Pakistan's most significant federalist initiative, the 18th Constitutional Amendment (2010), scrapped the Concurrent Legislative List and transferred wide-ranging legislative, administrative, and fiscal responsibilities to the provinces. But more than ten years on, devolution remains uneven. In this paper, we explore the administrative, political and institutional obstacles to devolution between 2010 and 2018, with a focus on Centre-Punjab relations, the pivot of Pakistan's federation. Through a qualitative documentary analysis of parliamentary proceedings, archival documents, institutional reports and academic work, we argue that bureaucratic mediation operates as a two-pronged process: provincial bureaucracies, especially in Punjab, facilitate some devolved functions, while federal bureaucracies continue to exert control via regulatory coordination, conditional fiscal transfers and legal grey areas. The National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, which increased provincial transfers, has not ended fiscal dependence: the provinces receive 60-70% of their budget from the centre. The removal of the Concurrent Legislative List resulted in unequal sectoral outcomes - provincialization in health and education, but contested labour and interprovincial coordination. We suggest that constitutional devolution in the absence of simultaneous bureaucratic, fiscal autonomy and effective intergovernmental coordination creates a hybrid governance form: constitutionally decentralized and operationally centralised. In the case of Punjab, we find that bureaucratic capacity is not enough; path dependence, bureaucratic opposition and political bargaining over devolution shape the outcomes. Our insights enrich understanding of decentralization theory by identifying bureaucratic mediation as a critical variable and provide policy lessons for other federations in the midst of reforms. References Adeney, K. 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South Asian Studies and Conflicts
Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
This paper looks at Pakistan's decentralisation policy under the Musharraf era and emphasises how it has affected the bureaucratic and administrative structure of the nation. The main contention is that Musharraf decentralization imitative were designed to improve governance and address disparities between the civilian and military sectors. The research technique, which draws from a variety of government and academic sources, involves a thorough analysis of legislative modifications, policy changes, and their practical ramification. The article summarises Musharraf's original seven-point plan, emphasising the transfer of financial and administrative authority to local levels. The national reconstruction bureau NRB and the provincial finance commission PFC were two important reforms that attempted to transfer authority and funds from the federal to local governments; nevertheless, bureaucracy and political parties posed strong obstacles to the execution, which reduced the efficacy of these changes. The results show that while decentralisation attempts enhanced women's participation and community involvement and briefly strengthened local governments, they were eventually undermined by a lack of resources, poor administration and ongoing military supervision. Although the national accountability bureau was established with the intention of combating corruption, it was criticised for being abused for political purposes. According to the report, improved coordination between different levels of government, a sincere desire on the part of the political class to maintain changes, and continued support for local government are all necessary for decentralisation to be successful. Developing institutional capabilities and promoting an open and transparent culture are essential for long-term success.
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Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
The evolution of organised crime in India and its transforming relations between power and criminality increasingly reflect the logic of decentralisation, digital technologies and networked connections. The gangs headed by dons, which rely on sharp hierarchical authoritybased structures and are punctuated by layers of absentees serving only their personal interests, are giving way to a quasi-invisible architecture of fluidity, cell-based interactions and technological apparatus. Our paper places the Lawrence Bishnoi Gang at the centre of the inquiry of a contemporary interstate gang network in the digital era, exploring the dynamics of how new digital appreciation, reconnaissance, social media, encrypted exchanges and prison forays emerge to provide new reach and resiliency. Networks beg to differ; if we are to extend networkable theory to include also the study of criminality, then the Bishnoi network is the proof in the pudding. Making a special place for the records of recent homemaking, we examine how they view high visibility, dalliance in extortion, recruitment, targeted killings and crossborder desiring playing host to an archipelago in constancy even as the leaders are locked away in prisons away from home. Features like the need for hub and spoke models and high visibility required need to be varied in digital amplification, conspiring to leverage symbolic power, fear and reputation that take over physicality and locomotion for effective control over regions. Under considerable stake in the legal framework, the duration study examines most existing laws in the Indian Constitution that deal with gangsterism, such as the Indian Penal Code, better coupled with the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and new media protocols dilemmas seen in the context of jurisdictions, lax borders and differential standards in prosecuting loosely accreted actors. Themes, such as suggestions, Honda variants like focus on interstate security units in combating the malady of cyber threats are safeguarded, and digital surveillance, though with care for the future.
