Prof. Suvarna A. Bahir, Tejas Vaidya, Ranjeet Waghmode, , Abhishek Gavand, · 5 authors
Electronic voting systems have gained significant attention due to their ability to improve the efficiency and accessibility of elections. However, traditional voting methods and centralized electronic voting systems face challenges such as vote tampering, lack of transparency, unauthorized access, and delayed result generation. Blockchain technology offers a decentralized and secure solution to address these limitations. This paper presents a Secure Blockchain-Based E-Voting System Using Smart Contracts that leverages Ethereum blockchain technology to provide transparent, secure, and tamper-resistant elections. The proposed system integrates voter authentication, election management, candidate registration, vote recording, and real-time result monitoring within a single platform. Smart contracts developed using Solidity are used to automate election operations and ensure the integrity of voting transactions. The system is implemented using HTML, CSS, JavaScript, FastAPI, MySQL, Ethereum, Ganache, and MetaMask. Votes are securely recorded on the blockchain, preventing unauthorized modifications and improving election transparency. The proposed framework enhances voter trust, reduces dependency on centralized authorities, and simplifies election management. This solution can be effectively used for academic institutions, organizations, and small-scale election environments requiring secure and reliable voting processes. Keywords: Blockchain, Electronic Voting, Ethereum, Smart Contracts, Solidity, Decentralized Voting.
Blockchain-based electronic voting systems have been identified as a solution to enhance the transparency, security, and efficiency of modern electoral processes. However, the existing system has three major problems, which include scalability, privacy issues, and cybersecurity attacks. The researcher proposed an innovative solution to develop an electronic voting system with enhanced security, scalability, and transparency of voters' information. This paper introduced the Hybrid Cryptographic and Enforced Blockchain (HCE VoteChain) framework, which combines Hyperledger Fabric with various sophisticated forms of cryptography, including SHA256 hashing, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES256) encryption, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and digital signatures, Paillier Homomorphic Encryption, and Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP) auditing. The experimental evaluation demonstrated that the system achieved a throughput of 288 Transactions Per Second (TPS) while maintaining an average latency of 2.521 seconds, a transaction speed of 0.13 votes per second, and a data immutability score of 0.999 and security resilience of 10000 and fault tolerance of 0.96, which proved its high reliability and robustness across different operational conditions. The results indicate that the framework suggested is a big step up in terms of security, scalability, and transparency over the existing solutions. Besides, it does not compromise the voter's privacy and auditability. The innovation of this work is the combination of multi-layer cryptographic mechanisms with the permission blockchain architecture to not only come up with a balanced compromise between performance and security but also to make the system capable of handling large-scale real-world digital elections.
We present Aggios, a scalable and privacy preserving proxy voting system designed for frequent and large-scale elections such as Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO), when storing votes on the bulletin board is expensive. To this end, Aggios introduces ‘aggregators’: entities to which voters delegate their votes, and who then post their batched proofs on the public ledger. Aggios achieves strong integrity guarantees: only authorized voters can vote, votes are counted correctly, voters are assured their vote is counted.
THE SS138 PROTOCOL: A DETERMINISTIC INGRESS ARCHITECTURE FOR DISTRIBUTED DATA DRIFT ISOLATION Abstract — This paper introduces the SS138 protocol, an invariant edge gateway architecture designed to isolate and eliminate calculation variance, packet time-series anomalies, and systemic tracking drift before data reaches downstream processing components. The architecture provides an application-layer structural filter, mapping incoming data vectors onto a fixed coordinate system bound by a multi-phase temporal macro framework. By evaluating metrics across structured phase intervals, the protocol achieves deterministic input sanitization and real-time entropy tracking with minimum algorithmic overhead, reducing the attack surface and protecting downstream distributed ledgers from processing failures or data propagation errors. Owner and Developer SquirrelSniper138 from YouTube
Electronic voting requires the simultaneous admission of only legitimate participants, ballot uniqueness, vote confidentiality, storage integrity, and result verifiability. Blockchain alone does not solve these problems, since ledger immutability does not guarantee anonymity, ballot correctness, or reduced trust concentration. The purpose of this work is to develop a parameterizable research framework for electronic voting scenarios with enhanced cryptographic protection, allowing the security level to be varied according to the requirements of a voting scenario. The main contribution of the work is a parameterizable research architecture for composing and experimentally comparing electronic voting configurations with different security and computational profiles. The cryptographic and audit mechanisms integrated into this architecture include blind-signature-based anonymous authorization, encrypted ballot submission, blockchain-style audit, receipt verification, homomorphic tally publication, and threshold-supported tally artifacts. These mechanisms are not proposed as new cryptographic primitives; rather, they are integrated into a reproducible prototype to study how their combination affects verifiability, privacy support, auditability, and computational cost. Compared with basic blockchain-based voting prototypes, this architecture explicitly separates security, privacy, and verifiability profiles and makes their computational cost observable. The implemented prototype is used as an experimental platform for analyzing supported security properties, threat modeling, and computational cost estimation. The results show that authentication, anonymous token issuance, and receipt verification maintain an almost constant cost at the studied scale, while the main cryptographic burden is associated with encrypted ballot submission and threshold-supported tally publication. The scientific novelty of the work lies in constructing a parameterizable architecture that integrates several cryptographic mechanisms and a blockchain audit layer into one reproducible research prototype. At the same time, the proposed approach retains prototype-level limitations associated with the absence of a full zero-knowledge proof stack, independently deployed threshold authorities, and coercion-resistance mechanisms.
