Self-reliance and the new ACP-EEC Convention Or again, to distinguish between a self-reliant development strategy and previous development strategies: 'The current development policy debate on improving the terms of trade, stab1Lizing export earnings, the new world economic order and so forth, does not go to the heart of the development problem.The primary obstacle to development is not mono-cultures, high export dependence, the high proportion of raw materials in exports, or fluctuating export revenue, but the~ in which such exports are produced, the~ export revenue is used and the internal structures which such activities produce.From the foregoing historical analysis it may be assumed that every effort to improve the external economic position of Third World countries merely through the use of external economic mechanisms will remain fruitless if that effort is not backed up by promotion of development through a far.reachingtransformation of the domestic, social and political systems of such countries'.<Dieter Senghas, Autocentric Development on the European Model, paper to the German Society for Peace and Conflict Research, No 37 p.18).A more eloquent expression than these definitions, couched in the language of political science, may be found in descriptions of what self-reliance means in practice, contained in important documents produced by the regional conferences or organizations to which the ACP countries belong.For instance: 'b~1-~~-Q~il9 QQ_~b~!-~~-b!~~ and let development plans do likewise' <Prime Minister Mara of Fiji to the Pacific Islands Conference: Development the Pacific Way, Honolulu, March 1980, Conference Papers p.74).At this conference of leading politician~mainly from the Pacific Island State~ attention focused on strategies designed, as the final communique puts it, to achieve self-sufficienty meeting basic human needs allow for control of our destinies speak with a united voice in international forums promote national development, and enhance regional cooperation, in order to 'achieve a quality of life based on what exists in each Island society, and through the "Pacific Way".Regional cooperation, cult1~ral identity ('If you don't know whence you have sailed, how can you know where you are going?',T~lese~proverb.)and decentralized problem-solving as close as possible to the individual citizen have an essential role to play in this.-7 -PE 85.143/fin. -In the Lagos Plan of Action for the economic developmen\ of Africa 1980-2000 of the OAU (quoted here in the edition of the International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva 1981, and referred to hereinafter as the Lagos Plan> the preamble states inter alia:'Africa must cultivate the virtue of self-reliance.This is not to say that the country should totally cut itself off from outside contributions.However, these outside contributions should only supplement our own effort And:'As a consequence of the need for increased self-reliance Africa must mobilize her entire hu~an and material resources for her development'.At the same time, the importance is stressed of ensuring that 'our development policies reflect adequately our socio-cultural values in order to reinforce our cultural identity', and repeated reference is made to such terms as autonomous capacity, self-sufficiency internally Located development, and indigenous abilities.Here again, then, emphasis is laid on mobilizing the country's own resources, both human and material, there is a desire for the country to rely to a greater extent on itself, and for the basic needs of the local population to be respected in the context of its own cultural identity -all this goes hand in hand with a substantial reappraisal of the regional approach to the ultimate objective of an African common market.This objective has already taken contractual form for the Caribbean countries in the Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community (Caricom) of 1973.It is PE 85.143/fin.Sources of Lagging Growth Ccontd.>The internal "structural" problems and the external factors 'impeding African economic growth have been exacerbated by domestic policy inadequacies, of which three are critical.First, trade and exchange-rate policies have overprotected industry, held back agriculture, and absorbed much administrative capacity.Second, too Little attention has been paid to administrative constraints in mobilizing and managing resources for development; given the widespread weakness of.planning,decisionmaking, and management capacities, public sectors frequently become overextended.Third, there has been a consistent bias against agriculture in price, tax and exchange-rate policies.' From'Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa' World Bank 1981, p.4.The Tongalese Prime Minister: 'There is confusion caused by the Pacific Communities being constantly confronted by an industrial model.There is heavy stress on economic development at the expense of social and appropriate cultural pgorammes.Colonial domination has exposed Pacific peoples to the standar-ds derived from living in other countries.These standards are being used as a yardstick in measuring development.Since most Western countries are industrialized, there is the risk that standards for cultural development in the Pacific may be based on these western values', Pacific Conference papers, p.39. Industrialization programme for Africa, p.28, point 7: 'Industrial activities initiated by foreign investors have failed to meet the basic needs of the population: they have not made for an integrated economy nor have they contributed to the modernization of African society.The legacy of Colonialism has perpetuated at best an economic structure featuring a comparatively small modern sector and a large backward agricultural sector ', and 'The capital-intensive manufacture of sophisticated products has heightened the regions' dependence on foreign manpower, capital and technology'.-14 -PE 85.143/fin.'---'into account by the Co11munity and the ACP between th"is meeting dr.d 1 September''.Let us hope that the European Parliament's own-init1at1ve report will contribute to that end.-36 -PE 85.143/fin.
