Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – DAOs constitute a new form of collective organization in the digital era. They usually relate to the use of blockchain technology, that ensures decentralization. DAOs rely on smart contracts to define their functioning rules and their operation. In general, DAOs are not related to traditional corporate forms and are not necessarily registered or recognized by law as corporates or associations. In any case, DAOs enable a new kind of governance, a governance based on technology and based on the use of smart contracts deployed on a blockchain network. In this sense, they could represent a revolution on collective governance. A revolution that could shape governance in the digital era. For this reason, DAOs could be the governance tool of Web3. The use of tokens as means of participation and voting by the members of a DAO provide a new technology tool that can combine law, governance, game theory, and behavioral economics. DAOs themselves could be viewed as technology tools that could transform governance in general and even democratic participation. The paper examines these issues and try to critically evaluate the potential and possible caveats of using DAOs as a governance tool. It demonstrates that the idea of decentralized governance in DAOs is similar to decentralization of governance of open-source software. The paper also highlights that the notion of modularity present in the open-source scene is also present in the blockchain technology realm and could be transposed to governance in DAOs. This modularity also contributes to the disruptive nature of governance in and by DAOs. As demonstrated in the paper, DAOs are true catalysts of law, governance and technology and represent the future of governance systems. The article refers that DAOs enable the coexistence of multiple democratic governance stacks. In any case, also mentions that some problems could arise from these multiple governance instances, as the fragmentation of the collectivity, the difficulties associated with the choice of the governance modules, the risk to the democratic principles in creating partial democratic instances, and the risks associated with a technocracy. At the end, considering all the benefits and risks related to the use of these new digital collective governance tools, the article concludes that DAOs can be considered the future of governance systems.
The advent of blockchain, smart contracts, and Web3 has empowered new concepts for equity partnerships with autonomous operating systems and democratic corporate governance. This paper explores 2,377 of such new partnerships and uses detailed transaction data (from 2017 through 2022) to examine the performance of so-called decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) on Ethereum. As a result, I find that DAOs with greater participation rates in voting are associated with superior performance. Small members are a prevalent and important class of investors, while the degree of decentralization in DAOs (ownership concentration) plays only a minor role in firm valuation. Overall, DAOs are an effective organizational structure, when members take an active interest in the venture.
Decentralized Finance (DeFi), a blockchain-based form of alternative financial markets, has been the focus of public attention in recent months. Even though DeFi has a young history, its smart contract ecosystem already offers multiple opportunities for the design and transfer of crypto assets, establishing market structures comparable to traditional financial markets. The landscape of DeFi projects also increasingly includes insurance protocols offering complex risk transfer mechanisms for hedging DeFi risks, above all smart contract risks. In principle, the projects offer the same value proposition as traditional insurance: risk minimization and transfer, and thus an increase in income predictability through the payment of a premium. At the same time, most of those risk transfer protocols are highly dependent on subjective expectations and decentralized governance structures. This article depicts a first taxonomical understanding of DeFi insurance, demarcates DeFi cover products from well-known insurance concepts, and provides an initial assessment of smart contract risk insurability and commercial opportunities for traditional insurers.
The decentralized finance (DeFi) industry hosts billions of dollars in cryptocurrency deposits across protocols that autonomously and independently execute financial transactions. However, little is known about how these protocols raise capital or conduct their governance. This paper examines the token distribution mechanisms of the top-50 DeFi protocols and documents significant variation in how tokens are allocated to users, investors, and developers. We find that several protocols distribute a greater share of tokens to insiders, such as through private sales and developer allocations, rather than to users via incentives and airdrops. We present evidence that protocols with greater insider control exhibit fewer deposits, lower token values, and increased risk. Using an event-study analysis, we find significant increases in protocol deposits post-airdrops. Our results suggest that DeFi users prefer user-centric governance models and are sensitive to the risks of insider control. Lastly, this paper discusses the risks and challenges of DeFi governance.
The collapse of FTX has underscored the critical importance of auditing, especially in the fast-growing decentralized finance (DeFi) markets. Due to the decentralized nature of DeFi platforms, which facilitate peer-to-peer transactions without intermediaries, and the rapid pace of innovation in the unregulated and highly asymmetric information environment of the DeFi market, traditional financial auditing methods face significant hurdles. This study explores the relevance of auditing in DeFi protocols and highlights its critical role in ensuring transparency, security, and trust within these decentralized systems. Through a comprehensive analysis of the unique characteristics of DeFi, including smart contracts and blockchain technology, we delve into the specific challenges and risks associated with auditing DeFi applications. Furthermore, the article discusses the demand for robust auditing practices, regulatory oversight, and industry standards to enhance resilience and stability in this fast-growing emerging market.
