First, the study is defined first that the welfare finance is a financial system executed by the public responsibility for the welfare user who have the livelihood problem to do human life. Secondly, the welfare finance in the contemporary society clarifies contradiction to which a quasi-surplus value has been raised while a quasi-value of usability of social welfare has been decreased. Finally, the problem of the decentralization type finance to improve the contradiction of the welfare finance is discussed. In a word, the problems are to be expanded local taxes and to construct a local sovereignty and financial system.
Open access
Diverse Approaches in Healthcare and Education Studies
Between 1974 and 2002 there were three state financed work life programmes at federal level in Germany, with a financial outlay of more than €1 billion. The author evaluates the programmes’ achievements, conflicts and deficits and pays special attention to the role of social science research in work design projects; he concludes by comparing the German experiences and the Norwegian tradition of work life programmes since the 1960s. The social partners participated at programme and project level from the very beginning. Many successes have been achieved: the easing of physical work load and unhealthy work; the development of flexible and decentralized work organization in industry and services; providing working people with opportunities to make better use of their qualifications. There were also lost opportunities: due to massive conflicts between trades unions, employers’ associations and the programme administration, the initial perspective of enhancing democratic participation and enlarging the scope of co-determination in industry was abandoned, after a series of successful experiments, as early as 1980. The implementation of modern forms of work organization, including semi-autonomous group work, largely failed; it was (and still is) restricted to less than 5% of enterprises in Germany. Recent tendencies in industry to return to Tayloristic forms of work organisation, to intensify work processes by introducing market-driven work organisation and flexible working time schemes, directly contradict the original intentions of the programmes.
Chapter 12 pulls together the different elements covered in the other chapters. Each chapter so far has inherent in it a contracting commandment. Following these commandments in an organized and business-like fashion leads to more effective contracting. In this final chapter, we will look at a framework for implementing these commandments. This approach is referred to as SMART Contracting TM . The acronym SMART stands for Strategically Managed, Aligned, degenerative, Transitional. SMART Contracting is a balanced approach that considers technical, legal, business and human issues in the development of more effective contracting approaches while recognizing the need to accommodate ongoing change. It is deliberately nonprescriptive. This means that we need to apply the principles and manage the detail depending on what we want to achieve and how much latitude we have to adapt corporate procedures. I feel that I have to apologize for the trademark. In a previous book I used other trademarked terms and was criticized for doing so by one reviewer. I am very sensitive to such criticism, especially if I agree with the comment! However, the trademark protects the term.
Jung Min Park, Edwin K. P. Chong, Howard Jay Siegel
Applications such as e-commerce payment protocols, elec-tronic contract signing, and certified e-mail delivery require that fair exchange be assured. A fair-exchange protocol al-lows two parties to exchange items in a fair way so that either each party gets the other's item, or neither party does. We describe a novel method of constructing very ef-ficient fair-exchange protocols by distributing the computa-tion of RSA signatures. Specifically, we employ multisig-natures based on the RSA-signature scheme. To date, the vast majority of fair-exchange protocols require the use of zero-knowledge proofs, which is the most computationally intensive part of the exchange protocol. Using the intrinsic features of our multisignature model, we construct protocols that require no zero-knowledge proofs in the exchange proto-col. Use of zero-knowledge proofs is needed only in the pro-tocol setup phase--this is a one-time cost. Furthermore, our scheme uses multisignatures that are compatible with the underlying standard (single-signer) signature scheme, which makes it possible to readily integrate the fair-exchange fea-ture with existing e-commerce systems.
Die Kompetenzverteilung zwischen den verschiedenen Gebietskörperschaftsebenen eines föderativen Staates kann sich erheblich auf das Wirtschaftswachstum auswirken, da es insbesondere die Regionen eines Landes sind, die zu seiner gesamten wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung beitragen. Dies legt einen regionalen Zuschnitt der staatlichen Wirtschaftspolitik nahe. Aus ökonomischer Sicht wird in der theoretischen Diskussion hingegen vornehmlich auf die Effizienzaspekte einer dezentralen Bereitstellung und die Finanzierung öffentlicher Leistungen abgehoben. Selten findet sich das Argument, dass Dezentralität oder Föderalismus – vermittelt über eine höhere Innovationsund Reformfähigkeit des politischen Systems – zu einer Steigerung des Wachstums führen. Nach einer Diskussion der theoretischen Überlegungen zu Föderalismus und Wachstum wenden wir uns in diesem Beitrag der empirischen Frage zu, welche Bedeutung die Zuordnung von Entscheidungskompetenzen und die institutionelle Ausgestaltung des fiskalischen Föderalismus für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung eines Landes haben. Auf Basis der bisher existierenden theoretischen und empirischen Studien zu Wirtschaftswachstum und Föderalismus werden offene Fragen und mögliche Ansätze zu ihrer Beantwortung formuliert. <bold>Abstract</bold> The assignment of competencies in a federal state can have a strong impact on economic growth, because the regions of a country particularly contribute to its total economic development. Hence, public policy should be tailored to regional needs. Public economists however mainly focus on the efficiency of decentralized public goods provision and financing; seldom arguments concerning political innovation due to a decentralized experimentation of policies and its impact on economic growth are considered. After a discussion of theoretical arguments on federalism and economic growth, the empirical question is addressed in this paper whether the assignment of autonomy and the institutional design of fiscal federalism influence economic development of a country. On this basis, open question and potential routes of research are formulated.