The apologetic tone taken by James G. Randall and other writers on the problem of arbitrary arrests in the North during the Civil War has always seemed to me to be curiously at odds with the tone Abraham Lincoln himself took. He did not apologize. In his public letter of June 12, 1863, to Erastus Corning and others, Lincoln said with characteristic toughness: '... the time [is] not unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than too many.' He argued that the Confederate States, when they seceded, had been counting on being able to keep 'on foot amongst us a most efficient corps of spies, informers, supplyers, and aiders and abettors of their cause' under 'cover of 'Liberty of speech' 'Liberty of the press' and 'Habeas corpus.'' Nicolay and Hay, who were not given to overstatement, noted that 'few of the President's state papers ... produced a stronger impression upon the public mind than this.'1Little wonder. Elsewhere in the letter, the president used even stronger language, saying that he could never: appreciate the danger ... that the American people will, by means of military arrests during the rebellion, lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trail by jury, and Habeas Corpus, throughout the indefinite peaceful future ... any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness, as to persist in feeding upon them through the remainder of his healthful life.2Stressing the image conjured up by Lincoln's use of the word 'emetics,' one could almost say that all the complaining about arbitrary arrests made him want to vomit.As most students of the Lincoln administration's racial policies agree, a historian must pay careful attention not only to what Lincoln said but also to what he actually did. The administration's statistical record on arbitrary arrests is persuasive testimony that Lincoln was not particularly embarrassed by the policy. No careful work on the numbers of civilians arrested by military authorities or for reasons of state has ever been done by a historian, and those historians who have attempted an estimate previously have been writing with the goal of defending Lincoln in mind. Even so, the lowest estimate is 13,535 arrests from February 15, 1862, to the end of the war.3 At least 866 others occurred from the beginning of the war until February 15, 1862. Therefore, at least 14,401 civilians were arrested by the Lincoln administration. If one takes the population of the North during the Civil War as 22.5 million (using the 1860 census and counting West Virginia but not Nevada), then one person out of every 1,563 in the North was arrested during the Civil War.4The February 15, 1862, date is significant because that is the date when authority for the arrests was switched from the State Department to the War Department. Evidence is sketchy, but this appears to have been strictly a matter of administrative convenience or logic. President Lincoln never made any high-level personnel or organizational move aimed at abating the severities of his internal security measures. The program was always in the hands of persons who were firm believers in its necessity as a means of saving the Union.William H. Seward became notorious for his alleged ability to exceed the king of England in his power to have any citizen arrested simply by ringing a little bell on his desk. The bell story appears apocryphal, but Seward's staunch belief that disloyalty in the North was a serious problem was not. When the president polled his cabinet about the Sumter crisis on March 15, 1861, the secretary of state warned that coercing the seceded states would make 'reunion ... hopeless, at least under this administration, or in any other way than by popular disavowal, both of the [resulting] war and of the administration which commenced it.' War, he feared, would arouse an opposition party that would offer peace and would profit politically from reunion. In other words, Seward's initial assessment of the possibility of civil war was that it would arouse so many people opposed to the war that the administration could never win it.5Seward was too busy to administer the arrest program and foreign policy at the same time, and as soon as Lincoln replaced the erratic Simon Cameron with Edwin M. Stanton in the War Department, Seward happily surrendered his authority over internal security. No one describes Stanton as anything but stern, and he in turn relied heavily on an even sterner man, Joseph Holt, the judge advocate general, to handle internal security. Holt's belief that the North was teeming with hundreds of thousands of traitors well organized in the Knights of the Golden Circle apparently exceeded the president's fears on this score, but Lincoln was content to allow a man haunted by such fears to exercise vast authority in internal security matters.6Given the Lincoln administration's generally consistent support of the arrest policy and given the remarkable extent of the arrests — nearly one person in every 1,500 — I have been struck by two question which never seem to have been asked about the arbitrary arrests: (1) why did the policy not cause the administration more political trouble than it did? and (2) how efficient was the policy?If the arrests had been aimed primarily at quashing dissent, so large a number would probably have threatened the fabric of what was left of the Union and would certainly have caused the administration serious political trouble. Yet the fact of the matter is that arbitrary arrests caused a minimum of social unrest. The three most famous and violent riots of the Civil War North — those in New York City in July 1863, in Baltimore in April 1861, and in Charleston, Illinois, in 1864 — had nothing to do with arbitrary arrests and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Baltimore riot occurred before the privilege of the writ was suspended anywhere. The Charleston riot, too, was a brawl between soldiers and civilians (with no indication that the question of civil liberties was at issue). And the New York riots were sparked by the issue which had real ability to cause socially explosive, violent, even murderous behavior — the draft.Arbitrary arrests caused few remarkable disorders, no matter how sensational the case or how famous the victim. Clement Vallandigham was the most famous politician in Dayton, Ohio, but his arrest in the night — despite a mysterious shrill whistled signal and three shots the victim fired into the air to alert friends — brought few people even curious to see what was happening. True, a mob the next night set fire to the offices of the local Republican newspaper, and one rioter was shot by a soldier while trying to cut a water hose in use to douse the fire, but the riot was quickly put down without loss of life. There were indignation meetings in most of the major cities of the North following Valiant Val's arrest, but this was orderly protest organized by politicians with some stake in preserving the system.7Other arrested persons upon their release had friendly crowds to greet them, but the nature of the protest was decidedly political, that is, orderly and organized