The twentieth century saw a vigorous debate over the nature of rights. Will theorists argued that the function of rights is to allocate domains of freedom. Interest theorists portrayed rights as defenders of well-being. Each side declared its conceptual analysis to be closer to an ordinary understanding of what rights there are, and to an ordinary understanding of what rights do for rightholders. Neither side could win a decisive victory, and the debate ended in a standoff.1 This article offers a new analysis of rights. The first half of the article sets out an analytical framework adequate for explicating all assertions of rights. This framework is an elaboration of Hohfeldâs, designed around a template for displaying the often complex internal structures of rights. Those unfamiliar with Hohfeld's work should find that the exposition here presumes no prior knowledge of it. Those who know Hohfeld will find innovations in how the system is defined and presented. Any theorist wishing to specify precisely what is at stake within a controversy over some particular right may find this framework useful. The analytical framework is then deployed in the second half of the article to resolve the dispute between the will and interest theories. Despite the appeal of freedom and well-being as organizing ideas, each of these theories is clearly too narrow. We accept rights, which do not (as the will theory holds) define domains of freedom; and we affirm rights whose aim is not (as the interest theory claims) to further the interests of the rightholder. A third theory, introduced here, is superior in describing the functions of rights as they are commonly understood. Will theorists and interest theorists have erred in adopting analyses framed to favor their commitments in normative theory. This has turned the debate between them into a proxy for the debate between Kantianism and welfarism. Yet that normative dispute cannot be resolved through a conceptual analysis of rights. The third theory presented here is not fashioned to fortify any normative position. Rather, it is offered as a vernacular standard against which to measure the interpretations of rights that various normative theories press us to accept. The ambitions of the article are thus principally descriptive. The first half of the article shows what kinds of things rights are (i.e., all rights are Hohfeldian incidents). The second half shows what rights do for rightholders (i.e., which Hohfeldian incidents are rights). The two halves together complete an analysis of the concept of a right. The analysis here is general. It holds for all rights of conduct: moral rights, legal rights, customary rights, and so on.2 The analysis aims to reveal the logical structure underlying our assertions of rights, while remaining faithful to an ordinary understanding of what rights there are, and of the significance rights have for those who hold them. The first half of the article sets out a modified Hohfeldian framework for explicating the meanings of rights assertions. The thesis of this section is that all assertions of rights can be understood in terms of four basic elements, known as the Hohfeldian incidents.3 There are two fundamental forms of rights assertions: âA has a right to phiâ and âA has a right that B phi,â where âphiâ is an active verb. We begin by connecting these two fundamental forms of assertion to the four Hohfeldian incidents: the privilege, the claim, the power, and the immunity. In the process it will emerge that each of the two fundamental forms of assertion can also indicate complex âmolecularâ rights, whose structure will be resolvable into combinations of the four âatomicâ incidents. Finally, at the end of this section we show how rights assertions that lack active verbs can be translated into active-verb form. We will then have covered all forms of rights assertions, and will have shown that all rights assertions can be understood in terms of the Hohfeldian incidents. We begin with those rights assertions of the form âA has a right to phiâ that indicate the privilege, the first of the four Hohfeldian incidents. A sheriff in hot pursuit of a suspect has the legal right to break down the door that the suspect has locked behind him. The sheriff's having a legal right to break down the door implies that he has no legal duty not to break down the door. For rights like the sheriffâs: âA has a Y right to phiâ implies âA has no Y duty not to phi.â (where âYâ is âlegal,ââmoral,â or âcustomary,â and âphiâ is an active verb)4 The type of right here is what Hohfeld called a âprivilege,â which is also called a âlibertyâ or a âlicense.â5 The sheriff's right is a single privilege. A right that is a single privilege confers an exemption from a general duty. While ordinary citizens have a duty not to break down doors, police officers have a privilege-right [no duty not] to break down doors. When President Nixon asserted that he had a legal right not to turn over the Watergate tapes, he was asserting âexecutive privilege.â Ordinary citizens have a legal duty to turn over evidence when subpoenaed. Yet Nixon alleged that because he was President he had a legal right [no duty not] not to turn over his evidence. James Bond's license to kill is also an exemption from a general duty. Bond's (alleged) right exempts him from a duty not to do what civilians emphatically have a duty not to do, viz., to kill. Similarly, your driver's license gives you the right to drive. This right exempts you from a duty not to do what you would otherwise have a strong duty not to doâto operate dangerous machinery at high speeds. We can represent a right that is a single privilege, such as your right to drive, in graphic terms as seen in Figure 1. . The Right to Drive as a Single Privilege In Figure 1 your right to drive a car is displayed as a single privilege. This single privilege is classified according to its function (a single privilege is a right of exemption), and according to the form of its assertion (a single privilege is asserted by expressions of the form âA has a right to phiâ). Some assertions of the form âA has a right to phiâ indicate not a single privilege, but a paired privilege. A paired privilege is composed of two privileges. The holder of a paired privilege has a privilege [no duty not] to phi, and also has a privilege [no duty not] not to phi. That is, for a right that is a paired privilege: âA has a Y right to phiâ implies both âA has no Y duty not to phiâ and âA has no Y duty to phi.