Blockchain Papers

Kwon Sam Kang

The Jeju Autonomous Police Agency represents the only institutionalized model of an independent local police system in South Korea, equipped with its own organizational structure, personnel, and legally defined functions. As such, it has served as an experimental institutional mechanism for exploring the feasibility of a decentralized policing system. However, since its establishment, a range of structural limitations have continuously emerged, particularly with regard to the legal basis of autonomous police functions, command and supervision mechanisms, fiscal arrangements, and the allocation of investigative authority. These limitations have significantly deepened the gap between formal autonomy and substantive autonomy in local policing. Most notably, inconsistencies between the regulatory frameworks of the Police Actand the Jeju Special Acthave resulted in the recurrent reproduction of overlapping functions, dualized command structures, and ambiguity in fiscal responsibility. First, the current system—under which autonomous police functions are effectively adjusted through intergovernmental agreements—raises serious concerns regarding the principle of statutory reservation and legal predictability in the exercise of police power, thereby calling into question the adequacy of fundamental rights protection. Second, the dual control structure, whereby the governor appoints the head of the agency while supervisory authority rests with the Autonomous Police Committee, undermines both organizational independence and the effectiveness of democratic accountability. Third, the fiscal structure, which relies predominantly on local funding, constrains capacity building in areas such as equipment modernization, information systems, and responses to region-specific security demands, while failing to adequately reflect the national public interest inherent in Jeju’s tourism-, maritime-, and environment-based policing needs. Fourth, the absence of general investigative authority limits the autonomous police’s ability to independently develop integrated systems for crime intelligence, analysis, and response, thereby impeding the establishment of a responsibility-based local policing regime. Against this backdrop, this study normatively examines the public law limitations of the Jeju Autonomous Police Agency and derives legal criteria for institutional reform along five core dimensions: the substantive realization of the principle of statutory reservation, unification of command and supervision structures, establishment of a shared national–local fiscal responsibility framework, phased and function-specific transfer of investigative authority, and systematic integration of the legal framework. In particular, the study emphasizes the necessity of redesigning the functional, command, fiscal, and investigative structures of autonomous policing in an integrated manner. Given that the Jeju model serves as an experimental institution under the special autonomous province system, its legal reform holds significance not merely as a regional issue but as a normative reference point for nationwide discussions on decentralized policing. Future research should further develop concrete criteria and evaluative frameworks for phased investigative authority transfer through comparative analysis between the Jeju model and foreign local policing systems. By normatively examining the constitutional foundations and public law structure of autonomous policing, this study aims to contribute to the substantive realization of local self-government and the development of a participatory, community-based policing system. In this regard, an in-depth examination of the Jeju model provides an essential foundation for envisioning the future direction of local policing policy in South Korea.

Oung-Seok Jeong

현재 우리나라는 국가영토의 협소성, 경찰력의 분산으로 인한 광역경찰기능의 약화, 일사분란하게 움직여야 하는 경찰조직의 특성, 경찰 위계질서의 해이, 지역 간 경찰력의 질적 수준 불균형, 지자체의 낮은 재정자립도 등을 이유로 자치경찰제를 도입하지 않고, 경찰청장부터 지구대 순경까지 연결되는 가장 강력한 중앙집권적 국가경찰제도를 유지하고 있다. 이에 수직적인 경찰조직의 지휘체계를 변경하여 인사·예산권 등을 지방자치단체에 이양함으로써 중앙에 집중된 경찰 행정권을 지방에 분권하고 지역별 특성에 맞는 민생치안을 확립하여 봉사하는 경찰상을 구현하겠다는 것이 자치경찰제의 도입배경이다. 즉, 선진국 경찰처럼 지역주민과 함께 하는 주민중심 또는 봉사중심의 고객지향적 치안서비스를 제공함과 동시에 경찰에 대한 주민통제를 강화함으로써 과도한 중앙집권적 국가경찰제도의 폐해를 제거하자는 것이다. 나아가 실효적인 자치경찰제도가 시행되면, 주민의 참여로 주민의 의사가 경찰운영에 적극 반영하고, 주민이 경찰활동을 감시·통제할 수 있게 되어 권한 남용이 줄어들 수밖에 없다는 것이다. 이에 우리나라의 현행 경찰법 및 관련 법률도 모두 전면적인 자치경찰제의 도입을 전제로 규정되어 있다. 다만, 자치경찰제의 실시로 자치단체에 속한 자치경찰이 일부 사법경찰관의 업무를 수행하게 된다는 가정 하에, 자치경찰의 수사업무는 중앙정부소속인 검사로부터 독립하여 자치단체가 독자적으로 처리하고, 검사의 수사지휘를 받을 필요가 없다는 주장은 시·도·자치구 등 지방자치단체 소속인 특별사법경찰관도 검사가 아닌 시장이나 구청장 등 지방자치단체장의 지휘를 받아야 한다는 주장과 다름 아닌 것이라 할 것이다. 위에서 이미 살핀 바와 같이 우리나라의 법체계상 사법업무는 본질적으로 국가사무일 수밖에 없고, 특히, 공소의 주체와 수사주체의 연결은 필수불가결하고, 검찰제도가 존재하는 이상 경찰수사는 자치경찰의 경우에도 “국가사무를 기관 위임받은 것”으로 보아야 하고, 따라서 검사의 수사지휘를 받아야 하는 것이다. 오히려, 자치경찰제도가 도입된다면 법집행의 형평성, 통일성을 기하고 인권보장을 담보하기 위하여 범죄수사에 관한 전국적으로 공정하고 통일적인 형사사법을 실현하기 위하여 검사의 수사지휘권은 더욱 강화되어야 할 필요성이 있다.Currently, the nation maintains the strongest centralized police system linking the police chief to the district police, citing the narrowness of the national territory, the weakening of the police function caused by the dispersion of police forces, the nature of police organizations that must move in a hurry, the lax police order, the imbalance in the quality of police forces between regions, and the low level of local autonomy. The background of the introduction of the local police system is that by changing the vertical police organization s command system and transferring personnel and budget rights to local governments, the central police administration authority will be decentralized to the provinces and the police officers who serve the people s livelihood by establishing measures suitable for the characteristics of each region. In other words, it is to eliminate the evils of the excessive centralized national police system by providing residents-oriented or service-oriented customer-oriented security services with local residents like police in advanced countries, while strengthening resident control over the police. Furthermore, if the effective self-governing police system is implemented, the residents doctors will be able to actively reflect on police operations and the residents will be able to monitor and control police activities, thereby reducing abuse of authority. The nation s current police law and related laws are all stipulated on the premise of the introduction of a full-scale self-governing police. Assuming that the implementation of the local police system would result in the operation of some law enforcement officers in the local autonomous community, it would be no different from claiming that the district police s manual work should be handled independently by the central government prosecutors, and that the special judicial police officers belonging to the local governments, such as the city and provincial governments, should be under the direction of the mayor or district heads. As we have already looked at above, the legal work of our country has to be essentially a state affairs, and especially since the connection of the prosecution with the investigation body is indispensable, and since the prosecution system exists, the police investigation should be regarded as a commissioned agency by the local police, and therefore should be directed by the prosecutor. Rather, if the self-governing police system is introduced, it is necessary to further strengthen the investigative command of prosecutors in order to realize a fair and unified criminal law concerning criminal investigations nationwide to ensure the fairness and unity of law enforcement and to guarantee human rights.

