Blockchain Papers

C.F. Chen, C.H. Hsiao

No abstract is available for this record.

Pedro Cavalcanti Ferreira

In this paper a competi tive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ('infrastructure'), and a positive extemality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent governrnent can improve upon decentralized allocation intemalizing the extemality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuais' welfare, no operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.

Michael Mitzenmacher

No abstract is available for this record.

Christian Dustmann

No abstract is available for this record.

Guido Trombetti, Pierre-Louis Lions, Angelo Alvino, Vincenzo Ferone

We give a “generalized” version of the isoperimetric inequality when the perimeter is defined with respect to a convex, positively homogeneous function on ℝ^n . We use it to prove that, for any function u compactly supported in ℝ^n , the integral of a convex function of Du decreases when u is rearranged in the corresponding “convex” way. Similar arguments allow us, for example, to prove comparison results for solutions of the Dirichlet problem for elliptic equations when the differential operator satisfies suitable structure assumptions. Résumé Nous donnons une version « généralisée å de l’inégalité isopérimétrique lorsque la définition du périmètre dépend d’une fonction convexe et positivement homogène sur ℝ^n . Cette inégalité est employée pour démontrer que, pour toutes les fonctions u avec support compact dans ℝ^n , l’intégrale d’une fonction convexe de Du décroît quand u est rearrangée à une façon « convexe å. Avec des arguments du même type nous démontrons, par exemple, les résultats de comparaison pour les solutions du problème de Dirichlet pour des équations elliptiques quand l’opérateur différentiel satisfait des hypothèses de structure convenables.

Anne de Bouard, Jean-Claude Saut

We classify the existence and non-existence cases for localized solitary waves of generalized Kadomtsev–Petviashvili equations according to the sign of the transverse dispersion coefficients and to the nonlinearity. We also prove regularity properties of the solitary waves. Résumé Nous classifions les cas d’existence et de non-existence d’ondes solitaires localisées pour les équations de Kadomtsev–Petviashvili généralisées selon le signe des coefficients de la dispersion transverse et la puissance du terme non-linéaire. Nous montrons également des propriétés de régularité de ces ondes solitaires.

Jean-Michel Roquejoffre

The paper is concerned with the long-time behaviour of the solutions of a certain class of semilinear parabolic equations in cylinders, which contains as a particular case the multidimensional thermo-diffusive model in combustion theory. We prove, under minimal conditions on the initial values, that the solutions eventually become monotone in the direction of the axis of the cylinder on every compact subset; this implies convergence to travelling fronts. This result is applied to propagation versus extinction problems: given a compactly supported initial datum, sufficient conditions ensuring that the solution will either converge to 0 or to a pair of travelling fronts are given. Additional information on the corresponding equations in finite cylinders is also obtained. Résumé Cet article traite du comportement en grand temps des solutions d’une classe d’équations paraboliques dans des cylindres; ce type d’équation contient le modèle thermo-diffusif multidimensionnel de la théorie de la combustion. Nous montrons que, sous des hypothèses minimales sur la donnée initiale, les solutions deviennent, en temps fini, monotones sur tout compact dans la direction de l’axe du cylindre; ceci implique la convergence vers des ondes progressives. Ce résultat est ensuite appliquéà des problèmes de propagation et d’extinction: une donnée initiale étant fixée, on donne des conditions suffisantes pour que la solution qui en est issue tende vers 0, ou converge vers deux fronts se déplaçant dans des directions opposées. On obtient enfin des informations supplémentaires pour des équations dans des cylindres bornés.

Mustapha Benmouna, Boualem Hammouda

No abstract is available for this record.

Daniel R. Phillips, Thomas D. Cohen

No abstract is available for this record.

Gunter Pauli

No abstract is available for this record.

George C. Necula

No abstract is available for this record.

S. G. Bobkov

No abstract is available for this record.

Lazarus Angbazo

No abstract is available for this record.

K. Vu, M.M. Begouic, D. Novosel

No abstract is available for this record.

S. Vinoski

No abstract is available for this record.

R.S. Blum, S.A. Kassam, H.V. Poor

No abstract is available for this record.

Lewis D. Solomon, Tricia Asaro

While Washington has been unable to lead the way in significant health care reform, the health care system has begun to transform itself in terms of curbing skyrocketing health care costs, dealing with the more than forty million Americans who lack health care coverage, and the problems plaguing the Medicare and Medicaid systems. The search has begun for a health care model that ensures quality care to a wide population in a cost-efficient manner. This article explores how the U.S. Health care system currently functions, examines several innovative models, and suggests ways in which a decentralized, community-based approach to health care reform can address our nation’s health care crisis. Specifically, Part I examines the current system of health care financing. Part II discusses current efforts to provide community based care. Part III offers suggestions for a community-based approach to health care reform, including ways to stimulate provider volunteerism, financing mechanisms, and methods to overcome potential legal barriers to local reform efforts.

