546 Reviews his style-remains curiously absent from this study.A relatively slender bibliography further suggests that thiswork ismore another chapter in theHugo/Sainte-Beuve saga than it is the finalword. None the less, the forthrightnessof the observations on display here is never less than compelling, and should invitemuch discussion from scholars of both Hugo and Sainte-Beuve, as well as attract the attention of anyone entertained by examples of literary friendships turned sour. UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL BRADLEY STEPHENS George Sand, pratiques et imaginaires de l'ecriture: colloque international de Cerisy-la Salle, Ier-8 juillet 2004. Ed. by BRIGITTE DIAz and ISABELLEHOOG NAGINSKI. Caen: Presses Universitaires de Caen. 2oo6. 399 pp. E30. ISBN 978-84I33 273-I This imposing collection of essays isone of themain fruitsof theGeorge Sand bicen tenary in2004, which was marked by an exceptional number of conferences and public events. The order of the calendar sometimes seems to impose its own logic in such commemorations, almost in defiance of intellectual considerations, but in the case of George Sand everything converges to justifypublic homage and academic reflection: an exceptional life,fullof lessons forany study of how awoman could stake her claim to a place in a public sphere that inprinciple was closed toher sex; amodel for modern feminism that at the same time resists any easy transposition, so differentare the cir cumstances inwhich itwas created from those of today; other political and social commitments thatofferone of themost developed and convincing answers for their century to thequestion of the artist's public responsibilities; above all a vast literary production, dominated by thenovel but espousing many forms,constantly changing and in that sense always experimental. Many of the articles in this volume recall and question George Sand's tendency todepreciate her own production and working methods, but that tendency perhaps helps toproduce the exceptional generic fluidity that rightly fascinates modern criticism. Everyone knows the surprising history of George Sand's reputation, her virtual disappearance in the firsthalf of the twentieth century from literaryhistory and academic discourse. Not the least interesting feature of theGeorge Sand revival thathas followed is that it marks thepartial retreatof a cri tical ideology thatcould accord Flaubert thehighest possible statuswhile professing scorn or at best indifferenceforthe woman he called 'mon chermaitre'. However, a fine article here byMarie-Eve Therenty on the failure to produce an edition of Sand's complete works, despite the efforts of Spoelberch de Lovenjoul at the end of the writer's life,comes as a reminder that the eclipse ofSand's reputation had a variety of causes. That eclipse isnow over, and the timewas right in2004, not fora stock-taking (with itssuggestion of immobility), but fora new surge of critical energy and activity. The present volume gathers together thirty-one articles,with an introduction by Brigitte Diaz and a conclusion by Isabelle Hoog Naginski. The theme ('pratiques et imaginaires de l'ecriture') isnot constraining; itdefines a vast area of reflectionwhich most of the authors occupy, but few of themmake specific reference to it,and the collection can also be approached as a series of critical studies of Sand by the best contemporary specialists in France and throughout theworld. Certain articles are of fundamental importance and will be a required reference forcritics in the future. Several also offera subtle lesson in the critical uses ofSand's own text, teasing out the complexities of her positions by confronting one textwith another (see, forexample, Jose-Luis Diaz on Sand and the 'boutique romantique'). Globally, in its richness and its diversity, the volume is itself a proof of Sand's standing. It contains occasional echoes of the old anxiety and defensiveness about her and at the same time answers MLR, 103.2,2oo8 547 them.The proof of her importance ishere, in theway herwork stimulates new think ing about literarygenre and literaryhistory. The papers arewell edited, although, as in many conference volumes, one would like to seemore signs in theprinted textof dialogue and exchange between authors during and after the conference. The editors have undertaken the always problematic taskof grouping the articles under subheadings, with varying degrees of success. However, all editors have to juggle with conflicting imperatives, and to bring this large and dense volume...
Restraints and seclusion are used on people in institutions, children in schools, nursing home residents, general hospital patients, and other locations, but most often with people who have disabilities. Questions regarding legality, morality, and efficacy abound. These questions, compounded by the serious possible adverse consequences of restraints and seclusion, have commanded wide-ranging attention from legislatures, government agencies, human service professionals, direct care staff, advocates, clients and families, and the public. This article addresses the use of physical restraints and seclusion. It does not address the use of drugs as a behavior restraint, although much of the discussion applies in that context as well.Is the use of human services restraint therapeutic? Can restraint use be reduced or replaced with alternatives? Is it time to relinquish these practices, at least when incorporated in a treatment or habilitation plan?In this article I begin with a look at the early institutional use of restraints and seclusion and, as a reminder of what may ultimately be at stake, I note some worst-case results in the United States. I then consider efficacy and risks of “human services restraint.” I review efforts to reform and reduce the use of restraint and address legal liability questions that impact on agency policy and professional behavior. I conclude with some thoughts on the current state of knowledge, policies, and practices regarding human services restraint and on the future of these techniques.Dr. John Conolly accepted the judgment of Dr. Robert Hill, who had experimented with nonrestraint at the Lincoln asylum. Dr. Hill had stated, “In a properly constructed building with [enough attendants], restraint is never necessary, never justifiable, and always injurious” (Ozarin, 2001, p. 27). That was 170 years ago.Dr. Conolly was appointed superintendent of the Middlesex County asylum at Hanwell in England in June 1839. Over 40 of the 800 patients were restrained at the time. Within 3 months, by September 21, all forms of mechanical restraint were gone (Hunter & Macalpine, 1963). Dozens of other facilities followed suit. As a modern commentator explained (Saks 1986),Dr. Conolly epitomized the no-restraint policy within the “moral treatment” movement influenced by the Quakers in England and post–French Revolution reformers in France in the late 1700s and into the 1800s. England's 1854 Lunacy Acts prompted the reduction of restraint use as well. The names of Tuke, Pinel, and Kirkbride are a familiar part of this history (Ozarin, 2000; Tomes, 1984).In the United States, psychiatric hospital superintendents in the mid- to late 1800s were divided on the use of restraints but generally opposed the no-restraint, English position. Physical restraint was viewed as a form of therapeutic treatment and was an accepted practice for dealing with violent patients. American psychiatrists extolled the value of restraint and seclusion, with one noting that these practices are required by a specific American violence. Eugene Grissom of the North Carolina state asylum argued “that the moderate use of mechanical restraint was therapeutic and morally sound, that it was required by the peculiar violence of American Insanity; and it that prevented tragic accidents and injuries” (Tomes, 1988, p. 190). John Gray, the editor of the American Journal of Insanity wrote, “We look upon restraint and seclusion, directed and controlled by a conscientious and intelligent medical man, as among the valuable alleviating and remedial agents in the care and cure of the insane” (as cited in Tomes, 1988, p. 206).In 1875, Dr. (Lord) John Buckmill, a former superintendent of an asylum in England, visited American public and private asylums. He disagreed with the American viewpoint. At the superintendents' annual meeting that year, he invited any superintendent to visit England for a month, and he bet £100 that such a visitor could not find any form of restraint in British asylums. He had no takers. He later wrote, “[The American superintendents] will look back to their defense with the same wonderment … that has been said in defense of domestic slavery” (Ozarin, 2001, p. 27).Although the vast majority of cases of restraint and seclusion do not result in physical harm or death, and for the most part shackles have given way to personal physical restraint, it is sobering to keep in mind at least some of the instances in which death during restraint has occurred recently. Contemplating these deaths assists in reflecting on how alternative practices might have affected the situation, if at all.It is sometimes said that the use of restraints represents a treatment failure. Here are seven stories of such failure; they represent tragic results in the use of restraints.Restraint is the use of force to limit another person's movement. This may occur by physical contact among individuals, mechanically by devices to limit movement, or chemically by the use of drugs. Seclusion is the involuntary placement of a person in a room, exit from which is not a permitted choice.Human service restraint, a term taken from Tumeinski (2005), is used here. The term encompasses both restraints and seclusion. It refers to restraint of a client under the mandate of a program or agency, public or private, by staff who are taught specific restraint techniques. We distinguish human service restraint from actions among parents, friends, and others in freely given relationships.Human services restraint is used in response to, or to control, injury to others, self-injury, property damage, resistance to behavior control, inappropriate behavior, rule-breaking, and the like. It may or may not be used solely in emergency situations. It may or may not be used for treatment, as part of a planned behavioral intervention, or as an aversive consequence for a target behavior.Restraints do not include orthopedically prescribed devices, protective helmets, holding someone to conduct routine physical examinations or tests, protections against one falling out of bed, or assistance to permit someone to