Emission trading policy provides a new approach using economic incentives to control the environmental pollution efficiently. Legal polluters can trade emission permits with each other through a trusted trading system that lacks security and credibility due to its centralization nowadays. Permissioned blockchain utilize a decentralized way to store private data immutably, providing new approaches to solve those defects of the existing centralized systems. In this paper, we propose a Hyperledger-based Emission Trading System (HyperETS) on the permissioned blockchain. Using Hyperledger Fabric as the implementation platform, HyperETS integrates the fine-grained access control, distributed ledger, and consensus protocol, aiming to provide credible trading service for polluters. We achieve the business logic by designing the particular ledger structures and smart contract in blockchain. HyperETS stores all transactions immutably in a chain and makes it easy to share the data between organizations. Finally, several experiments are conducted to evaluate the performances of the proposed demonstration system.
Directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) are emerging as an attractive alternative to traditional blockchain architectures for distributed ledger technology. In particular, DAG ledgers with stochastic attachment mechanisms potentially offer many advantages over blockchain, including scalability and faster transaction speeds. However, the random nature of the attachment mechanism coupled with the requirement of protection against double-spending transactions might result in an unstable system in which not all transactions get eventually validated. Such transactions are said to be orphaned, and will never be validated. Our principal contribution is to propose a simple modification to the attachment mechanism for the Tangle (the IOTA DAG architecture). This modification ensures that all transactions are validated in finite time, and preserves essential features of the popular Monte Carlo selection algorithm. In order to demonstrate these results, we derive a fluid approximation for the Tangle (in the limit of infinite arrival rate) and prove that this fluid model exhibits the desired behavior. We also present simulations that validate the results for finite arrival rates.
Directed Acylic Graphs (DAGs) are emerging as an attractive alternative to traditional blockchain architectures for distributed ledger technology (DLT). In particular DAG ledgers with stochastic attachment mechanisms potentially offer many advantages over blockchain, including scalability and faster transaction speeds. However, the random nature of the attachment mechanism coupled with the requirement of protection against double-spend transactions leaves open the possibility that not all transactions will be eventually validated. Such transactions are said to be orphaned, and will never be validated. Our principal contribution is to propose a simple modification to the attachment mechanism for the Tangle (the IOTA DAG architecture). This modification ensures that all transactions are validated in finite time, and preserves essential features of the popular Monte-Carlo selection algorithm. In order to demonstrate these results we derive a fluid approximation for the Tangle (in the limit of infinite arrival rate) and prove that this fluid model exhibits the desired behavior. We also present simulations which validate the results for finite arrival rates.
Blockchain technology on the platform business becomes a new paradigm which gets security, irreversibility, and trustfulness closer to both of clients and service providers (SPs) for providing a better quality of service. To provide an economic analysis of such blockchain-based platform business, a game theoretic approach is used to model a competitive market against the incumbent platform operated by a centralizer as a trusted third party. In this market, the platforms behave as a mediator to deliver the services provided by SPs to clients. The crucial factors for the success of blockchain-based platform business are (i) how SPs' participation is reflected on its quality of service (QoS) and (ii) how to incentivize SPs to contribute their resources such as computing/storage infrastructure. In our game formulation, a non-cooperative two-stage dynamic game is used, where the first stage models how to incentivize SPs in a blockchain-based platform and the second stage models the competition between platforms to attract clients. As a result, we provide an equilibrium analysis, which gives a useful insight into how much the service quality of blockchain-based platform affects the competition between platforms and the equilibrium incentive strategy for SPs. Moreover, our numerical analysis shows that the equilibrium incentive increases with proportional to the QoS of a blockchain-based platform whereas the incentive becomes negative if it provides a non-increasing QoS with the number of participated SPs.
Innovations such as the Cloud, Internet of Things (IoT) and data analytics have already dramatically altered the customer experience in many, if not all, industries. Blockchain, as another emerging technology, is expected to be the next generation infrastructure to established trusted multiparty collaborations. In this paper, we investigated the convergence of aforementioned technologies, by presenting a prototype of fine-grained transportation insurance. Insurance premium were assessed based on vehicles usage and driver's behavior, which were deduced from streaming IoT data collected from mobile sensors. This incentive mechanism promotes fairness among drivers and encourages safer driving style. The prototype takes advantage of both private blockchain (e.g., high transaction rate in Hyperledger) and public blockchain (e.g., inbuilt cryptocurrency). Besides system architecture and implementation details, preliminary performance evaluations are presented and discussed.