M. W. Luke Chan, Wendy Rotenberg, You Mei

This paper describes the evolution of accounting systems, accounting education, and the accounting profession in the People's Republic of China. Throughout the reform process, accounting development has been recognized as critical to Chinese economic progress. As China moves towards a more decentralized, market-based economy, ownership and financing arrangements for enterprises are becoming more complex and diverse. The Chinese accounting system is being transformed to meet the demands of these new and emerging economic relationships.

Yoshitsugu Hayashi, Hiroaki Hayashi, Tetsuo Saito, Syo Sugata · 8 authors

The decentralization of the government authority, or the establishment of local autonomy is one of the most important policy targets in Japan. This problem has lately drawn considerable attention. In this research we aim at the investigations of a appropriate local revenue structure focusing on the intergovernmental fiscal transfers. According to the current data, two-third of the total tax revenue is collected by the central government and one-third of the total government expenditure is conducted by local governments. An imbalance between the tax revenue and expenditure of the local governments shows that there exists the large intergovernmental transfers of financial sources from the central government to the local governments. Local governments receive these intergovernmental revenues so that a policy objective may be accomplished. The most general observation that can be made is that intergovernmental revenue has become essential for most of local governments, except a few that contain metropolitan areas in their jurisdiction. Though intergovernmental revenues can be justified by some reasons such as fiscal equalization among local governments and the redistribution of income from higher-income taxpayers to those who by definition of their eligibility are lower- income, it is also true that they invariably influence the fiscal status of local governments. The central government provides funds for local governments mainly in the shape of the matching grants and unspecified financial resources. In this report, we focus on the matching grants, which play a main role of the central control over local governments. We also focus on the local taxes which support local autonomy as the revenue source. The intergovernmental transfers from the central government to local governments induce a divergence between the benefit from local public goods and local tax burdens of inhabitants. More appropriate resource allocation is achieved when the benefit of public goods coincides with the burden. Thus, resource allocation may be distorted by the intergovernmental transfers. We construct the account of regional fiscal finance to verify the possibility of divergence between the benefit and the burden. This report consists of six chapters. In Chapter 1, we overview current situation and problems of the matching grants, especially grants-in-aid for public works. Our observation shows that the local economy has been increasingly dependent on the central government expenditures such as public investments and agricultural grants-in- aid although a large amount of grants-in-aid had been already allocated to the rural areas for their public works. We conclude that expanding the self-revenue resources of local governments, or replacing the amount of matching grants with the distribution of local transfer taxes is required to achieve more appropriate resource allocation. Chapter 2 clarifies the structure of the matching grants. First, we set the criteria for the evaluation of the grants, such as the rational of subsiding, a starting year, the ratio of subsidies and variations of the amount of grants-in-aid. Then, we list categories of grants-in-aid which should be reconsidered in order to scrap and build. In Chapter 3, we analyze the welfare effects of replacing from the matching grants to the unspecified financial resources by a numerical simulation method. This policy reform will create the welfare gains at the level of 1.8 percent at large to prefectural governments in terms of the welfare index compared to the circumstance in which the reform has not been taken place. The analysis also shows that matching grants for compulsory education and social capital have a tendency to stimulate local governments to their additional expenditures compared with those for social welfare and others. In Chapter 4, we construct the system of regional account and examine benefits and burdens of local public services in each region. We measure the effects on inter-regional redistribution by Atokinson coefficients. The analysis shows that the redistributional effect through the government expenditures has been increasing since the 1980' s. Chapter 5 examines an appropriate local tax system in the era of decentralization from global point of view, based on the analysis using OECD data. It suggests the importance of independent local tax system. In Chapter 6, we summarize all above results and present the policy recommendations to promote the decentralization. Finally, the Keizai Bunseki (The Economic Analysis) is a series issued by the Economic Research Institute of the Economic Planning Agency and contains results of research works by the member of the Institute and the Economic Planning Agency. The purpose of the publication is to promote understanding of the general public about current research works and ideas in the Institute and to ask for any comment on the research results in order to enhance quality of the research activities in the Institute while the works are still not completed. Thus, the views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent those of Economic planning Agency.

Mihir Bellare, Markus Jakobsson, Moti Yung

No abstract is available for this record.

Ian Finch, Frans Coenen, Trevor Bench‐Capon, M. J. R. Shave

No abstract is available for this record.