The literature continues to debate the effects of democracy and fiscal capacity on economic growth, both partially and jointly. To remedy the literature puzzle, this study examines the economic growth effects of democracy and fiscal capacity in 34 Indonesian provinces from 2016 to 2021. Using a fixed-effect model, this study documents no evidence of a partial effect; rather, it finds a joint effect of democracy and fiscal capacity on Indonesian economic growth. These findings remain relatively robust even when provincial heterogeneity, COVID-19 pandemic shocks, and sectoral composition are factored into the model. This finding indicates that regions with democracy and strong fiscal capacity possess relatively fast per capita GRDP growth. Based on these findings, the study concludes that democracy and fiscal capacity should exist side by side. Indonesia's sub-national economic growth strategy, like a tango game, requires reforming two types of decentralization: political decentralization to improve the quality of democracy that upholds the merit system and fiscal decentralization to expand local tax capacity to finance public goods productively.
The fiscal dimension of decentralization covers the assignment of public spending responsibilities to subnational governments (SNGs), and how these are financed through local taxes, transfers, and borrowing. Revenues from local tax powers are inadequate and the scope for borrowing is limited for most SNGs outside wealthy urban areas. Consequently, the main source of financing for the local spending responsibilities of most SNGs is, and will remain, fiscal transfers (i.e., revenue-sharing and unconditional and conditional grant mechanisms). These show a wide variety of types and features around Asia. The challenge is to design such mechanisms in ways that promote equity in public spending across the national territory, and impart the right degree of local flexibility and the right incentives for SNGs.
Constance J. Crawford, Corinne Crawford, Glenn C. Vallach
Subtitle A, of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), contains regulatory provisions regarding the federal taxes imposed on the income of both individuals and corporations. The IRC guidance is intended to provide a determination of all income that must be reported on tax returns and potentially could become subject to an income tax. A new form of currency, known as cryptocurrency appeared on mainstream trading platforms beginning in 2009. Bitcoin initially was the most widely recognized digital currency but other virtual currency versions soon followed. Initially, taxpayers mistakenly believed that cryptocurrency transactions were not subject to Subtitle A of the IRC. Therefore, crypto transactions were assumed to be non-taxable and non-reportable for tax purposes. However, within a few years of the introduction of Bitcoin into the US economic system, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) introduced tax guidance pertaining to cryptocurrency transactions. In 2014, the IRS responded with Notice 2014-21 as the popularity of Bitcoin grew exponentially. The IRC guidance stated that cryptocurrency must be treated as property for federal tax purposes. The tax implication of the IRS guidance was that cryptocurrency transactions would result in either a gain or loss for tax purposes on Schedule D. This guidance resulted in a recognition that all cryptocurrency transactions would be subject to federal income tax.
Due to widespread decentralization of spending responsibilities, increasing revenue power and borrowing capacity of sub-national governments, sub-national borrowing has become an increasingly important source of sub-national finance. While there are arguments for and against giving sub-national authorities room for raising their own financial resources, appropriate sub-national borrowing regulatory framework can reduce chances of defaults and fiscal crises. This dissertation investigates the effectiveness of sub-national borrowing regulations in maintaining fiscal sustainability. More precisely, it tests the hypothesis that is sub-national borrowing is restricted to financing capital investments (the “golden rule”), and if the sub-national governments are provided with some measure of revenue autonomy, then the sub-national borrowing should not endanger fiscal sustainability. Based on the sub-national government panel data for 57 countries between 1990 and 2008 and applying the system GMM estimator and the survival analysis, this dissertation provides support for this hypothesis. The results suggest that the “golden rule” is effective in maintaining fiscal sustainability at both general and sub-national government level. Sub-national tax autonomy, however, seems to have positive but very small marginal effect on fiscal sustainability. The obtained results also emphasize the risk of the soft budget constraint and the moral hazard. Significant central government financing may give encouraging signs to the sub-national governments to over-borrow and to expect being bailed out by the central government. The results obtained in this dissertation imply following policy recommendations. First, sub-national government borrowing does not have to endanger fiscal sustainability if the borrowing regulation framework is well designed and according to specific country circumstances. Second, reducing fiscal dependence on central government financing reduces the risk of moral hazard and improves the effectiveness of borrowing control in maintaining fiscal balance at the sustainable level.