In the context of recent decentralization of regional development in Indonesia, the local authorities and communities need to understand by how potential sources for financing regional development effect the economic growth. There is three sources of financing such as government, private investor and local communities. The purpose of this paper is to explain the role of financing resources of the economic sectors in regional economic growth. Using panel data generated from economic sectors among 20 kabupaten/kota (municipalities) in Jawa Barat Province during 1991-2000 I examine the effect in economic growth of different financing sources. The pattern of development financing was varied among regions. The financing concentration was occurred in some regions where have good available infrastructures and characterised with industry-based development. The results from empirical analysis suggest that the impact of both government and private financing on economic growth is significant in industry-based regions. In the period analysis, communities financing through bank loans supported the regional development significantly in both industry-based and agro-based regions. The implication based on this study is that the local authority should encourage the private financing sources to promote local economic growth.
John Grundy, Valentine Healy, L Gorgolon, E Sandig
INTRODUCTION: In 1991 the Philippines Government introduced a major devolution of national government services, which included the first wave of health sector reform, through the introduction of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Code devolved basic services for agriculture extension, forest management, health services, barangay (township) roads and social welfare to Local Government Units. In 1992, the Philippines Government devolved the management and delivery of health services from the National Department of Health to locally elected provincial, city and municipal governments. AIM: The aim of this review is to (i) Provide a background to the introduction of devolution to the health system in the Philippines and to (ii) describe the impact of devolution on the structure and functioning of the health system in defined locations. METHOD: International literature was reviewed on the subjects of decentralization. Rapid appraisals of health management systems were conducted in both provinces. Additional data were accessed from the rural health information system and previous consultant reports. RESULTS: Subsequent to the introduction of devolution, quality and coverage of health services declined in some locations, particularly in rural and remote areas. It was found that in 1992-1997, system effects included a breakdown in management systems between levels of government, declining utilization particularly in the hospital sector, poor staff morale, a decline in maintenance of infrastructure and under financing of operational costs of services. CONCLUSION: The aim of decentralization is to widen decision-making space of middle level managers, enhance resource allocations from central to peripheral areas and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of health services management. The findings of the historical review of devolution in the Philippines reveals some consistencies with the international literature, which describe some negative effects of decentralization, and provide a rationale for the Philippines in undertaking a second wave of reform in order to 'make devolution work'.
On May 20, 1999, Nature published a brief report on an experiment performed by researchers at Cornell University that indicated that pollen from genetically modified (GM) Bt corn (Zea mays) could kill the larvae of monarch butterflies (Danaus plexippus). In laboratory tests, caterpillars fed milkweed (Asclepias curassavica) leaves dusted with pollen from a Bt corn hybrid showed retarded growth and increased mortality. “These results,” the authors stated, “have potentially profound implications for the conservation of monarch butterflies” (Losey et al., 1999). In a press release announcing the publication in Nature, the principal investigator on the Cornell study, John Losey, had expressed due caution: “Pollen from Bt-corn could represent a serious risk to populations of monarchs and other butterflies, but we can't predict how serious the risk is until we have a lot more data. And we can't forget that Bt-corn and other transgenic crops have a huge potential for reducing pesticide use and increasing yields. This study is just the first step, we need to do more research and then objectively weigh the risks versus the benefits of this new technology” (Cornell News, 1999). Such caution was wasted on Greenpeace International. The day the findings of the Cornell study were published it already demanded that authorities in the United States, Argentina, Canada, and the European Union take immediate action and prohibit the growing of genetically engineered maize crops. The environmentalist nongovernmental organization (NGO) reiterated its earlier call for a ban on all releases of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Less than a month later, in a media-oriented action, members of Greenpeace dressed up as butterflies confronted a meeting of European Union environment ministers held in Luxembourg, carrying banners demanding “Give butterflies a chance.” In Europe, their campaign apparently found resonance among the authorities: The European Commission decided to freeze the approval process for new Bt maize varieties. The Cornell study did not show that monarch butterfly populations in the wild were actually endangered by Bt corn. However, when Monsanto and Novartis, the companies that sold Bt corn at that time, correctly pointed out that the detrimental effects had so far only been shown in the laboratory, Greenpeace branded them as irresponsible. A spokesperson declared: “Such reactions are the precise opposite to precaution and follow the same pattern of denial these companies have employed for decades, when health and environmental effects of their chemical pesticides were exposed. However, in the case of these GMOs we are talking about living toxins that can reproduce in nature and transmit their dangerous traits to wild species. We cannot consider GMOs harmless until harmful effects are fully proven (sic)” (Greenpeace, 1999a). (The last sentence is obviously a—Freudian?