We describe an agent-based conceptual model of a Blockchain system. Blockchain technology enables distributed, encrypted and secure logging of digital transactions in an add-only ledger record. We model and simulate an expanding Blockchain network, describing the participating agents, the transactions, and the verified add-only public ledger record achieving decentralized consensus. All of the essential details of the functioning of the Blockchain including the behaviors and decisions made by agents deciding to join as well as participate in the market are detailed in the prototype model. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the essential elements and functioning of a Blockchain system, implement a generalized simulation and a measure of Blockchain efficiency from an agent choice and energy cost perspective. Our preliminary results indicate that mining choice (transaction block to verify) coupled with proof of work incentives are critical for energy efficiency.
Benefit from the capabilities of providing decentralized tamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization, open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gained tremendous popularity. Yet, the proof-of-work based consensus protocols under threats, e.g., double-spending. In this paper, by adopting the cyber-insurance as an economic tool to neutralize cyber risks, we propose a novel approach of cyber risk management for blockchain-based service. The blockchain service market under our consideration is composed of four entities, i.e., the infrastructure provider, blockchain provider, cyber-insurer, and users. The blockchain provider purchases the computing resources, e.g., a cloud, from the infrastructure provider to maintain the blockchain consensus and then offers blockchain services to the users. The blockchain provider optimize its profit by strategizing its investment in the infrastructure in order to improve the security of the blockchain and the service price charged to the users. In the meantime, to prevent the potential damage incurred by the attacks and then fully secure the cyber-space, the blockchain provider purchases a cyber-insurance from the cyber-insurer. In return, the cyber- insurer adjusts the insurance premium according to the perceived risk level of the blockchain service and will pay the claim to the blockchain provider once attacks happen. Based on the rationality of the market entities, we model the interaction among the blockchain provider, users, and cyber-insurer as a two- stage Stackelberg game. Specifically, the blockchain provider and cyber-insurer lead to set their pricing/investment strategies in the upper level subgame, and then the users follow to determine their demand of the blockchain service in the lower level subgame. Specifically, we consider the scenario of double-spending attacks and provide a series of analytical results about the Stackelberg equilibrium in the market game.
The gaming industry has evolved into a multi-functional smart city that combines integrated casinos and entertainment (ICE). ICE logistics involve supply chains with various stages in geographically-distributed locations and with limited and complex storage and warehouses. Challenges are to leverage demands, traffic, and storage allocation in ICE logistics. The decentralized structure of blockchain technology allows all parties to participate in ICE logistics. Its cryptography-based, immutable nature gives the assurance of security. This research deals with the design and application of blockchains in ICE logistics. We first adopt a Concentric Value Circles (CVC) model to identify the requirements and business opportunities that use blockchain technology in ICE logistics. We develop an open, automated, and transparent platform, TransICE, which utilizes the feature of smart contracts in blockchain technology and adopts a decentralized model, Hawk, where no financial transactions are stored on the blockchain to hold privacy of transactions publicly. Two cases, (1) the Shipment Pricing and Scheduling process and (2) the Pickup, Shipping and Delivery process in TransICE, are studied to illustrate the applications and feasibility of the proposed TransICE platform and the developed smart contracts of the Hawk model.
Blockchain is highly secure in design and can hand huge data efficiently. A smart contract, based on a blockchain, can automate the entire process and make the contract self-executing in nature. Since the first introduction of these technologies in the 1990s, they have been at the center interest for academia and industry. Numerous researchers and practitioners have investigated the principles and usage of blockchain and smart contracts. However, little is coincidental regarding estimating the consumer’s additional willingness to pay (WTP) and analyzing the relationship with socio-economic characteristics of the consumer for blockchain and smart contracts in the insurance sector. This study conducted the survey on 1000 heads of the household or homemakers who represent population well in South Korea and estimated additional WTP using one-and-one-half-bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation (OOHB DC CV) method. About 65% of sample respondents answered they are willing to pay some additional premium for blockchain and smart contracts. The mean WTP has the value of KRW 28,425.43 (USD 25.38) and the median WTP is KRW 16,111.71 (USD 14.39). Those with high incomes, high education and more insurance contracts are more likely to pay extra for insurance policies using blockchain and smart contracts. Considering the total number of households in South Korea, the aggregated additional WTP is about 8 percent of the net income of the insurance industry in fiscal year of 2017. Consequently, strategic development of insurance products using block chains and smart contracts targeting educated consumers with high-income will increase the number of policyholders, which can in turn increase premium revenues.
Igor Silva Bonomo, Iuri R. Barbosa, Lucas Borges Monteiro, Camila Fernanda Bassetto · 7 authors
System Wide Information Management (SWIM) including SWIM Registry for Air Traffic Management (ATM) has been successfully developed and applied in Europe and United States. The most developing countries have just started to study the employment of SWIM concept, which its establishment is required prior to the development of SWIM Registry. In this paper, we introduce the experience of the development of SWIM Registry Brazil, which comprises the study of the architecture, components, services and data accessing. In order to encourage consumers and providers to participate in the SWIM community, we developed a prototype of SWIM Registry Demonstration for the Brazilian ATM society. We propose a model based on Blockchain for managing services currently provided by Brazilian ATM in order to certificate operations which are performed by consumers, authorities and involved stakeholders. The proposed model is expected to provide services for SWIM Registry with integrity, efficiency, security and authenticity, which are fundamental for the proper operation of Brazilian aviation system.