participate in activities without risk of physical harm [42 C.F.R. 482.13 (e)(1)(i)(C)].In hospitals, restraint appears to be allowed in nonemergency situations; in intermediate care facilities–mental retardation (ICF/MR) programs, physical restraint and time-out are specifically permitted in nonemergency situations and, when prescribed, must be included in a client's individual program plan for active treatment. The United States provides some regulatory definitions. These differ depending on the type of program and people served. Two examples are provided here.For Medicare and Medicaid participating hospitals, including psychiatric facilities, the regulations are new. Restraint is “Any manual method, physical mechanical device, material, or equipment that immobilizes or reduces the ability of a patient to move his or her arms, legs, body, or head freely” [42 C.F.R. 482.13 (e) 2006]. Restraint is allowed in nonemergency situations. Seclusion is “The involuntary confinement of a patient alone in a room or area from which the patient is physically prevented from leaving. Seclusion may only be used for the management of violent or self-destructive behavior. Seclusion may only be used for the management of violent or self- destructive behavior.”The older ICF/MR regulations forbade “unnecessary” restraints and required that clients must be “provided active treatment to reduce dependency on drugs and physical restraints” [42 C.F.R. 483.420(a)(6)]. The ICF/MR regulations permit the use of a time-out room as part of “an approved systematic time-out program” incorporated into the client's individual program plan. [42 C.F.R. 483.450(c)]. Physical restraints are permitted only:The use of these human services restraint techniques is not simply a response to client behavior. There is an interplay among staff, setting, the characteristics of the individual, and the individual's behavior, which is perhaps best conceptualized, in the words of one researcher, within an “ecobehavioral” perspective (Day, 2000). Day noted, for example, that age and nature of disability may affect restraint use; there is a greater use of restraints for children with “lower intelligence or neurological impairments.” (Day, 2000, p. i). As discussed below, policy, training, and staff behavior greatly affect the extent of restraint use.Fisher, in a review of the existing literature published in 1994, reached the conclusion that “[l]ocal non-clinical factors, such as cultural bias, staff role perceptions and the attitudes of hospital administrators, have a greater influence on the use of these practices than any clinical factors” (Fisher, 1994, p. 1590).There is a vast amount of literature on these practices, much of it simply descriptive, policy oriented, and useful in training staff in techniques. There is a also what might be called a “negative literature” and a “positive literature.” Critiques of restraint use have been made on multiple grounds:The negative literature includes a small number of self-described “voices of protest” who defend restraint and seclusion and seek to “slow down the locomotive of opinions and pressure tactics that may lead mental health treatment in the wrong direction:The discussion here focuses on what the author believes are two fundamental questions that are most likely to influence governmental, agency, and judicial decisions on restraint: (a) efficacy and (b) risk of harm. There is relatively little scientific investigation of the techniques' efficacy, and no proof of their efficacy. There is, however, much evidence of their risks.Rapid intervention limited to protecting someone from immediate harm is sometimes necessary in an emergency. In such cases, the intervention is limited to the least duration and to the least risky method and must be accomplished by specially trained personnel. “Emergency restraint” is not planned and is not for the purpose of treatment or reduction of harmful behavior.Planned human services restraint for treatment, to support positive behavior, or to reduce negative behavior has not been shown to be effective. For example, a review of 109 articles spanning 35 years between 1965 and 2000 on restraints and seclusion on children and adolescents found that the techniques have only “questionable efficacy” (Day, 2000, p. 28). Research on human services restraint is characterized as sketchy and inconclusive. Both governmental and professional reviews have found no therapeutic value in the practices. For example, the state of Wisconsin concluded,The National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) stated:In a training manual, A Roadmap to Seclusion and Restraint Free Mental Health Services for Persons of All Ages, the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services' Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA; 2006) set a goalDespite the absence of evidence of efficacy, there are volumes on proper procedures and criteria, minivolumes on documentation, and innumerable dollars spent annually on programs for staff training in techniques that have not been found to be effective.It is difficult to evaluate the relative risks in the use of human services restraint. The absence of data on restraint use (including data on routine use as well as the frequency of untoward events) makes it extremely difficult to comment on the relative risks involved in restraint, the comparative risks involved across a wide range of individual procedures, and the relative risks involved in alternative interventions, including seclusion, mechanical restraint, or medication (Busch & Shore, 2000; Patterson, 2003).Clients and staff may be injured during the imposition of restraint. The ultimate risk is death. In the professional literature, there has been discussion of the risk of death associated with the use of physical restraints since at least the 1980s. More recent research has focused on deaths and other adverse consequences in restraint (Fisher, 1994; Milliken, 1998; Mohr, 2003; Patterson, 2003). Although much of the research concerns psychiatric restraint use, the physiological effects of restraint are no different for individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities. These risks exist with both mechanical restraint and with so-called personal restraint, where a staff person's body is used to impose the restraint.Upset clients, when restrained, are held down or held tight, often with bodily organs and chest compressed; the heart begins to beat faster or out of rhythm, as the body attempts to obtain more oxygen to support itself (DiDino & Zaccardi, 2007). Restraints involving neck holds or obstruction of the nose or mouth have a high risk of fatality, as do mechanical restraints or prone tying, including “hobble tying.” “Hobble tying is the term used to describe the prone positioning of a patient, following which their wrists are secured behind their back, their ankles are tied, and their wrists and ankles are subsequently secured together by pulling the shoulders back and bending the legs towards them” (Horsburgh, 2004, p. 8). In a series of 214 cases of hobble tying in agitated delirium, death occurred in nearly 12% of the cases (Stratton, 2001). Seated restraint is also risky; preexisting physical conditions, such as obesity, heart disease, general physical ill health, or exhaustion, are additional risks (Horsburgh, 2004).It is fair to say that there is no way to predict who may die due to the use of physical restraint or who may be seriously injured. Almost 10 years ago, an editorial in the Canadian Medical Association Journal noted the asserted benefits of human services restraint and then reminded us, “However, restraint is not itself harmless; some of who are restrained may We do not what this is, or how others will death and to be p. to be likely to be to restraints and to die restrained & & & The use of restraints in is of and is the of specific research restraint use in is often not to or regulatory & is a of evidence that the use of human services restraint be reduced and, as some programs have for this result is the use of positive behavioral which back, in at to the by Pinel, Tuke, and the treatment movement, and American institutional reformers such as policies, and of restraint of and specially staff training have all to reduction taught staff on an behavioral and a treatment that focused on the The reduced the number of of restraint and seclusion, these the at published in regarding reduction program the use of seclusion and mechanical restraint from to 2000 and the of staff from patient from to 2000 in state hospital to 2000, the of seclusion from to The duration of seclusion from to The of restraint from to The duration of restraint from to were in of staff from to 2000 National Association of Mental Health has training on human services restraint reduction and has that were reduced by as much as the of individuals in was reduced by as much as and the of in a were reduced by as much as These data are on to of the with data alternative often (a) and policy (b) and to clinical such as of the behavior or to restraints or seclusion, or the use of alternative for reduction include such as the following of & 2000; Milliken, 1998; are other to human services restraint. These may be by the that is These include the discussed in the use of restraints or seclusion as planned or treatment, only emergency This is a with who use of restraints have or are restraint on restraints is in Health restraint examples are as public or private, facilities, a to be from … any restraints or involuntary for of or The and of of 2000 [42 includes that public be for programs that to of the use of physical restraint and seclusion for such an individual necessary to the immediate of the individual or others, and of the use of such restraint and seclusion as a or as a for a habilitation a state mental health medical spent the in he their use in state and have also been affected by institutional staff restraints to U.S. Department of Health and Human Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration to the use of seclusion and restraint in behavioral on Mental Health that seclusion and restraint be used as of not as treatment Mental Health p. The force on the that aversive behavior be without as part of a behavior intervention p. A is by The Alliance to and Seclusion was by a number of professional and decisions may have a I to the in the discussion on the use of human services restraint focuses on legal of care are to on which legal liability is will staff, or an agency be for for restraint at or for to use is there liability for a restraint gone does it treatment to use, or not to