—slip of the tongue and should be read: “We cannot consider GMOs harmless until the absence of harmful effects is fully proven.”) For Greenpeace, not just monarchs were supposed to be endangered. The NGO drew up a list of over 100 species of butterflies that it believed could be harmed by GM maize. It accused biotech companies and regulatory authorities of fully ignoring these risks (Greenpeace, 1999b). More recent field research performed in the American Midwest, however, seems to indicate that monarch butterfly populations are hardly affected, if at all, by the large-scale cultivation of Bt maize in this region (Ortman et al., 2001). The monarch butterfly case is only one among many occasions in which the so-called Precautionary Principle (PP) has been invoked to advocate preventative action to forestall possible harm even before the likelihood or the possible extent of the latter has been scientifically well established. This principle is highly contested. With many other environmentalist NGOs, Greenpeace champions its adoption as a central principle of international law against tenacious opposition from the United States, Canada, and Australia (Greenpeace, 2002). The principle is also at issue in recent World Trade Organization trade disputes between the United States and the European Union. But why does the PP play such a central role? The PP is an outgrowth of increased environmentalist awareness since the 1970s. The conviction took hold that humanity finds itself in a historically unprecedented situation in which our technological capacity and the potential scale of our actions far exceed our predictive knowledge. According to the German philosopher Hans Jonas, this discrepancy between the ability to foresee and the power to act itself assumes ethical importance and asks for humility and responsible restraint on our part. Jonas maintains that it is possible to extract from this situation of profound scientific uncertainty a rule or principle of decision making that is itself not uncertain at all, namely the rule “to give in matters of a certain magnitude—those with apocalyptic potential—greater weight to the prognosis of doom than to that of bliss” (Jonas, 1984). The supreme moral imperative in the new age, Jonas holds, is that humankind may not put its own existence and survival at stake in the wager of technological progress. If we want to find a philosophical basis for the PP, we must look for it in Jonas' book on the imperative of responsibility (although he himself did not use the expression PP). Environmentalists often hold that modern biotechnology has “apocalyptic potential” because it tampers with the basic processes of life. If we release GMOs into the environment, the ultimate consequences for the natural flora and fauna are extremely hard to predict but may well be irreversible. However, many environmentalists, just like Jonas, believe that we possess a decision rule or principle for dealing with fundamental scientific uncertainty that is itself not the least uncertain. That rule is the PP. Thus, in almost any debate, it seems that the PP can be brought in as a trump card to override all other considerations and arguments. But what exactly is the PP? Proponents of the PP assert that the principle is already “enshrined” in such international agreements as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, but existing definitions of it are at best partial and incomplete. In the context of dealing with environmental hazards, the Rio Declaration of 1992 presented the following formulation of what a precautionary approach entails: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” A well-known definition of the PP was spelled out in a January 1998 meeting at Wingspread in Racine, Wisconsin. The Wingspread Statement summarized the principle thus: “When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically” (Raffensberger and Tickner, 1999). Definitions such as these beg many questions. Is there ever full scientific certainty? Do we need a minimal threshold of scientific certainty or plausibility before we may (or should) undertake preventative action? And do we really know how to prevent harm if we are so much ignorant about the underlying cause-effect relationships? The definitions that are currently on offer fail to spell out the precise conditions that have to be fulfilled before the PP may be invoked or the nature of the preventative action that has to be taken. The types of action suggested range from implementing a ban, imposing a moratorium while further research is conducted, allowing the potentially harmful activity to proceed while closely monitoring its effects, to just conducting more research. The PP does not have a very precise meaning as long as such crucial aspects are left largely unanswered. In practice, however, the PP is often given a more definite meaning by reducing it to an absurdity. Normally, no minimal threshold of plausibility is specified as a “triggering” condition, so that even the slightest indication that a particular product or activity might possibly produce some harm to human health or the environment will suffice to invoke the principle. And just as often no other preventative action is contemplated than an outright ban on the incriminated product or activity. The intervention of Greenpeace in the monarch butterfly case seems to fit this pattern. Closely linked to various versions of the PP is the idea of reversing the onus of proof. Thus, the adherents of the Wingspread Statement declare that “the applicant or proponent of an activity or process or chemical needs to demonstrate that the environment and public health will be safe. The proof must shift to the party or entity that will benefit from the activity and that is most likely to have the information” (Raffensberger and Tickner, 1999). Greenpeace also holds that effective implementation of the PP requires a shift in the burden of proof (Greenpeace, 2001). Shifting the burden of proof seems a fairly straightforward way to ensure, as Jonas demanded, that greater weight will be given to the “prognosis of doom” than to the “prognosis of bliss.” Before looking into the proper assignment of the burden of proof, we must first examine more closely the underlying justification for the strong version of the PP. Why should the prospect of harmful effects of a new technology take precedence over the prospect of beneficial effects, quite apart from the inherent likelihood of each of these possibilities? The obvious answer seems to be that such a priority is defensible only when the harmful effects are of such magnitude that they carry catastrophic (or, as Jonas would say, “apocalyptic”) potential. The infinite costs of a possible catastrophic outcome necessarily outweigh even the slightest probability of its occurrence. This type of reasoning exhibits a remarkable resemblance to a well-known example of a “zero-infinity dilemma,” namely Pascal's famous “wager.” When it comes to wagering on the existence of God, the 17th century French philosopher argued incisively in his Pensées that it is better to be safe than sorry (Haller, 2000; Graham, 2002; Manson, 2002). Given an unknown but nonzero probability of God's existence and the infinity of the reward of an eternal life, the rational option would be to conduct one's earthly life as if God exists. Alas, Pascal's reasoning contains a fatal flaw. His argument is vulnerable to the “many gods” objection (Manson, 2002). Consider the possible existence of another deity than God, say Odin. If Odin is jealous, he will resent our worship of God, and we will have to pay an infinite price for our mistake. Never mind that Odin's existence may not seem likely or plausible to us. It is sufficient that we cannot exclude the possibility that he exists with absolute certainty. Therefore, the very same logic of Pascal's wager would lead us to adopt the opposite conclusion not to worship God. Pascal's argument, then, cannot be valid. If the wager argument is not valid, the strong version of the PP (which Manson dubs the “catastrophe principle”) cannot be valid either. Take the application of this principle to the problem of global warming. Environmentalists often argue that even if it is not conclusively established that the emission of carbon dioxide and other gases causes an enhanced greenhouse effect, the mere prospect of an ecological catastrophe due to such a scenario should lead us to drastically curb our emissions of greenhouse gases now. By the same logic, however, one could conjure up the possibility