by a political party, the Democrats. The arrests produced a great amount of heated rhetoric from that party which, by and large, changed no one's mind about the Lincoln administration. According to Joel Silbey, the premier student of Democratic voting behavior in this period, the voting totals for the party were largely stable after the 1850s. Why did the policy not unseat the Lincoln administration?8Since much of the writing on the subject, from Civil War times on, has focused on discussions of the constitutional justification for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, no one seems to have been tempted to assess the efficiency of the arbitrary arrests. In fact, both those who assert their rightness and those who assert their wrongness have a tendency to assume that the arrests were inefficient and abusive, the victims chosen by affiliation with the Democratic party or press, and hordes of innocent persons incarcerated in a largely useless witch hunt. Lincoln himself encouraged that view a little by arguing, '... if, as has happened, the executive should suspend the writ ..., instances of arresting innocent persons might occur, as are always likely to occur in such cases; and then a clamor could be raised in regard to this, which might be, at least, of some service to the insurgent cause.' How likely were such arrests to occur under Lincoln's administration? Were they more likely to occur than under other wartime administrations?9To answer these questions which lie to some degree outside the usual question of the legality or constitutional validity of the arrests, I have begun compiling a list of all the civilian arrests in the North during the Civil War. From the State Department's record of 'Suspicious and Disloyal Persons,' from dozens of lists of inmates in federal prisons (the notorious 'Bastilles of the North'), from William H. Seward's unpublished correspondence, and from the narratives of political prisoners published in book form, I have compiled a list of 866 'prisoners of state' or 'political prisoners' (as they were very frankly termed by the Lincoln administration) arrested while Seward was in charge of the program. A close look at them suggests some rather surprising answers to the questions.The most notable feature of the arrests is their geographic distribution. Of the 866 persons on the list, place of residence is noted for 582. One hundred and seventy-one were Marylanders. Thus a state with a little over 3 percent of the North's population produced 29.4 percent of the persons arrested by the Lincoln administration in the first year of the war. Kentuckians (about 5 percent of the North's population) accounted for 8.4 percent of the arrests. Because of a quirk of record-keeping, figures are not readily available for Missouri in this period (the prison-keepers in St. Louis and Alton, probably assuming that Seward would know that most of their inmates came from strife-torn Missouri, failed to report the place of residence of their civilian inmates), but records for other periods of the war indicate a percentage of arrests about as high as Maryland's. Even ignoring Missouri's obviously gross underrepresentation in these figures, the Border States alone accounted for 40.5 percent of the arbitrary arrests.Another substantial percentage of persons arrested were not Northerners at all. Seventy-nine of the 582, or 13.6 percent were Virginia residents, and another 12.7 percent were of other seceded Thus a percent of the people arrested were of Confederate persons arrested for trouble in the few of the by Union in the first year of the war or in the North when the war and arrested for trying to to the one the of as a Border on the that throughout the period of Seward's as of the administration's internal security another percent of the arrests are accounted Thus states accounted for percent or nearly of the arbitrary arrests in the first year of the war. The administration was not at war with but the suggests a for the arrests: people from were not likely to be very on the Civil War. No one would that was a serious problem in and Missouri, all of which were at one time or another to the and two of which and were of from this period one of the of arrests in this a way why civilian arrests did not cause the Lincoln administration serious political and percent of the people arrested had as their president and never in political of the Lincoln administration. well over 40.5 percent were of states Lincoln's political were never very the Border and of did not for is that Lincoln did not suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas in in the period when Seward the on the from to on April on the on military between and New York on July and on that to on law arrests in Missouri, Illinois, and other and many to the privilege of the writ had been Thus the in New the of New on writ of habeas has been ... And even when the was — — the of the arrests did not percent of the arrests were politically because they another of of these were percent of all persons after a period of time — not because they were not of serious the States but because the after its had the prisons in of and put on Seward to them No one more than Seward did the necessity of out of the war — the of many a of the One in noted in his when a ... as he is a he be as soon as the of his to have been in or any outside the of the and of the at least percent of the arrests little political to the Lincoln administration and persons from to the States at the very least, a should to make how the nature of the persons arrested put the policy of arbitrary arrests from any serious issue of quashing the of Confederate States who on the of civilian inmates in the were James M. and and their no was much about the civil liberties of these Confederate to taken from the and incarcerated without of habeas of always civil in other and some of the persons arrested were an who the Confederate States to see a and through the apparently that he had a such He was arrested on of being a and in with the because he had no from Union He to the only to be quickly when the nature of his case was the reasons for the arrests cause to appreciate their of on Lincoln's political and some of their the 866 arrests to have occurred under have some of cause of the of them have nothing to do with political — or any other which takes place on One hundred and were up in or upon from a of the persons arrested on the high were or through the to a Confederate the great in many of the over arbitrary arrests were not aimed at public In some they had no Lincoln himself to of them as being not so much for what has been as for what probably would be In fact, arrests were most made for what had been on evidence, and were not so much at as available as a for no one would and for which seemed to be no other is a case in In 1864 a by not of is, by the of to for his were in and of and and loss of were the only by the law of for of it was an the law of the state or it was and a States could not a were such The could be until brought to and to in but that was all the the States which had much and