Abstract This chapter examines the Russo-Ukraine War as a case study in command and control (C2), highlighting the enduring importance of mission command in large-scale combat operations. It contrasts Ukraine’s evolving adoption of decentralized execution, built on trust, shared understanding, and risk acceptance, with Russia’s rigid, centralized command culture rooted in Soviet tradition. Case studies from Kyiv, Kharkiv, Avdiivka, and Kursk illustrate how command philosophy, organizational culture, and technology has shaped battlefield outcomes. The chapter emphasizes that while emerging tools such as artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, and digital command networks can enhance mission command, they cannot substitute for human judgement or a culture that empowers initiative. Ultimately, the war underscores that mission command, when institutionalized through education, training, and cultural reform, can provide a decisive strategic advantage in modern, multi-domain warfare.
Open access
European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies
This paper combines novel archival research with a re-reading of the existing documentary record to reframe and investigate "the POW/MIA issue" as an ideological phenomenon. Prior research on the POW/MIA issue, or the widespread, persistent belief that US prisoners of war were secretly held in Vietnamese custody for years after the official 1973 prisoner swap, treats its persistence as the outcome of voluntarist factors like fraud and gullibility or the energy and innovation of grassroots activists. In contrast, this thesis argues that the issue's persistence in American political discourse is an artifact of the US national security state's ideological functions. It accomplishes this argument by first casting the National League of Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia as an ideological state apparatus, then demonstrating that the League modeled a specific kind of state-sanctioned POW/MIA subjectivity organized through the feeling I call autonomic certainty, or the use of intense feeling as proof in-and-of-itself. The POW/MIA activism of Ann Fischer, a rank-and-file League member from Madison, WI, stands as an example of autonomic certainty in action. Ann's brother, US Marine Richard W. Fischer, was declared MIA in Vietnam in 1968, sending members of the Fischer family into a years-long quest to prove he was alive in captivity. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense withheld convincing wartime evidence that Richard Fischer was killed and buried on the day he disappeared. This thesis is the first piece of POW/MIA literature to stake its claims with DOD case files relating to a POW/MIA.
Delo obravnava pojav tehnološko inovativnih organizacij, ki zaradi razvoja tehnologije veriženja blokov v povezavi s pametnimi pogodbami avtonomno delujejo v decentraliziranem medmrežju, z multinacionalnim obsegom in dostopom do trga in tako predstavljajo idejno zasnovo za razvoj optimalnejših poslovnih modelov in struktur. S predstavitvijo prednosti v povezavi z dodatnimi vzroki za regulacijo decentraliziranih avtonomnih organizacij predpostavimo in zaključimo, da ni primerno, da tovrstne inovativne organizacije delujejo neregulirano. Hkrati v delu izpostavljamo problematiko vzpostavitve optimalnega regulativnega okvira z željo preprečiti prekomerno centralizacijo tehnoloških sistemov, katerih idejna zasnova temelji prav na decentraliziranem delovanju, ter z željo zasnovati regulativni okvir, ki bo v največji meri skladen z obstoječimi tehnološkimi strukturami, ter bo kot tak omogočil tudi nadaljnji (regulirani) razvoj inovacij. V delu za ta namen primerjalnopravno predstavimo vzroke in napotke za sprejetje tovrstnega regulativnega okvira, ter ponazorimo možnost analogne uporabe tradicionalnega prava (tudi v slovenskem pravnem redu).
This thesis examines tactical lessons learned from recent military operations other than war (MOOTW) for implications on leadership development for junior leaders in the United States Marine Corps. A doctrinal examination of MOOTW provides the context for the study. The research questions focus on unique leadership capabilities and competencies necessary for junior Marine Corps leaders in the MOOTW environment. The research involved analysis of recent tactical experiential lessons. These tactical lessons learned, coupled with the doctrinal examination, result in MOOTW specific junior leader competencies necessary for MOOTW organizational effectiveness. The results synthesize into three key competency areas: (1) ability to adapt leadership roles to diverse environments, (2) independent decision-making skills for decentralized operations, and (3) ability to develop leadership skills in team members. Theoretical leadership development frameworks are reviewed for insight into improving these junior leader competencies in the Marine Corps. Recommendations include focusing MOOTW training on the characteristics of: (1) highly politicized environment at all levels of command, (2) high ambiguity between combatants and non-combatants, (3) decision-making at the lowest tactical levels in a decentralized environment, (4) development of teams to operate autonomously in this decentralized environment, and (5) reinforcement that tactical decisions by junior leaders have operational and even strategic impact.
This monograph examines the adequacy of the joint task force (JTF) to operate effectively in the context of wartime uncertainty. Military theorists have long understood the deleterious effects of uncertainty on the conduct of war. Commanders never know as much about the enemy or environmental conditions as they would like, so they decide and act on the best information available, however incomplete. In coping with uncertainty, there are proven methods of structuring one's organization to meliorate its effects. These methods involve decentralizing command, lowering decision thresholds, and creating self-contained, semi-autonomous units. U.S. military doctrine recognizes the need for JTFs in responding to the global commitments of the nation. Unfortunately, Service incompatibilities and parochialism often have hampered the joint commander's ability to get the job done. Congress mandated reform through the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986; the result has been to streamline joint command structures, thus making them better able to deal with uncertainty. The experience of multi-Service operations during World War II confirms the wisdom of creating joint task forces when doctrinal conditions are met. My research into two of these operations -- FLINTLOCK in the Marshall Islands and HUSKY in Sicily – indicate that an integrated joint command structure, akin to a modern JTF, reduces the effects of uncertainty by allowing the central headquarters to operate with less information.
Abstract : The year 1935 marked the establishment of the General Headquarters Air Force, the first official recognition that the development of effective airpower necessitated authority for independent action. The purpose of this monograph is to show the organizational growth of the Army air arm from 1935 to September 1945 and to trace the ideas and influences that affects its development. Most significant of these was the continuous effort to attain an autonomous air force, one with a large degree of control over its own affairs internally and the necessary voice in determining its operational activities. Important internal developments included the establishment and implementation of an Air Staff, the application of management devices, the improvement of programming methods, the consolidation of AAF Headquarters offices, and decentralization of command responsibilities.