Anders Henten, Iwona Maria Windekilde, Anders Henten, Iwona Maria Windekilde
This paper examines current business applications of blockchain technology and discusses blockchain implications for transaction costs. Blockchains are a relatively new set of technologies that can be used for various business purposes, primarily activities related to contracting. Transaction costs comprise the operational costs of contacting (searching and communicating) as well as the costs of contracting (writing and enforcing contracts), and blockchains can be used to lower, first and foremost, the costs of writing and enforcing contracts. Other technology applications that have been investigated to a larger extent, such as multi-sided platforms, primarily help in lowering the costs of searching and communicating, while blockchains can contribute to lowering the costs of contracting.
A decentralized ride-or carsharing application is among the early proposals of what smart contracts on blockchains may enable in the future. To facilitate use cases in the field of location-based services (LBS), smart contracts need to receive trustworthy positioning information, and be able to process them. We propose an approach on how geofences can be defined in smart contracts, and how supplied positions can be evaluated on whether they are contained in the geofence or not. The approach relies on existing location encoding systems like Geohashes and S2 cells that can transform polygons into a grid of cells. These can be stored in a smart contract to represent a geofence. An oracle run by a mobile network provider can submit network-based positioning information to the contract, that compares it with the geofence. We evaluate the location encoding systems on their ability to model city geofences and mobile network cell position estimates and analyze the costs associated with storing and evaluating received oracle-positions in an Ethereum-based smart contract implementation. Our results show that S2 encodings perform better than Geohashes, that the one-time cost of geofence definition corresponds linearly with the number of grid cells used, and that the evaluation of oracle-submitted locations does not incur high costs.
Future electricity distribution grids will host a considerable share of variable renewable energy sources, such as roof photo voltaic and small wind power. The households will progressively become prosumers playing an active role on localized peer-to-peer electricity trading. This paper proposes a conceptual framework that enables households to autonomously exchange energy with neighbors based on blockchain techniques, aimed to locally balancing renewable energy production.
Blockchain technology is growing everyday at a fast-passed rhythm and it is possible to integrate it with many systems, namely Robotics with AI services. However, this is still a recent field and there is not yet a clear understanding of what it could potentially become. In this paper, we conduct an overview of many different methods and platforms that try to leverage the power of blockchains into robotic systems, to improve AI services, or to solve problems that are present in the major blockchains, which can lead to the ability of creating robotic systems with increased capabilities and security. We present an overview, discuss the methods, and conclude the paper with our view on the future of the integration of these technologies.
In Internet of Vehicles (IoV), data sharing among vehicles is essential to improve driving safety and enhance vehicular services. To ensure data sharing security and traceability, highefficiency Delegated Proof-of-Stake consensus scheme as a hard security solution is utilized to establish blockchain-enabled IoV (BIoV). However, as miners are selected from miner candidates by stake-based voting, it is difficult to defend against voting collusion between the candidates and compromised high-stake vehicles, which introduces serious security challenges to the BIoV. To address such challenges, we propose a soft security enhancement solution including two stages: (i) miner selection and (ii) block verification. In the first stage, a reputation-based voting scheme for the blockchain is proposed to ensure secure miner selection. This scheme evaluates candidates' reputation by using both historical interactions and recommended opinions from other vehicles. The candidates with high reputation are selected to be active miners and standby miners. In the second stage, to prevent internal collusion among the active miners, a newly generated block is further verified and audited by the standby miners. To incentivize the standby miners to participate in block verification, we formulate interactions between the active miners and the standby miners by using contract theory, which takes block verification security and delay into consideration. Numerical results based on a real-world dataset indicate that our schemes are secure and efficient for data sharing in BIoV.
The smart community (SC), as an important part of the Internet of Energy (IoE), can facilitate integration of distributed renewable energy sources and electric vehicles (EVs) in the smart grid. However, due to the potential security and privacy issues caused by untrusted and opaque energy markets, it becomes a great challenge to optimally schedule the charging behaviors of EVs with distinct energy consumption preferences in SC. In this paper, we propose a contract-based energy blockchain for secure EV charging in SC. First, a permissioned energy blockchain system is introduced to implement secure charging services for EVs with the execution of smart contracts. Second, a reputation-based delegated Byzantine fault tolerance consensus algorithm is proposed to efficiently achieve the consensus in the permissioned blockchain. Third, based on the contract theory, the optimal contracts are analyzed and designed to satisfy EVs' individual needs for energy sources while maximizing the operator's utility. Furthermore, a novel energy allocation mechanism is proposed to allocate the limited renewable energy for EVs. Finally, extensive numerical results are carried out to evaluate and demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed scheme through comparison with other conventional schemes.