â (where âYâ is âlegal,ââmoral,â or âcustomary,â and âphiâ is an active verb) A person vested with a paired privilege is entitled to perform some action, or not to perform that action, as he pleases. For instance, a chess player has the right to capture his opponent's pawn en passant. This right is a paired privilege: the player has a right [no duty not] to take en passant, and a right [no duty not] not to take en passant. The player may take his opponent's pawn, or not, as he thinks best. The function of a right that is a paired privilege is to endow its bearer with discretion, or choice, concerning some action. The chess player's right gives the player discretion over whether to take his opponent's pawn, or to leave that pawn on the board. Paired privileges can be enormously important. For instance, each person has extensive (if not unlimited) paired privilege-rights to move her body, and to use her property. In a liberal society each citizen also has extensive (if not unlimited) paired privilege-rights regarding her speech, association, and religious practice. These paired privilege-rights all entitle the rightholder to choose how to act within some domain: that is, they all specify what the rightholder has no duty (not) to do. It may be noticed that while a paired privilege is composed of two privileges, the function of a right that is a paired privilege is not related to the function of a right that is a single privilege. The function of a single privilege-right is to confer an exemption from a general duty. Yet neither of the privileges that make up a paired privilege need confer an exemption from a general duty. Rather, the function of the two privileges in a paired privilege-right is together to endow the rightholder with discretion concerning some action. The function of the single privilege-right (exemption) and the function of the paired privilege-right (discretion) are entirely independent.6 We can represent the chess player's right in the same space as we represented your right to drive, so long as we indicate that the rights which occupy this space may have either of two distinct functions (Fig. 2). . A Chess Player's Right as a Paired Privilege In Figure 2, âPrivileges (not) to capture a pawn en passant,â indicates the paired privilege to capture and not to capture a pawn. This paired privilege-right is classified according to its function (a paired privilege-right is, unlike a single privilege-right, a right of discretion), and according to the form of its assertion (a paired privilege-right is, like a single privilege-right, asserted by expressions of the form âA has a right to phiâ). We assert not only that âA has a right to phi,â but that âA has a right that B phi.â This second fundamental form of rights-assertion often implies not a lack of a duty in the rightholder A, but the presence of a duty in a second party B. In such cases: âA has a Y right that B phiâ implies âB has a Y duty to A to phi.â (where âYâ is âlegal,ââmoral,â or âcustomary,â and âphiâ is an active verb) Ignoring the domain restriction âY,â let us examine the simple assertion âA has a right that B phiâ when this implies âB has a duty to A to phi.â The Hohfeldian incident here indicated is the claim. For every claim in A there is some B who has a duty to A. Your right that I not strike you correlates to my duty not to strike you. Your right that I help you correlates to my duty to help you. Your right that I do what I promised correlates to my duty to do what I promised.7 As these examples suggest, rights that are claims can have three different functions. A claim-right can entitle its bearer to protection against harm or paternalism, or to provision in case of need, or to specific performance of some agreed-upon, compensatory, or legally or conventionally specified action. Claims, like privileges, can be of signal importance. Your right against assault, and a child's right to a decent education, and an employee's right to his pay are all examples of rights that are claims. Some rights are privileges, and some rights are claims. Many familiar rights are combinations of both of these Hohfeldian incidents. For example, in the United States arrestees have the right to remain silent. This is a âmolecularâ right made up of a privilege and a claim. The arrestee's privilege is a single privilege [no duty not] not to speak, which exempts the arrestee from the general duty to obey police instructions. The arrestee's claim correlates to the police officersâ duties not force him to speak, which protects the arrestee from the police (Fig. 3). . The Right to Remain Silent as a Privilege and a Claim Figure 3 displays an arrestee's molecular right to remain silent. On the left is the single privilege: a right of exemption of the form âA has a right to phi.â On the right is the claim: a right of protection of the form âA has a right that B phi.â The privilege and the claim together make up the arrestee's right to remain silent. âA has a right to phiâ often implies a privilege, and âA has a right that B phiâ often implies a claim. These implications hold oftenânot alwaysâbecause each of these forms of rights-assertion can also indicate a different, âhigher-orderâ Hohfeldian incident. We have not only privileges and claims, but rights to alter our privileges and claims, and rights that our privileges and claims not be altered.8 The higher-order incident indicated by âA has a right to phiâ is the power. To have a power is to have the ability within a set of rules to alter the normative situation of oneself or another. Specifically, to have a power is to have the ability within a set of rules to create, waive, or annul some lower-order incident(s). I have a right to promise to give you my fortune. Before I exercise this right I have no duty to give you my fortune, and you have no claim that I do. In exercising my power by making the promise, I create in you a claim to my fortune and thereby create in myself the duty to give it to you. Similarly, a judge has the legal right (power) to sentence a criminal to prison, meaning that a judge has the ability to annul the criminal's privileges of free movement. Or again: in a restaurant you have the customary right (power) to waive your claim to be served a sample of the wine before the bottle is poured, thereby annulling the waiter's customary duty to serve you this sample. The power, like the privilege, is indicated by propositions of the form âA has a right to phi.