these simply them — for the they were into In this the problem was not even but a in the the arrests were some of the most of the the arrests, as they might be has made us that was a of power for and the Civil War a in the States who to be at when the war of them had been at for as as three came to to an of to the States, to their and other and their — and were arrested and in a A at a of these it appears one of the most and of this to who have made it a of to their into and their when they might have with taken them into and on their them as prisoners to the his President ever the and the war was he had made more of these of arrests: Joseph William Simon and the in the war were all the power of the the and were nearly as well to be traitors then as had and them, the insurgent cause would be much no one of them had then any in the one of them arrested would have been on Habeas Corpus, were the writ to so, most of the were on in the some of them to Confederate on the and should be too that many of the arrests not of the political but of serious and and for the Confederate was the case in Missouri, and and times of of the The of is that the percentage of serious after as the Union more and more as it is likely that the percentage of the civilians arrested who were Confederate and not for or Lincoln other words, the population of persons arrested and being as the war Even under a substantial of those arrested were and were and or or the asked to be were The Lincoln administration the view that to be for a in Confederate hands was of on the arrests is to come but a minimum of percent of the persons arrested were by the to these the and the who were into under the of for the West and other and it could well be argued that at least percent of the arrests the state of Lincoln's in a and efficient internal security Even the percent record that of the security of arrests during War I of under the and and by the American notorious not one or was by the administration. from the West in War but was not one of or by any on the West in War Of I am arrests of persons with in the War I but given the in and nature of between Lincoln's and the it is to some to the state of Lincoln's only of the famous who were in the Lincoln administration's hands at one time or another to be with the efficiency of their internal the who for the first to on 1861, for or the of the Confederate in and the man who to Virginia on 1861, and over the protest of military arrested was as as and of but even the for which only arbitrary arrest seemed to and William for arrested at were were of two Confederate were but to the of because they to be able to to North One should not only the innocent victims of the arbitrary arrests but also the of the program who for this by obviously of the prisoners are who were to the and them two are and two all have at and the has set in they have and to a few to the State Department the and to them to them on their that of to the the were but the first a when the was to him I no such a the next was a who to know had taken and on being in the no arrests, for that of Clement throughout the Civil War a local problem at first to the Border States and then more and more to the Confederate States or a problem and persons on the high is always them arbitrary arrests the is almost a few place the the or the of this in three in on in the of the only of some had been of their liberty by military was a Republican which well have but a Democratic on in the was able to only civilians arrested about from the beginning of the war until of them were arrested as a of a riot in City which in the of the from which the was to the first for the There was no of even in one of the was because was no on the him of a when the Habeas of March 1863, the War Department to lists of political prisoners to the and Stanton the to Holt, who — and — to the were to be all the civilian prisoners in but that the had been and he all persons arrested as or or being with or as well as those who came under the of War. The fact of the matter is that most such could occur only in Missouri out the St. Louis and prisons as being of the of prisoners or the so that the list was Even so, percent of the persons on the list were of percent of them percent and percent from or There were New three one man from Ohio, and one from to its substantial of civilian prisoners percent of those in in June percent of those in in July and percent of those in in 1864 were And the The of prisoners noted that from 1862, through the end of the war at least civilian prisoners were If that as an of then at the very least percent of those arrested fact of the matter is that the Lincoln administration's internal security so well from its that the administration was to it for the of the Civil War. — by all — was in the Union by of its state in and by arresting other authorities to be in who the Department of in it and it his for in and ever The — the of the people — were replaced and to ... their made a ... occur in North in in in and If ... those States shall be by that are ... shall then have and William H. Seward it too, as this by a of state but despite in Stanton of this was a at his an of a of from New and as I an and of to him to to were at by a of The three on being by M. their by that they had to see him in to the He that those prisoners would not be are the Seward are no him on and that the of his him too much to or One it was his to keep no charge was He a they are or I by arrests, and so I to this it was that the and public of were to such arrests. a for the of he that what he was to in the and make for and then on of the are not at of their release is the of the as to me by M. and William M. out that the of the and left a that all by to internal are and to a The internal security of the Lincoln administration were those and be only by the of the in which they are of the war left on the of the Lincoln administration, and on more so than on William H. When he The of the the Seward that was to that as great feature of the first suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas occurred in the next after that much more than those as Seward know or appreciate the of and state of of the of the in those of peace had us for any but the most of all a civil was upon and it had to be had without any for the it was at and soon to upon the A with and in the was to and