use, liability may affect agency and professional behavior, it is to consider the current state of the in this the of how the cases have been and the have generally been of restraint use and have not to the use of restraint. It does not however, that the least in their published have taken into the professional research on efficacy and risks or the by professional and governmental is a to be from bodily restraint, with the by the by the years in a in the and restraint practices of restraint have been by the under the and other legal and such as the and is a patient is to and in the of a for restraint, the are as a found 2007). A fair of the state of the is found in that practices are that are in that are not to a purpose or that are but are in of their current the legal cited likely restraint use when treatment or to or someone for or behavior and the is taken in at least and actions have not been by the some of these specific on the restraint techniques by decisions on and other At the same it is that the decisions in these cases found in the use of have not been provided a of the history and nature of restraint, the of evidence of efficacy, the high or the of professional The will likely from current state as that At that I the decisions to another will the of the decisions restraint and will begin to that restraints are therapeutic with by a or as an treatment for in a treatment or as an will likely be by The efficacy evidence is The specific ICF/MR regulations that permit time-out and restraint as part of an individual active treatment plan will be as in individual cases and then more use of restraint is to and and professional in recent years have of any use of restraint and noted, on Mental Health and restraint will be used only as of not as treatment Mental Health p. The National on and Research provides research on positive behavioral as a way to reduce the use of restraint and seclusion. has stated, a as do the practices of seclusion, restraint, and treatment” In seclusion and restraint as a area and a National to of seclusion and restraint mental health Department of Health and Human attention has focused on the both in the and in response to government The U.S. a 10 years ago, Restraint or Seclusion At The National for Mental Health a on the treatment professionals, and other have the and the who have are the American of and American of American American Association of and of Health National National Mental Health and the on are to this There is an by Restraint and and one by multiple to the use of seclusion and restraints Restraint to all restraint the of attention on restraint and seclusion from and personal with the imposition of these involuntary on with and the risks by these techniques. Human services restraint not the individuals to restraint but also staff, agency families, and the public. wide-ranging effects have a that is often both in practice and in the published is valuable to consider the use of human services restraint within planned treatment is with the of treatment programs, and personal and that it is to impose restraint on people who are and who have a have gone and that all use of human services restraint be simply on the for restraints is treatment, then that restraints are therapeutic or that the risks be does the future The use of human services restraint is into We that emergency restraint be in instances policy and training, positive and other We that restraint as part of a treatment program does not and is extremely There is a professional and governmental against the use of all restraint will be and that restraint will not be permitted in an habilitation or treatment plan or as an aversive consequence for a target behavior. I this will occur for there is a for restraint or seclusion in an emergency to immediate harm to a the techniques may be to such as in recent regulations to in these cases, only restraint be permitted to the death risk of prone and that restraint for a limited duration and under are back to discussion in the to years is is that have research on efficacy and and have perhaps a more of the due to who might be at risk of of a nonrestraint policy in human services will occur in an I the by together with administrators, professionals, advocates, and the and in a years of service to people with will do no than Dr. do
Healthcare Decision-Making and Restraints
Psychopathy, Forensic Psychiatry, Sexual Offending
Remote attestation is an important attribute in trusted computing. One of the purpose of remote attestation is to attest the remote platform is trusty but not revealing the actual identity of the platform. Direct anonymous attestation (DAA) is a kind of scheme which is adopted by Trusted Computing Group in the specification 1.2 to hide the privacy of the platform. But DAA involves various of zero-knowledge proofs and is not efficient to implement. To guarantee the trustworthiness and privacy, we propose a remote anonymous attestation protocol based on ring signature in this paper. We also show that our protocol is secure under the RSA assumption in random oracle model. Furthermore, the attestation protocol does not need the third party and extra zero-knowledge proof, which makes it very efficient in realization.
Jan Bouda, Paulo Mateus, Nikola Paunković, João Rasga
We show how quantum tamper-proof devices (QTPD's) can be used to attack and to develop security protocols. On one hand, we prove that it is possible to transfer proofs of zero-knowledge protocols using QTPD's. This attack can be extended to other security schemes where privacy is important. On the other hand, we present a fair contract signing protocol using QTPD's where there is no communication with Judge during the exchange phase (which is impossible classically). In the latter case, we make use of decoherence in the quantum state of the QTPD to implement a global clock over the asynchronous network. QTPD's seem to be possible to implement with existing quantum hardware, due to the fact that it is hard to isolate quantum memory from interference. These theoretical results contribute to justify the implementation of QTPD's.
El Sistema Nacional de Salud (SNS) presenta una compleja situación de equilibrio, que aunque puede ser satisfactorio a corto plazo, plantea grandes problemas de sostenibilidad y gobernabilidad; el incierto balance del proceso de descentralización sanitaria en España señala claramente la senda de buscar nuevas alternativas organizativas para hacer efectivas las ventajas de la descentralización, a la vez que ser capaces de aprovechar las economías del sistema y conseguir la equidad pretendida. Se proponen cuatro líneas de actuación: redefinición del SNS en torno al aseguramiento público y derecho cívico igual para todos; replanteamiento del sistema de financiación y del papel del fondo de cohesión; redefinir el papel del gobierno central y el Ministerio de Sanidad, y crear un nuevo organismo, la Agencia del SNS con un Comisionado que de soporte organizativo e identidad al SNS como ámbito de acción cooperativa. The Spanish National Health System (SNHS) is currently in a complex equilibrium which, even if acceptable in the short term, faces major sustainability and governance challenges; the so far inconclusive outcome of the SNHS decentralization process clearly underlines the importance of seeking new alternatives to effectively bring about the real benefits of decentralization, while taking advantage of the system's economies of scale and achieving its equity objectives. To this end, four lines of action are proposed in this paper: first, redefine the SNHS based on universal public coverage, as a civic right and equal for all; second, reframe the financing system and the role of the Cohesion Fund; third, review the role of central government and its Ministry of Health, and fourth, create of a SNHS Agency headed by a Commissioner, for providing an organizational framework and identity for the SNHS, and serving as the cooperative body of the seventeen Autonomous Communities’ Health Services.
Open access
Global Health Care Issues
Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to present an approach for the decentralization of swarm intelligence algorithms that run on computing systems with autonomous components that are connected by a network. The approach is applied to a particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm with multiple sub‐swarms. PSO is a nature inspired metaheuristic where a swarm of particles searches for an optimum of a function. A multiple sub‐swarms PSO can be used for example in applications where more than one optimum has to be found. Design/methodology/approach In the studied scenario the particles of the PSO algorithm correspond to data packets that are sent through the network of the computing system. Each data packet contains among other information the position of the corresponding particle in the search space and its sub‐swarm number. In the proposed decentralized PSO algorithm the application specific tasks, i.e. the function evaluations, are done by the autonomous components of the system. The more general tasks, like the dynamic clustering of data packets, are done by the routers of the network. Findings Simulation experiments show that the decentralized PSO algorithm can successfully find a set of minimum values for the used test functions. It was also shown that the PSO algorithm works well for different type of networks, like scale‐free network and ring like networks. Originality/value The proposed decentralization approach is interesting for the design of optimization algorithms that can run on computing systems that use principles of self‐organization and have no central control.
How to find efficient and secure member- ship revocation algorithms is one of the most important issues standing in the way of real-world applications of group signatures. In this paper, the proof of knowledge of divisibility is given and a novel membership revocation method in ACJT group signature scheme is proposed: the group manager issues the product E of the public keys of current members in the group, when a group member wants to sign, he should not only proves that he has a membership certificate, but also proves that the public key in his certificate divides exactly the public key product E with zero knowledge. The proposed method is efficient since the group manager only needs one division and one exponentiation when a group member is deleted, while the signing and verifying procedure are independent of the number of current group members and excluded members, as well as the original group public key and membership certificates needn't be changed.