â All rights that are powers confer authority. Rights that are single powers confer nondiscretionary authority. For example, a judge's right to sentence a convicted criminal under mandatory sentencing laws is a single power. The judge's right authorizes her to annul the criminal's right to free movement. Yet this is a single power because the judge has no discretion under the sentencing laws: she must use her authority to sentence the criminal to a specified term of years. A right that is a paired power confers discretionary authority. For example, you have the power to waive, and the power not to waive, the waiter's duty to serve you a sample of wine. Rights that are paired powers, like rights that are paired privileges, endow their bearers with discretion concerning some action. Rights that are paired powers are thus both authorizing and discretionary.9 The rights that are indicated by the form âA has a right to phiâ have, in sum, three possible functions: single privileges mark an exemption from a general duty; both paired privileges and paired powers mark discretion within a certain domain; and both single powers and paired powers mark authority to alter the normative situation in some way. Powers can range over the rights of others. Clearly such powers must not be unlimited. The fourth and final Hohfeldian incident is the immunity. One person has an immunity whenever another person lacks the ability within a set of rules to change her normative situation in a particular respect. The immunity, like the claim, is signaled by the form âA has a right that B phiâ (or, more commonly, â. . . that B not phiâ). Rights that are immunities, like many rights that are claims, entitle their holders to protection against harm or paternalism. A professor has the right to teach and research at her university. A tenured professor has the right that her university not annul her rights to teach and research. The right of tenure is an immunity. The tenured professor's right corresponds to the university's lack of a right (power) to fire her. Similarly, an American's right that Congress not restrict her privilege of free speech protects her against the general power of Congress to impose duties upon her. A witness granted a right against prosecution gains an immunity against being indicted for certain crimes. A defendant who desires to be punished may invoke a right against being required to present evidence that might lead to his acquittal. All of these rights are immunities, and all protect the rightholder from harm or paternalism.10 Figure 4 displays all four Hohfeldian incidents working together within a complex right that you have over your body. This complex right comprises both first-order incidents (a paired privilege and a claim) and second-order incidents (a paired power and an immunity). On the first order, the paired privilege endows you with the discretion to move your body, or not to move your body, as you see fit. The claim on the first order affords you protection; it correlates to a duty in each other person not to touch your body. On the second order are your rights regarding the alteration of these first-order rights. Here we see the paired power that gives you the discretionary authority to waive your claim against others touching your body: your right, that is, to authorize others to touch your body. Also on the second order is your protective immunity against other people waiving your claim not to be touched: your right, that is, against anyone else authorizing others to touch your body. . A Complex Molecular Right As Figure 4 shows, the four incidents are positioned in the diagram according to their attributes. Rights over objects such as one's body are first-order privileges and claims. Rights over rights are second-order powers and immunities. As for the two columns, A's âactiveâ rights on the left are privileges and powers, while A's âpassiveâ rights on the right are claims and immunities. Privileges and powers are exercised, while claims and immunities are not exercised; they are merely enjoyed.11 Moreover, there is an overlap in function between privileges (exemption, discretion) and powers (discretion, authorization) on the left; and an overlap in function between claims (protection, provision, performance) and immunities (protection) on the right. Most rights are complex molecular rights like the one in Figure 4: rights made up of multiple Hohfeldian incidents.12 Molecular rights indicated by the form âA has a right to phiâ (where phi is an active verb) will always contain an incident from the left side of the diagramâa privilege or powerâalthough they may contain incidents from the right side as well. Thus the right to move freely is a molecular right that contains privileges (not) to travel about the country; and the right to lead a meeting is a molecular right that contains the power to close a debate.13 Molecular rights indicated by the form âA has the right that B phiâ will always contain an incident from the right side of the diagramâa claim or immunityâalthough they may contain incidents from the left side as well. Thus the right that others respect one's privacy is a molecular right containing a claim against unwanted surveillance; and the right that the government not take one's property without due process is a molecular right containing an immunity against sudden expropriation.14 We have shown how the two fundamental forms of rights assertions can be understood in terms of the Hohfeldian incidents. In both of these fundamental forms of rights-assertion âphiâ is an active verb. Assertions of rights in which âphiâ is not an active verb but a noun (âWorkers have the right to a decent wageâ) or in which âphiâ is a passive verb (âChildren have a right to be educated at state expenseâ) are easily transposed into active verb forms. Workers have a right that their employers pay them a decent wage, and children have a right that the state pay for their education.15 Explications of assertions of rights containing nouns and passive verbs merge in this way into the explication of the two fundamental forms of rights-assertion. Finally, assertions of broad or indeterminate rightsâsuch as the âright to free expressionââcan be specified in several different ways into complexes of Hohfeldian incidents. The different specifications will correspond to different understandings of the right at stake. Indeed one of the virtues of the Hohfeldian framework is its capacity to display in exact terms various interpretations of what people might mean when they assert a broad or indeterminate right like the right to free expression. For example, should a controversial author assert that his right to free has by a to his a Hohfeldian explication will show that the author is not asserting the privilege-rights to by protective claims and immunities. is asserting a claim-right that others the of his expression. This Hohfeldian explication will be in the of the assertion that his right to free has The framework