A recent development in economic science is the attempt to integrate monetary theory with the theory of general economic equilibrium. This work takes as its starting point the idea that money cannot have value in standard, general equilibrium models. In these, too much trade can be accomplished in centralized markets (see Robert Clower, 1969, 1971; Frank Hahn, 1973; or Neil Wallace, 1980). Thus, to decentralize or break up the structure, either exchange must be made costly or there must be restrictions on who can trade with whom, and thus such choicetheoretic models offer the intriguing possibility that real and monetary phenomena can be understood as intimately related. This paper continues in the relatively brief, choice-theoretic tradition, motivated by real and monetary phenomena associated economic development and growth: 1) To be noted first is Simon Kuznets' seminal work on national income (1971). In a cross-section study of fifty-seven countries in 1958, Kuznets shows that the share of the agricultural sector, including forestry, fishing, and hunting, in Gross Domestic Product is inversely correlated with Gross Domestic Product per capita. The share of the industrial sector, including transportation and communication, is closely and positively associated with per capita product. The share of the service sector tends to be positively but weakly associated with per capita product, but the share of banking, insurance, and real estate shows a striking rise as one shifts from lowto higher-income countries. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the ratio of industrial prices to agricultural prices is perhaps lower the higher is per capita income, though the evidence on relative prices for the service sector is inconsistent. Turning to long time-series for thirteen developed and four less developed countries, Kuznets finds dramatic evidence for a decline of the agricultural sector and a rise in the industrial sector with per capita income, at least in developed countries. Again, results for the service sector are mixed, but Canada, France, and the United States are positive exceptions. The share of a transport-communication subsector rises quite consistently. Turning next to shares of sectors in the labor force, Kuznets finds, both on a cross-sectional and secular basis, that all the above movements are at least mirrored and in many cases amplified. In particular, both components of the share of the service sector, services and commerce, rise substantially with Gross Domestic Product per capita. 2) To be noted second is the extensive work of Raymond Goldsmith on financial structure and financial intermediation. For the United States, Goldsmith (1958) finds that the activity of intermediaries, as measured by their share in national assets, in tangible assets, and in all claims, has shown a substantial rise from 1860 to 1952. Similarly, Goldsmith (1969) finds that the ratio of financial institutions' assets to Gross National Product rises substantially from 1860 to 1963 in both developed and less developed countries, including Switzerland, Great Britain, the United States, Japan, Argentina, and India. Related, the number of households with savings accounts, the number with life insurance policies, and the number with stock ownership expressed as percents of the population are all low for less developed countries relative to developed countries, and *Professor of Economics, Carnegie-Mellon University, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Schenley Park, Pittsburgh, PA 15213. This paper was motivated by a conversation with Thomas Sargent and has been aided by helpful comments from Robert Barro, Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Dan Peled, Kenneth Singleton, and Neil Wallace. Financial support from the National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and the Peterkin Symposium on Foundations of Monetary Policy and Government Finance at Rice University, and research assistance from Pramerudee Townsend are all gratefully acknowledged. I alone assume full responsibility for any errors and for the views expressed here.
Though public intervention in the market for research is virtually universal, economists have paid surprisingly little attention to the choice of the form of research incentive in a given market structure. Many studies concentrate on patents, but any assumption of their superiority over other incentives has been founded on intuition rather than on formal analysis. In this paper I analyze the choice between three of the most alternative means of public intervention in the research market, namely, patents, prizes, and direct contracting for research services. I show why, and under what conditions, any one of the three may be preferred by a social welfare-maximizing administrator in a competitive economy, using a model that, for the first time, pays explicit attention to differences in the informational roles of each of these alternatives. In the extensive literature on the economics of patents (see Arnold Plant, 1934; Fritz Machlup, 1958; Charles Taylor and Z. A. Silberston, 1973; Morton Kamien and Nancy Schwartz, 1975; and F. M. Scherer, 1977, for valuable surveys), formal analysis weighs the benefits of patents as a solution to the market failure associated with the inappropriability of knowledge against the welfare cost due to the restriction on the use of the knowledge generated, and this tradeoff is optimized by patent life adjustment in William Nordhaus (1969). Scant analytical attention is paid to alternative incentive mechanisms. (An exception is Ben Yu, 1981, who considers the role of prior contracting for inventions.) But as many writers (for example, Dan Usher, 1964; Yoram Barzel, 1968; Joseph Stiglitz, 1969; Carole Kitti, 1973; Glenn Loury, 1979; Partha Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980a) have pointed out in various contexts, the incentive offered by an unlimited patent to competitive researchers may be excessive, due to the common pool problem discussed further in Section I below. If the patent administrator and researchers share the same information, as implicitly assumed in previous models, then the patent life limitation can be adjusted to provide the optimal patent incentive, given the pool problem. But in all such models, patents would not be chosen in a fully optimized fiscal system. Researchers and the administrator are assumed to have identical information about the shadow price of potential inventions; a patent is just a means of turning this shadow price into a monetary reward. But monetary compensation can instead be offered directly to researchers by the state. Assuming that patent revenues incur a higher deadweight loss than an equivalent amount of public funds financed by less distortionary means (for example, a minimally efficient tax system), appropriate prizes or government contracts are socially preferable to patents with optimal lives. If the patent is ever to be the optimal incentive mechanism for research, it must possess advantages not captured in existing models. Informal discussions of patents emphasize their informational role. To include the latter as a justification for decentralized invention incentives, I incorporate an ex ante imbalance of information about costs and benefits of research in the model presented in Section II. But this alone is not quite enough. It is further necessary to specify that the terms of the award must be fixed before *Department of Economics, Economic Growth Center, Box 1987 Yale Station, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520. I thank, with the usual caveat, Marguerite Alejandro-Wright, Cindy Arfken, Martin Baily, Nuong Brennan, Steven Englander, Robert Evenson, Richard Levin, Richard Nelson, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Denis Wright, and two referees for assistance of various kinds.