of a coming ice age. The mere prospect of this equally catastrophic scenario should then induce us to avert this outcome by stepping up the emission of greenhouse gases. Thus, the strong version of the PP would lead to contradictory recommendations (compare with Graham, 2002). In a similar way, it could be argued that this principle commits us to each of two contradictory policies: (a) We must not develop GM crops, and (b) We must develop GM crops. The first alternative is argued vehemently by many environmentalists who appeal to the PP. To support the second possibility, Gary Comstock conjures up a dramatic scenario in which people are forced to seize upon the remaining reserves of nature in a desperate effort to overcome food shortages resulting from global warming. He then argues, in the style of the environmentalists, that “lack of full scientific certainty that GM crops will prevent environmental degradation shall not be used as a reason for postponing this potentially cost-effective measure” (Comstock, 2000). Therefore, the strong version of the PP is untenable. But what about the proposed shifting of the onus of proof toward those who advocate a new technology or activity? Reversing the burden of proof would amount to substituting the maxim “guilty until proven innocent” for the age-old legal principle “innocent until proven guilty.” Biotech enthusiasts and antiregulationists resent this departure from what they consider time-honored legal sanity (Miller and Conko, 2000). They are prone to counter the frequent invocation of the PP with an equally insistent demand of “sound science.” The same opposition is also at the center of the present World Trade Organization trade disputes between the United States and the European Union and their disagreement on the regulation of GM crops. One side claims the moral high ground, whereas the other side attempts to seize the scientific high ground. The situation is highly polarized because various economic and political interests are at stake (Fig. 1). Wheat (Triticum aestivum) fields in the Palouse region of the state of Washington in the United States. The polarized discussion about the PP and the adoption of GM crops has become a proxy for everything that Europeans and environmentalists in other countries don't like about modern agriculture. The rejection of agricultural biotechnology may perhaps be tolerated as a European indulgence but hardly makes sense on a global scale. The critics of the PP assert that the burden that environmentalists and regulators want to impose on the proponents of new technologies tends to be unbearable (Miller and Conko, 2000). In the name of absolute safety, the latter are asked nothing less than to demonstrate conclusively that the new technologies they advocate offer no possible harm. This is a formidable, perhaps even logically impossible, task. You cannot prove a negative (compare with Wildavsky, 1995). Moreover, a risk-free world is not a real option. Thus, a consistent application of the PP would in the final analysis stifle all innovation. A closer analysis of what is involved in applying the classical principle “innocent until proven guilty,” however, reveals that the situation need not be as black and white as it seems at first sight. Take the paradigm case of criminal justice. There are two main ways in which a miscarriage of justice can come about. Either the suspect did not commit the crime, but the verdict found him guilty; or the suspect did commit the crime, but the verdict found him not guilty. In a civilized system of justice, the risks of the first type of error are minimized as far as possible. That is what is meant by the phrase “innocent until proven guilty.” The system contains safeguards and precautions in the form of high standards of proof so as to ensure that a suspect will be condemned for a certain criminal offense only if it has been established “beyond reasonable doubt” that he in fact committed the alleged offense. Alas, there is a price to be paid for this cautious and civilized approach, namely the possibly large number of wrongdoers who have to be acquitted due to “lack of sufficient proof.” To a certain extent, the risks of the two types of error are inversely related. We may to the risk of an by demanding ever more standards of proof but only at the of increasing the risk of Therefore, we must that there is an involved in the of our system of criminal justice. We may to our standards as high as we but a must be the system will become by making it to sentence on the of there is a similar to be between the of a type or a type the of when it is in fact or to the when in fact it is By a we a particular this should on our of the and with of the two types of The analysis that the at issue is not just to burden of proof. as we for more or less standards of proof, an of In other the burden we want to put on the of one or the other party more or less on we our standards of proof more or less This may us to from the polarized opposition of PP versus In most companies to GM crops have to their to for health effects and environmental This can be more or less The of those who by “sound is a fully risk However, it is only possible to this in more and such as or are at then the expression “sound is because it the that necessarily into the of of and between type and type In other or more ecological effects are at the of the fully risk is of “sound will be to such less straightforward as or risks that can be However, as the proponents of the PP are in lack of of harm is not of lack of harm. If we are really about such hazards, we can put in effort to more about their plausibility or It would be to our with an appeal to “sound science.” A recent European on the release of GMOs into the environment that any that to or a transgenic should carry out a environmental risk into immediate and 2001). This new regulation of GM crops much further than some American also argue for a more approach et al., 2001). The new European a burden of proof on biotech companies to or not they are to take that burden on their will on the definition of a or for conducting environmental risk The to be is that the on these companies will become them at the of regulatory and for of environmental This will be enhanced by the fact that the of the has been by the PP and that regulatory authorities may give to the of GMOs only they have been that the release will be safe for human health and the The fairly of the environmental risk need not be in if of play for the regulation of GM crops can be More is also about the that have to be taken into in The outcome of the is for on or not in are taken as a or or not a strong to as a option is 2001). The and of a Bt maize hybrid or any other transgenic might be quite in than in the United States. Europeans are to because their countries lack of and other of regulatory at holds that the in on GM is not about safety, but is in fact a proxy for a on how should be 2001). GM crops have become a for all that Europeans don't like in modern agriculture. a for and a rejection of agricultural biotechnology perhaps may be tolerated as a European the prospect hardly makes sense on a global scale. this is what Greenpeace us as a the NGO us a serious answer to the of how to a growing world and natural the of modern biotechnology (compare with 1999). We can even press the environmentalist organization by the Thus, it that the polarized on the PP is just a proxy for a on the of world agriculture.