for explicating rights assertions into assertions about Hohfeldian incidents is Any assertion of a right can be translated into an assertion about a single Hohfeldian or into an assertion about a complex of or into a set of assertions about such incidents. All rights are Hohfeldian incidents. The of this thesis is In sample rights, we have Each right can be with one or more of the Hohfeldian and Each right has one or more of the specific functions (exemption, discretion, provision, The is to All rights are like All rights can be into Hohfeldian in this will as we more and more rights with the Hohfeldian and as we to find The may to or that in this is and may to the framework with more sample rights. The a of rights from a which may be for the of that the ordinary of rights is or Yet there is with ordinary The in ordinary is merely like many other such as Assertions of rights can to various Hohfeldian incidents. these incidents have different logical may into they do not the implications of their assertions. For example, it is not for a to assert a right that can only be a privilege, and then on to from this assertion that him a duty. Yet this of is not the of a in ordinary It is a in the understanding of the various meanings of the Ordinary can be entirely and that how assertions of rights the Hohfeldian incidents. The Hohfeldian framework shows that the of rights is not a simple it is the of composed of the of the and the concept of and range over and the concept of and range over lower-order incidents. and are exercised, and overlap in their functions. and are and their functions also All of the rights that we know are from these elements, in ways by the of the All rights are Hohfeldian incidents. all Hohfeldian incidents That is, would any of the four Hohfeldian or any of as A's right it to We might the theory that this the theory of rights. of the theories of the functions of will theory and the interest this theory. to the will theory and the interest theory, some Hohfeldian incidents do not as rights because they do not perform the function that all rights The will theory that only those combinations of incidents that give their holders certain kinds of are as rights. The interest theory the term to those incidents that further their well-being. The will and interest theories are each theories of rights. to these theories all rights have some single the two theories as to what that function theories would the explication of rights assertions in the first of this in which rights have distinct The long and between these two theories through interest and (a will into the In the twentieth century the between of the two theories ended in I as is often the case with this situation is by each side a of a Here I will the to each theory in order to show how each is too as an of the functions of rights, and to indicate how the of each theory is the of the A I is what might be called the several functions theory of rights. The several functions theory what is in the will and interest because it not that all rights have some single function it the of The of a theory of the functions of rights is how it our ordinary understanding of what rights there are and what significance rights have for rightholders. The several functions theory is, I will to both the will theory and the interest theory on these The will theory of rights that the single function of a right is to give the rightholder discretion over the duty of another. A has a right, for instance, because he has the power to waive or not to waive the duties that others have not to his A has a right because she has the power to performance of the or to waive as she As the thesis of the will theory, who has the right is a to the duty is The of the will theory is that it for rights the of over of action. Many rights do endow rightholders with this of discretion, and so serve the freedom of those who hold them. The between rights and so in is for will theorists a of the will on a certain of freedom what he as a right. The will theorist as a right only those Hohfeldian incidents that confer on their bearers the discretion to alter the duties of others. Thus the will theorist as rights only those molecular structures that a paired power (not) to create, waive or annul a claim that one person has against This of the function of rights also a restriction on the of rightholders. The will theorist as rightholders only those that have certain the to exercise powers to alter the duties of others. These the will theory narrow. This is in the range of rights that the theory Many rights, such as the complex right in Figure do a paired power to alter a claim. many do For example, you have no legal power to waive or annul your claim against being or your claim against being to The will theory not that you have a legal right against being or against being to Yet would these claims as rights, as the more rights that Will theorists have to this of in two The first is to restrict the of the theory to a this that the will theory is at the of the with the working of the and is not adequate to rights at the of The second is to to the incidents in as rights by who have discretion with to such as a government who has discretion over whether to a Yet this for always the would with an ordinary understanding of rights. For here the will theory is to that you have no right against being Rather, the right that you not be would be the right, the is the person with the The of the will theory are also in its to for the rights of and of The will theory can rights only in those to exercise powers, which and children are and children cannot on this have This is a at with ordinary would that it is for example, for children to have a right against The will theory in many rights that there Yet where the will theory the interest theory The interest theory holds that the single function of rights is to further their rights are those incidents whose is to the well-being of the As
During recent years, the environmental conditions around the deliverly system of social welfare in South Korea is dramatically changing. Specially, establishment of social welfare office, operation of the committee of community welfare, and decentralization of finance to local government are very important tries to rebuild the social welfare delivery system not only for the people in each local community but for constructing more developed welfare state. The purpose of this paper is to make suggestions about the developmental plan for more successive social welfare deliverly system and find primary conditions setting the system constantly in the changing environmental conditions.