Between 1916 and 1941, Henry Ford embarked on an effort to decentralize the production facilities of the Ford Motor Company. One component of this effort was an experiment in which he located seventeen small factories, called Village Industries, in rural areas throughout southeastern Michigan. These factories were designed to utilize water power in the production of sub-assembly parts for Ford's main assembly plants and were intended to provide jobs for rural residents. Ford endeavored to develop a sense of “field and factory” in these plants by training rural workers in the latest technological advances, allowing them release time to farm their fields, and paying them “city” wages. The Ford experiment is important for, despite a significant body of literature calling for the decentralization of industry during this period, there were few efforts that were comprehensively implemented, few which included rural areas, and even fewer that were totally financed by the private sector.
Alternative devices for efficient pricing in multiproduct monopoly situations Two rules for the efficient pricing of monopoly firms have been widely discussed in the literature. The marginal-cost rule was the center of controversy in the 1940s and 1950s, and the Ramsey rule’ was the fashionable topic of the last decade. Both rules require substantial information for their implementation. Mainly because outside regulators lack such information, the marginal-cost rule has lost its popularity. Information to implement the Ramsey rule may be even harder to come by. However, as this chapter shows, the information requirement to implement both rules can be lowered substantially by setting appropriate performance indices for public-enterprise managers. A combination of two features distinguishes the public enterprise from other economic institutions: (1) it is mainly financed by the revenues derived from the sale of its products in markets, which makes it differ from ordinary public administration, and (2) it differs from private capitalistic enterprises by virtue of public (state) ownership. This hybrid position of public enterprises gives rise to two natural starting points for a normative analysis. First, what can be gained by decentralizing part of the administration via public enterprises? Second, what advantages can public enterprises hold over private firms? If there are such advantages, they must have a restricted domain, because otherwise the hybrid would dominate its parents. To be the superior institutional setup, public enterprises first have to be feasible. This is of major relevance for the decision to turn a government administration into a public enterprise. If the administration's output consists of pure public goods with no possibility to exclude, a public enterprise simply is not feasible.
Isolation of the real roots of a polynomial equation is the process of finding real, disjoint intervals such that each contains exactly one real root and every real root is contained in some interval. This process is quite important because, as J. B. J. Fourier pointed out, it constitutes the first step toward the solution of general equations of degree greater than four, the second step being the approximation of roots to any desired degree of accuracy. In the beginning of the 19th century F. D. Budan and J. B. J. Fourier presented two different (but equivalent) theorems which enable us to determine the maximum possible number of real roots that an equation has within a given interval. Budan's theorem appeared in 1807 in the memoir Nouvelle methode pour la resolution des equations numeriques [10, p. 219], whereas Fourier's theorem was first published in 1820 in Le Bulletin des sciences par la Societe Philomatique de Paris, pp. 156, 181 [10, p. 223]. Due to the importance of these two theorems, there was a great controversy regarding priority rights. In his book (1859) Biographies of distinguished scientific men, p. 383, F. Arago informs us that Fourier deemed it necessary to have recourse to the certificates of early students of the Polytechnic School or Professors of the University in order to prove that he had taught his theorem in 1796, 1797 and 1803 [10]. Based on Fourier's proposition, C. Sturm presented in 1829 an improved theorem whose application yields the exact number of real roots which a polynomial equation without multiple zeros has within a real interval; thus he solved the real root isolation problem. Since 1830 Sturm's method has been the only one widely known and used, and consequently Budan's theorem was pushed into oblivion. To our knowledge, Budan's theorem can be found only in [16] and [61 whereas Fourier's proposition appears in almost all texts on the theory of equations. We feel that Budan's theorem merits special attention because it constitutes the basis of Vincent's forgotten theorem of 1836 which, in turn, is the foundation of our method for the isolation of the real roots of an equation [1], a method which far surpasses Sturm's in efficiency [2], [3]. In the discussion which follows we present separately, and without proofs, the classical theorems by Fourier and Budan and we indicate how they lead to the corresponding real root isolation methods. Some empirical results are also presented for comparison.