Muhammad Umar Janjua, Akshaya Mani, Uğur Şen, Daniel Kaiser
Privacy and anonymity of validators, especially regarding IP address linkability, are essential to protect the Ethereum network from various attacks. Network-level attacks, such as DoS, can interrupt validators and affect the overall security of the Ethereum network. Correlating the IP addresses of validators with their identities, along with knowledge about their action slots can be exploited by attackers to cause network delays, MEV exploitation, and finality risks. Therefore, ensuring the unlinkability of a validator's IP and identity is crucial for maintaining the network's trust and resilience. In this techreport, we first provide a review of the existing network and consensus layer techniques that have been proposed for maintaining validator privacy in the Ethereum blockchain. Secondly, we evaluate a Tor-based protocol named Tor push that helps unlink validator identities (IDs) from their nodes' IP addresses, thereby making it difficult to determine any end-to-end correlation between validator IDs and IP addresses of validators' beacon nodes. To evaluate the effectiveness of Tor push, we present a working, deployed proof-of-concept (PoC) implementation in the Nimbus Ethereum client. Our PoC deployment pushes attestations, aggregations, and block proposals over Tor to the Goerli testnet. Furthermore, we also analyse the security and latency of Tor push. Our experimental results suggest that Tor can be incorporated into the existing Ethereum network with a tolerable latency overhead of 613.82 ms on average and without compromising the overall network performance while enhancing the location privacy of validators in the Ethereum network.
Abstract In the digital age, the reliance on network communication for information exchange has surged, making encrypted network traffic a linchpin of secure digital interactions. However, while encryption safeguards data, it creates hurdles for network management and security surveillance. Conventional deep packet inspection (DPI) falters when faced with encrypted traffic, and existing studies in this area have drawbacks like reliance on trusted third parties and limited detection capabilities. To address these issues, we present a novel zero knowledge proof based encrypted traffic management( $$\mathbb {ZKP}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mi>ZKP</mml:mi> </mml:math> - $$\mathbb {PET}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mi>PET</mml:mi> </mml:math> ) scheme. By integrating a third-party verifier operating under the honest-but-curious (HBC) model, $$\mathbb {ZKP}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mi>ZKP</mml:mi> </mml:math> - $$\mathbb {PET}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mi>PET</mml:mi> </mml:math> establishes a trustless verification system that effectively and efficiently curbs metadata leakage. $$\mathbb {ZKP}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mi>ZKP</mml:mi> </mml:math> - $$\mathbb {PET}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mi>PET</mml:mi> </mml:math> is implemented with two applications: HTTP traffic blocking and blacklist management. For HTTP traffic blocking, the BTHP circuit is developed to extract version details from TLS traffic and verify compliance, enabling precise traffic control. In blacklist management, tailored extraction algorithms for DoT and DoH encrypted DNS traffic are implemented, and Merkle tree based membership proofs are utilized to decide whether to intercept traffic. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that $$\mathbb {ZKP}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mi>ZKP</mml:mi> </mml:math> - $$\mathbb {PET}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mi>PET</mml:mi> </mml:math> can efficiently enforce diverse network policies on encrypted traffic. It not only safeguards security and privacy but also exhibits outstanding performance, offering a dependable, efficient, and privacy-centric solution for encrypted network traffic management.
