This pamphlet argues that the fiat monetary system is fundamentally incompatible with the deflationary nature of technological progress. It proposes an Energy Standard â a decentralized, blockchain-based currency backed by physically produced kilowatt-hours â as a thermodynamic anchor for money in the age of AI and robotics. Drawing on the Austrian School of Economics (Mises, Hayek), game theory, and thermodynamics, it analyses incentive structures in energy markets and makes the case for a market-driven ecological transition without state coercion.ditigal: petznek.at/pamphlet
This chapter examines the decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), which rely primarily on sociotechnical infrastructures supplied by blockchain technology and consist substantially of combinations of shared computer code and shared data. The chapter considers DAOs using the governing knowledge commons (GKC) research framework, contrasting the GKC perspective with long-standing views of the corporate form as a nexus of contracts, as an instance of hierarchy and decision theory, and as a complex system. The analysis is set against the context of earlier work on the corporation as commons. The chapter concludes that the GKC framework focuses attention on elements of governance that often are not salient in conventional accounts. This is especially true of the important question of how governance responds to and generates social dilemmas associated specifically with practices of sharing knowledge, information, and data.
This paper establishes the Equality of Wealth Creation principle within the Natural Economic Wealth (NEW) framework: any algorithmic execution satisfying Axioms 1, 2, and 3 of Paper 0 constitutes wealth creation and is recorded in the distributed ledger with full Qoin attribution, regardless of whether it is recognised, monetised, or valued by any existing economic system. The restriction that orthodox economics imposes requiring financial mediation as a precondition for economic recognition has no physical basis. It is an institutional convention, and Axiom 1 dissolves it by measuring what physically occurs rather than what the financial system records.
This article argues that the extraction of value through informational asymmetry, what the article formalizes as the Blaeu rent, is categorically distinct from Ricardian scarcity rents and Schumpeterian innovation rents: it scales with the counterpartyâs blindness, is invariant to productive merit, and is dissolved entirely by symmetric closure. The argument proceeds in three interlocking registers. The first is philosophical: drawing on Maurice Merleau-Pontyâs account of motor intentionality, Martin Heideggerâs analysis of the ready-to-hand, and Antonio Damasioâs somatic-marker hypothesis, the article defends the existential claim that some intentional states carry content before they are verbalized, and that pre-articulate knowledge, alongside acquired, derived, received, and inherited knowledge, constitutes a legitimate and analytically distinct mode of knowledge entry. The second is formal: the article introduces a fiber bundle topology to represent semantically overloaded concepts without metric distortion; formalizes the Blaeu rent as a function of the information set differential between counterparties, subject to strict conditions of merit-invariance; presents a mechanism-design proof, grounded in adverse selection dynamics, demonstrating that institutional adoption of symmetric instruments is the dominant rational strategy for capital; and formalizes the irreversible loss of cognitive potential under asymmetric conditions as a cognitive entropy law, drawing on Nicholas Georgescu-Roegenâs thermodynamic framework, showing that the waste is path-dependent and permanent. The third is architectural: the article specifies the federated, homomorphically encrypted governance structure required to make the sovereignty claim real rather than nominal, and addresses the warrant-adjudication problem through cryptographically verifiable zero-knowledge credential systems. The central finding is that symmetric closure of the information gap dissolves the Blaeu rent entirely while leaving earned competitive advantage, including first-mover position, execution capacity, and risk tolerance, wholly intact.
This guest editorial argues for renewed intellectual engagement between anthropology and economics, two disciplines that became estranged during 20thâcentury debates over human motivation and cooperation. With anthropologists largely rejecting economic theories following the formalistâsubstantivist controversy, this âdisciplinary divorceâ has impoverished anthropological analysis by limiting available theoretical tools. Contemporary anthropologists often mischaracterize economic arguments â particularly regarding barter theory â while remaining unaware of insights from heterodox economic schools that increasingly draw on anthropological methods and findings. Both disciplines share a fundamental concern with developing a general theory of value, making collaboration essential. The institution of money serves as an especially productive site for such interdisciplinary dialogue, functioning simultaneously as a social institution and technology that addresses the coordination problems inherent in complex societies. Bitcoin's emergence as the first natively digital, nonstate medium of exchange presents an unprecedented opportunity to examine how monetary institutions evolve and impact social relationships. By moving beyond disciplinary boundaries and engaging seriously with economic theory, anthropologists can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of value across human societies while advancing both fieldsâ shared intellectual project of explaining social organization and cultural change.