Diverse Approaches in Healthcare and Education Studies
There are no other objection on the assumption that the decentralization of power for local self-government's development. Especially We can confirm that the decentralization of power must be important factor through experience of many other countries driving the decentralization of power. To pay due regard to their convenience, Our country's decentralization of power and local finance have many improvement. The decentralization of power, especially finance decentralization corresponds to basic concept of local government. So finance decentralization is a problem awaiting solution for activation of local government. That is still a matter of debate that new items of taxation will take concrete shape from finance power of local government. But to take finance security is difficult by limitation of local taxation. Of course, It is advisable to take examination on local consumption-taxation and local income-tax positively. But they have various problems by that. For several reason, There are increase of income except taxation for strengthening finance independence The financial expansion through cultural industry has certain effect and meaning. Local cultural industry bring not only visual effect on local economy but also competition power security through strategy of local specialization and strengthening of positive participation on local administration of region residents. But because our local government is unable to rearing cultural industry oneself, It is required various support by central government and development linking expert cultural companies.
The paper describes and analyzes river basin management in the most intensely urbanized and industrialized region of Brazil. The area covered by the Alto Tiete basin is almost coterminous with the Metropolitan Region of Sao Paulo. With a drainage area of 5,985 square kilometers (2.4 percent of the state's territory), the basin encompasses 35 of the 39 municipalities and 99.5 percent of the population of Greater Sao Paulo. Population growth and urban sprawl in Greater Sao Paulo have been rapid and uncontrolled in recent decades. In 2000, 17.8 million people lived in the basin and by 2010 the population is estimated to reach 20 million. This massive human occupation was accompanied by the large-scale construction of water infrastructure, including dams, pumping stations, canals, tunnels, and inter-basin transfers to and from neighboring basins. Today, the Alto-Tiete basin is served by a complex hydraulic and hydrological system. Despite this extensive water infrastructure, the water availability of the region is still very low (201 m3-hab-an) and even lower than the semiarid regions of the Brazilian Northeast. The two key management issues to be addressed in the Alto Tiete basin are water quantity to supply a burgeoning population, and water quality which is deteriorating to a point where water availability for a range of uses is severely affected. Urban flood control and mitigation represents another major challenge in the basin. Although important achievements have been made over the past 15 years, the decentralization process - characterized by the creation of the Alto-Tiete committee and its subcommittees and some financing from the State Water Resources Fund - has yet to reveal measurable physical results such as the improvement of water quality or the rationalization of water use. It is undeniable that the Alto-Tiete committee and its subcommittees have already played an important leadership role around several issues. An extraordinary mobilization around water issues, problems, and management has occurred, even though solving many water-related problems may be beyond the capacity of the committees or even of the water resources management system as a whole. Charging for water remains one of the key issues in making the Alto Tiete Committee more relevant and giving it more say in water investment and management decisions. As long as such decisions remain at the individual agency level (both state and municipal), decisionmaking will remain fragmented and it is unlikely that key policy instruments to curb water demand increases and pollution will be implemented.
Although studies of organization certainly need to include analysis of discourse, one prominent tendency within current research on organizational discourse limits its value for organizational studies through a commitment to postmodernism and extreme versions of social constructivism. I argue that a version of critical discourse analysis based on a critical realist social ontology is potentially of greater value to organization studies, and I refer in particular to the contribution it can make to research on organizational change.
ABSTRACT Cross-country studies of education and economic prosperity often reach conflicting results when using growth rates as the measure of economic development. However, growth rates lack persistence over time and may not accurately measure long-term economic success over relatively short economic horizons. To overcome this potential specification problem, we estimate the relationship between key education variables and the capital to physical labor ratio. Using both cross-sectional and panel specifications, we find that both the primary-pupilâteacher ratio and decentralized education finance are associated with a larger capital to physical labor ratio. The relationship between human capital and expenditures, private education, and test scores are less robust.
