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Jan 26, 2024·Revista de Estudios Globales Análisis Histórico y Cambio Social
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Digital Technology, Work, Finance and Crises: Do We Now Live in Lash and Urry’s Capitalism of Mobilities or in Ernest Mandel’s Late Capitalism?

John Michael Roberts

The single and combined work of Scott Lash and John Urry have become extremely significant in the social sciences in the UK and beyond. In particular, one of their principal ideas that dominant capitalist countries have made a transition to a ‘disorganized’ and ‘mobile’ era founded on digital networks, global flows of people, objects, images and texts, decentralized and flexible work practices, declining industrialized social classes, and a loss of power for the nation-state to regulate flows of finance, has influenced many researchers. Their work has even helped to establish of a new ‘mobilities’ paradigm in the social sciences. Ernest Mandel has also explored the impact of digital technology on capitalist restructuring. Indeed, he claims that from 1945 onwards, a ‘late capitalist’ wave emerged predicated on the rise of factors like automation, the service sector, and new class identities. Unlike Lash and Urry, however, Mandel applies Marxist theory to investigate these changes. The aim of this paper is to draw on Mandel’s ideas to examine critically the account put forward by Lash and Urry. Five areas in particular will be discussed: theoretical differences between Lash and Urry and Mandel; the transition between different phases in capitalism; the changing composition of social class; whether the workplace is now dominated by decentralized and flexible networks; and the relationship between finance, the state and digital technology.
 Los trabajos individuales y combinados de Scott Lash y John Urry han adquirido una gran relevancia en las ciencias sociales del Reino Unido y de otros países. En particular, una de sus ideas principals y más influyente se fundamente en que los países capitalistas dominantes han realizado una transición hacia una era "desorganizada" y "móvil" basada en las redes digitales, flujos globales de personas, objetos, imágenes y textos, prácticas laborales descentralizadas y flexibles, declive de las clases sociales industrializadas y pérdida de poder del Estado-nación para regular los flujos financieros. Su trabajo, sin duda, ha contribuido a establecer un nuevo paradigma de "movilidades" en las ciencias sociales. También Ernest Mandel ha estudiado el impacto de la tecnología digital en la reestructuración capitalista. En efecto, afirma que a partir de 1945 surgió una oleada de "capitalismo tardío" basada en el auge de factores como la automatización, el sector servicios y las nuevas identidades de clase. Sin embargo, a diferencia de Lash y Urry, Mandel aplica la teoría marxista para investigar estos cambios. El objetivo de este artículo es basarse en las ideas de Mandel para examinar críticamente el relato presentado por Lash y Urry. Se discutirán cinco áreas en particular: las diferencias teóricas entre Lash y Urry y Mandel; la transición entre las diferentes fases del capitalismo; la composición cambiante de la clase social; si el lugar de trabajo está ahora dominado por redes descentralizadas y flexibles; y la relación entre las finanzas, el Estado y la tecnología digital.

Open access
Political Economy and Marxism
Critical Theory and Philosophy
Original source
Jun 30, 2023·Constellations
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From Jacobin flaws to transformative populism: Left populism and the legacy of European social democracy

