A Study On The Institutional Structure And Public Law Challenges Of The Autonomous Police System: Focusing On The Jeju Special Self-Governing Provincial Autonomous Police Agency

Abstract

The Jeju Autonomous Police Agency represents the only institutionalized model of an independent local police system in South Korea, equipped with its own organizational structure, personnel, and legally defined functions. As such, it has served as an experimental institutional mechanism for exploring the feasibility of a decentralized policing system. However, since its establishment, a range of structural limitations have continuously emerged, particularly with regard to the legal basis of autonomous police functions, command and supervision mechanisms, fiscal arrangements, and the allocation of investigative authority. These limitations have significantly deepened the gap between formal autonomy and substantive autonomy in local policing. Most notably, inconsistencies between the regulatory frameworks of the Police Actand the Jeju Special Acthave resulted in the recurrent reproduction of overlapping functions, dualized command structures, and ambiguity in fiscal responsibility. First, the current system—under which autonomous police functions are effectively adjusted through intergovernmental agreements—raises serious concerns regarding the principle of statutory reservation and legal predictability in the exercise of police power, thereby calling into question the adequacy of fundamental rights protection. Second, the dual control structure, whereby the governor appoints the head of the agency while supervisory authority rests with the Autonomous Police Committee, undermines both organizational independence and the effectiveness of democratic accountability. Third, the fiscal structure, which relies predominantly on local funding, constrains capacity building in areas such as equipment modernization, information systems, and responses to region-specific security demands, while failing to adequately reflect the national public interest inherent in Jeju’s tourism-, maritime-, and environment-based policing needs. Fourth, the absence of general investigative authority limits the autonomous police’s ability to independently develop integrated systems for crime intelligence, analysis, and response, thereby impeding the establishment of a responsibility-based local policing regime. Against this backdrop, this study normatively examines the public law limitations of the Jeju Autonomous Police Agency and derives legal criteria for institutional reform along five core dimensions: the substantive realization of the principle of statutory reservation, unification of command and supervision structures, establishment of a shared national–local fiscal responsibility framework, phased and function-specific transfer of investigative authority, and systematic integration of the legal framework. In particular, the study emphasizes the necessity of redesigning the functional, command, fiscal, and investigative structures of autonomous policing in an integrated manner. Given that the Jeju model serves as an experimental institution under the special autonomous province system, its legal reform holds significance not merely as a regional issue but as a normative reference point for nationwide discussions on decentralized policing. Future research should further develop concrete criteria and evaluative frameworks for phased investigative authority transfer through comparative analysis between the Jeju model and foreign local policing systems. By normatively examining the constitutional foundations and public law structure of autonomous policing, this study aims to contribute to the substantive realization of local self-government and the development of a participatory, community-based policing system. In this regard, an in-depth examination of the Jeju model provides an essential foundation for envisioning the future direction of local policing policy in South Korea.