Open access
Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
Intergenerational and Educational Inequality Studies
The Paper traces the evaluation of agricultural credit in India. The first attempt at institutional changes in agriculture saw the establishment of special funds under the RBI and formation of co-operative credit societies. Then came nationalisation of commercial banks and concepts of priority sector lending. Targeted lending along with subsidized interest rate charged by the NABARD characterised this phase. Institutional framework undergoes a dramatic change since the nineties when decentralization occupies the centre stage. Micro credit societies and SHG-bank tie up assume the role of feeder canals of finance in agriculture.
Blum integers (BL), which has extensively been used in the domain of cryptography, are integers with form p , where p and q are di#erent primes both 3 mod 4 and k 1 and k 2 are odd integers. These integers can be divided two types: 1) M = pq, 2) M = p at least one of k 1 and k 2 is greater than 1.
We introduce covert two-party computation, a stronger notion of security than standard secure two-party computation. Like standard secure two-party computation, covert two-party computation allows Alice and Bob, with secret inputs xA and xB respectively, to compute a function f(xA,xB) without leaking any additional information about their inputs. In addition, covert two-party computation guarantees that even the existence of a computation is hidden from all protocol participants unless the value of the function mandates otherwise. This allows the construction of protocols that return f(xA,xB) only when it equals a certain value of interest (such as "Yes, we are romantically interested in each other") but for which neither party can determine whether the other even ran the protocol whenever f(xA,xB) is not a value of interest. Since existing techniques for secure function evaluation always reveal that both parties participate in the computation, covert computation requires the introduction of new techniques based on provably secure steganography. We introduce security definitions for covert two-party computation and show that this surprising notion can be achieved by a protocol given the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in the "honest but curious" model. Using this protocol as a subroutine, we present another protocol which is fair and secure against malicious adversaries in the Random Oracle Model --- unlike most other protocols against malicious adversaries, this protocol does not rely on zero-knowledge proofs (or similar cut-and-choose techniques), because they inherently reveal that a computation took place. We remark that all our protocols are of comparable efficiency to protocols for standard secure two-party computation.
Politicians and public managers continue to debate over whether to centralize or to decentralize departments, information systems and services. Shared service centers (SSCs) are gaining importance in public administration as a means to innovate, to reduce costs and to increase service levels. The SSC is a business model in which selected government functions are concentrated into a semi-autonomous business unit. Implementing SSCs is not easy, as it often requires several trade-offs and an effective organization and management structure.The discussions about the decision whether to use SSCs seem to be predominantly focused on efficiency and effectiveness aspects, which are rational arguments. In this research-in-progress ongoing research into the design and governance of SSC is presented. We analyze a case study at a municipality and identify factors contributing to success and failure. Our preliminary findings suggest that designing an effective management structure, establishing an architecture capturing central and decentral elements, setting the right expectations, creating a sense of urgency and ensuring that all stakeholders understand the centralization/decentralization aspects of the SSC are important elements resulting in success.
The aim of this work is to investigate the possibility of designing zero-knowledge identification schemes based on hard-on-average problems. It includes a new two-party identification protocol whose security relies on a discrete mathematics problem classified as DistNP-Complete under the average-case analysis, the so-called Distributional Matrix Representability Problem. Thanks to the use of the search version of the mentioned problem, the zero-knowledge property is formally proved by black-box simulation, and consequently the security of the proposed scheme is actually guaranteed. Furthermore, with the proposal of a new zero-knowledge proof based on a problem never used before for this purpose, the set of tools for designing cryptographic applications is enlarged.
In this paper, we propose a proof scheme of shuffle, which is an honest verifier zero-knowledge proof of knowledge such as the protocols by Groth and Furukawa. Unlike the previous schemes proposed by Furukawa-Sako, Groth, and Furukawa, our scheme can be used as the shuffle of the elements encrypted by Paillier's encryption scheme, which has an additive homomorphic property in the message part. The ElGamal encryption scheme used in the previous schemes does not have this property.
An efficient computational Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge whose security relies on the NP-completeness of the Independent Set Problem is presented here. The proposed algorithm is constructed from a bit commitment scheme based on the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem, which guarantees the fulfillment of soundness, completeness and computational zero-knowledge properties, and allows avoiding the use of the Graph Isomorphism Problem, which is present in every known Zero-Knowledge Proofs for the Independent Set Problem.
Cryptography and Data Security
Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
It's essential on algorithm design of designated confirmer signatures to construct proofs satisfying security requirements such as unforgetablility, non-transferability, invisibility and zero-knowledge. A designated confirmer signature protocol (RSA-DCSV) is proposed, based on RSA encryption and signature schemes in forms of RSA extended modular computations. Proofs for a designated verifier are considered. Security analysis on RSA-DCSV is also addressed.