From a historical perspective, the multiverse is just one more step in our progress from geocentric to heliocentric to galactocentric to cosmocentric worldview. Indeed, several lessons of relevance to the multiverse debate can be gleaned from considering the history of this progression. To the ancient Greeks, the heavenly spheres were the unchanging domain of the divine and therefore outside science by definition. It required Tycho de Brahe's observation of a supernova in 1572 and the realization that its apparent position did not change as the Earth moved around the Sun to dash that view. Because this contradicted the Aristotelian view that the heavens cannot change, the claim was at first received sceptically. Frustrated by those who had eyes but would not see, Brahe wrote: “O crassa ingenia. O coecos coeli spectators.” (Oh thick wits. Oh blind watchers of the sky.) Lesson 1: Theoretical prejudice should not blind one to the evidence. Of course, we will never see the other universes themselves — in that sense we are necessarily blind, so this point might seem irrelevant to the multiverse. However, I would claim that the analogue of Tycho's supernova is the fine-tunings. Long after Galileo had speculated that the Milky Way consists of stars like the Sun and Newton had shown the laws of Nature could be extended beyond the solar system, there was still a prejudice that the investigation of this region was beyond the domain of science. In 1842 August Comte said of the study of stars: “Never, by any means, will we be able to study their chemical compositions. The field of positive philosophy lies entirely within the Solar System, the study of the universe being inaccessible in any possible science.” Comte had not foreseen the advent of spectroscopy, which identified absorption features in stellar spectra with chemical elements. Lesson 2: New observational developments are hard to anticipate. Perhaps we will find extra dimensions at the Large Hadron Collider or even create baby universes in the laboratory one day. Cosmology attained the status of a proper science in 1915, when the advent of general relativity gave it a secure mathematical basis. Nevertheless, for a further decade there was resistance to the idea that science could be extended beyond our galaxy. Indeed many astronomers refused to believe that there was anything beyond. Although Kant had speculated as early as 1755 that some nebulae are “island universes” similar to the Milky Way, most astronomers continued to adopt a galactocentric view until the 1920s. Indeed, the most popular model of the galaxy at the start of the 20th century — Kapteyn's Universe — even had the Sun at its centre! The controversy came to a head in 1920 when Heber Curtis defended the island universe theory in a famous debate with Harlow Shapley. The issue was finally resolved in 1924, when Edwin Hubble measured the distance to M31 using Cepheid variable stars. In many ways this parallels the current debate about whether anything exists beyond our horizon. Lesson 3: More conservative cosmologists might prefer to maintain the cosmocentric view but perhaps the tide of history is against them. The evidence for other universes can never be as decisive as that for extragalactic nebulae but the transformation of worldview required may be just as necessary. A few years later Hubble obtained radial velocities and distance estimates for several dozen nearby galaxies, thereby discovering that all galaxies are moving away from us with a speed proportional to their distance. The most natural interpretation of this is that space itself is expanding, as indeed had been predicted by Alexander Friedmann in 1920 on the basis of general relativity. Einstein rejected this model at the time because he believed the universe (i.e. the Milky Way) was static and he even introduced an extra repulsive term into his equations — the cosmological constant — to allow this possibility. After Hubble's discovery, he described this as his “biggest blunder”. Lesson 4: One should not necessarily reject theoretical predictions because they have no observational support. In fact, Einstein continued to uphold the static model even after the evidence was against it — he only accepted the Friedmann model in 1931, several years after Hubble published his data — so knowing how much weight to attach to theory and observation can be tricky. Let me now address George's specific issues. There are plausibly galaxies just beyond the visual horizon, where we cannot see them, so we can extend this argument, step by step, to way beyond the horizon and infer there are many different universes that we cannot see. Even though we can never prove what happens outside our visual horizon, the standard FRW model has been well tested within it, so there is surely some probabilistic sense in which one can extrapolate models at least some way beyond it. Also the smooth dependence of the CMB fluctuations on angular separation (whatever the source of those fluctuations) gives no reason to suppose that anything strange happens just beyond the horizon. George himself seems to accept this, which illustrates the problem of regarding speculations as non-scientific just because they involve the unobservable. Admittedly one's confidence in any proposed model must decrease as one extrapolates ever further beyond the horizon, but one should beware of using Rees's slippery slope argument in reverse: we cannot extrapolate to scales much larger than the horizon, so we should not extrapolate to scales only slightly outside it. The problem comes when one makes the jump from the Level I to Level II multiverse (which is where George's argument that the FRW solution extends everywhere must fail). In fact, the inflationary scenario does provide an answer to this. For if the amplitude of the density fluctuations increases slightly with scale (as appears to be the case), one can predict the scale at which the FRW approximation breaks down. Current data suggest that this happens at around 10100 horizon scales. The existence of a multiverse is implied by inflation, which is verified by the CMB anisotropy observations. In particular, known physics leads to chaotic inflation and this implies a multiverse. There are two distinct issues here: does one believe in inflation and does inflation lead to a multiverse? Inflation is attractive because it resolves several cosmological conundra. Quantum fluctuations of the scalar field can also generate the small density perturbations that eventually give rise to galaxies and large-scale structure and it is impressive that the predicted dependence of the CMB fluctuations on angular separation is almost exactly as observed by the WMAP satellite (Spergel et al. 2003). Of course, the evidence for inflation is not conclusive — there is still no evidence for any scalar field in Nature!— but the Level I multiverse is still a good bet. As regards the second issue, I agree with George that the evidence for the sort of chaotic inflation that leads to a Level II multiverse is more equivocal, and certainly one cannot infer this from the form of the CMB anisotropies. There are now around 100 models of inflation and, while Linde (1990) claims that the existence of other domains with different coupling constants is generic, this is debatable. The multiverse idea is testable, because it can be disproved if we determine there are closed spatial sections in the universe (for example, if the curvature is positive). This is really a straw man argument because we have seen that inflation is only one of several multiverse proposals — for example, quantum cosmology models give closed spatial sections — and not all inflationary models require that the spatial sections be open anyway. However, George is surely right to stress the importance of looking for circles in the CMB. The idea of small universes is not mainstream but it has the advantage that it can be tested. The existence of a multiverse is the only physical explanation for the fine-tuning of parameters that leads to our existence. In the absence of direct evidence for other universes, I regard the anthropic fine-tunings as the best indirect evidence. (A multiverse in which the constants were the same everywhere would have no explanatory value.) I agree with George that the fine-tunings do not constitute proof, but they still carry weight. One can argue about how impressive the fine-tunings are (could we really exclude life if the constants changed a lot?), but I still think the number and precision of the tunings is remarkable. Nearly 30 years ago I wrote a review with Martin Rees about these fine-tunings (Carr and Rees 1979). In the intervening period a few of them have gone away (e.g. inflation may explain the value of the cosmological density parameter) but most of them have got stronger. Without a multiverse one may be forced to adopt a non-physical explanation like a fine-tuner, which is why Neil Manson (2003) claims that “the multiverse is the last resort of the desperate atheist”. This is not necessarily true — Paul Davies (2006) advocates a “third way” in which the laws of Nature evolve in a single universe in such a way that life can arise — but if you reject the multiverse, you certainly lower the scientific status of the anthropic arguments. I agree with George's argument against physical infinities. However, we do not need an infinity to validate the anthropic principle — just a large number. The existence of a multiverse is implied by a probability argument: the universe is no more special than it need be to create life. In particular, the small value of the cosmological constant shows that other universes exist. George argues that multiverse theories are not useful because they cannot be disproved: if all possibilities exist somewhere, then they can explain all conceivable observations. However, the fact that we only observe one sample of the multiverse still allows the proposal to be refuted at a given confidence level. Statistical predictions still qualify as science and that is why Rees has stressed the importance of calculating the probability distribution for various parameters across the universes. Indeed, a core difference between the Bayesian and frequentist views is the former's willingness to make inferences from single, and possibly unrepeatable, pieces of data. George rejects the Λ argument but there is no doubt that this has been very influential in attracting many physicists to the multiverse cause. It used to be thought that Λ was exactly zero and it was then plausible that there might be some physical (non-anthropic) explanation for this. However, the fact that Λ is non-zero but very tiny is a profound mystery that completely changes the situation. Critics say that we cannot know what distribution for Λ is predicted across the multiverse and that is correct. It may be simplistic to assume that the distribution is uniform, but postulating that there is a spike in precisely the observed region is just as improbable as what we are trying to explain. Even if one does not accept inflation, multi-verses are predicted by many theories of particle physics. It is still legitimate to invoke the existence of other universes for which there can be no direct evidence if one has a theory (like M-theory) that predicts this. It is not necessary to check all predictions of the theory for it to be considered scientific (e.g. we cannot probe inside black holes and we cannot see quarks but we still regard these as subjects for scientific discourse); it is only necessary to test some of them. Does M-theory qualify in this respect? George claims no; it does not come under the purview of science because our confidence in it is based on faith and aesthetic considerations (mathematical beauty etc) rather than experimental data. Certainly he is not alone in this attitude. For example, Woit (2006) and Smolin (2007) dismiss M-theory as mathematics rather than physics because it has not made contact with observations after 20 years. However, I feel this rejection is premature. It may take 200 years to solve the equations of M-theory and test them, but the definition of what constitutes a scientific question should not depend on how difficult it is. The nature of science changes, so what is illegitimate science today may be legitimate tomorrow. The fundamental issue in the dispute between myself and George concerns which features of science are to be regarded as sacrosanct. Experimentation used to be regarded as sacrosanct but by that criterion all of astronomy would be excluded since one cannot experiment with stars and galaxies. Fortunately, one can still make observations and — since there are billions of these objects — Nature effectively performs experiments for us. Cosmologists are in worse shape because there is only one universe to observe and speculations about processes at very early and very late times have to be viewed as ultra-speculative. For this reason, more conservative physicists regard even relatively standard cosmological speculations as trespassing into metaphysics. George places a lot of emphasis on falsifiability, but not everybody in the philosophy of science agrees with Popper on this and it is surely dangerous to impose a philosophical prescription that prevents scientists changing the border of their field. As Susskind cautions, it would be a pity to miss out on some fundamental truth because of an over-restrictive definition of science. Of course, one needs some degree of falsifiability, but the question is, how much? It is certainly not fair to put M-theory in the same class as astrology. On the other hand, I share George's scepticism of the Level IV multiverse, which corresponds to universes governed by different mathematical structures. The view that any mathematically possible universe must exist somewhere seems untestable in a deeper sense than Levels I to III. The notion of a multiverse entails a new perspective of the nature of science and it is not surprising that this causes intellectual discomfort. But this situation has often occurred before and one should not be surprised if it happens again. The Cosmic Uroborus in figure 2 shows that the history of physics might be regarded as the extension of knowledge into ever smaller and ever larger scales. The ideas encountered at the two frontiers have often been viewed as part of philosophy rather than science, so in a sense the debate is nothing new. However, there is another sense in which the current situation is very special. This is because — for the first time — the boundaries at the largest and smallest scales have connected, as indicated by the top of the Cosmic Uroborus, so the two science/philosophy frontiers have merged. Does this merging represent the completion of science or merely the sort of transformation in the perceived nature of science that accompanies every paradigm shift? This is a contentious issue and clearly we do not yet know the answer. I accept that there may eventually be a limit to the sort of questions that science can address; George and I merely disagree on whether we have reached that limit with the multiverse. In any case, we are surely behoven to try to take science as far as possible. I will end with a comment by Steven Weinberg (2007) in his contribution to Universe or Multiverse?: “We usually mark advances in the history of science by what we learn about Nature, but at certain critical moments the most important thing is what we discover about science itself. These discoveries lead to changes in how we score our work, in what we consider to be an acceptable theory.”