Lixin Colin Xu, Bob Cull, Joe Hotz, D. Gale Johnson · 5 authors

In moving toward a more market-oriented system, how did China's government and state enterprises partition control rights, incentives, and financial arrangements? In 1980, China's government owned and controlled its state enterprises, which were managed (inefficiently) by bureaucrats. During the 1980s, the government experimented with decentralizing state enterprises to boost productivity. By decade's end, China's state enterprises had become more market-oriented, and the structure of enterprise property rights had changed dramatically. One factor in the move toward a more market-oriented system was the use of performance contracts with incentive components to govern state enterprises. Xu examines how China's government and state enterprises partitioned property rights - how the government and enterprises decided about incentives, financial arrangements, and control rights. Xu assumes that the government is risk-neutral and the enterprise manager is risk-averse; that the government's goal is to increase revenue (or profitability), to retain maximum control of the firms, and to reduce the inequality of income across firms (by bailing out firms in financial trouble and collective heavier taxes on high-performing firms). The enterprise manager and employees, on the other hand, have an informational advantage over the government that allows them to earn a rent; that advantage leads to suboptimal efforts. Among Xu's findings: The government, in striving for equality, rewards inefficient firms while penalizing efficient ones (the so-called ratchet effect). Efficient firms are unwilling to reveal their true efficiency. They pretend to be inefficient by slacking, so they can get more transfers. There are inherent conflicts between two of the government's goals: Profitability and equality. And the government's desire to control state enterprises prevents many of them from becoming decentralized and improving their productivity. Capital-intensive firms depend more on bank loans and less on retained profits, probably reflecting both their greater need for capital and the banks' role in allocating investment funds. Larger firms rely more heavily on the government for investment, their managers have more autonomy, yet the firms are easier to control (it's easier to monitor 100 employees in one firm than to monitor one employee each in 100 firms). This paper - a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to understand state-owned enterprise reforms and government behavior.

Jorge Martínez-Vázquez, Sally Wallace

The governments of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are at a crucial juncture in their movement from highly centralized command economies to more decentralized market economies. While there is a belief in these countries that decentralization brings greater economic efficiency, the reality is that such a transition is a difficult process. This paper examines what types of administrative reforms are needed for the decentralization process, how far along the countries are with respect to these reforms, and what reforms are missing. As we discuss, many of the necessary administration reforms are missing and we argue that more attention must be paid to these elements for successful decentralization of these governments. This paper examines the recent experience and reform needs of the key administrative aspects of the design of intergovernmental relations in countries in transition in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. There is a widespread realization in all of these countries that decentralizing government will help increase efficiency in the public sector just as privatization will improve efficiency in their economies. Decentralization of government operations is also attractive as a way to cement a democratic form of government. Despite the appearances of the existence of an already decentralized system, such as in the case of the Soviet Union, this experiment started in practically all cases with a lack of institutions and experience on how decentralized government operations should be organized. As different as these countries are, there are many similarities in the reform process they are following in order to decentralize government structure. While the basic components of a decentralized system of government are emerging in many of these countries the structure of government has not fully evolved in a manner that can support such a decentralized system. Often, governments remain structured along a vertical hierarchy: information, budgetary authority, and revenue pass from the central government down to subnational levels of government while little communication or interaction exists at a horizontal level. In general, the assignment of revenue and expenditure has not been clearly defined among the two or three levels of government, central government transfers continue to occur in a relatively ad hoc manner, and the entire budgeting system still rests in many cases on more or less formal system of negotiations and bargaining among the different levels of government. There has been some change in this structure in certain countries. Over the last three years, both Poland and Hungary have legally increased the automony of subnational governments. In 1994 in Russia a new and more transparent system of intergovernmental grants has been established between the federal government and the regions. In 1994 also, Latvia introduced a more transparent formula-driven, transfer formula for the regional and municipal governments. The focus of this paper is to develop a “blue print” for necessary changes in organization and administration of intergovernmental relations in countries in transition. While many experts have recently been discussing the public finance policy components of this new, evolving relationship among levels of government, less attention has been paid to the structural and administrative challenges and the information design issues that must be met in order to develop and support a system of intergovernmental relations. The paper is organized as follows: First we review the major responsibilities and their allocation among levels of government, the assignment of revenue sources, and the system of transfers. We then turn to a discussion of the current experience of Eastern European and NIS countries in the context of the structural components of an intergovernmental fiscal system. Next, we analyze the organizational reforms that are necessary for the efficient functioning of a decentralized system of government in the economies in transition. Finally we “rate” the transition economies in relation to their current design of the system of intergovernmental relations and support mechanisms.

Alex Mourmouras

Government financing of schooling is necessitated by capital market imperfections. Governments are also res­ ponsible for maintaining a stock of public capital that enters private production function. In this paper the welfare implications and politics of these investments are examined in a version of Diamond (1965) growth model. It is argued that in decentralized environments where the working generation is decisive each period significant underinvestment in both schooling and in­ frastructure will be observed relative to the Ramsey equilibrium.