Matthias Zana Naab, PhDUniversity of Pittsburgh, 2005This study examines decentralization and democratic local governance in Ghana by assessing the effectiveness of the performance of District Assemblies (DAs) in order to better understand how DAs plan, implement, and manage development activities in close partnership with communities. It applied the proposition that decentralization and democratic local governance are expected to result in more efficient, effective, sustainable, and equitable outcomes through the hypotheses that decentralization results in more effective local government; more responsive local government; local government that is democratic, more accountable, and more participatory; local people having more positive perceptions of government; and local governments providing high quality services that respond to local demands.Engaging in both exploratory and explanatory research, this study identifies important variables and relationships as well as plausible causal networks that shaped local government and governance in Ghana. Using an inductive and theory-building design, it explains a model of decentralized governance and highlights potential partnership arrangements for the effective engagement of Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) in complementing the efforts of local governments.The results of decentralization, interpreted through questionnaires as well as stories and conversations with local people in two Ghanaian District Assemblies, was a combination of success and failure. In the two case study districts, the assemblies have resulted in a slight increase in development projects and services. However, the poor level of local revenue mobilization has limited the ability of the assemblies to finance significant development projects in their districts. Consequently, this has forced the assemblies to depend on the District Assemblies' Common Fund as well as on external donor funded projects and programs and on local people in self-help projects. The analysis of revenue and expenditure patterns in the two districts showed that per capita development spending was low, while recurrent expenditure and spending on local government infrastructure was high. District assemblies and CBOs often remain unwilling partners, and both are faced with serious capacity constraints which militate against structuring effective partnerships for service delivery. The successful implementation of decentralization depends on the degree to which national political leaders are committed to decentralization, and the ability and willingness of the national bureaucracy to facilitate and support decentralized development. Therefore, the ongoing process of decentralization in Ghana must be seen in the broader context of a deliberate redirection and change in the internal regulatory framework of the state.
We consider algebras over a field $k$ of characteristic zero. The article is concerned with the isomorphism of graded vectorspaces \[ H(\gl(A))\iso\wedge (HC(A)[-1]) \] between the Lie algebra homology of matrices and the free graded commutative algebra on the cyclic homology of the $k$-algebra $A$, shifted down one degree. For unital algebras this isomorphism is a classical result obtained by Loday and Quillen and independently by Tsygan. For $H$-unital algebras, it is known to hold too, as is that the proof follows from results of Hanlon's. However, to our knowledge, the proof is not immediate, and has not been published. In this paper we fill this gap in the literature by offering a detailed proof. Moreover we establish the isomorphism in the general setting of ($H$-unital) pro-algebras.
Asynchronous collaborative applications and systems have to deal with complexities associated with interaction nature, idiosyncrasy of groups and technical and administrative issues. Inclusion of requirements derived from them is costly (in time, resources and economically). Existing solutions addresses asynchronous collaboration via simplification of requirements and by using centralized models. In this paper we present LaCOLLA, a fully decentralized infrastructure for building collaborative applications that provides general purpose collaborative functionalities. The provision of those functionalities will avoid applications deal with most of complexities derived from groups and its members, what will help inclusion of collaborative aspects. The implementation of LaCOLLA follows the peer-to-peer paradigm and pays special attention to autonomy of its members and to self-organization of the components of the infrastructure. Another key aspect is that resources (e.g. storage) and services (e.g. authorization) are provided by its members (avoiding dependency from agents not belonging to group).
A.J. Chakravarti, Gerald Baumgartner, Mario Lauria
We propose a biologically inspired and fully-decentralized approach to the organization of computation that is based on the autonomous scheduling of strongly mobile agents on a peer-to-peer network. Our approach achieves the following design objectives: near-zero knowledge of network topology, zero knowledge of system status, autonomous scheduling, distributed computation, lack of specialized nodes. Every node is equally responsible for scheduling and computation, both of which are performed with practically no information about the system. We believe that this model is ideally suited for large-scale unstructured grids such as desktop grids. This model avoids the extensive system knowledge requirements of traditional grid scheduling approaches. Contrary to the popular master/worker organization of current desktop grids, our approach does not rely on specialized super-servers or on application-specific clients. By encapsulating computation and scheduling behavior into mobile agents, we decouple both application code and scheduling functionality from the underlying infrastructure. The resulting system is one where every node can start a large grid job, and where the computation naturally organizes itself around available resources. Through the careful design of agent behavior, the resulting global organization of the computation can be customized for different classes of applications. In a previous paper, we described a proof-of-concept prototype for an independent task application. In this paper, we generalize the scheduling framework and demonstrate that our approach is applicable to a computation with a highly synchronous communication pattern, namely Cannon's matrix multiplication.