Kathryn Scarborough, Gary W. Cordner

This article explores the intersection of (1) policing and police intelligence with (2) national intelligence and military intelligence. The premise is that for more than 150 years, prior to the events of September 11, 2001, police intelligence had little connection to national or military intelligence. Basically, national intelligence focused on serious world-wide political and economic threats to the nation's well-being; military intelligence focused specifically on military threats to the national security; the police focused their intelligence work on criminals who posed threats to individuals and local communities. A fairly clear division of labor was in place, based largely on the type and scale of threats.Since 9/11, however, it has become plausible that a small group of non-state actors, such as terrorists, could launch a serious attack against the nation using weapons of mass destruction, or even small arms, as in Mumbai. These individuals might live in a local U.S. community or halfway across the world, yet plan and execute a massive and violent attack against a local U.S. community. They might also commit ordinary crimes to help finance their larger intentions. In this new context of terrorism and asymmetric threats, a local police department might develop intelligence of significant interest to national and military intelligence, or vice versa.Important historical, conceptual, and policy issues associated with the intersection of national, military, and police intelligence are discussed more fully elsewhere. 1 This article presents the results of a small-scale study in which subject matter experts were asked to respond to several scenarios related to intelligence and sharing, asking both what should happen and what would actually happen.U.S. POLICINGPolicing in the United States is civilian (non-military), predominantly local (funded and directed by local governments), and extremely fragmented. It is not just that police are distributed all around the country 2 - they mostly answer to local elected officials. The U.S. has almost 18,000 separate law enforcement agencies, roughly 16,000 of which are local. Of the remaining 2,000 agencies, the vast majority represent special jurisdictions (university police, transit police, park police, etc.), followed by state agencies, and lastly by federal non-military agencies. Out of 837,000 full-time sworn police personnel (armed with arrest authority), 74 percent work for local agencies, 13 percent work for federal law enforcement, and 13 percent work for state or special jurisdiction law enforcement agencies. 3The two largest components of U.S. policing are both local: municipal police departments (cities, towns, townships, boroughs, villages) and county sheriff's offices. 4 Two characteristics of these types of law enforcement agencies are absolutely essential for understanding their capabilities and contexts: most are small (77 percent have fewer than twenty-five full-time sworn officers), 5 and they are all independent of each other. There is no chain of command in the police industry - within individual agencies, yes, but among and between the 18,000 agencies, no. 6Along with industry structure, it is important to note a thing or two about police work and police culture. Particularly at the local and state levels, police officers in the field frequently act alone and without immediate supervision. Much of their work involves making low visibility - especially when an officer's decision does not result in a report or an arrest (and most police actions and decisions do not), it is rarely subject to review. If an officer's decision does not result in a report or arrest, it probably will not produce any official for later analysis. As Peter Manning notes, information in police departments can best be characterized as systematically decentralized. …

Vincent E. Henry

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have had a profound impact on American policing, requiring that police agencies substantially modify various elements of their policies, operations, and training. This article examines several types of changes local American police agencies will have to implement if they are to effectively meet the challenges of preventing, deterring, responding to, and investigating terrorist acts. Police agencies face a compelling need for more sophisticated intelligence gathering and analysis, as well as better dissemination of terrorism intelligence among local, state and federal agencies. There is also the need for more sophisticated operational policies with regard to terrorism response, greater cooperation and sharing of resources among local public safety agencies, and more comprehensive training that educates police officers to the realities of contemporary terrorist methods and activities. Finally, the need for effective investigation and prosecution of terrorist acts demands that agencies ignore or overcome the traditional organizational boundaries and rivalries that impede the achievement of these and other goals. The article also points some of the difficulties involved in implementing the necessary changes within a highly decentralized system of thousands of relatively autonomous local agencies, and it illuminates some of the initiatives undertaken by the New York Police Department (NYPD) to overcome these obstacles and more effectively prepare for the terrorist threat.