The author argues that commentary on the Second Circuit's 1989 Lessinger decision involving section 357(c) has not clearly identified the tax logic issues that are at stake in the case. He agrees that the controlling shareholder's obligation is not section 351 "property" and should not be accorded basis in the shareholder's hands. Instead, the obligation should be treated as a purchase money obligation that affords basis in the shareholder's stock unless it is properly viewed as contingent. In any event, proper structuring of section 351 exchanges of property subject to debt in excess of the property's basis for stock in order to reflect an actual retention of liability on that debt by the shareholder should prevent shareholder gain recognition under section 357(c).
The subject of this article is the set of economic and financial relations that develop in the process of inter-budgetary regulation and equalization of budgetary provision and balance of heavily subsidized budgets at the subnational level. The purpose of the study is to identify the degree of influence and effectiveness of the existing system of inter-budgetary regulation and fiscal decentralization in Russia in relation to heavily subsidized budgets at the subnational level in the context of their socio-economic, budgetary and financial condition and development. The methodological basis of the study is based on the Russian budgetary legislation, as well as domestic and foreign scientific studies devoted to the theory of fiscal decentralization (federalism), mechanisms for equalizing budgetary provision at the subnational level, approaches to assessing the degree of influence of fiscal decentralization on stimulating economic growth in regions and states. In the course of the study, the author applies a systematic approach, as well as general scientific and special methods: coefficient method, comparative, structural dynamic retrospective analysis. The analysis of the relationship and dispersion of the financial parameters of subnational budgets using the Pearson pair correlation coefficient, as well as the coefficients of variation and oscillation. The study reveals the problematic aspects of the effectiveness of the existing system of inter-budgetary regulation and the convergence of the socio-economic state of heavily subsidized regions in recent years. This result contradicts most budgetary practices and the theory of fiscal decentralization, which justifies the need for a qualitative change in the existing system of inter-budgetary regulation. The main conclusion of the study is that the existing mechanism of inter-budgetary regulation and the existing instruments for equalizing budgetary provision do not contribute to a significant change in the fiscal and socio-economic parameters of the development of heavily subsidized budgets at the subnational level. The nature of the use of the gratuitous aid received for this category of subjects of the country is reduced to short-term coverage of the gap in financing expenditure obligations but does not change the model of either the organization of budget regulation or the regional economy. Soft budget constraints create weak incentives and lead to financial and economic problems — increased dependency and subsidies.
Intergovernmental fiscal transfer is a pillar of fiscal decentralization initiatives in developing and transition economies. These transfers serve several functions that include: correcting the vertical and the horizontal fiscal balances, compensating or offsetting for the spill-overs or externalities between different jurisdictions, funding national priorities and administrative priorities and capacities of the national. However, SNGs in developing countries particularly in Sub-saharan Africa is struggling with fiscal decentralization initiatives due to the lowered potential of local revenue generation. Due to these gaps in studies on Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers (IGFT) in devolved government structures, the study evaluated how IGFT is organized and structured in Kenya. The study adopted a descriptive design and undertook a review of publicly available data which was supported by interviews of selected directors from the budget, finance and planning departments in three county governments of Baringo, Kiambu and Vihiga. The study established that intergovernmental fiscal transfers make up 87 per cent of SNG revenues, equalization fund is about 2 per cent while own source revenues make up 10 per cent. Other revenue sources are conditional transfers in form of ad hoc and cost-reimbursement approaches from both the national government and development partners. Regarding intergovernmental fiscal transfers, the national government should disburse funds in a timely and efficient manner to enable county governments to fulfil their mandates. The study makes the following conclusions; there is an overreliance on intergovernmental fiscal transfers by SNGs and this might constrain their capacity to provide services and impede devolution initiatives; the formula-based unconditional grant in Kenya offers great prospects for devolution and the rise in unconditional transfers portends well for SNGs. The study recommends that SNGs speed up the legal mechanism for identifying and classifying and assigning local revenues, the national government should consider introducing or substituting fiscal transfers with the tax-sharing arrangement to incentivize revenue diversification among SNGs and lastly, SNGs should consider pooling of resources to incorporate special purpose vehicles for sub-national government borrowing. The study contributes to the existing knowledge by delving more into the elements of fiscal decentralization and in particular intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Recommendations for further studies include studies on how other elements of decentralization impact the performance of the counties, how decentralization is improving governance at the local level and how the East African Community may affect governance and service delivery at the sub-national levels.