This paper examines the concepts of federalism, fiscal federalism, and fiscal decentralization, with a focus on the Indian context. It outlines the constitutional and institutional foundations of India’s federal structure, tracing the historical evolution of fiscal decentralization from the colonial period to the post-independence era including pre- reform era. The study analyses revenue-sharing mechanisms, taxation policies, and grants-in-aid, alongside the roles of key institutions such as the Finance Commission, GST Council, and NITI Aayog. Findings highlight persistent vertical and horizontal imbalances, the positive impact of GST on state fiscal autonomy, and the continuing need for equitable and efficient fiscal arrangements. The paper concludes with policy recommendations aimed at strengthening cooperative federalism, enhancing state-level fiscal flexibility, and improving transparency in intergovernmental transfers.
The constitutionalising of local self-government through the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments marked a significant moment in India’s democratic and federal evolution. These reforms sought to deepen democracy by devolving powers, responsibilities and resources to local governments. More than three decades later, decentralization in India has produced institutions that are electorally vibrant but administratively constrained. This paper examines the paradox of extensive formal devolution coexisting with persistent state control. Using the analytical framework of finance, functions, and functionaries (the “3Fs”), it argues that decentralization in India has unfolded as a managed and politically conditioned process rather than a comprehensive transfer of authority. While fiscal transfers and functional assignments have expanded unevenly, control over administrative personnel has remained firmly centralized. The retention of authority over functionaries emerges as the central mechanism through which state governments preserve power over local governance. The paper contributes to decentralization scholarship by shifting attention from constitutional design to political economy, highlighting personnel control as the key constraint on substantive local self-government in India.
The foundation of rural local self-governance in India was laid post-independence, inspired by Mahatma Gandhi's vision of Swaraj. The Indian Constitution institutionalized this vision through provisions like the 73rd Amendment Act, which established the Panchayati Raj system as a three-tier structure for decentralized governance. Articles 243G and 40 emphasize empowering Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) for economic development and social justice, while Articles 243D, 243E, and 243I provide for reservation, periodic elections, and financial autonomy.Despite these constitutional provisions, challenges persist in rural governance. Villagers often lack awareness about government schemes and their legal rights, leading to underutilization of available resources. Administrative inefficiencies, limited participation in decision-making bodies, and issues of transparency undermine the effectiveness of rural governance. Additionally, inadequacies in the selection and training of government personnel hinder productive interactions with elected representatives and villagers.Reforms are needed to address these issues and enhance rural governance. Strengthening awareness campaigns, reforming recruitment and training of personnel, and institutionalizing mechanisms for greater villager participation are essential steps. Leveraging technology through e-governance can promote transparency and accessibility, while robust financial empowerment through State Finance Commissions can ensure PRIs have the resources necessary for development. Accountability mechanisms, such as social audits, can further improve trust and performance in rural governance.The role of new actors like civil society organizations and private sector collaborations is also crucial in bridging gaps in service delivery and promoting participatory governance. While India has achieved significant milestones in its 75 years of independence, consistent efforts and structural reforms are vital to realizing the constitutional vision of Swaraj and ensuring effective rural governance that empowers communities and fosters inclusive development.
Abstract The authority of political leaders in Bangladesh rests on diverse qualities, not least of which are the muscle and finance they can mobilize, and the relationships they can craft with senior party members. These are utilized to confront rivals both within and outside their own party. In some instances, the intensity of intra-party competition can be so severe that a further quality emerges: the capacity to find allies among enemies. Building local inter-party alliances can bolster the authority of politicians, yet be to the detriment of party coherence. This argument is developed through an analysis of mayoral and parliamentary elections held in the past decade in a small Bangladeshi city, where a ruling party member of parliament (MP) and opposition mayor appear to have developed such a relationship. This has thwarted the electoral ambitions of their fellow party members and has posed a serious challenge to party discipline. While political competition is often seen as being either inter- or intra-party, here it is focused around inter-party alliances. This portrayal suggests we need to give greater emphasis to the decentralized and local character that political authority can take in Bangladesh.
Changing the formal structure of Indian federalism may have been difficult, given that altering the Indian constitution requires super-legislative majorities which are harder to mobilize in a fragmented party system than in a one party dominant one. The dynamics of Indian federalism underwent significant change due to the transformation of the Indian party system and economic liberalization. Decentralized spending with centralized financing through grants, from a public finance perspective, serves to help central governments implement redistributive programs. The effect of party politics on federalism is felt most intensely in those sectors of government which are open to direct party political influence. Economic liberalization built on central deregulation and party system fragmentation is likely to generate centrifugal tendencies. With it comes the expectation of more policy divergence across the states.