The very nature of the scientific enterprise is at stake in the multiverse debate. Its advocates propose weakening the nature of scientific proof in order to claim that the multiverse hypothesis provides a scientific explanation. This is a dangerous tactic. Two central scientific virtues are testability and explanatory power. In the cosmological context, these are often in conflict with each other and there has been an increasing tendency in theoretical physics and cosmology to say it does not matter whether a proposal is testable: if it fits into our other theories in a convincing way, with great explanatory power, then testing is superfluous. The extreme case is the multiverse proposal, where no direct observational test of the hypothesis is possible. Despite this, many articles and books dogmatically proclaim that the multiverse is an established scientific fact. In this context one must re-evaluate what the core of science is: can one maintain one has a genuine scientific theory when direct and indeed indirect tests of the theory are impossible? If one claims this, one is altering the meaning of science. One should be very careful before so doing. There are many other theories waiting in the wings, hoping for a weakening of what is meant by “science”. Those proposing this weakening in the case of cosmology should be aware of the flood of alternative scientific theories whose advocates will then state that they too can claim the mantle of scientific respectability. The key observational point is that the domains considered are beyond the visual horizon and are therefore unobservable. You cannot receive signals of any kind from beyond the horizon, as there has not been time for messages to reach us from there since the universe began. Hence no object out there is detectable by any kind of astronomical observation. To see this clearly one should look at the space-time diagrams of our past light cone (figure 5). The assumption made in justifying the multiverse is that we can extrapolate to 10100 times the horizon distance or even more (the word “infinity” is casually used in these writings). The extraordinary pretentiousness of this attempt should be clear. This shows the space-time diagrams of our past light cone in both the usual form (a) and conformal form (b), in which one expands the spatial distances in order to see the causal structure. The light cones are then at ±45°, making clear the observational and causal limits; any observation beyond the visual horizon is impossible. The Hubble distance is where galaxies recede at the speed of light (v=c). The redshift measures the expansion factor and goes to infinity at the horizon itself. (c) shows more clearly the vast extrapolation envisaged in justifications of the multiverse. Note that there is a distinction betweeen the visual horizon and the event horizon. The latter relates to causality in the far distant future and is irrelevant to present-day observations, but becomes relevant if the universe accelerates. (Mark Whittle, University of Virginia) The often claimed existence of physical infinities in the multiverse context — of either universes or spatial sections of universes (Vilenkin 2006) — is dubious. What has been forgotten here is that infinity is an unattainable state rather than a large number — its character is totally different from any finite number and it is a mathematical rather than physical entity. According to David Hilbert (1964): “The infinite is nowhere to be found in reality, no matter what experiences, observations, and knowledge are appealed to.” Even if there were an infinite number of galaxies, and we could see them all (which we could not), we could not count them in a finite time. So there is no way the existence of an infinity can ever be proven correct by observation or any other test. The concept of physical infinities is not a scientific one if science involves testability by either observation or experiment. The claim of infinites in the multiverse context emphasizes how tenuously scientific that idea is. It is a huge act of hubris to extrapolate from one small domain to infinity when infinity is never attainable. Seven different kinds of justification have been proposed for the existence of a multiverse and I will now consider these in turn. There are plausibly galaxies just beyond the visual horizon, where we cannot see them, so we can extend this argument, step by step, to way beyond the horizon and infer there are many different universes that we cannot see. This is the “slippery slope” argument and Rees (2001) uses it to defend both Level I and Level II multiverses. The argument is fine as regards extrapolation in the vicinity of the visual horizon, but the assumption that it can be continued to very distant domains or other universes is an untestable major extrapolation, which assumes a continuity that may or may not be true. If each link in a chain of evidence is well understood and tenable, then indirect evidence such as this carries nearly as much weight as direct evidence. But not all the links in the chain are tenable. If employed to its logical conclusion it seems a priori to lead to the old idea of spatial homogeneity extending forever (“The Cosmological Principle”) rather than the multiverse of chaotic cosmology with domain walls separating different phases. For if the universe within the horizon is almost exactly Friedmann-Robertson-Walker (FRW) — a statistically spatially homogenous and isotropic space-time — it is plausible that it is also FRW just outside the horizon, and a simple extrapolation suggests that it is spatially homogeneous without limit. But supporters of chaotic inflation claim that there are completely different domains out there with different values of the constants, so which is the case? You can say what you like and nobody can prove it right or wrong. The existence of a multiverse is implied by inflation, which is verified by the Cosmic Microwave Background anisotropy observations. In particular, known physics leads to chaotic inflation and this implies a multiverse. A multiverse is implied by some forms of inflation but not others. Inflation is not yet a well defined theory and chaotic inflation is just one variant of it. For example, inflation in a small closed universe fits all the observations, without requiring a multiverse. In any case, the key physics involved in chaotic inflation (Coleman-de Luccia tunnelling) is extrapolated from known and tested physics to quite different regimes; that extrapolation is unverified and indeed unverifiable. The physics is hypothetical rather than tested. We are being told that what we have is “known physics → multiverse”. But the real situation is “known physics → hypothetical physics → multiverse” and the first step involves a major extrapolation which may or may not be correct. The multiverse idea is testable, because it can be disproved if we determine there are closed spatial sections in the universe (for example, if the curvature is positive). The claim is that only negatively curved FRW models can exist in a multiverse based on chaotic inflation, either because Coleman-de Luccia tunnelling only gives negative curvature or because a closed spatial section necessarily implies a single universe. But the first argument is disputed (there are already papers suggesting that tunnelling to positively curved universes is possible) and the second argument would not apply if we lived in a high-density lump imbedded in a low-density universe (i.e. the extrapolation of positive curvature to very large scales may not be valid). Neither argument is conclusive. Certainly observational confirmation of negatively curved space sections would not constitute proof of a multiverse, for that can occur in a single universe. However, chaotic inflation versions of the multiverse can be disproved if we observationally prove that we live in a universe with closed spatial sections that are so small that we have already seen round the universe. We can test this possibility by searching for identical circles in the CMB, together with low anisotropy power at large angular scales (which is indeed observed). This is an important test as it would disprove the chaotic inflation variety of multiverse. But not seeing the circles would not prove a multiverse exists: their non-detection is a necessary but not sufficient condition for multiverses. The existence of a multiverse is the only physical explanation for the fine-tuning of parameters that leads to our existence. The multiverse is a reasonable theoretical explanation of the fine-tunings, but this does not help in observationally confirming the hypothesis. The issue here is, which is more important in cosmology: theory (explanation) or observations (tests against reality)? The essential proposal is that one should downgrade observational testing in favour of theory — a dangerous road to take. In any case, the major problem with this proposal is that it can explain anything at all, because in a multiverse with an infinite or extremely large variety of universe properties — for example, the 10500 possibilities allowed by the landscape of string theory — virtually anything can happen. In that case, the hypothesis does not predict any specific testable fact. The existence of universes with giraffes is certainly predicted by many multiverse proposals, but universes where giraffes do not exist are also predicted. Observing a giraffe neither confirms nor disproves the multiverse. The existence of a multiverse is implied by a probability argument: the universe is no more special than it need be to create life. In particular, the small value of the cosmological constant shows that other universes exist. But the statistical argument invoked here only applies if a multiverse exists; it is simply inapplicable (because the probability distribution has no meaning) if there is no multiverse, so it cannot prove a multiverse exists. It is a calculation that assumes the answer (that a multiverse exists) before it begins. If we only have one object to observe, we can make many observations of that object, but it is still only one object (one universe), and you cannot do statistical tests on its nature. This is a consistency test if there is indeed a multiverse, but it says nothing if there is not. It is not a sufficient condition for its existence. The argument that the actual value of Λ is extremely different from the “natural” one predicted by theoretical physics (120 orders of magnitude smaller!) makes very clear the nature of the multiverse project: it is an attempt to make the extremely improbable appear probable. Even if one does not accept inflation, multiverses are predicted by many theories of particle physics. One example of this is the string landscape of M-theory, but that is a hypothetical proposal with no solid evidence in its favour. Indeed, even many string theorists are sceptical about the landscape, despite the enthusiasm with which some propose it. A major problem arises when one has a theory where no verification is possible. It is not necessary to check all the predictions of a theory for it to be considered scientific — one can check some predictions to help the theory gain credence, but that does not prove the theory because it has to be the only one that makes the prediction for it to carry weight; it cannot be conclusive