Coping with Uncertainty: The Joint Task Force and Multi-Service Military Operations

Abstract

This monograph examines the adequacy of the joint task force (JTF) to operate effectively in the context of wartime uncertainty. Military theorists have long understood the deleterious effects of uncertainty on the conduct of war. Commanders never know as much about the enemy or environmental conditions as they would like, so they decide and act on the best information available, however incomplete. In coping with uncertainty, there are proven methods of structuring one's organization to meliorate its effects. These methods involve decentralizing command, lowering decision thresholds, and creating self-contained, semi-autonomous units. U.S. military doctrine recognizes the need for JTFs in responding to the global commitments of the nation. Unfortunately, Service incompatibilities and parochialism often have hampered the joint commander's ability to get the job done. Congress mandated reform through the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986; the result has been to streamline joint command structures, thus making them better able to deal with uncertainty. The experience of multi-Service operations during World War II confirms the wisdom of creating joint task forces when doctrinal conditions are met. My research into two of these operations -- FLINTLOCK in the Marshall Islands and HUSKY in Sicily – indicate that an integrated joint command structure, akin to a modern JTF, reduces the effects of uncertainty by allowing the central headquarters to operate with less information.