Carpooling enables passengers to share a vehicle to reduce traveling time, vehicle carbon emissions, and traffic congestion. However, the majority of passengers lean to find local drivers, but querying a remote cloud server leads to an unnecessary communication overhead and an increased response delay. Recently, fog computing is introduced to provide local data processing with low latency, but it also raises new security and privacy concerns because users' private information (e.g., identity and location) could be disclosed when these information are shared during carpooling. While they can be encrypted before transmission, it makes user matching a challenging task and malicious users can upload false locations. Moreover, carpooling records should be kept in a distributed manner to guarantee reliable data auditability. To address these problems, we propose an efficient and privacy-preserving carpooling scheme using blockchain-assisted vehicular fog computing to support conditional privacy, one-to-many matching, destination matching, and data auditability. Specifically, we authenticate users in a conditionally anonymous way. Also, we adopt private proximity test to achieve one-to-many proximity matching and extend it to efficiently establish a secret communication key between a passenger and a driver. We store all location grids into a tree and achieve get-off location matching using a range query technique. A private blockchain is built to store carpooling records. Finally, we analyze the security and privacy properties of the proposed scheme, and evaluate its performance in terms of computational costs and communication overhead.
This paper deals with the problems of the Plug-in Electric Vehicles charging costs in housing sector. A review of the optimal strategies is proposed and as such six algorithms are presented: three smart unidirectional and three smart bidirectional charging algorithms where the Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) and the Vehicle-to-Home (V2H) concepts were exploited. In addition an innovative V2G algorithm named Optimal Logical Control (V2G-OLC) is introduced in this paper. This latter is dedicated to the French energy billing system within the peak/base hour's contract. All the algorithms are tested over a set of 1000 data composed of real elements with four different daily energy price profiles. The results show a great efficiency of the V2G-OLC algorithm compared to the traditional optimal charging strategies. Indeed, the results show a reduction of 47.94% of the average charging cost with a unitary selling/buying price ratio in comparison to the simple charging at 230V-32A.
Anton Fedosov, Agon Bexheti, Egor Ermolaev, Marc Langheinrich
Networked digital sharing economy services enable the effective and efficient sharing of vehicles, housing, and everyday objects. However, contemporary online sharing platforms face several challenges related to the establishment of trust among peers, as well difficulties to deal with the growing number of intermediaries (e.g., payment, insurance) needed to ensure an adequate service delivery. We designed and developed "Just Share It" (JSI), an interactive system that enables the sharing of personal physical possessions (e.g., power tools, toys, sports gear) by directly connecting lenders and borrowers, as peers, through mobile technology. The JSI system utilizes a blockchain ledger and smart contracting technologies to improve peer trust and limit the number of required intermediaries, respectively. In this submission, we briefly review emergent challenges in this space, describe the JSI prototype system and its trust model, and reflect on future architectural opportunities for an eventual "in the wild" deployment.
This paper proposes a scheme to use blockchain technology for rideshare services. This paper replaces the centralized authority that matches drivers and riders, with block chain and a matching application that uses two types of coins, which encourages the drivers turning into miners. To evaluate the proposed system, this paper applies the proposed blockchain rideshare service to a case study to simulate and find the least matching probability to make drivers benefit from this system. Furthermore, this paper establishes a mathematical model of the stationary distribution of drivers and calculate the stationary profit of each driver in the blockchain rideshare system.
Thomas Morstyn, Alexander Teytelboym, Malcolm McCulloch
This paper proposes the novel application of matching markets with contracts for electric vehicle smart charging. The flexibility inherent in electric vehicle charging presents the new opportunity for automation and coordination to shape overall demand. Mechanisms that incentivise coordination are a promising approach for integrating the individual preferences and energy requirements of electric vehicle owners. However, these mechanisms require careful design, since they directly influence power system operation. This paper proposes a new market design, allowing owners of electric vehicles and aggregators to competitively negotiate contracts specifying the time and price of charging at discrete power levels. It is shown that the agents' preferences over contracts satisfy the condition of substitutability, establishing the existence of a stable outcome - an agreed set of contracts no group of agents wish to mutually deviate from. A distributed price-adjustment process is then presented for finding stable outcomes, which only requires local agent decisions and agent-to-agent negotiation. An advantage of the proposed market design is that contracts specify discrete charging power levels, rather than requiring continuously controllable charging powers. This makes it suitable for standard charging infrastructure, and could potentially increase efficiency compared with strategies that operate chargers at low power levels.