unless no other explanation is possible Let me illustrate with an example. I can propose that there are leopards hidden in the mountains of Scotland. They are very shy, so they hide away and no-one ever sees them. But you can tell they are there because sheep vanish without trace every year. I can put together an exciting research project that will look at statistics of lost sheep in Scotland for the past 50 years, and hence prove the existence of these rare mountain leopards. This seems to me to be analogous to the argument for proof of the existence of a multiverse through any specific property (e.g. the smallness of Λ) that might possibly exist somewhere in the landscape. This may be something that is predicted by some multiverse theory, but it hardly proves it true. I am all for the exercise of applying known physics in more extreme conditions: do it and see what happens. But admit that it is an untested extrapolation and that different extrapolations are possible. You can extrapolate different aspects of known physics to the unknown and different predictions will result. For example, if one extrapolates classical physics to the quantum domain, the answers will be wrong. But in that case you can show this is so by experimental tests. That is what is missing in the multiverse case: you can make the extrapolation but cannot then determine if it is right or not. The nature of science changes, so what is illegitimate science today may be legitimate tomorrow. This is true, but the foundations must be respected if one is to preserve the core features of science that have led to its phenomenal success: that is the feedback from reality to theory provided by experiment and observational testing. One abandons that at one's peril. For example, today's philosophical definition of science excludes astrology, despite all the claimed theory and data supporting it. But now astrologers can take hope from the arguments of string theorists and multiverse enthusiasts: with the weakened kinds of criteria proposed, astrology too will soon be a strong candidate for recognition as a genuine science. The Popperazi (a derogatory term used by Susskind for those who believe testing scientific theories is an indispensible aspect of science) will no longer be able to deny astrology its place as a proper scientific theory. Is that what we really want? At the very least, we must be given a clear statement as to what broader definition of the nature of science is being proposed, and in particular what criteria of testing will be taken to be adequate (Ellis 2006); this then needs to be assessed in relation to cases such as astrology and “intelligent design”, as well as multiverses and string theory, in order to see what its implications are. The multiverse idea is provable neither by observation, nor as an implication of well established physics. It may be true, but it cannot be shown to be true. It does have great explanatory power — it provides an empirically based rationalization for fine tuning, developed from known physical principles — but one must distinguish between explanation and prediction. Successful scientific theories make predictions that can be tested. The multiverse theory cannot make any testable predictions because it can explain anything at all. Even though multiverse proposals are good empirically based philosophical proposals for the nature of what exists, they are not strictly within the domain of science. There is nothing wrong with empirically based philosophical explanation — indeed it is of great value provided it is labelled for what it is — but I suggest that cosmologists should be very careful not to make methodological proposals that erode the essential nature of science in their enthusiasm to support specific theories. For if they do so, there will very likely be unintended consequences in other areas where the boundaries of science are in dispute. Let me state it more strongly: it is dangerous to weaken the grounds of scientific proof in order to include multiverses under the mantle of “tested science”. It is a retrograde step towards the claim that we can establish the nature of the universe by pure thought without having to confirm our theories by observational or experimental tests. This abandons the key principle that has led to the extraordinary success of science. The claim that multiverses exist is a belief rather than an established scientific fact. It is a reasonable belief with strong explanatory nature, but a belief nonetheless. The appropriate statement we can make is not “multiverses exist” or “multiverses have been proved to exist” or even “multiverses can be proved to exist”, but rather “multiverses are a useful explanatory hypothesis”. We should not state more. Martin Gardner (2003) puts it this way: “There is not the slightest shred of reliable evidence that there is any universe other than the one we are in. No multiverse theory has so far provided a prediction that can be tested. As far as we can tell, universes are not as plentiful as even two blackberries.”
The project development objectives of the Additional Financing for Second Decentralized City Management Project of Benin remain unchanged: to increase access to infrastructure and basic services for residents of Benin's primary cities (Cotonou, Porto- Novo, and Parakou) and selected secondary cities (Abomey-Calavi, Lokossa, and Kandi). The additional financing would scale up the project impact in terms of the number of people gaining access to roads and being protected from periodic flooding. It is within this framework that the Project will help strengthen the infrastructure of roads and storm-drainage in the cities of Cotonou, Porto-Novo and Parakou. The realization and implementation of selected works in this program could have negative effects on the cultural and human affairs. These impacts are traditionally the subject of a management plan for environmental and social impacts. However, when these impacts lead to involuntary displacement of persons, a special procedure is scheduled to limit these impacts and to minimize or compensate for the property losses and activities incurred by these populations.
The project development objectives of the Additional Financing for Second Decentralized City Management Project of Benin remain unchanged: to increase access to infrastructure and basic services for residents of Benin's primary cities (Cotonou, Porto- Novo, and Parakou) and selected secondary cities (Abomey-Calavi, Lokossa, and Kandi). The additional financing would scale up the project impact in terms of the number of people gaining access to roads and being protected from periodic flooding. It is within this framework that the Project will help strengthen the infrastructure of roads and storm-drainage in the cities of Cotonou, Porto-Novo and Parakou. The realization and implementation of selected works in this program could have negative effects on the cultural and human affairs. These impacts are traditionally the subject of a management plan for environmental and social impacts. However, when these impacts lead to involuntary displacement of persons, a special procedure is scheduled to limit these impacts and to minimize or compensate for the property losses and activities incurred by these populations.
The Long Transition: 1993-1996 Richard Fulton (bio) For at least the first three years of the 90s, Barbara Quinn Schmidt hinted with increasing urgency that she would like to pass the editorship of VPR on to someone new. She had wrought significant changes in VPR, but the publication of the journal continued to be an ad hoc venture carried on by Barbara, several supporters at SIU-Edwardsville, and students in selected classes. In those pre-desktop publishing days, setting up the publication, printing, binding, bundling, and mailing demanded a serious commitment of time from the staff she had assembled, and, as she confided to me, the fun was beginning to wear off. The crisis came for RSVP at the 1992 meeting at Manchester Polytechnic University; with no other volunteers, and faced with the reality that VPR would cease as an important critical journal without an editor, I stepped up as interim until Penny Kanner's search committee could unearth someone who could do the job justice. Barbara assured me that editing VPR would be a piece of cake, especially since I had access to key technical expertise through the faculty and resources of my community college. When I reminded her that I had no editing experience whatsoever and no Victorianists on campus to turn to for support, she pooh-poohed my concerns, saying something to the effect that anyone who could edit an institutional accreditation self-study (!) could put out four issues of VPR a year. She also told me that she had the next several issues nearly completed, and that I'd have some lead time to get started on my first issue, 26:3 (Fall 1993). Within a few weeks boxes of files, paper stock, back issues, correspondence, bills, and ledgers arrived. The spring 1993 issue carried the following notice that I had asked Barbara to insert: VPR is Moving! After 8½ years at Southern Illinois University under the editorship of Barbara Quinn Schmidt, VPR will move to Vancouver, Washington in June; [End Page 33] former RSVP President Richard Fulton will take over editorial duties for at least the next two years. Fulton will be assisted by Shirley Sackman in Vancouver. John Powell will be Book Review Editor, and Louis James and Merrill Distad will continue to act as Associate Editors for Great Britain and Canada respectively. . . . On behalf of the Society and Victorian scholars everywhere, the new editors thank Barbara Schmidt and her staff at SIUE for the heroic efforts in publishing four quality issues of VPR annually beginning 1985. It is rapidly becoming apparent to the new staff just how much is involved in getting out an issue. We hope that the members of the society will bear with us as we establish a working routine. We will be prepared to discuss future directions for VPR at the annual meeting in Ann Arbor. Please be there with helpful comments. Thanks for your confidence. As that plaintive second sentence in the second paragraph indicates, I had neither the staffing nor the time to publish the paper at Clark College. When I took the job the Board agreed that we needed an established publisher to handle subscription lists and the mechanical details of printing, binding, and mailing. John Powell contacted several presses; we finally settled on the University Press of Colorado, which at that time was engaged in an ambitious expansion program. UPC would publish and distribute our first effort, the fall 1993 issue. I sent off a mockup of that issue on a WordPerfect disk in late June. Readers familiar with VPR's early days will remember that for over twenty years the 8½ × 11 format that had been a holdover from the mimeographed newsletter era continued as the journal became a more serious critical organ. UPC were not excited about continuing the larger format, preferring instead a more standard 6 × 9 journal size. However, they agreed to print their first two issues—e.g., numbers 3 and 4 of volume 26—in the larger format to maintain continuity and to avoid alienating an army of librarians (fig. 1). In August I sent a disk for number 4, and began plugging away at what I hoped...