Kolja Möller

In the established landscape of research in the social sciences, populism is seen as a type of politics that chiefly revolves around the distinction between the “people” and the “elite”.1 Within this, different forms of populism can be distinguished—ranging from right-wing and authoritarian to liberal-centrist and religious varieties. In the camp of the political left, populism is often cast as essentially a democratic endeavor. Drawing on a conception of inclusive peoplehood, which is not opposed to other vulnerable social groups “below” but solely to the “elite above”, many authors emphasize that it is crucial to pursue a populist strategy in order to overcome existing hegemonies, democratic deficits, ossifications, and class-rule (Grattan, 2016; Howse, 2019; Kempf, 2020; McCormick, 2001; Mouffe, 2018). Throughout the past few decades, the landscape of research on left populism has grown considerably. Various studies have investigated the history of anti-establishment popular movements of the 19th century, such as the Narodniki in Russia or the American Populist Party (Canovan, 1981; Kazin, 1995). Further, research has also looked at how, from the 1990s, anti-neoliberal alliances in Latin America had their momentum, entered governmental office, and established a far-reaching renewal of constitutional orders (Linera, 2014; Weyland, 2013). And in particular, in the last decade, the rejuvenation of left politics in Europe and the United States has often relied on populist approaches (Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis, 2019). Taking a more systematic stance, theories of radical democracy have sought to demonstrate that politics in modern societies is structured around the embodiment of the “people” as an empty signifier. From this perspective, it is not by accident that left varieties of populism can be recurrently observed; their persistence reflects that politics is, at its heart, not only concerned with policy-issues but with “constructing the people” (Laclau, 2014). Thus, populism may not be episodic, accidental, or a specific ideology that brings the vital interests of ordinary people to the fore. Rather, it must be seen as a generalizable discursive strategy—in the words of Ernesto Laclau: the “royal road”—when it comes to the strive for political power (Laclau, 2005, p. 67).2 In recent years, a neo-Machiavellian strand of research has emerged that is not so much concerned with the discursive construction of peoplehood, instead focusing on the materiality of social power. Drawing inspiration from the political philosophy of Early Modernity and Niccolò Machiavelli's insights on the exercise of political rule, these approaches assume that societies are constantly split between the “plebian” people and the ruling elites (McCormick, 2001; Vergara, 2020a). Against this backdrop, populism amounts to a plebian politics that “springs from the politicization of wealth inequality in reaction to systemic corruption and the immiseration of the masses, an attempt to balance the scales of social and political power between the ruling elite and the popular sectors” (Vergara, 2020a, p. 238). However, the historical balance sheet of left populisms remains ambivalent. Though recurring attempts to change society through mobilizing the people against the elite can be observed, they have often revealed self-defeating dynamics:3 the collapse into authoritarian government once populism is in power, the inability to account for how complex modern societies actually operate by adhering to an all-too simple people/elite binary distinction; and the arising incapacity to identify reasons for political failure and success apart from stressing that popular mobilizations played a key role (when successful) or were diluted (when unsuccessful). In the current debate on left-populism, however, a broader camp of anti-populist critiques mainly advances objections from a normative angle (Arato, 2016; Cohen, 2019; Urbinati, 2019; Müller, 2014). It is argued that populist forms of politics are, in principle, incompatible with central achievements of liberal democracy, such as pluralism, the separation of powers, or parliamentary representation. They seem to be unavoidably entangled in authoritarian politics and, therefore, in need of being rejected as a course of political action. This article aims to move beyond the rigidified divide between appraisals and rejections of left populism by shifting the field of inquiry: instead of investigating the relation of populism and the political as such or evaluating whether populism is compatible with principles of liberal democracy, it conducts a reconstruction of discussions in the broadly conceived camp of European Social Democracy in the “long 19th century” (Hobsbawm). Thereby, it focuses on how the leading intellectuals of this political current were reflecting on the practical potentials and limitations of a politics that is centered on the popular will. As emphasized by contemporary discourse theoretical approaches to the study of populism, politics in modern societies largely revolves around the role of the people and the conflicts that surround its articulation.4 Therefore, a wide range of people-centered politics can be identified—popular, populist or folky. While the article echoes the definition of populism as people-centered politics that opposes the elites, it stresses not only its inevitability but also its limitations. It scrutinizes populism's internal pitfalls and how it reacts to the contradictions and problems inherent to the structure of the given societal order. Thereby, the article aims at circumventing a transhistorical per se perspective and at a closer examination of the respective social circumstances. The ambition is not to provide an encompassing investigation of the whole theoretical landscape of social democracy, but to look for how some of the leading intellectuals grappled with the problems of a people-centered politics in the light of practical experiences in political struggle. It will be argued that we can identify an intellectual trajectory that dealt with the question of whether a politics that is centered on the popular will as opposed to the elites is able to incite social transformation and collective learning processes or, to the contrary, thwarts them. Admittedly, one should not overlook that there are severe differences between the social democratic mass parties of the 19th century and the contemporary disorganized party landscape. However, the article encourages an investigation that overcomes the juxtaposition of left populisms and other variants of progressive politics such as social movement politics (Arato & Cohen, 2021) or class-politics (Seferiades, 2019). Drawing on the recent work of the historian Christina Morina, European Social Democracy is understood in the following as a broader social movement that extended from the mid-19th century to the First World War (Morina, 2022).5 It was characterized by the advent of new forms of political organization, most notably trade unions and social democratic mass parties. Despite severe internal conflicts, it was driven by a shared approach to history and society that was drawn from the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The defining feature of European Social Democracy was located in a specific mode of social inquiry. As stressed by Morina, activists and intellectuals may have engaged in controversies around a whole set of issues. 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This was largely to the of the political that was to take and it to overcome In from the problems of by of a on the one it should overcome the through a as the it should overcome the through an on collective learning The was not only the of but also of the of and Thereby, the for a a populism that should not only simple or but should also society and the to the the contradictions and societal of modern society are take on collective learning processes was It beyond the of this article to provide a comprehensive account of the relation of populism, and collective learning However, some of account must be has political approaches from the that social as such with society and rejected it in all its a perspective, and instead of mass in of the inquiry is, from the constituted and of social are seen as in a it through into social or through a sound perspective on the social to the of the of social European Social which was concerned with a more of modern it has in this that processes can in a progressive and that must be overcome from within the internal contradictions of social not solely through a on the social the that there can be many and movement may not be to social the conception the of the collective learning as it to of action that may to be in many Thereby, populism of the to learning of are in order to the with the of and the into mass the can collapse into a the learning is from the In light of the against the of a that must be It remains to or more complex of The of learning is as is not the of mass of populism have to on a more mode of inquiry that the of a perspective, but not of from the a is that to the of social of constantly the of movement a must be in order to populist approaches seem for social transformation in a given or the of left populism or per it is to with more of left populisms in as as in contemporary and whether they incite or collective learning whether they to or whether they from past to and as as to the for on of this It is within the of the research by the for and and by is of at the of of