Axie Infinity is a blockchain-based video game offering players the chance to earn crypto tokens in exchange for their time spent playing the game. During the COVID-19 lockdowns, the game's popularity surged alongside the crypto market and stories of early adoptersâ quick returns on investments circulated among online crypto and Web3 communities. As the game's rapidly growing userbase plateaued, the community experienced several growth-related crises, one of which saw the value of the game's tokens crash. But players were not passive victims of these developments. They responded by creating a âscholarshipâ program to secure the flow of new players to the platform and actively commented on their commitment to the âgrindâ of playing the game to recoup their investments. This article treats the trajectory of Axie Infinity as both an exemplar case study of broader dynamics in the crypto gaming landscapeâa process we call the economization of play âand as a unique site in which players were not simply duped by the promise of the game, but were responding to crises proactively with risk mitigating and rationalizing strategies.
This paper offers a critical reassessment of Milton Friedmanâs economic principlesâmonetarism, free-market competition, and limited governmentâin light of the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) and platform capitalism. Drawing on a structured qualitative literature review, the study explores how AI-driven economic structures challenge core assumptions embedded in Friedmanâs theoretical framework. The analysis is organized around three key domains where traditional economic logic is being destabilized: (1) the erosion of competitive market dynamics through the rise of digital monopolies and algorithmic control; (2) the transformation of labor markets via automation, gig work, and AI-based management; and (3) the weakening of central bank authority amid the proliferation of decentralized finance and platform-based payment systems. Friedman envisioned markets as inherently self-correcting and efficient, but AI capitalism increasingly reveals the limitations of such views. Digital platforms leverage network effects, data accumulation, and algorithmic manipulation to entrench market power, creating structural barriers to entry that contradict the competitive ideal. Similarly, the gig economy, governed by opaque algorithms, distorts labor flexibility into labor precarity, contradicting Friedmanâs belief in voluntary and efficient labor exchanges. On the monetary front, the expansion of private payment ecosystems and algorithmic lending challenges the foundational monetarist assumption that central banks can regulate the money supply effectively. While the analysis recognizes the continued relevance of Friedmanâs normative commitment to individual autonomy and market-based coordination, it argues that his framework must be significantly revised to account for the institutional and technological dynamics of the digital age. The paper concludes by proposing a forward-looking governance agenda focused on antitrust reforms, algorithmic accountability, labor protections, and monetary innovation. In doing so, it contributes to the emerging literature that seeks to reconcile classical economic theories with the demands of a rapidly evolving AI-driven global economy.
Abstract Blockchain-based emerging technologies such as decentralized finance (DeFi), cryptocurrencies, tokens, and smart contracts have introduced innovative frameworks for resource allocation and economic interactions. Ethereum, as the major technical network foundation of DeFi and tokenized assets, is becoming increasingly pivotal in facilitating an extension and alternative to traditional finance for many stakeholders, including those who are âunbankedâ. Moreover, the recent transition of Ethereum from a proof-of-work (PoW) mechanism to a proof-of-stake (PoS) consensus mechanism and the Shanghai upgrade may significantly impact Ether (ETH) distribution. However, the status quo and dynamics of wealth distribution, especially after these changes in governance structure, remain unclear. By utilizing a rich dataset spanning the entire Ethereum history from July 2015 to December 2024, we analyze the balances across address groups of different sizes and the role of key economic activities and infrastructure components within Ethereum, such as exchanges, DeFi platforms, and staking. To provide detailed insights into ETHâs distributional equality, our approach combines descriptive, longitudinal, and causal inference analyses; a complete enumeration of more than 98 million unique wallet addresses; and novel on-chain analysis. Our findings show a substantial concentration of ETH within a small fraction of addresses, with approximately 0.3% of wallets holding nearly 95% of the total supply, despite the majority of wallets holding less than 0.1% ETH. However, the ETH distribution broadly resembles wealth distributions in traditional economies, with a log-normal body and Pareto-like tails. We assert that previous studies have overstated the concentration of ETH. Additionally, our dynamic analysis reveals a nuanced trend toward less concentration over time, driven by market cycles, increasing staking participation, and reinvestment in DeFi. These results challenge the notion of pervasive centralization. This study contributes to a deeper understanding of the current ETH distribution and its evolution over time. Therefore, this work provides an objective, data-driven basis for the ongoing discussion on wealth (in)equality in blockchain-based ecosystems, particularly in DeFi.