Reviewed by: Slave Agriculture and Financial Markets: The Bank of the United States in Mississippi, 1831–1852 Jessica Lepler (bio) Slave Agriculture and Financial Markets: The Bank of the United States in Mississippi, 1831–1852. By Richard Holcombe Kilbourne, Jr. (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2006. Pp. 202. Cloth, $99.00.) In Slave Agriculture and Financial Markets: The Bank of the United States in Mississippi, 1831–1852, Richard Holcombe Kilbourne, Jr., aims to rekindle interest in the "bank war" of the 1830s. Once the fodder of arguments between giants like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Bray Hammond, the story of the demise of the Second Bank of the United States (BUS) starred in the narrative of antebellum America until the new social history removed the spotlight from powerful, dead, white men like President Andrew Jackson and BUS President Nicholas Biddle. Although many historians lost interest in the bank war after the 1960s, economic historians performed econometrical analyses of the available statistics to locate the financial cause of one of the worst depressions Americans had ever experienced. In 1969, Peter Temin's The Jacksonian Economy (New York, 1969) supplied quantitative evidence of macroeconomic forces stretching from England to China that replaced the contest between Whig and Democratic fiscal policy as the explanation for America's hard [End Page 134] times. Written almost four decades later, Kilbourne's monograph is an attempt to refute Temin's theory and return to an interpretation of the bank war that relies on American domestic fiscal policy. Despite the mention of slavery in the title, Slave Agriculture and Financial Markets does not try to spark new interest in the bank war by linking recent social, political, and cultural studies of the early-nineteenth-century market revolution with quantitative economic history. Rather, this is a purely financial and legal history of an ignored sector of the 1830s economy that makes some astounding discoveries and specialized historiographical arguments. Whereas previous economic historians have examined Jacksonian era banking from the perspective of either the federally chartered BUS or the decentralized state-chartered banks, Kilbourne scrutinizes the intersection between national and state institutions by focusing on the Natchez branch of the BUS before, during, and after the expiration of the federal charter. Employing the surprisingly complete financial records of this institution and other Mississippi banks in conjunction with familiar documents relating to the Philadelphia-based BUS, Kilbourne has crafted a case study of the rise and fall of the Natchez branch of the BUS. Each of Kilbourne's four chapters targets a different historiographical literature on the bank war. In the first chapter, he dismisses studies that blame the financial crisis on inflated bank paper by analyzing the competition among Mississippi banks for the more lucrative trade in commercial paper. He shows that in the early 1830s, the BUS opened branches in Natchez and elsewhere to control local banks and profit from the intra-national circulation of commercial bills of exchange and other financial instruments. Kilbourne finds that during these prosperous years, the investments of the branches of the BUS supplied the central bank with the majority of its profits. After Andrew Jackson's refusal to renew the BUS's charter, the financial flow from periphery to center reversed direction. As Kilbourne argues in his next section, after 1836, the branches drained Biddle's Philadelphia institution of its liquidity and, eventually, forced banks throughout the United States to suspend specie payments. Kilbourne blames the Panic of 1837 and the subsequent depression on the events following the expiration of the BUS's federal charter and its recharter in Pennsylvania. Although Kilbourne argues for domestic causation, his sources document strong connections between financiers in Mississippi and London that reaffirm Temin's international thesis. Thus, Kilbourne's reconsideration of the financial causes of the Panic of 1837 [End Page 135] should inspire new scholarship that synthesizes national and global perspectives. Switching from the terms of finance to the letter of the law (subjects that explain but do not excuse jargon-laden chapters), Kilbourne next considers the BUS's attempts to recover losses in Mississippi through both state and federal court systems. Countering a historiography that posits that commercial law responded to economic development, he finds that...
The Czech Republic and Slovakia, like other transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, have given significant lip service to fiscal decentralization and engaged in public administration reforms. But the subnational governments of their public finance systems still lack relative autonomy, which could be addressed partly through developing independent revenue sources for their municipalities and regions. Currently, such independent revenue sources include the proceeds of a strictly nominal property tax as well as those of a small set of local user fees and taxes designed and approved by the central governments. Together they represent only about 5 percent of total municipal budget revenues. A number of market democracies have used user fees dramatically to generate revenues for local governments, a possibility that remains undiscovered in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. User fees could potentially generate badly needed revenue for the municipal and regional governments of the twin republics. The user fees and taxes currently available to the local governments of the two republics are reviewed, primarily to demonstrate their current, very limited use. The revenue implications of current fees are also addressed, revealing them as little more than nuisance fees. A discussion on the growing significance of user fees globally and their potential for the Czech Republic and Slovakia suggests the possibility for heavier use. Particular attention is paid to the question of charging user fees not only for cost recovery, but to provide some budgetary relief for hard-pressed local authorities in economic transition. A basic theory of optimal, revenue-enhancing user fees is presented.
The 20th century has been called the era of centralized authoritarian rule.On the other hand, the 21st century is known as the era of devolution.In this lecture, I will first explain the reasons why a decentralized society, that is, devolution, has become necessary.Second, I will give a general outline on the OECD system of fiscal relations across government levels.Third, I will examine the present state of the reform for decentralization that has been undertaken in Japan in recent years, and fourth, I will investigate the situation of local government finance in the age of devolution in reference to the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government.
It is thought that the corporations bear excessive debt in 1980s, leading to the bubble, and it burst in 1990s. An example of the proof is the bad debt problem of the banking sector. If the amount of debt was excessive, a corporation should have excessive assets, and which would impair its profitability, ie, impaired efficient use of capital employed. The issue has been studied from many aspects such as macro economic condition, character of the financial markets, etc. Also, there have been many researches on cost of capital with respect to corporate governance. Yonezawa and Matsuura (2000) said retained earnings had not been efficiently used in the light of dividend policy. Miyagawa, Arikawa and Saito (2001) said free cash flows had been used for low return projects in the comparative study on the oil shock and the bubble period. On the other hand, Fukushima (2003) said as far as ex-post returns were concerned, they sufficed to the expectation of investors. Takemi (2005) suggested it was wrong to say that 1990s was the only period to see the impaired profitability and its tendency could date back to 1970s. And as a whole industry, the increase in labor costs had surpassed the increase in productivity. From the view of stake holders, equity holders had aided employees financially for a long period of time. Miyanaga (2002), whose attention was to labor costs, has the same conclusion. Analysis tool of this paper is return on capital employed. The reason is as follows; it is a hybrid measure of assets turn-over, relating to cost of capital, and operating profit ratio to sales, relating to expense control on labor costs. And it leads to present the strategic character of Japanese corporations.