Since 2016, Apple has claimed that device analytics collected to improve user experience are protected by differential privacy (DP). Apple's DifferentialPrivacy framework is deployed across its operating systems and handles sensitive signals such as Safari domains, keyboard events, photo attributes, and health-related reports. Because Apple has not open-sourced its privatization algorithms, these privacy claims have been difficult to verify independently. We present a client-side audit of Apple's DP framework on macOS Sonoma 14.2 and Sequoia 15.6. We reverse engineer the shipped binaries, recover Objective-C interfaces, build runtime harnesses that execute Apple's deployed mechanisms, and test whether their outputs match the advertised privacy guarantees. Our audit covers nearly all active deployed mechanisms, including Count Median Sketch, Hadamard-CMS, randomized-response mechanisms, and Prio-style secure aggregation. We find multiple implementation bugs and misconfigurations. Every audited mechanism that relies on floating-point noise fails to meet its advertised DP or zero-knowledge proof guarantee, due to insecure samplers with known floating-point vulnerabilities. We also find secure-aggregation configurations with local DP disabled, exposing pre-aggregation records to any party with access to those logs. Overall, we find DP violations in 5 of 9 audited mechanisms, affecting 87% of data collection in macOS Sonoma and 68% in Sequoia. We also identify public leaked iPhone logs that can be decoded to recover private information, including Safari domains and keyboard emoji signals.
Austin Bennett, Preston Vander Vos, Duc V. Le, Mira Belenkiy
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) run protocol governance by letting token holders vote on proposals. The dominant rule, voting power proportional to wallet balance, concentrates control among a small number of large holders, fueling the token-control governance attacks that have already compromised real protocols. To counter this concentration, the community has turned to anti-plutocratic voting mechanisms such as Quadratic Voting (QV), which assign sublinear voting power per token with the goal of dampening the influence of large holders. We prove that no voting rule that derives power solely from wallet balance can succeed on a permissionless blockchain. Through a costed model of on-chain voting that captures realistic blockchain frictions -- including per-wallet splitting and voting costs, fixed setup costs, and minimum-balance requirements -- we show that whenever a wallet of any size yields nonzero voting power, a Sybil attacker who splits tokens across many wallets achieves total voting power that grows at least linearly in their token holdings. For concave rules actually proposed to dampen governance power -- those that are positive, increasing, and finite -- we show that the optimal strategy yields power that is asymptotically linear in token holdings, regardless of the cost scheme. Instantiating the model on real DAOs reveals attack costs orders of magnitude below the value at stake. Replaying the ten most recent finalized proposals of five major DAOs (ENS, Compound, Uniswap, Arbitrum, and ZKsync) under linear, quadratic, logarithmic, and power-($β= 0.25$) voting, we measure Sybil amplification factors between $1,172\times$ and $4,039\times$ under Quadratic Voting, and exceeding $229,000\times$ under steeper power rules.
Secure voting remains a critical challenge in modern democracies due to concerns over transparency, tampering, and voter trust. This paper proposes a blockchain-based voting system designed to enhance the integrity, security, and reliability of electoral processes. By leveraging the decentralized and immutable nature of blockchain technology, the system ensures that each vote is securely recorded and cannot be altered once submitted. Smart contracts are utilized to automate vote validation and counting, eliminating intermediaries and reducing the risk of human error or manipulation. Cryptographic techniques preserve voter anonymity while ensuring authentication, thereby maintaining both privacy and legitimacy. The distributed ledger allows real-time verification and auditing, increasing transparency and public confidence in election outcomes. Performance analysis indicates that the system is scalable and resistant to common cyber threats such as double voting and unauthorized access.
Vote Chain is a fully implemented, decentralized e-voting application (DApp) built on Ethereum. Existing blockchain-based voting systems often suffer from either high computational overhead due to homomorphic encryption or lack of fully deployable, adversarially tested implementations. To address these limitations, VoteChain employs a keccak256-based commit–reveal protocol to preserve ballot secrecy during the voting phase, with Solidity 0.8.20 smart contracts enforcing all election rules autonomously. Wallet-based authentication via MetaMask eliminates centralized identity management. The system is validated through 14 automated unit tests (all passing in 615 ms) covering correctness, access control, double-voting, hash forgery, and phase-bypass attacks. Per-voter gas cost is approximately 120,000 units (commit and reveal combined). An ablation study confirms the non-redundant contribution of each architectural component. Comparative analysis shows that VoteChain achieves vote privacy without homomorphic encryption while maintaining full decentralization and implementation completeness. The system is evaluated and validated on a local Hardhat network, with the architecture readily extensible to Layer-2 rollups for large-scale elections.
