rising democratic leaders can most credibly challenge the corrupt old ways if they are forearmed with successful records in local government. Fourth, the widespread transition from traditionally paternalistic social policies to more efficient and targeted programs depends on balanced partnerships among national governments, local governments, and new social and civic actors. Eliminating Authoritarian Enclaves National political conditions certainly shape the possibilities for local democratization, but the reverse is true as well. If enough authoritarian enclaves persist, democracy's consolidation at the national level may be jeopardized. Longstanding exclusionary practices will not disappear because of the signing of decrees or the transfer of the presidential sash in national capitals. [End Page 106] The persistence of authoritarian enclaves under civilian rule prevents the effective extension of basic political rights to the entire population. The proliferation of seemingly small free spaces within civil society greatly helped to weaken centralized authoritarian rule in many a Latin American dictatorship. Now one encounters a mirror image of that situationâelected civilian regimes rule nationally, but the societies...
Politics and Society in Latin America
Political Conflict and Governance
Political and Social Dynamics in Chile and Latin America
Redemocratization in the Southern Cone has contended with a fiscally weakened state and ideologically divided groups. Years of free-market military rule have scaled back the welfare state and deteriorated public health care. Draconian cutbacks in public spending have forced private voluntary organizations (PVOs) to provide care for the urban poor. Shantytown health care and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have surfaced to fill the gap created by a shrinking public sector under military rule in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. This paper overcomes some shortcomings of Weberian and Marxian analyses of bureaucratic behavior and empowered social groups through the study of shantytown health care as a new social movement. A comparative review of medical-care policy in Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Montevideo reveals that only Santiago and Montevideo hold promise for decentralization. Neighborhood-based activities in shantytowns remove primary care from the marketplace by decommodifying it. Success of shantytown health care under democratic rule depends on its ability to remain autonomous. In doing so, it would avoid cooptation by political parties and the stigmatized public health system.