Cryptocurrencies have long captured the attention of the financial world, revolutionizing how the world does business by providing virtually costless transactions. More recently, however, a new digital token has taken its place on the world stage. Known as NFTs, non-fungible tokens have allowed for the reinvention of modern finance infrastructure consisting of sophisticated trading and loaning systems for different asset types. Despite cryptocurrencies’ and NFTs’ novelty and popularity, they are not immune to the U.S. Tax Code. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has provided guidance on the tax framework of cryptocurrencies, but the taxation of NFTs is still relatively unclear, leaving taxpayers to rely largely on the cryptocurrency tax framework to address NFT taxation. The cryptocurrency framework, however, does not fully address all issues that may arise in NFT taxation. Virtual currencies have drawn much excitement, sparking the popularity of cryptocurrencies and NFT investors but have also drawn the scrutiny and worry of tax regulators. The U.S. has been experiencing a significant tax gap between the money taxpayers make from the transactions of these crypto assets and the amount of taxes paid to the IRS. Specifically, to blame for this tax gap are the novelty of these crypto assets, their inherent anonymity, their cross-border nature, and their independence from governmental or financial institutions. This article discusses the taxation of cryptocurrencies, its influence on a potential NFT-specific tax framework, why crypto assets are the weapon of choice for tax evaders, and the possible solutions the U.S. can pursue to remedy crypto asset tax evasion.
Lin William Cong, Wayne R. Landsman, Edward L. Maydew, Daniel Rabetti
We describe the landscape of taxation in the crypto markets, especially that concerning U.S. taxpayers, and examine how recent increases in tax scrutiny have led to changes in trading behavior by crypto traders. We predict under a simple theoretical framework and then empirically document that increased tax scrutiny leads crypto investors to utilize legal tax planning with taxloss harvesting as an alternative to non-compliance. In particular, domestic traders increase taxloss harvesting following the increase in tax scrutiny, and U.S. exchanges exhibit a significantly greater amount of wash trading. Additional findings suggest that broad-based and targeted changes in tax scrutiny can differentially affect crypto traders' preference for U.S.-based exchanges. We also discuss other gray areas for tax regulation related to new crypto assets such as Non-Fungible Tokens and Decentralized Finance protocols that further highlight the importance of coordinating tax policy and other regulations.
Tax is assessed and paid in the legal tender in which the transaction was conducted. A legal tender is a fiat currency centrally issued by the government through its Central Bank and is legally declared and designated as money to meet all kinds financial obligations including payment of taxes and debts within the boundary of a particular country. However, advancements in technology led to the emergence of virtual medium of payment such as ‘cryptocurrency’ which do not enjoy legal tender status like fiat currency. Over the past decade, there has been an increased number of transactions in Nigeria where cryptocurrency was the means of payment. This raises the question as to how such transactions will be assessed to tax bearing in mind that tax can only be assessed and paid in the currency in which the transaction was conducted. In addition, the virtual nature of cryptocurrency creates opportunities for tax avoidance thereby constituting a serious tax challenge for a developing country such as Nigeria. It therefore becomes necessary to address the taxation of cryptocurrency transactions to prevent tax avoidance that can arise therefrom. This objective of this article is toexamine the nature and the legal status of cryptocurrency. The article will also examine the tax treatment of cryptocurrency in some selected tax jurisdictions as well as the tax challenges posed by cryptocurrency transactions.
O presente trabalho tem como objetivo demonstrar a origem e a formação de criptomoedas, compreendendo a natureza material dessa tecnologia em detalhes, será possível categorizá-la em um fator de incidência tributária adequado, pois apenas compreendendo o objeto da tributação, em sua essência, será possível classificá-lo com menores riscos de incorrer em erro, aplicando o imposto mais adequado ao caso específico. Consequentemente, serão apresentadas a criptomoeda e suas possíveis classificações na ordem jurídica, a fim de entendê-la como um bem ou como um ativo de mercado, ou seja, uma própria moeda. Essa classificação é fundamental para que seja possível determinar como a incidência tributária será dada na moeda virtual e, é claro, permitir a aplicação da regra da matriz tributária a ela. Além disso, nesta pesquisa será trabalhada, em um primeiro momento, a constituição existencial da criptomoeda, além de uma explicação tributária sobre os fatores de incidência que podem ser aplicados a essa tecnologia, buscando entender a essência tanto no amplo escopo jurídico e na própria tributação. Dessa forma, será necessário analisar a moeda virtual de maneira semelhante a outros ativos que possuem operações fechadas, bem como verificar o entendimento internacional sobre o assunto, uma vez que essa tecnologia é definitivamente um ativo internacional.