Sinchana Shetty, Tejaswini M R, Kiran Samantha D S, Vijaylaxmi H Manjunatha
Existing electronic voting platforms are persistently centralized repositories, introducing fundamental security challenged by vote manipulation, result falsification, limited weaknesses [1]. Blockchain technology has emerged as a compelling alternative, owing to its cryptographic permanence, data management. This paper proposes and evaluates a fully integrated blockchain-based electoral system built on the Ethereum network, leveraging Solidity smart contracts to address these systemic shortcomings. The proposed architecture adopts a decentralized three-tier design incorporating Web3.js communication bridges and cryptographic validation mechanisms that collectively guarantee immutability, transparency, and end-to-end verifiability throughout all electoral phases. The system incorporates hierarchical role-based access controls, real-time vote tallying, and comprehensive audit trail functionality, while preserving voter anonymity through pseudonymous addressing. Experimental results demonstrate transaction confirmation within 15–20 seconds, with a mean gas consumption of 0.0023 ETH per vote, confirming practical feasibility for medium-scale deployments. A comparative evaluation against conventional centralized e-voting solutions highlights measurable security full-stack Ethereum-based voting platform comprising Solidity improvements and the elimination of single points of failure, balanced against acceptable computational overhead.
Elections may be expedited, simplified, and enhanced through electronic voting. They are not frequently employed as a result of security, transparency, scalability, and voter confidentiality concerns. Our blockchain-based electronic voting system is impermeable, visible, and privacy-protective due to the use of advanced cryptographic algorithms and a permissioned distributed ledger. A permissioned blockchain that employs an expedited consensus method enhances throughput and minimizes latency during critical elections. Voter registration, voting, and tabulation are automated through the use of smart contracts. This mitigates centralization and manipulation. Privacy is safeguarded through encryption, decentralized identity (DID) frameworks, and verified methods. Comprehensive verification is facilitated by the protection of voter anonymity. In a hybrid architecture, scalability is enhanced and computational power is reduced through off-chain storage and on-chain validation. The proposed system is capable of withstanding unauthorized access, data manipulation, and duplicate voting, as evidenced by a comprehensive security and performance analysis. Furthermore, it surpasses voting systems that are founded on blockchain technology. The findings indicate that the secure digital election technology is both scalable and viable, thereby facilitating the implementation of transparent and dependable voting systems.
Mohammad Y. Allaho, Mehmet H. Karaata, Israa A. Elgemiei
The distributed ledger systems rely heavily on miners, who are a vital component of the cryptocurrency ecosystem. Most cryptocurrencies cease to exist within five years of operation [1] due to churning. Most current cryptocurrency analyses in the literature focus on mining pools and ignore the individual miners’ perspective and in-depth analysis of the churning phenomenon and its possible reasons. In this study, we conducted a longitudinal and overall study on two of the most growing cryptocurrency networks, namely Bitcoin and Ethereum. The Bitcoin dataset used spans over 12 years (2009-2021). Whereas the Ethereum dataset spans over 8 years (2015-2023), including the two versions of Ethereum (before and after the merge). Our goal is to uncover the factors that drive miners’ churning and reveal essential characteristics of cryptocurrency mining, such as network fairness and centrality. Generally, both networks experience a decline in active miners over time. Our results confirm the centrality of the Bitcoin and Ethereum networks, whereas Bitcoin is found to be more distributed and fairer than Ethereum in both versions. Also, in Bitcoin, solo miners are less centralized and experience a fairer distribution of blocks formation than pool miners, however, pool miners have more mining rewards on average. Also, pools are found to decrease churning for pool miners compared to solo miners. Moreover, it is found that miners’ waiting time is a significant factor in miners’ churning. The existing protocols used require improvements to increase network decentralization and fairness, as well as reduce miners’ churn.