If one wants to begin with most common of beginnings, namely, with the claim that one would like to be able to consider sexual politics during this time, a certain problem arises. Since, it seems clear that one cannot reference ‘this time’ without knowing which time, where that time takes hold, and for whom a certain consensus emerges on the issue of what time this is. So if it is not just a matter of differences of interpretation about what time it is, then it would seem that we have already more than one time at work in this time, and that the problem of time will afflict any effort I might make to try and consider some of these major issues now. It might seem odd to begin with a reflection on time when one is trying to speak about sexual politics and cultural politics more broadly. But my suggestion here is that the way in which debates within sexual politics are framed are already imbued with the problem of time, of progress in particular, and in certain notions of what it means to unfold a future of freedom in time. That there is no one time, that the question of what time this is, already divides us, has to do with which histories have turned out to be formative, how they intersect – or fail to intersect with other histories – and so with a question of the how temporality is organized along spatial lines. I'm not suggesting here that we return to a version of cultural difference that depends on cultural wholism. In fact, I oppose any such return. The problem is not that there are different cultures at war with one another, or that there are different modalities of time, each conceived as self-sufficient, that are articulated in different and differentiated cultural locations or that come into confused or brutal contact with one another. at some that be a it would namely, that of progress and a temporality that they for the of the what time are we are of in the and has in and has are in the of The cannot be to a my that sexual than to the of this is in the of and that to or sexual are that of – within – that would try to and the of as the where sexual and not the claim is that such a of freedom be the with that claim for the it with it a of that be trying to in this But the that this is a one that is a that to notions of sexual and of within a that and into the of freedom and In my the problem is not that there are different in different cultural locations we to cultural to more and That of the and for each of these and then question about how they might the problem is that certain notions of – the spatial of – are this of a certain notions of what ‘this time’ and be are on the of the of I make clear that I not notions of and not of that I if not means for progress and the time of the and that that is of what I to on a of sexual I to a of sexual politics of that is my is that there be no of sexual politics without a of the time of the now. claim will be that the problem of temporality and politics in this way a different to cultural one that the of and The is not just to of the and spatial of some of the that if not of But to that of what is is with a certain on the of the and a to what to of time if we the problem of the the and what and the means and of that or to be to any of The of sexual politics is I would with and that the time of sexual politics as a the of progress is one within that and it is one that for come into is to on how certain of and of what is a within politics on a of freedom that is to time, and which is in and freedom and progress is what is when and to like I to that this is they I do to that a certain of freedom is as a and for certain of and this of have as a sexual politics in a In this I to to a of sexual politics and that that certain of the progress of a sexual politics and the and the of the issues that such a is that a certain version and of be as of and most when sexual freedom or the freedom of and for and is to cultural on that we freedom and in the of or we is not to freedom as a to about and to consider how it be if it is to in the and have that might for a In the for for are to at of and to are they are to and the are to in a that the of to and are in of the claim that of is the as in such how is as sexual and the sexual freedom of is to a as to one that would be It would seem that the has for a of are The the are to the and more than are of the and where is not to be or In the of this has for some time. 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the and of certain the and the and the as a in such a That the then a of for and in the is that the to such and in to and at we might that at a the to a of freedom that is on is that might the that is, to the of the cultural of In other in or in that do not the of and the of and that in the of the that that cultural which a that is The that as the are that the for into in this is the of and the for to a certain cultural for the of it is not the of the of and on common the question of the of this of as of in particular, the is a if what this about the of In particular, it the question of this as a and of that in with is not the that the is what in a that a in the of is what the of sexual as the difference and in we that the not is to and sexual difference as a cultural and In to the of the in the of and in the and the to The to The seems to to the politics that takes to be a this of with the In to the of one or the differences to be as of and cultural In this is the cultural is to the and to be The of the difference or of the has on a of of the to for of has in for into question the in of and and make and in a of to that this to issues is in a as to be to this in not in and to as they they are to In the that is the is the that a without will not be without will be the cultural and of in able to of the of the to oppose effort to It is, as I to the that a and that of to of some this to the that the into the of the where it is that do not has to the of and one that in of the and the if it means If the to the of when and and to when of In of we the The a that the of just what that and there will and such as to the the that this not that if one it clear that and then it to issue a about the to that there are to this most to the which to the But like to to the it is with and we have already what the about the cultural of the as as the is as a means of in the it a of in this to whom the when it in the of if not to are not the of in a they a time, a and the of I on at I 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to to on such we would make a in that to be in each and that is not a of or a of a for is not in a for the and of and a of it do to as if it a the of the of the they make with the of a that and and I the of the for this this at for in the of within in is and the of into of The on be the in to this into The of the to and of the is other than the of the that are to or the with at which a way not of or cultural a way of a of cultural that the and of cultural If I this about the of progress as a for about the sexual politics during this time, like to that what is at issue is any and of out for – I to of in which not so as of of and the one the of we are in and the that it in the which is In the of we a different to a and that is at cultural and suggesting of one in the are not the as the of there are that are The problem is, of not progress the in which certain and at the and of framed as and as in such a of what of of a and of the and what and the that the for within the I this as one is 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cultures as and which the of cultural and and which and more in the of cultural I to that the of to a for the and for the of the of of there is no and it is not to the and the in and the that it then for this and they in the of that have to as as that in any these of to the of a within and as a of sexual that at a of or But what we have to is that the of the and the as as the of the of that within the of the I to be so this the not effort to to and the of and on the of cultural The a way to the and the That means that of the cultural of the they to the cultural this that the not have to It is of the to the of that and we will have to has not in most of the debates that have on this issue within the have to this issue within a The is on the of cultural and cultural It that these of sexual and the sexual of these The is that one a of this that no reference to these would be and no matter whom they or The which cultural is the and the that cultural in the of these that have to do with on and of and The of sexual to and I to that of these for the are there cultural at work and these of to any we have to of these within a if we are to how the of sexual and are of the in particular, to the of the of If we what is at in the as a of sexual and we have to out what is not the the war effort more If we to speak about then it would make to begin with the of the and and it for the which it war as the of and I to that a war is at work in this that the as the more The more they or it they in and the of they The of the in to war not and not the sexual and of in to the the of The is not to the to a that would when to such – and I we have to – which would not It be that the as one is at the of the of the that cannot a that for the to is of it is a way of and a freedom that is at and one that has come to and the there be no with on the to the of and of the if we at what is as the it of and we have to the as the of a a that is and for about the of a a in which are in of and and so not 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and as a that is already at work in the most in the of a cultural that as as a within and the of the is not the and that the on If is as to the it is it to the that it is it that I not that of is the as that to sexual But I suggesting that the of of a to to of when some of to a to the cultural of and of then the for and is In the of sexual a of the of sexual freedom is at that do we are to and so to and will to us, and that will as the for this is different the of the that on the of The is there a common at and the for sexual freedom within these a of the in we begin to the of if we cannot for the in the as it on are a on of is at the of in which a and the and of If we on the within a of or cultural or cultural we of the at work in the of The and seem more to the of than any and that one have to the or that one might as the or of the is and the of begin with the that it is and not to a to that on in of which have already might be a to for is at issue in the of is the of and that to the as it has in the of this the is to the or what it most is as the and of are not of a the and of as it in the of The of are in the of and we that the at issue is of a politics that is no more or of than the of and In fact, the and be more than we The at issue here is the of the and any a and oppose it at the is to a politics that and and to a that how the in the of a certain and of cultural or is the most to If the of are the of a certain of it is one that is of and of in to and to That there are notions of freedom at is it is that the freedom to be and is the that have is the to time, this time, of that that as and of the The of a that of cultural to and within a would be one way to begin to a politics that sexual freedom in the of and the of and I'm not at we to within a I I have at in to on a cultural as a of or or is to such a as the of for be the then it seems to that a way of how and will be for any of that I that would the in question into that in in what a just of It is to not the in which is just as a of how certain not have without and But the is not to that we are If to a and of time, and if some of are within that of a and then we would do to The to not it not is in the of on the of the of the progress of cannot be the of a time. of the of such a be the of any of the of progress to this are in a that that they are about to make the of is of the at the of The how the how the is not in the is one time of the as with of time’ reference here not on future to on the of the on a that differences The which is is the and of that cannot be to cultural or a of in the of of time the which the might which for the It is not that the as the as the of That on a certain of progress to as the the time’ these of is to the that and a of and the it to the of cultural to freedom the that make of other with such a of do we a of and the already and of with other in to consider how to and to the of It is to with the and that any of will be able to of the time and of If freedom is one of the we it will be to how freedom in the of a the to claim to then we freedom as a of and how it is to sexual politics in the of a of this is the that as the which at the of and in
Ali Rezaee, Amir Masoud Rahmani, Saeed P arsa, Sahar Adabi
Grid computing is emerged as a new distributed computing technology that implements flexible and coordinated resource sharing among dynamic, heterogeneous, unpredictable and geographically distributed collections of resources owned by different individuals and organizations. Due to heterogeneous and dynamic nature of the grid, resource management and application scheduling is a complex undertaking. This paper proposed a multi-agent architecture that addressed resource management and application execution with support for Quality of Services (QoS) in grid environment. Five types of collaborative intelligent and mobile agents proposed to manage grid resources and applications in a decentralized, autonomous and intelligent manner. In the proposed architecture, negotiation, advanced reservation and QoS measurements handled by collaborative intelligent agents. Resources and applications are managed independently with respect to their defined policies. The simulation results showed that the multi-agent architecture is practical, flexible and effective.