We present the first constant-round non-malleable commitment scheme and the first constant-round non-malleable zero-knowledge argument system, as defined by Dolev, Dwork and Naor (1991). Previous constructions either used a non-constant number of rounds, or were only secure under stronger setup assumptions. An example of such an assumption is the shared random string model where we assume all parties have access to a reference string that was chosen uniformly at random by a trusted dealer. We obtain these results by defining an adequate notion of non-malleable coin-tossing, and presenting a constant-round protocol that satisfies it. This protocol allows us to transform protocols that are non-malleable in (a modified notion of) the shared random string model into protocols that are non-malleable in the plain model (without any trusted dealer or setup assumptions). Observing that known constructions of a non-interactive non-malleable zero-knowledge argument systems in the shared random string model (De Santis et. al., 2001) are in fact non-malleable in the modified model, and combining them with our coin-tossing protocol we obtain the results mentioned above. The techniques we use are different from those used in previous constructions of non-malleable protocols. In particular our protocol uses diagonalization and a non-black-box proof of security (in a sense similar to Barak's zero-knowledge argument (2001)).
In this paper we propose a definition for (honest verifier) quantum statistical zero-knowledge interactive proof systems and study the resulting complexity class, which we denote QSZK/sub HV/. We prove several facts regarding this class, including: the following problem is a complete promise problem for QSZKHV: given instructions for preparing two mixed quantum states, are the states close together or far apart in the trace norm metric? This problem is a quantum generalization of the complete promise problem of Sahai and Vadhan (1997) for (classical) statistical zero-knowledge; QSZK/sub HV/ is closed under complement; QSZK/sub HV//spl sube/PSPACE. (At present it is not known if arbitrary quantum interactive proof systems can be simulated in PSPACE even for one-round proof systems); any polynomial-round honest verifier quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof system can be simulated by a two-message (i.e., one-round) honest verifier quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof system. Similarly, any polynomial-round honest verifier quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof system can be simulated by a three-message public-coin honest verifier quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof system. These facts establish close connections between classical statistical zero-knowledge and our definition for quantum statistical zero-knowledge, and give some insight regarding the effect of this zero-knowledge restriction on quantum interactive proof systems. The relationship between our definition and possible definitions of general (i.e., not necessarily honest) quantum statistical zero-knowledge are also discussed.
We show that every language in NP has a (black-box) concurrent zero-knowledge proof system using O/spl tilde/(log n) rounds of interaction. The number of rounds in our protocol is optimal, in the sense that any language outside BPP requires at least /spl Omega//spl tilde/(log n) rounds of interaction in order to be proved in black-box concurrent zero-knowledge. The zero-knowledge property of our main protocol is proved under the assumption that there exists a collection of claw free functions. Assuming only the existence of one-way functions, we show the existence of O/spl tilde/(log n)-round concurrent zero-knowledge arguments for all languages in NP.
We consider the problem of discrete-time iterative learning control (ILC) for position trajectory tracking of multiple-input, multiple-output systems with Coulomb friction, bounds on the inputs, and equal static and sliding coefficients of friction. Only position measurements are assumed available. No velocity measurements are assumed available. We present an ILC controller and a proof of convergence to zero tracking error, provided the associated learning gain matrices are scalar-scaled with a sufficiently small positive scalar. We also show that non-diagonal learning gain matrices satisfying the same prescribed conditions do not lead to the same convergence property. To the best of our knowledge, for problems with Coulomb friction, this paper represents a first convergence theory for the discrete-time ILC problem with multiple-inputs and multiple-bounded-outputs; previous work presented the theory only for the single-input, single-output problem.
We put forward a new type of computationally-sound proof systems, called universal-arguments, which are related but different from both CS-proofs (as defined by Micali, 2000) and arguments (as defined by Brassard et al., 1986). In particular, we adopt the instance-based prover-efficiency paradigm of CS-proofs, but follow the computational-soundness condition of argument systems (i.e., we consider only cheating strategies that are implementable by polynomial-size circuits). We show that universal-arguments can be constructed based on standard intractability assumptions that refer to polynomial-size circuits (rather than assumptions referring to subexponential-size circuits as used in the construction of CS-proofs). As an application of universal-arguments, we weaken the intractability assumptions used in the recent non-black-box zero-knowledge arguments of Barak (2001). Specifically, we only utilize intractability assumptions that refer to polynomial-size circuits (rather than assumptions referring to circuits of some "nice" super-polynomial size).