Lalithambikai S, R Kavinkumar, Sowndariya K, Barath M · 5 authors
While digital shifts have radically redefined modern governance and civil operations, the practice of casting ballots electronically continues to grapple with persistent obstacles concerning data transparency and operational robustness. Conventional, centralized digital voting systems typically harbor singular vulnerability points that attract cyber offensives, compounded by a distinct lack of mechanisms to rapidly manage arising voter concerns. In response to these pressing flaws, this study introduces a multifaceted architecture merging distributed ledger technologies with an intelligent, machine-learning-driven grievance resolution interface. Specifically, our model leverages a decentralised blockchain framework for immutable ballot storage, ensuring that individual vote modifications are virtually impossible and establishing a trustless verification environment devoid of centralized oversight. This schematic aims to seamlessly preserve data fidelity and supreme voter anonymity. Our comprehensive investigation of these distributed consensus rules and AI-guided triage methods indicates that unifying rigid cryptographic ballot handling together with responsive, automated complaint mechanisms dramatically elevates overall electoral resilience while reinforcing public faith in democratic workflows.
For communication scenarios demanding extremely high information security and facing significant risks of data leakage, a covert communication scheme based on Ethereum virtual machine bytecode was proposed. By strategically allocating the storage space of smart contract variables, the scheme embedded covert data into contract bytecode and utilized the inherent characteristics of bytecode to set positioning markers, enabling efficient extraction by the receiver. Additionally, three ciphertext parsing modes were designed to accommodate transmissions of different data scales, further enhancing the security of encoded data. Theoretical analysis and extensive experimental results demonstrate that the scheme can effectively hide up to 170 bit of information per transaction. The structural similarity of opcode frequency distributions between the embedded contract and the original contract reaches up to 99.78%. The Pearson correlation coefficient of the high-frequency 3-gram opcode patterns between the normal and embedded contracts is 0.999 7 (<italic>p </italic>= 6.42×10⁻¹⁴), indicating that the embedding process does not introduce statistically significant differences in the local instruction sequence distribution. These results fully validate the strong concealment capability, transmission efficiency, and security of the proposed scheme.
Open access
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
The proliferation of sophisticated AI and bot networks necessitates robust methods for verifying human uniqueness and liveness in digital ecosystems. Existing Proof-of-Personhood (PoP) solutions rely on centralized authorities, invasive static biometrics, or socially-correlatable data, creating vulnerabilities in privacy, security, and accessibility. We introduce the Entros Protocol, a decentralized framework for PoP and Self-Sovereign Identity built on Solana. The core innovation is temporal consistency: the assertion that human identity is best proven not by a static secret, but by the bounded, chaotic drift of biological and behavioral patterns over time. The framework captures multi-modal behavioral data (voice prosody, hand tremor, touch dynamics) during a configurable behavioral challenge, extracts a 308-dimensional feature vector, and produces a 256-bit locality-sensitive hash via SimHash. A Groth16 zero-knowledge proof verifies that consecutive fingerprints fall within a bounded Hamming distance without revealing either value. Attestations are anchored to non-transferable identity tokens (SPL Token-2022) with progressive Trust Scores. We provide formal security definitions, analyze the protocol against replay, synthesis, and Sybil attacks, introduce a graduated trust model distinguishing first-time liveness checks from sustained temporal consistency, and present benchmarks from a working implementation deployed on Solana devnet.