In the 2004 presidential election, the United States came much closer to electoral meltdown, violence in the streets, and constitutional crisis than most people realize. Less than a 2% swing among Ohio voters toward Democratic candidate for President John Kerry and away from incumbent Republican President George W. Bush would have placed the Ohio - and national - election for president well within the margin of litigation, and it would have gotten ugly very quickly. Allegations of voter fraud and voter suppression were rampant on both sides, and even though Kerry conceded the election on the day after Election Day, public confidence in the U.S. system of American administration is now quite low. Previously unpublished data demonstrate that there is a growing partisan divide over views of the fairness of the election process.The bad news from the story of Election 2004 is that things likely won't get better in 2008. As Part I details, the extreme partisanship and close division of the American electorate, coupled with the Electoral College system, make the possibility of another razor-close presidential election in one or more battleground states fairly likely. Add to that mix election administration incompetence and a widely decentralized system of election administration with a patchwork of inconsistent rules. What's worse, since Bush v. Gore, losing candidates have become more willing to resort to election law as part of a political strategy: the number of election-law related cases in the lower courts has risen dramatically compared to the period before the case. It all adds up to a recipe for electoral meltdown.In Part II of this Article, I argue for three reforms that could significantly lower the risk of electoral meltdown. First, I advocate registration reform, in particular universal voter registration conducted by the government coupled with a voter identification program. There has been a wide partisan divide in the election administration debate between Democrats who have expressed concern about voter suppression and Republicans who have expressed concern about voter fraud. The registration reform I advocate can alleviate both of those concerns, minimize the potential for and political rhetoric regarding voter fraud, and eliminate a great majority of potential litigation surrounding presidential election administrationSecond, I advocate a transition to nonpartisan election administration. The nonpartisan solution aims to create both the actuality and appearance of neutrality in election administration, thereby bolstering the public's faith in the process. Australia and Canada serve as good models for reform in this regard, though not necessarily their nationalization of election administration. I consider how to assure that U.S. election administrators are truly nonpartisan, and contrast arguments for nonpartisan election administration with calls for nonpartisan redistricting commissions and campaign finance enforcement.Third, I discuss the role of the courts in minimizing electoral meltdown. The key here is to encourage courts to be more willing to entertain pre-election litigation and much more chary of entertaining post-election litigation. To the extent election administration problems can be recognized in advance, pre-election judicial review prevents future harm from occurring, rather than putting courts in the position of trying to undo the bad effects of a past harm. The costs of post-election review are large: the pressure put on courts to decide arcane election law questions when the outcome of an election - especially a presidential election - is huge, and the appearance of partisan decisionmaking is inevitable.
According to the facts proven, the claimant was in the supermarket ?Torre Lucas? in the city of Murcia on 28 August 1994. There he took a glass bottle containing white lemonade from one of the shelves in order to buy it, which exploded just as he was placing it in a shopping bag. The shards reached his face and caused, among others, injuries to the iris and cornea of the right eye as a result of which his eyesight was reduced. The bottle has been identified as belonging to the commercial brand ?La Casera?. It is a product which is produced by the defendant, while a different firm, ?CarbĂłnica Murciana S.L.?, is in charge of bottling and commercial distribution. It has also been proven that the only cause of the injuries was the low quality of the product destined to be sold, since the bottle exploded because it was defective. The claimant claimed the amount of 36.520.000 pesetas from the three companies mentioned above. The Court of First Instance partially admitted this claim in a decision on 18 April 1996; the commercial firm ?La Casera S.A.? appealed against the aforementioned decision before the Appellate Court of Murcia. On 21 March 1997 this Court rejected the appeal. The defendant brought an appeal before the High Court, which was denied. In its ruling, the Court rejected the arguments brought by the defendant, amongst them the following assertion. The defendant alleged that the claimant had not proven that the product was defective, according to Article 5 of the Products Liability Act. The point is that the explosion took place without the product having being manipulated by the consumer in any way; this means that the explosion was caused by the product itself. According to Article 3 of the Act referred above, a product is defective when it does not meet the safety that a person could lawfully expect from it, taking all circumstances into account and, in particular, the presentation of the product, the reasonably foreseeable use and the time when it was put into circulation. At any rate, a product is defective when it does not meet the safety normally offered by all the other items of the same series. In the case at stake it has been sufficiently proven that the bottle which caused the injuries to the claimant markedly lacked the safety required. Therefore, since it is an unsafe product, it was obviously defective in itself as from the time when it was put into circulation. The concept of defect laid down by the Act, which follows the EU Directive 85/374 EEC, is a flexible and broad one. In addition, since there is no place for subjective elements, the safety has to be seen as a requirement of the product, because every consumer is entitled to be able to use the product without any risk for his or her physical or patrimonial integrity. The existence of the defect results from the concept established by the Act 22/1994 and has to be connected to safety that the product must offer. If this requirement is not met, the product has to be deemed defective, thereby reversing the burden of proof, since it is the manufacturer who has to bring evidence that the product is suitable or that there are other causes that could exonerate him or her from liability.