In 1986, the German sociologist Ulrich Beck published the first edition of his book, Risk Society.1 Beck's book has attained wide popularity, especially in Europe, for his analysis of the distance between scientific expertise and popular opinion in the understanding of potential harms. Time and again, Beck points out, the public complains that there is a harmful process at work, while the scientists who are appointed by authorities to assess the complaints conclude that there is no objective basis for concern. Too often, though, the scientific conclusions are advanced without involving the public and without taking into account conditions outside of the laboratory. Subsequent experiences, such as the Mad Cow disaster in British livestock, have only reinforced the problem. Public skepticism about genetically modified organisms and the food supply can be traced to the same roots. On both sides of the Atlantic, the example of HIV in the blood supply, the halting management of the crisis, and the resulting loss of public confidence in the system, constitute an all-too-familiar case for readers of this journal. These kinds of examples and the conditions that Beck describes and explicates helped lead to the development of a policy standard, again especially in Europe, called the precautionary principle. In a 1992 statement, the European Environment Agency gave a succinct statement of the principle: [I]n order to protect the environment, a precautionary approach should be widely applied, meaning that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage to the environment, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. Further, The precautionary principle permits a lower level of proof of harm to be used in policy-making whenever the consequences of waiting for higher levels of proof may be very costly and/or irreversible (emphasis added).2 Paradoxically, technologic advancement itself is the source of the risks that concern us. In other words, scientific expertise has created the very conditions that society now doubts the experts fully appreciate. In Risk Society, Beck defines risk as “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself.” He goes on, “Risks, as opposed to older dangers, are consequences which relate to the threatening force of modernization and to its globalization of doubt.” The social and political conditions that affect current issues in transfusion medicine are thus part of a much larger “globalization of doubt” about expertise. Although he does not allude to transfusion medicine per se, it is a paradigm case of risk in the sense that Beck writes about, for it has been a modernizing development in medical care and the risks it brings about would not exist without that modernization. The tensions within a “risk society” are brought to the surface when a new incident reignites doubt, such as concerns about West Nile virus in the summer of 2002. Sensitized by previous failures to satisfy public concern, responsible officials leap into action, often shifting their attention and energy away from known and measurable risks to persuade society that the unknown and often nonmeasurable risk is being taken seriously. This reaction, while understandable in light of the critique leveled by Beck and many others, should give us pause. Along with policies intended to drastically reduce risk, it is an example of the way that the precautionary principle has been both transformed into a dogma and taken out of its original context. I call these tendencies “creeping precautionism” because the adoption of a precautionary stance may not even be noticed until it is too late, and because a reasonable principle can easily be turned into a self-defeating ideology. Consider two recent policies that public health and blood industry experts have cited in conversation as examples that might reflect creeping precautionism: p24 antigen testing for HIV, which may have prevented one case per year at a cost of tens of millions a year; and deferral of donors who have been European residents, when the risk of CJD risk remains highly theoretical with no documented case of transmission, and hundreds of thousands of units have been lost as a result. I am no authority on the complex medical and public health issues involved, but suppose for the sake of argument that these policies raise valid questions. How did they come to pass? Clearly many elements came into play in these policy decisions. One that has not previously been identified is the fact that, as these policies were being formed, the precautionary principle came to have a great deal of influence in environmental health circles. In fact, I believe that we live in a period in which the principle has, without argument and often without conscious awareness, both been taken out of context, applied to problems other than catastrophic health concerns, and misinterpreted. The original context was environmentalism, where ecologic complexities and uncertainties present risks that, for all intents and purposes, may truly be inestimable and irreversible. Those conditions may not apply in other policy contexts. The misinterpretation has been to suppose that precautionism requires that only zero risk is acceptable, or at least something quite close to zero risk. Even advocates of the principle would recognize these subtle shifts in thinking as errors. In particular, it is clear that no action or inaction is risk free, and that any decision has opportunity costs. The opportunity costs of precautionism in the blood industry are, among others, the loss of many usable units of blood and the alienation of potential donors. I am not arguing that the policies in question are without merit nor that they should be repealed. Rather, I urge that a discussion begin in the blood services community about whether unwarranted precautionism has in fact crept into policymaking. This discussion should also take into account the peculiar stresses upon the role of expertise in a modern democracy. To step back for a moment, it is useful to recall the classical origins of the idea of expertise. In his seminal work, The Republic, Plato uses an allegory to characterize the situation of the truly knowledgeable person. He spins a tale about a group of slaves bound to their places since birth, unable to turn their heads, and only able to view a wall in front of them. Behind them are carried ordinary objects, whose shadows fall upon the wall. Knowing nothing better, the slaves assume that the shadows are the real objects. Now suppose, Plato continues, a slave manages to break his bonds and escape to the mouth of the cave. Unaccustomed to the light, he will at first be blinded by the sun, then realize to his horror that all his life what he has thought was reality was merely illusion. He tries to enlighten (pun intended) his comrades, but they mock him as mad. Discouraged, he takes his place among the slaves again. The allegory implies that knowledge is painful, hard to achieve, and subject to ridicule by the ignorant. This is the uncomfortable position of the expert. The problem is especially grave in medicine, whose practitioners are supposed to be sensitive to the uninitiated. Yet, too much sensitivity is incompatible with the detachment and decorum that the physician requires to be effective. Sir William Osler, generally regarded as the father of internal medicine, commented on this dilemma of the health care expert over a century ago. Imperturbability. . . . It is the quality which is most appreciated by the laity though often misunderstood by them; and the physician who has the misfortune to be without it, who betrays indecision and worry, and who shows that he is flustered and flurried in ordinary emergencies, loses rapidly the confidence of his patients.3 I write as a product and professor of the bioethical revolution in medicine, which is characterized by a deep suspicion of expertise, manifested as the insistence on informed consent and truth telling by doctors. This