LokNirikshan: A Blockchain-Inspired Election Transparency and Management System LokNirikshan is a comprehensive, blockchain-inspired digital platform designed to enhance transparency, integrity, and efficiency in modern election systems. Traditional voting mechanisms—both paper-based and electronic—often suffer from limitations such as lack of transparency, centralized control, slow processing, and susceptibility to data manipulation. These challenges reduce public trust in electoral outcomes and highlight the need for more secure and verifiable solutions. This work proposes a hybrid approach that integrates key blockchain principles—such as cryptographic hashing, Merkle tree-based verification, and audit trails—into a practical, scalable, and user-friendly web-based system. Instead of implementing a fully decentralized blockchain, which introduces complexity and performance constraints, LokNirikshan selectively adopts core concepts to achieve transparency and data integrity without compromising usability. The system supports the complete election lifecycle, including voter registration, constituency and booth assignment, political party onboarding, candidate nomination, election configuration, voting, result computation, and post-election verification. It incorporates role-based access control (RBAC) to manage different stakeholders such as voters, party representatives, party heads, and administrators, ensuring secure and structured interactions across the platform. A key innovation of the system lies in its verification layer, which utilizes Merkle trees to ensure data integrity. Election results are converted into cryptographic hashes and organized into a hierarchical structure, generating a root hash that acts as a tamper-evident reference. This allows independent verification of results without requiring access to the complete dataset, thereby promoting trust through transparency. Additionally, an open public verification portal enables users and observers to validate election outcomes in a decentralized manner. The platform is implemented using modern web technologies, with React and Vite for the frontend, Node.js and Express for backend services, and MongoDB for flexible data storage. Authentication and session management are handled using JSON Web Tokens (JWT), ensuring secure access control. The system also includes anomaly detection mechanisms to identify irregularities such as duplicate entries, missing records, and inconsistent data. Experimental evaluation was conducted using a simulated dataset of 500 voters across multiple constituencies. The system demonstrated high functional reliability, successfully executing all stages of the election process. Verification tests using Merkle proofs achieved 100% accuracy for valid records, while anomaly detection reached approximately 98% effectiveness. Performance analysis indicated efficient response times, with most operations completing within milliseconds. Despite its strengths, the system has certain limitations, including scalability constraints for large-scale elections, partial centralization, and basic identity verification mechanisms. Future enhancements may include full blockchain integration (e.g., Ethereum or Hyperledger), advanced cryptographic techniques such as zero-knowledge proofs, improved voter authentication, machine learning-based anomaly detection, and mobile accessibility. In conclusion, LokNirikshan demonstrates that a balanced integration of blockchain-inspired concepts with conventional web technologies can significantly improve the transparency and reliability of election systems. It provides a practical foundation for developing secure, verifiable, and scalable digital governance platforms, contributing to increased public trust in democratic processes.
The Blind Watchdog Protocol (BWP) constructs a directed oversight graph where each autonomous agent has exactly one hidden watchdog, but no agent knows who watches it. Compliance emerges through a Panopticon equilibrium — the mere possibility of observation makes defection irrational. A closed-form Nash equilibrium theorem (6-step proof, TLC model-checked: 2,071 states, zero violations) establishes that compliance is strictly dominant under configurable parameters. The protocol implements 10 composable plugins (reputation, staking, mixnet, rotation, correlation analysis, adaptive watcher allocation, conviction scoring, knowledge gating, hybrid oversight, and optimistic slashing) and maps 10 biological oversight mechanisms to executable code. Key results: 100% detection rate with 0% false positives across 1,000 deterministic simulation runs (p_d=1.0). Stress-tested with stochastic observation noise, collusion sweeps (10-40%), Dark DAO bribery economics, and latency profiling. Layered defense separates immediate containment (escalation levels 1-3) from delayed adjudication (optimistic slashing with challenge period). Three-tier Sybil resistance via admission staking, DID-based identity, and Proof-of-Personhood interface. Constant-rate dummy traffic for timing-analysis resistance. Standardized evidence protocol for dispute resolution. Dynamic VaR-coupled stakes for high-value environments. Three fundamental open problems are identified: out-of-band cryptographic bribery (Dark DAOs), the recursive final arbitrator problem, and the latency-anonymity-cost trilemma for LLM agents. The reference implementation (422 tests, 5,757+ LOC, Python) is licensed under PolyForm Noncommercial 1.0. This paper is a defensive publication of the protocol design, formal proofs, and empirical results.
In the classic model, data integrity assumes a simple sender-receiver channel where threats are limited and verifications are straightforward. However, the modern Internet has reshaped this paradigm. In an era of viral misinformation, encrypted messaging, and decentralized finance, integrity is no longer about just who sent the data, but what it really means and whether it can be trusted. For instance, can we verify the authenticity of a direct message screenshot? Is Signal's end-to-end encryption truly end-to-end when a central server distributes users' keys? Can decentralized protocols, which have attracted four trillions in capital, sustain trust under attacks that wipe out millions?In response, we present a modern perspective on data integrity across diverse systems, arguing for the need of comprehensive innovations from theory to practice along three axes: cryptographic foundation in which we borrow ideas from theoretical research and develop interesting cryptographic tools, protocol design in which we find and achieve novel application goals, and empirical security analysis in which we critically evaluate deployed systems to understand their strengths and exploit their blind spots.To ground these ideas, we discuss three cases: Cauchyproofs as a batch-updatable vector commitment, an analysis of proxying in TLS oracles revealing subtleties in AEAD context unforgeability, and attacks and improvements on the Tor directory protocol. These case studies illustrate both the fragility and opportunity in today's integrity landscape, and how an integrated approach can help guide us forward.