In public, permissionless blockchains, incentives play an essential role in the evolution of a network. Without sufficient incentives, people will not be interested in contributing to a network. Misalignment of incentives is dangerous as well. Given sufficient alternative incentives, network participants can attempt attacks that affect consensus stability. This could go as far as centralizing the entire network around a small set of vertically integrated actors. Until the explosion in decentralized finance protocols in the summer of 2020, the main incentives on Ethereum were the block reward and the transaction fees. That summer, it became clear that there is an extra value on top of these incentives, which protocol members like miners can permissionlessly extract by reordering, censoring, and including transactions in a block. In this chapter, we introduce the advent of this new incentive, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), and discuss its impact on Ethereum.
Tarun Chitra, Kshitij Kulkarni, Mallesh Pai, Theo Diamandis
Mechanisms for decentralized finance on blockchains suffer from various problems, including suboptimal price execution for users, latency, and a worse user experience compared to their centralized counterparts. Recently, off-chain marketplaces, colloquially called `intent markets,' have been proposed as a solution to these problems. In these markets, agents called \emph{solvers} compete to satisfy user orders, which may include complicated user-specified conditions. We provide two formal models of solvers' strategic behavior: one probabilistic and another deterministic. In our first model, solvers initially pay upfront costs to enter a Dutch auction to fill the user's order and then exert congestive, costly effort to search for prices for the user. Our results show that the costs incurred by solvers result in restricted entry in the market. Further, in the presence of costly effort and congestion, our results counter-intuitively show that a planner who aims to maximize user welfare may actually prefer to restrict entry, resulting in limited oligopoly. We then introduce an alternative, optimization-based deterministic model which corroborates these results. We conclude with extensions of our model to other auctions within blockchains and non-cryptocurrency applications, such as the US SEC's Proposal 615.
âą We study governance mechanisms in decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). âą Regression discontinuity design on contested proposals overcomes endogeneity concerns. âą Distributed governance mechanisms increase tokenholders value. âą Proposal passage increases DAO token returns by 4.7 % at the margin. âą Effect amplified by voter participation, DAO democratization, and DAO decentralization. Distributed governance mechanisms increase tokenholders value in decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) when decision-making is contested. Using a comprehensive dataset of proposals voted on within blockchain-based DAOs from 2020 to 2024, we exploit a regression discontinuity design on proposals that pass or fail by a close margin around the majority threshold. Local average treatment effects indicate that proposal passage increases DAO token returns by 4.7 % at the margin. Further, a one standard deviation increase in vote participation amplifies this effect by 2.2 %. Proxies for democratization and decentralization also increase the value-creating effect of contested decision-making in DAOs. Our findings contribute to understanding how distributed governance structures create value in digital organizations.
Abstract This chapter discusses the additional risks on MLFT that are created by the Metaverse. These two risks as discussed in the introduction are the Non-Fungible Tokens and the anonymity created by the Metaverse. Section 8.1 starts by discussing Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) and the specific risk for MLFT. It considers both the risks from a financial aspect as well as the risk it poses for transferring information. Section 8.2 discusses the concept of stateless firms. The construction of the Metaverse makes it possible for firms to remain fully anonymous. Section 8.2 discusses how the risks of these stateless firms can be limited.
Ludwig von Mises produced an impossibility theorem indicating that economic calculation in the absence of market prices was impossible. This gave rise to the âsocialist calculation debateâ in the first half of the twentieth century. This paper makes use of the insights of that debate to shed light on other situations where decision makers are required to allocate resources in areas where there are no market prices. A pertinent example would be most corporate social responsibility programs. In the absence of market prices local information cannot be communicated to decision makers. The paper further argues that blockchain technology can create the institutional environment for markets to emerge and consequently overcome the problem of missing prices.
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