Open access
Populism, Right-Wing Movements
German legal, social, and political studies
Critical Theory and Philosophy
Original source
May 17, 2018·Law and Critique
51 cites
No Gods, No Masters, No Coders? The Future of Sovereignty in a Blockchain World

Sarah Manski, Ben Manski

The building of the blockchain is predicted to harken the end of the contemporary sovereign order. Some go further to claim that as a powerful decentering technology, blockchain contests the continued functioning of world capitalism. Are such claims merited? In this paper we consider sovereignty and blockchain technology theoretically, posing possible futures for sovereignty in a blockchain world. These possibilities include various forms of individual, popular, technological, corporate, and techno-totalitarian state sovereignty. We identify seven structural tendencies of blockchain technology and give examples as to how these have manifested in the construction of new forms of sovereignty. We conclude that the future of sovereignty in a blockchain world will be articulated in the conjuncture of social struggle and technological agency and we call for a stronger alliance between technologists and democrats.

Open access
Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism
Critical Theory and Philosophy
Political Economy and Marxism
Original source
Dec 1, 2016·SCRIPTed A Journal of Law Technology & Society
4 cites
Decentralisation, Distrust & Fear of the Body – The Worrying Rise of Crypto-Law

Alan Cunningham

The increasing collective use of distributed application software platforms, programming languages and crypto-currencies around the blockchain concept for general transactions may have radical implications for the way in which society conceptualises and applies trust and trust-based social systems such as law. By exploring one iteration of such generalised blockchain systems – Ethereum – and the historical lineage of such systems, it will be argued that indeed their ideological basis is largely one of distrust, decentralisation and, ultimately, via increasing disassociation of identity, a fear of the body itself. This ideological basis can be reframed as a crypto-legal approach to the problems of human interaction, one whereby the purely technological solutions outlined above are considered adequate for reconciling many of the problems of our collective existence. The article concludes, however, by re-iterating a perspective of law more so as an entirely embodied and trust dependent notion. These aspects go some way to explaining the necessarily centralised role it takes on within societies. They also explain why the crypto-legal approaches advanced by systems like Ethereum – or even the co-opting of blockchain technology by law firms themselves – will only ever be at best efficiency exercises concerned with the processing of data relating to legal affairs, and not the more radical, ambiguous and difficult process of actual legal thought or, indeed, engagement with trust.