In Saskatchewan, the community colleges, as introduced in lQ73, were heralded as being unique.Politicians, government civil servants and others stressed the unique philosophy and principles upon which these new institutions were to be based.This dream of something new, yet readily applicable to Saskatchewan, caught the imagination of many Saskatchewanians along with a good number of people outside Saskatchewan.Lifelong learning, access to educational opportunities and the worthiness of learning were to become the pillars for enhancing peoples' personal growth and development.These colleges would facilitate the decentralization of learning opportunities to rural Saskatchewan.The learner would determine the location, the type of services and programs offered through community colleges.These colleges would be autonomous within the designed system in order to accommodate the particular demands of individuals, organizations and communities.The college would be the community and the community would be the college.Government and its agencies would work in support of this idea.iii Colleges have operated for nearly ten years.In these years there has come to be a certain emptiness about colleges, their philosophy and how this philosophy has been implemented.This unique system was to have accomplished so much, but by the end of the first decade, there even appeared to be confusion over what the original philosophy was, what it meant and how it was to be carried out.The original architects of the Saskatchewan community college system were interviewed to determine their vision and thinking related to community colleges for Saskatchewan.Other people linked to this ideal were subjected to the same process.An extensive literature search supplemented the interviews and provided further background and explanation for the development of community colleges.
Cultural policy in Sweden. During the ‘70’s, Sweden adopted a genuine cultural policy evolving along the following main criteria : major opportunities for self-expression, creative and community development, decentralization and financial efforts in favour of the underprivileged. Since State finance does not reach the local level, the implementation of such a policy remained within the exclusive terms of reference of local govemment. This accounts for wide discrepancies among boroughs. The 80ties witness a cut in public expenditure with serious effects on cultural policy which had not yet reached its full development and still lacked strong local structures. Therefore, future cultural policy is as yet uncertain. It will largely depend on societal options taken : privatization and commercialization or cultural welfare and creativity.
In the American governmental system, local governments have a fairly high degree of autonomy in their relations with state and federal governments. This is one reason that local governments play such an important role of financing and delivering human services. Moreover, the many agencies, both private and public, which deliver these services at the local level, have a high degree of autonomy in carrying out their missions and in relating to each other. In such a decentralized context, the working relations among human service agencies are critical to the effective delivery of the services they provide. The coordination of these organizations and their services is a complex and pervasive issues. This paper will describe and compare two complementary studies of the same substantive area, coordination of transportation provided by human service agencies in the United States.
Prologues: We live in an age of high technology, whether the subject is medicine, the exploration of space, or unraveling other mysteries of mankind. One small reflection of this reality is the presence on Capitol Hill of the Office of Technology Assessment, an arm of Congress created to assist legislators to better understand the relentless pace of technological change in our society. One of the pursuits of OTA involves a wide range of health related issues, which command the attention of a professional staff numbering about a dozen at any given time. David Banta, a board-certified specialist in preventive medicine, directs this work. One of his senior associates is Jane Willems, a Ph.D economist with a particular interest in technology. The thinking of Banta, as it relates to the appropriate role of government in monitoring technology, has changed in the seven years he has worked on Capitol Hill. Once a devout believer in strong regulation as the primary force to improve the use of technology, Banta has come around to thinking that a variety of instruments may be needed to undertake such tasks in the United States. Willems, on the other hand, has maintained a firm belief in the workings of the marketplace and in decentralized decisionmaking. The paper written by Banta and Willems reflects this tandem of thought. Three congressional committees in particular make use of the OTA 's health work: the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, and the House Energy and Commerce Committee. Recent studies undertaken by the OTA include technology transfer at the National Institutes of Health, the role of technology in Medicare, alternatives to health and safety regulation in the work place, and technologies for handicapped people.
Abstract Social services in the Netherlands have traditionally been delivered by non-state agencies, in a climate of support for ‘private initiative’ and resistance to direct intervention by government. These agencies have, however, become almost totally dependent upon government finance, while operating virtually autonomously in a non-politicised sphere where services have become increasingly sophisticated and expensive. The power exercised over public resources and public services by these ‘private’ agencies, particularly at national level, and the lack of control over the welfare sector by government, has been the subject of growing criticism in recent years. The dysfunctions of a ‘voluntary’ system of social services have also become glaringly evident. This article traces the development of a relationship between state and ‘private enterprise’ in the social services which has developed from a strictly ‘separatist’ model to one where a high degree of inter-penetration has been reached. It also examines current efforts to extend this second ‘incorporated’ model of statutory-voluntary relationships by placing social welfare services under a greater measure of public control within a decentralized system of local political responsibility.