India adopted an ambitious reform policy of rural and urban decentralization in 1992, under which powers and finance are transferred to new local and regional bodies. These are governed by elected councils, in which women and members of disadvantaged groups/castes have a fixed quota of seats. While the legislation is still relatively new, some states have been able to make fast progress in decentralizing tasks, power and funds, while others have been much slower. This article presents an initial review of the decentralization efforts, exploring administrative, fiscal and political dimensions, and the implementation problems at central, state and local levels. Most emphasis is given to development at the local level: the panchayats in rural areas and the ward committees in urban areas, which is where the impact of decentralization should be felt. This article assesses whether increased proximity between citizens and government leads to increased transparency, accountability and participation.
Sandeep Tambe, M. L. Arrawatia, Anil K. Ganeriwala
Rural development is a vast sector that encompasses infrastructure creation, sustainable livelihoods, and decentralized governance. Mountain landscapes, with their inherent constraints of remoteness, sensitive ecosystem, and marginality, pose unique challenges to rural development. We undertook an assessment of the evolution of development themes and rural development progress made in the mountain state of Sikkim over the past decade. We found that a rapidly growing national economy has facilitated a 4-fold rise in investment in key rural development subsectors in Sikkim over the past 5 years. This significant enhancement in financial investment, coupled with good governance and innovative policies, has ensured that human development indicators, along with social infrastructure creation, have shown impressive progress. Setting up village cluster-level support offices to strengthen governance, transforming regular programs to mission mode with great political determination by adopting a saturation approach, financing improved earthquake-resistant housing for poor households, and promoting climate change adaption measures to enhance rural water security are some of the innovative approaches that have the potential to be transferred to other mountain areas. We propose a further expansion of capacities and economic opportunities in rural areas by prioritizing the self-employment sector, by expanding the nonfarm rural economy, youth training and placement, and continuing commitment to strengthening democratic institutions and procedures to ensure more rapid and inclusive growth of the rural economy.
As Gandhi often pointed out, India lives in villages and unless village life can be revitalized the nation as a whole can hardly come alive. When India became independent in 1947, perhaps one-third of the villages of India had traditional Panchayats and many of them were far from flourishing conditions. The congress government has made a determined effort to promote the creation of Panchayats and to make them effective units of local self- government. Article 40 of the Constitution clearly declares ‘The state shall take necessary actions to organize village Panchayats and to endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government’. The aim was to foster democratic participation, to involve villagers in the development of the community and to reduce the burden of higher level of administration. Though various steps were taken by successive governments to revitalize the system, Gramswaraj through village Panchayats remained as a distant dream till 1992. Bureaucratic apathy, indifference of the people, lack of political will, lack of uniformity etc were the main factors behind the failure of the system. Realizing the potential of the PR system, Rajeev Gandhi government initiated a process of Constitutional amendment to give sanctity and uniformity to Panchayati Raj system so that it can be immune from political interference and bureaucratic indifference. Rajeev Gandhi introduced 64th Constitutional amendment Bill in 1989. But the Bill did not materialize because of the fall of his Ministry. Finally the P.V.Narasimha Rao government introduced Panchayati Raj system in India through the 73rd Constitutional Amendment in 1992. \nThe article mainly focuses on the effectiveness of 73rd Constitutional amendment in securing empowerment of people. The article tries to capture the efforts of various states to implement panchayati Raj system and makes a comparative study of performance of states in terms of people’s participation, capacity building, de-bureaucratization and decentralization of powers. The salient features of 73rd Amendment Act including reservation of seats, provision for separate election commission and finance commission, gramsabha, taxes, periodic elections etc are discussed. More over it examines the initiatives of state governments towards democratic decentralization and highlights special programmes initiated by Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh etc to make the system effective. The article critically evaluates the effectiveness of PRIs as a system of governance for increased people’s participation empowerment and social change. Here attempt is made to incorporate the results of impact assessment studies conducted by World Bank. Concluding section highlights the need for revitalizing the system through integrating NREGP [National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme] and NRHM [National Rural Health Mission] etc