Open access
Critical Theory and Philosophy
Law in Society and Culture
Original source
Jun 30, 2015·Proceedings of ISIS Summit Vienna 2015—The Information Society at the Crossroads
2 cites
Techno-Politics as Network(ed) Struggles

Laura Fichtner

Introduction At least since the NSA disclosures of 2013th “Summer of Surveillance”, internet surveillance and informational privacy and security have received widespread public attention and become a political concern for many. Taking the disclosures as a starting point, I follow up on this development and inquire into the techno-politics of surveillance and counter-surveillance. Instead of focusing on regulation applied to technological practices from outside, I investigate the socio-political dimensions of the internet infrastructure itself and the politics of concrete technological surveillance and counter-surveillance practices. I show how data infrastructures are not only regulated through policy, but can function as techno-political means which bring about a specific socio-technical structure. My question is: How do surveillance and counter-surveillance technologies operate as a form of techno-politics within the internet infrastructure? The answer to this question can enhance our understanding of the impact on the political landscape, which ubiquitous information technologies and their steady diffusion into every realm of our lives have. Technological infrastructures and networks are of central importance to my research, as contemporary ICTs and ICT surveillance technologies operate in and through networks rather than as single artifacts. The network, one of the 21st century’s most prominent entities, is both a potential threat and a potential point of control. Cumbers, Routledge and Nativel argue that “it is becoming increasingly difficult for ruling elites, usually located at the national scale, to play the gatekeeper role, through traditional territorialized hierarchies, with regard to information and communication flows across space” (Cumbers, Routledge & Nativel, 2008, p. 188). To exercise control then requires an “‘empire’ based upon a decentred and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm” (Cumbers, Routledge & Nativel, 2008, p. 185). At the same time, networks have the tendency “to create hubs as these provide more stability and robustness. Hubs establish a kind of ‘hierarchy’ within networks and this in turn gives a certain advantage to key positions of players’” (Cumbers, Routledge & Nativel, 2008, p. 189). In my research I explore how surveillance technologies exploit the internet’s inherent hierarchies and operate through the global hubs that emerged within the infrastructure. Counter-surveillance technologies try to sabotage the centralized surveillance network this establishes. By using encryption technologies, they aim to make hubs dysfunctional for surveillance and to strengthen non-hierarchical network features. Consequently, the two antagonists are opposed in the way they use the network and are involved in a struggle over the network’s very structure and technological design. Methods I base my framework on pragmatist John Dewey’s approach to the relation between politics and infrastructures (Dewey, 1927) and extend it by analyzing the actual technological internet infrastructure. Susan Leigh Star and Geoffrey C. Bowker’s work on infrastructures and Alexander Galloway’s description of different network topologies to be found within the internet provide my basis for this analysis (Star & Bowker, 2006; Galloway, 2004). It builds the foundation for understanding surveillance and counter-surveillance technologies’ operation in and on the internet and its political dimensions. In Dewey’s political thought, technological infrastructures play a major role because he held politics to be concerned with governing the channels of human interactions, of which technological infrastructures are an essential part (Dewey, 1927, p. 30). Through these channels, people can purposefully organize within society, interact through networks of communication and collaboration, and engage in joint endeavors. Technologies become the means and ends of their purpose-directed activities and signify “the intelligent techniques by which the energies of nature and man [sic] are directed and used in satisfaction of human needs” (Hickman, 2001, p. 8). Politics exercise indirect control over people’s behavior through governing technological channels and regulating infrastructural systems. It is through these systems that interactions amongst society’s members propagate and actions translate into consequences through transmission over several instances. Even though Dewey recognized their political importance, he did not analyze infrastructures in detail. According to Susan Leigh Star and Geoffrey C. Bowker, infrastructures are that “upon which something else rides, or works” (Star & Bowker, 2006, p. 230). As the technological structures that enable social phenomena, they are always underneath – transparent, invisible and embedded. Once in place, infrastructures only call for active investigation and attention when conditions of usability are altered and smooth use is prevented; otherwise they remain outside our awareness and active experiences. Because they organize flows of exchange within socio-technical complexes, infrastructures can be understood as the technological ordering of things. They consist of a plurality of technologies, agents