revolution is only about 30 years old in practice and would have shocked my father, a 1917 graduate of the University of Vienna medical school. The emergence of bioethics in the 1970s (my father died in 1974, too soon to experience the sweeping changes in medical ethics) is of a piece with the appearance of the precautionary principle of the 1980s. Both are rooted in skepticism of professional authority, and both have advocated lay involvement in medical decisions. I do not advocate repudiating the new medical ethics. As the Yale University psychiatrist and law professor Jay Katz has long pointed out, the doctor-patient relationship was for eons characterized by a doctor-dominated paradigm that is best left behind. Yet, I worry that the critique of modernism, of expertise, has swung too far. In the clinical setting, I have seen this phenomenon manifested as the reluctance of physicians to give advice to patients who are facing a complex treatment decision. Often I hear complaints that doctors respond to patients’ requests for guidance with the demurrer that it is their decision, that they must exercise their self-determination. This is a case of turning patient autonomy into a shield behind which doctors can hide. The ethical principle of autonomy should not be an excuse for abandoning the counseling that patients crave. Similarly, in the long run I think it is bad for the profession to give up the moral authority that comes with expertise. Perhaps those with expertise in public health and blood should open a conversation about whether they have succumbed to creeping protectionism in an honest attempt to learn from the horrors of the HIV experience. I cannot say whether this is the case, only that the signs point to this possibility. On the importance of a philosophical view of scientific expertise, consider Osler again. A rare and precious gift is the Art of Detachment, by which a man may so separate himself from a life-long environment as to take a panoramic view of the conditions under which he has lived and moved: it frees him from Plato's den long enough to see the realities as they are, the shadows as they appear. Could a physician attain to such an art he would find in the state of his profession a theme calling as well for the exercise of the highest faculties of description and imagination as for the deepest philosophic insight.4 In our time, scientists have learned about the pitfalls of an aristocratic attitude. The challenge is to balance those lessons with society's continuing need for unshackled expertise. To this end, efforts should be made to develop evidence that quantifies, or at least aids in prioritizing risks, with the goal of evidence-based risk assessment. Scientists and physicians should then recognize their social obligation to participate in policy debates in which their expert opinions can help the public balance imminent and more remote risks and evaluate the costs associated with risk-minimizing initiatives. In this way, perhaps we can all meet the Platonic challenge of doing science in a democracy.
Digital watermarking is a promising technology for protecting intellectual property rights on digital content. Resolving authorship-disputes was one of the first and most propelling applications of robust digital watermarks, and much research effort has gone into protocols for resolving authorship-disputes by means of digital watermarks. Unfortunately, previous proposals lack formal definitions of their trust model, their assumptions, and requirements they should fulfill. This lack of formal definitions makes security proofs for such protocols impossible and many dispute resolving protocols, claimed to be secure, can be shown to be insecure. In this paper we set off to rigorously defining dispute resolving schemes based on a reasonable formal definition of "authorship." Building on this formal fundament, we analyze the most important proposals for dispute resolving, and discuss their connection to our authorship model. We show that existing proposals suffer from two major problems: First, they require an unnecessary high level of trust in the dispute resolving party. The second and even more serious is that the winner of the dispute is not guaranteed to be the rightful author of the disputed work (conclusiveness problem). As solutions, we propose dispute resolving schemes based on zero-knowledge watermark detection and asymmetric watermarking schemes.
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
This paper aims to improve local financial system for socio-economic development at local and regional levels. It has been widely known among financial experts and planners that local financial system is inadequate to meet the increasing needs for local governments to provide various local services. Local financial system needs to be improved particularly for the achievement of decentralization and regional balanced development, which have been selected as major national agenda of the Roh Mu-hyun administration. The first half of this paper reviews current status and problems of local finance in terms of its relative size against national finance, ratio of local revenue against total local finance, and eff iciency in using local finance for regional development. It suggests that unlike many previous arg uments, the major problem of local finance is not its over-all size but its inequal distribution among regions and its inefficient use for regional development. The paper introduces the concept of local financial coefficient to analyze the inequality of local financial capability, particularly between the Capital region and rest of regions in Korea. It shows that the national finance has been overly allocated in the Capital regions while it has been insufficiently allocated in other regions. Furthermore, this paper clearly indicates that current proposals for the improvement of local financial system are likely to widen regional inequalities and weaken national financial capability to promote regional balanced development. The second half of this paper proposes some policy prescriptions to improve local financial system in the context of balanced regional development. It suggests that it is necessary to expand local financial capability to promote regional development projects in less prospe rous regions and to establish a regional governance system to coordinate regional development projects between the central and local governments for the efficient use of financial re sources at local and regional level.
This article analyzes how administrative decentralization can improve the provision of social services in Africa. It uses political, economic, and historical approaches, to investigate the bureaucratic dysfunctions that administrative decentralization may reduce. It argues that administrative decentralization can overcome the all-time challenge for African central governments to broadcast authority over harsh and sparsely inhabited territories. Also, by tackling the use of public employment and wages to leverage distributive politics, it may reduce the distortions affecting the financing of public services, and which particularly undermine the quality of education. Administrative decentralization may also enhance merit-based appointments and promotions of bureaucrats by reducing the propensity to resort to public employment and wages as a means for political officials to reward loyalty and to recruit fellows. Finally, administrative decentralization may leverage effectively civil service reforms seeking to align central bureaucracies with the objective of poverty reduction through enhanced service delivery. Attention is drawn, however, to the conflicts that may arise, as administrative decentralization will come to threaten vested interests. The paper argues that for reformer international institutions, handling situations of political crises and learning how to use them to leverage reform will be critical for the success of administrative decentralization in Africa.