ABSTRACT E-voting in polarized contexts requires a strict balance between public verifiability, ballot secrecy, andcoercion resistance. Traditional centralized systems lack transparency, while fully decentralized modelsface scalability and privacy issues. This paper proposes a hybrid architecture compliant withOSCE/ODIHR standards [1] for low-trust environments. The protocol decouples identity from voting anoff-chain Oracle manages authorization via cryptographic tokens, while the Waves DLT acts as animmutable bulletinboard.Utilizinghomomorphicencryption[2],Zero-KnowledgeRangeProofs(ZKRP) [3],and Distributed Key Generation (DKG) [4], the system ensures End-to-End Verifiability (E2E) bydelegating tallying to auditable scripts. Finally, the study examines model limitations, specificallyregarding endpoint vulnerabilities and physical constraints on coercion resistance. KEYWORDS E-Voting, Distributed Ledger Technology, Homomorphic Encryption, End-to-End Verifiability, ZeroKnowledge Proofs PDF LINK: https://ijcionline.com/paper/15/15226ijci01.pdf VOLUME LINK: https://airccse.org/journal/ijci/Current2026.html MORE DETAILS: https://airccse.org/journal/ijci/index.html
SOUJANYA SOUJANYA, N. JYOTHI N. JYOTHI, G. KUSHAL G. KUSHAL, M.THRILOCHAN M.THRILOCHAN · 5 authors
The criminal activities in India are increasing at a rapid rate. Many of these activities go unreported. Even after having an online portal for the police for storing FIRs and NCRs, most of the FIRs are handwritten as a traditional practice. In most of the cases, the complainant has to be present in the police station to file a cognizable offense. An effective system for e-governance was started in 2009 named Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) for the entire country. However, it is a centralized system for a particular state. Thus, there is a need for a completely decentralized system for assuring that there is no central point of failure in the system and complaints are managed securely protected from unauthorized access. Our aim is to propose a blockchain-based solution to manage complaints against both cognizable and non-cognizable offenses. The FIR filed by the police will be encrypted, stored in the IPFS and hash is added to the blockchain network. If the police decide not to file the FIR under pressure or deny receiving any complaint, then the complainant will have strong proof against him/her as the complaint along with its timestamp was stored on the blockchain network. Having all the records stored in an immutable database would remove any chances of the FIR/NCR being tampered and going unnoticed. Keywords – Blockchain Technology, Police Complaint Management System, Smart Contracts, Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), Decentralized Application (DApp), Data Integrity, Tamper-Proof Records, Immutable Audit Trail, Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP), Hyperledger Fabric and Permissioned Blockchain
Decentralized identity (DID) is a key infrastructure for Web3, granting users sovereign control over their private identity data. While existing DID systems like FADID-TT (WWW'25) realize anonymity and traceability within a single domain, the Web3 ecosystem is a multiverse of independent domains like DeFi, GameFi, and DAO. This multi-domain reality presents critical issues for current DID solutions. First, most existing solutions are built on the monolithic committee architecture, facing severe scalability bottlenecks as the committee size grows. Second, most existing solutions cannot offer strong cross-domain anonymity, where frequent cross-domain interaction inevitably exposes the user's privacy. Third, existing methods for tracing the identities of malicious users are inefficient.
This paper analyses MicroMix, a noncustodial Ethereum mixer that unlinks deposits from withdrawals using browser-side zkSNARKs, a centralised relayer, and on-chain enforcement via Semaphore and Mixer contracts. The study formalises core acceptance conditions—value conservation, nullifier uniqueness, external‑nullifier scoping, and signal binding—and evaluates risks that persist despite sound cryptography, including timing correlation in small anonymity sets, Sybil pool distortion, single‑relayer censorship, ETH payout liveness under gas‑stipend limits, ERC‑20 heterogeneity, circuit–verifier input/order mismatches, and cross‑chain replay. The work proposes concrete mitigations: randomised scheduling and probabilistic batching, multi‑denomination support, decentralised relayer participation with user-paid fallbacks, guarded call patterns with reentrancy protection, SafeERC20 enforcement and token whitelisting, strict public‑input ordering and signal‑to‑field mapping, a fixed mixer-scoped external nullifier, and chain-bound proofs. With these measures, MicroMix can preserve unlinkability while improving liveness and correctness in adversarial environments, advancing practical, privacy‑preserving withdrawals on Ethereum.