and sub-networks and their actual configuration is contingent and dependent on implementation. Every configuration “represents only one of a number of possible contributions of tasks and properties between hardware, software and people” (Star & Bowker, 2006, p. 234). Network diagrams describe the structural features of different configurations and visualize their inherent distribution of power and control. To describe the control structures within the internet infrastructure, Alexander Galloway uses three different network types: the distributed, the decentralized and the centralized network (Galloway, 2004, pp. 11-12 & pp. 30 ff.). The centralized network is a hierarchical network in which one central host wields power over subordinate nodes. The decentralized network is then the conjunction of several centralized networks and consists of multiple hosts which rule over their sub-set of nodes. In both networks, information flows one-directionally from the host(s) to the nodes. A distributed network on the other hand does not have a hierarchical order, but every node is an equally autonomous agent and can communicate with any other node peer-to-peer. Now, when it comes to surveillance, the centralized network is easiest, since all flows must pass through the central hub. To surveil a decentralized network, multiple host need to be intercepted, because information does not accumulate in one place. In a distributed network, surveillance is most complicated. Here, in order to access every information flow within the network, all nodes (network participants) must be monitored. Figure 1. The centralized, decentralized and distributed network diagram. (see PDF version for the Figure). Results and Discussion Within the internet infrastructure’s different technological layers, we can find both distributed and (de)centralized network topologies. On the one hand, there is what I call the internet’s “physical layer”. This layer transmits actual data signals and consists of devices, cable networks, routers, servers, etc. When looking at its global constitution, we can see that this physical layer resembles a decentralized network. Across the globe, there are a number of major internet exchange points (IXPs). These are operated by internet providers like AT&T and most are located in the United States and Europe, for example in London, Frankfurt, Paris and New York (Figure 2). Nearly all internet traffic needs to pass one of them in order to get forwarded to its destination. Consequently, the IXPs build central internet hubs. Global (undersea) cable networks support this, because cables with the greatest bandwidth connect to these IXPs (TeleGeography, 2014). As it is cheapest to route through high bandwidth, data often does not take the geographically shortest path. Instead, it is linked through different high bandwidth cables across the globe and most likely across the United States. Therefore it is not surprising that NSA surveillance technologies exploit the decentralized structure of the physical layer (The Guardian, 2013). As most global hubs are are located on US soil or on the soil of US allies, the NSA can gain access to global information flows and retrieve data doubles secretly. One example for how this is done is Room 641A in AT&Ts office in San Francisco. According to former technician Mark Klein, the NSA had installed a splitter device in the office’s internet room, which is basically an IXP (Klein, 2007). From this splitter, it directs copies of all passing internet traffic to its secret room, where the data is analyzed with latest technology. From such interception points then, the NSA feeds the data into its own network and data center. This creates a centralized shadow-network on top of the actual internet infrastructure, in which the NSA is the central hub. From this position it can monitor information flows and oversee the whole network, but peripheral network participants remain unaware. Moreover, it is potentially able to manipulate data flows, as has been the case with the program Quantumtheory (Spiegel Online, 2013). Figure 2. Global internet routes in 2012: © Copyright 2014 PriMetrica, Inc., retrieved from http://www.telegeography.com/telecom-resources/map-gallery/globalinternet-map-2012/index.html. (see PDF version for the Figure). But there is also a reason for why we often consider the internet a distributed network. Operating ‘on top’ of the physical layer, the “protocological layer” creates a network of equal nodes and bi-directional communication flows. In this layer, the rules are defined according to which data is wrapped and transmitted by the physical layer. The internet’s TCP/IP Protocol Suite logically assigns equal weight to all hubs and nodes (Cowley, 2012; Galloway, 2004). According to its predefined rules, IXPs have to route data but are not allowed to wield power over information flows. The protocols’ universal rules count equally for all network participants communicating through the infrastructure. To a potential surveiller, this distributed network is a thorn in the eye, because surveilling all flows here is very complex. For this reason, counter-surveillance technologies operate on and strengthen the protocological layer. Through encrypting data flows end-to-end, they make the decentralized physical structure dysfunctional for surveillance. Data still flows through the physical infrastructure and passes global hubs, but through encryption, communication