ABSTRACT: The treatment of virtual currencies when it comes to income tax differs as much as the definitions of virtual currencies from country to country. It depends on this definition whether the existing laws corresponding to income tax can also include virtual currencies. Most commonly, virtual currencies fall under a certain category of income and thus are taxed accordingly. Many states have also published clarifying documents on how virtual currencies fit for tax purposes and how the existing legislative framework applies to them. Very few states consider cryptocurrencies as another type of currency, complementary to the usual one, whether we are talking about domestic or foreign markets, thus including them for tax purposes. KEY WORDS: Tax system, Cryptocurrencies, legislation, regulation
Blockchain technology, perhaps the most revolutionary invention of the 21st century, was popularized by introducing the world's first cryptocurrency 'Bitcoin.' However, despite many purported advantages offered by cryptocurrencies, they eluded mass adoption due to their extreme volatility. This flaw led to the ideation of an alternate cryptocurrency, 'stablecoin' which have seen their popularity surge almost 10x within a year. Further, the world has also witnessed the evolution of new business structures in decentralized autonomous organizations ('DAOs') where ownership and management intermingle with the help of smart contracts driven blockchain technology.
The profoundness of these new-age concepts could see them become the inherent elements of the global economy soon. This development would also necessitate devising new tax policies to cater to the crypto and blockchain-driven world. So far, not much has been discussed or debated around the income-tax implications for these concepts. With this background, the authors have deep-dived into the concept of stablecoins, their mechanics and explored the possible income tax implications throughout the lifecycle of different stablecoins. The authors have also discussed the concept of DAO along with a real-world case study, examine conceivable income tax offshoots that could arise due to DAO's unique nature, and sign-off with a suggestion on the probable solution.
A game between a representative household and a government was analyzed. The household chose which fractions of two currencies to hold, e.g., a national currency such as a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) and a global currency such as Bitcoin or Facebook’s Diem, and chose the tax evasion probability for each currency. The government chose, for each currency, the probability of detecting and prosecuting tax evasion, the tax rate, and the penalty factor imposed on the household when tax evasion was successfully detected and prosecuted. The household′s fraction of the national currency, the government’s monitoring probability of the national currency, and the penalty factor imposed on the global currency, increased in the household′s Cobb Douglas output elasticity for the national currency. The household′s probabilities of tax evasion on both currencies increased in the government’s Cobb Douglas output elasticity for the national currency. The government’s taxation on both currencies decreased in the output elasticity for the national currency. High output elasticity for the national currency eventually induced the government to tax that currency more than the global currency. The household′s probability of tax evasion on the global currency increased in the government’s output elasticity for that currency. The household was less (more) likely to tax evade on the national (global) currency if the government valued taxation and penalty on the national (global) currency. The results are illustrated numerically where each of the eight parameter values was varied relative to a benchmark.
This paper sheds light on the scarce empirical evidence on cryptocurrency users and use types. Based on the only available empirical estimate (shared by Chainalysis), this paper simulates the revenue potential from taxing Bitcoin capital gains in the EU. Total estimated Bitcoin capital gains in the EU amount to 12.7 billion EUR in 2020, including 3.6 billion EUR of realized gains. Applying national tax rules on capital gains from shares to those from Bitcoin yields a simulated tax revenue of about 850 million EUR in 2020. This paper is the first to empirically assess the tax revenue potential of capital gains from Bitcoin in the EU. While most of the empirical cryptocurrency literature is based on time-series data, this paper relies on dis-aggregated country-level data. The findings show that revenue from taxing cryptocurrencies is non-negligible and will be if the market of cryptocurrencies continues to grow.
While the founders of cryptocurrencies may not conceptualize their efforts as such, the infrastructural choices they make in designing their systems mimic those routinely made by lawmakers in the design of fiscal policy. The totality of their decision-making in this regard constitutes essential elements of “taxation” written into the governance structure of the cryptocurrency system — its tax cryptographia . This article examines how cryptocurrency founders determine what common goods are necessary to make their systems viable and then design a way to fund them. The object of comparing certain cryptographic design elements to taxation is to examine how investors, speculators, enthusiasts, and skeptics should assess the decisions that founders make, and why it might matter if the participants in cryptocurrency systems recognize the fiscal infrastructure as a reproduction of state-like functions that serve to allocate the cost and benefits of participating in the collective activity despite the core motivation of cryptocurrency to bypass centralized and hierarchical political institutions.