Traditionally, financial management theory has emphasized the separation of the capital investment and financing decisions [2, pp. 81 and 176]. This separation assumes that the firm's financing decision is taken as given when the investment decision is made or that the two decisions are independent of each other. In reality, these decisionis are seldom independent. Mergers and acquisitions are typical examples of capital investments that make the investment/financing separation inappropriate. The tone of research on the interaction between investment and financing decisions was set by Myers [16]. Myers advanced the concept of Adjusted Present Value (APV), which permits an examination and evaluation of the consequences of interactions between the firm's financing and investment decisions. A new project's APV is defined as the sum of the present value of its net operating income assuming all-equity financing plus the value of any additional debt capacity to the firm contributed by the project. The definition of the new project's APV presented above represents a fairly simplified version. However, a closer look at the concept of APV brings up other potential issues relating to stock purchase decisions, dividend policy, and transaction costs associated with new sources of funding, etc. These are important financial management variables that have been considered in other research efforts [1, 3, 7, 17]. The second phase of the investment/financing interaction process was developed by Bower and Jenks (BJ) [1]. They used the simplified concept of APV in their effort to estima e divisional screening rates for decentralized investm nt decisions. After assuming that each investment project had its implicit optimal debt ratio, BJ used this implicit ratio to estimate the project's cut-off rate in the fr m work of the capital asset pricing model. While BJ's study does provide an important application of the APV concept, it does not go far enough: (a) It does not provide any theoretical basis for assessment of the implicit debt ratio of each project. Their analysis instead relies on average debt ratios of different industries observed on an ex post basis. (b) It assumes that the firm's debt capacity is increased by an amount equivalent to the project's debt capacity. Although the additivity of the firm's debt ca-
well established in the United States. With few exceptions, states are paying a larger share of total education costs and, increasingly, states are setting limits on how much or how little school districts may spend for educational services. While generally acknowledged as inevitable, the movement has raised fears that the viability of local control is threatened and that the advantages of decentralized policy making are soon to be lost. The fear is summed up in the adage, He who pays the piper calls the tune. That is a possibility, but it need not be. There is much to be learned in this respect from the experience of England. The English have developed a system of schooling whereby approximately twothirds of the costs are borne by the central government while local educational authorities exercise a greater degree of discretion than enjoyed by their counterparts in the United States especially at the school building level. The purpose of this paper is to describe the relationship between central and local government in England and to draw implications for practice in the United States with specific reference to education.
This thesis is an attempt to generalise to the odd orthogonal group Γ_K, over an Infinite field K not of characteristic two, the work of Schur [S], and more recently Green [G], on the general linear group G_K using the approach of Weyl [W] in characteristic zero. The special feature here is that we treat Γ_K as merely a group of matrices defined by the vanishing of polynomials in its coefficients (the classical view) rather than a group generated by elements derived from an associated Lie algebra, the approach used initially by Chevalley and adopted by most authors in recent times. \n \nAfter generalising Green's [G] Schur algebra for G_K to Γ_K in §0 we prove in §1 Chevalley's famous theorem on the 'Big Cell' in G_K and then, by an easy extension, prove it for the Big Cell in Γ_K. Chevalley's original proof uses representations of Lie algebras, ours requires nothing but a little knowledge of the coordinate ring K_+[G] of all 'polynomial' functions on G_K . We define K[Γ], the coordinate ring of Γ_K, to be the space of all polynomial functions on G_K restricted to Γ_K and in §2 give a generating set of the kernel of the restriction map ψ_K:K_+ [G]→K[Γ]. This generalises Weyl's result in characteristic zero. In §3 we use this result to show that the family, or 'scheme', of rings K[Γ] (K varying over all infinite fields not of characteristic two) is 'defined over Z' ; in fact K[Γ] is naturally isomorphic to K θ Z[Γ_Q], where Z[Γ_Q] is the subring of Q[Γ] spanned by 'monomial' functions. This enables us to formulate a 'modular' representation theory for Γ which connects polynomial representations of Γ_Q with those of Γ_K. \n \nIn §4 we investigate the Schur algebras of Γ_Q following Weyl [W] and in §5 find a complete set of irreducibles for each of them, once again following the lead of Weyl. In §6 we attempt to 'reduce' these modules modulo p to obtain 'Weyl' modules for Γ_K, a task only partially completed.
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Advanced Algebra and Geometry
Finite Group Theory Research
Advanced Differential Equations and Dynamical Systems
A bstract . The fiscal crisis of particular central cities has been primarily caused by social and economic decentralization within metropolitan regions. This hypothesis is examined through a case study of the Bridgeport, Connecticut metropolitan region. Middle and upper income groups have moved from the central city of Bridgeport to its suburbs while the poor remain. Business and industry have also decentralized. These factors weaken the capacity of the central city to generate sufficient revenue from its declining share of the region's taxable resources. The central city must fund a wide range of services and faces, as all local governments do, increased costs. Because of these fundamental social and economic changes , the central city cannot meet its service commitments. Unless the existing system of public finance is altered, continued decline is inevitable.
The required Third National Energy Plan NEP-III offers the Reagan administration an opportunity to assess cogeneration. The Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act, increasing energy prices, capital-intensive industrial investments in energy efficiency, utility financing problems, opportunities for decentralized energy systems, stabilizing gas supplies, and the economics of energy efficiency combined to make cogeneration attractive to a wide range of energy producers and users. US energy policy will be reassessing several issues, among them the roles of utilities, states, and the Federal government in cogeneration and the appropriate financial and legal incentives to ensure certainty for those developing cogeneration facilities. (DCK)