is established peer-to-peer only. If someone intercepts the hubs, they cannot get any information usable for surveillance, because they cannot read the data. The Tor network does a similar thing (Tor Project, 2014); it hooks up to the regular internet infrastructure and allows user to access the internet. But by encrypting meta-data, surveillance of internet activities becomes impossible. In this way, encryption technologies have the power to strengthen the distributed features of the protocological layer and circumvent the decentralized physical one. Conclusions The results of my analysis show how the operation of surveillance and counter-surveillance technologies exploit different socio-political dimensions inherent to the internet infrastructure. Network diagrams helped me to describe these different dimensions and demonstrate how the two antagonists are engaged in a struggle over the network’s (dominant) structure and particular socio-technical organization. NSA surveillance technologies aim at establishing a centralized network in which the agency provides the central hub and oversees all information flows. Counter-surveillance technologies aim at establishing a distributed network where all nodes have equal rights and no one host has centralized control. This techno-political struggle is carried out within the infrastructure itself and through technological means. Within a Dewian account of politics, surveillance and counter-surveillance technologies then operate as a form of techno-politics, because they organize the channels of human interaction and strive to systematically regulate structures of interactions and communications through technologies. However, Dewey still thought infrastructures to be extrinsic to political forms. In the case of governmental internet surveillance, we now see they become intrinsic, as infrastructures are employed for political purposes. In such techno-politics, political solutions are not negotiated through public discourse but through the application and operation of technologies. The people implied in the global network are affected by these techno-politics, because they structure their interactions in the network. But when political struggles are carried out on infrastructural levels that are transparent to users by their very definition, people remain unaware of these ongoing political developments. The problem this poses to democracy is further intensified by the network’s deterritorializing forces, which allow national agencies to access global hubs and wield power over a global public, while representing only a single nation state in whose interest they (supposedly) act. If technological solutions are provided to political problems, and if these solutions are applied on infrastructural levels that are transparent and invisible, then regular internet users and citizens are left unaware of political processes and cannot participate. Instead, it is technological elites who negotiate political decisions. Acknowledgments This paper is the result of my Master’s graduation project in Philosophy of Science, Technology and Society, offered at the University of Twente in the Netherlands. At this point I would like to offer my special thanks to my first supervisor, Dr. Michael Nagenborg, who was very enthusiastic about my project from the beginning on and provided me with the right starting points and a great introduction to Surveillance Studies. I would also like to express my great appreciation to my second supervisor, Prof. Peter-Paul Verbeek, who gave me feedback during the writing process and great support throughout the whole program. Finally, I wish to acknowledge all the people who make this outstanding Master’s program possible, my fellow students with whom I had such great discussions, and my family and friends for always supporting me. References and Notes Cumbers, A.; Routledge, P.; Nativel, C. The entangled geographies of global justice networks. Progress in Human Geography 2008, 32(2), 183-201. Cowley, C. Communications and Networking, 2nd ed.; Springer-Verlag: London, United Kingdom, 2012. Dewey, J. The Public and its Problems; Swallow Press/Ohio University Press: Athens, OH, United States, 1927. Galloway, A. Protocol: How Control Exists after Decentralization; The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, United States, 2004. Hickman, L. Philosophical Tools for a Technological Culture; Indiana University Press: Bloomington, IN, United States, 2001. Klein, M. Spying on the home front. Interview with H. Smith, Interviewer, 2007, May 15. Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/homefront/interviews/klein.html Spiegel Online. NSA-Dokumente: So übernimmt der Geheimdienst fremde Rechner; Published 2013, December 12. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/nsa-dokumente-so-uebernimmt-dergeheimdienst-fremde-rechner-fotostrecke-105329-8.html Star, S. L.; Bowker, G. C. How to infrastructure. Handbook of New Media 2006, 230-245. TeleGeography. Submarine Cable Map 2014; 2014. Retrieved from http://www.telegeography.com/telecom-resources/map-gallery/submarinecable-map-2014/index.html The Guardian. NSA Prism program slides. Published 2013, November 1. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/prism-slidesnsa-document Tor Project. Tor: Overview. Project website, 2014. Retrieved from https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en

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