The Distributed Computing Column covers the theory of systems that are composed of a number of interacting computing elements. These include problems of communication and networking, databases, distributed shared memory, multiprocessor architectures, operating systems, verification, internet, and the web.This issue consists of the paper "Reconstructing Paxos" by Romain Boichat, Partha Dutta, Svend Frølund, and Rachid Guerraoui. Many thanks to them for contributing to this issue.The celebrated Paxos algorithm of Lamport implements a fault-tolerant deterministic service by replicating it over a distributed message-passing system. In a companion paper [2], we presented a deconstruction of the algorithm by factoring out its fundamental algorithmic principles within two abstractions: an eventual leader election and an eventual register abstractions. Using those abstractions, we show in this paper how to reconstruct, in a modular manner, powerful variants of Paxos. In particular, we show how to (1) alleviate the need for stable storage access if some processes remain up for sufficiently long, (2) augment the resilience of the algorithm against unstable processes, (3) enable single process decision with shared commodity disks, and (4) reduce the number of communication steps during stable periods of the system.The Island of Paxos used to host a great civilisation which had developed a sophisticated parttime parliament protocol. Paxons codified various aspects of their parliament protocol which enabled them to easily adapt the protocol to specific functioning modes throughout the seasons. In particular, during winter, the parliament was heated and some legislators did never leave the chamber: their guaranteed presence helped alleviate the need for the writing of decrees on ledgers. This was easy to obtain precisely because the subprotocol used to "store and lock" decrees was precisely codified. In spring, and with the blooming days coming, some legislators could not stop leaving and entering the parliament. Their indiscipline prevented progress in the protocol. However, as the election subprotocol used to choose the parliament president was also precisely codified, the protocol could easily be adapted to cope with indisciplined legislators. During summer, very few legislators were in the parliament and it was hardly possible to pass any decree because of the lack of the necessary majority. Fortunately, it was easy to modify the subprotocol used to store and lock decrees and devise a powerful technique where a single legislator could pass decrees by directly accessing the ledgers of other legislators. Fall was a protest season and citizens wanted a faster procedure to pass decrees. Paxons noticed that, in most periods, messengers did not loose messages and legislators replied in time. They could devise a variant of the protocol that reduced the number of communication steps needed to pass decrees during those periods. Again, this optimisation was obtained through a simple refinement of the subprotocol used to propose new decrees.
Larry M. Coutts, Frank Schneider, Andrew Johnson, Paul McLeod
ABSTRACT This research focuses on developing strategies for the more effective recruitment and selection of community policing (CP) officers. University students (N = 178) reviewed descriptions of the law enforcement policing (LEP) and (CP) models. After rating each model on several evaluative criteria, one-half of the participants completed a measure of personality (Neo Personality Inventory; Costa & McCrae, 1992), while the other half completed a measure of vocational interest type (Self-Directed Search; Holland, Powell & Fritzsche, 1997). The dimensions of personality and vocational interest type were correlated with the ratings of the models. The ratings of the models supported the hypotheses that students would equate extant policing with LEP, prefer to work under CP, and experience increased interest in a career in policing once informed of the emergence of CP. These results were interpreted as suggesting that if the public were better informed about CP, the police would attract a higher number of job applicants. In addition to the above, correlational analyses revealed some conceptually meaningful relationships among the individual difference variables and the evaluations of the models. These results were interpreted as suggesting the possibility of selecting recruits whose personal characteristics represent a good fit with CP. Changing from a traditional law enforcement policing (LEP) model to a community policing (CP) model has been a major objective of North American police organizations since the 1980s (Chacko & Nancoo, 1993; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). It may be argued, however, that this change requires adopting a new philosophy and strategy of policing. For example, whereas the LEP model is based on a highly centralized organizational structure, is incident driven, and emphasizes reactive response in combating crime, the CP model is more organizationally decentralized, proactive, and entails close police-community partnerships in the identification, analysis, and solution of local crime and disorder problems (Leighton, 1994; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). Given the above, it is clear that a move toward a CP model involves considerable changes in the role and concomitant skills required of front-line police officers (Clairmont, 1991; Meese, 1993; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990). For example, compared with traditional LEP officers, CP officers are called upon to demonstrate more of the following: autonomous functioning, decision making ability, innovative and analytical problem solving, effective communication with community leaders, groups, and social service agencies, and ability to plan and organize community crime prevention programs. In addition, some observers have noted that the expanded role and skills required of CP officers have significant implications for both police recruitment and selection (see e.g., Getting an Edge, 1999; Hoath, Schneider & Starr, 1998; Metchik & Winton, 1995). For example, Metchik and Winton (1995) reviewed the typical 'screening out' practices of traditional police selection and argued that CP requires more positively oriented selection criteria and procedures. This is especially true in light of the fact that significant numbers of police officers, many of whom were selected and trained under the traditional LEP model, have resisted accepting CP (Clairmont, 1991; Dicker, 1998; Roberg, 1994; Scrivner, 1995; Vinzant & Crothers, 1994). The extent to which such resistance is problematic is underscored not only by existing research which has clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of CP, but also by the enormous resources invested in the implementation of CP. In the United States, for example, since 1994 more than $7.5 billion has been invested by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to promote CP in law enforcement agencies (National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 2002). …