We provide a large-scale empirical audit of DEX routing using 2.98 million WETH-USDC swaps on Ethereum. Comparing realized routes with optimized benchmarks, we measure an average shortfall of 2.02 bps per trade or \$24 million. To attribute losses, we introduce three reproducible optimal benchmarks: a Support-Constrained Optimum (SCO) that evaluates split quality conditional on the pools actually used; a Full-Venue Optimum (FVO) that considers all available pools to quantify the value of broader pool access; and a Gas-Aware FVO (G-FVO) that augments FVO with gas costs to capture the trade-off between additional pool usage and gas expenditure. Computing these benchmarks at scale is enabled by a bisection-based algorithm for optimal routing across multiple pools for the same token pair. Two regularities emerge. First, information timeliness is crucial: moving from execution-time state to one-block lagged state optimization significantly raises mean shortfall and additional delays further degrade performance, albeit with diminishing increments; evaluated on the same stale snapshots, realized routes lie closer to optimal, indicating timing-mismatch as a key component. Second, inefficiency is heterogeneous and heavy-tailed: small trades suffer higher percentage losses, while a few extreme outliers dominate the aggregate dollar shortfalls. Finally, we demonstrate that sandwiching attacks drive a significant fraction of routing sub-optimality. Our benchmark protocol and algorithm offer a rigorous, reproducible basis for evaluating and improving information-timely, gas-aware routing.
We audit whether candle-based machine-learning models can turn predictions of cryptocurrency extrema or short-horizon outcomes into positive Binance Spot paper policies after assumed costs. Numerical results come from scripted fixed-seed model runs and deterministic simulators; human-supervised AI agents supported the July 20 evidence-integrity revision through literature retrieval, separately tasked critique, artifact reconciliation, documentation, and source packaging, not trading decisions. The strongest later-period evidence, conditional on extensive predecessor search, is negative: an unchanged ten-pair mandatory-daily selector lost 6.72\% over 19 July cycles at an assumed 31-bps completed-cycle cost, with 3 wins and 16 losses. In short model-specific July evaluations, the validation-selected local-minimum policy returned -1.79\%, while the local-maximum sell-to-cash/re-entry policy underperformed continuous holding by 2.80\%; their gross mean advantages of 11.11 and 12.21 bps were below even the 21-bps stress. A Gurgul-inspired, OHLCV-only daily adaptation attained minimum/maximum ROC AUC of 0.874/0.896 but average precision of only 0.134/0.116 and lost 44.30\% over seven cycles, versus -41.20\% for buy-and-hold. A forensic audit also downgraded an earlier One4All "30-day holdout": its dates had influenced prior architecture work, its four-hour outcome horizon was not purged at split boundaries, it used same-close entry, and its raw result directories were absent. Across the tested, mostly exploratory protocols, event-ranking performance did not establish positive executable policy value. Every operational decision remains NO\_TRADE.
In this paper, we develop an open-economy macroeconomic model of a Proof-of-Stake network to analyze nominal token-price dynamics and the systemic effects of speculative capital. We first consider a network populated solely by active utility users, who finance network activity through a steady exogenous inflow of fiat currency. We prove the existence of a unique, globally asymptotically stable steady-state equilibrium with a well-defined nominal token price and derive a closed-form expression for the network's relaxation time. Calibrating the model using parameters representative of the current Ethereum network, we estimate a relaxation half-life of approximately 46 years. This extreme macroeconomic inertia implies that the token price may remain persistently displaced from its evolving steady-state benchmark, producing sustained price overshooting as the network adjusts to changing fundamentals. We then introduce an Investor class to examine the effects of passive and active speculative capital. We show that passive institutional staking compresses the native staking yield and creates a structural imbalance that systematically raises the nominal token price while shifting consensus ownership away from active utility users. Active speculative capital has a qualitatively different effect. In response to capital shocks, the Consumer class's rigid preference for fiat-denominated consumption generates an endogenous constant-value strategy. This mechanism shifts staked-token ownership from the Investor class toward active utility users, with potentially favorable implications for consensus decentralization.
Jakub Zwydak, Marcin Wątorek, Jarosław Kwapień, Stanisław Drożdż
Artificial transaction generation remains an important source of potential market manipulation on cryptocurrency exchanges, as it may distort reported liquidity and reduce market transparency. This study proposes a diagnostic framework for detecting unusual trading patterns based on complexity and statistical-structure measures derived from high-frequency trade-level data. The analysis considers log-returns, trading volume, and transaction counts, using tail distributions, autocorrelation functions, multifractal characteristics, approximate entropy, and detrended cross-correlations. The methodology is applied to BTC, ETH, and XRP traded on Binance, Bitget, KuCoin, and Kraken over the period from April 1 to June 30, 2025. The results reveal a pronounced anomaly on Bitget for BTC and ETH after mid-May 2025. The number of transactions increases sharply, but there is no proportional increase in traded volume or return fluctuations. This regime is characterised by numerous low-volume trades, weaker autocorrelations, reduced multifractal organisation, higher short-pattern irregularity, and weaker cross-correlations involving the transaction-count series. These features are consistent with a noise-like component in trading activity and may indicate artificially increased transaction counts, although they do not provide direct proof of wash trading. The findings show that complexity-based indicators can be useful for detecting exchange-specific trading anomalies that remain hidden in price-based measures.
Cryptocurrency markets exhibit periodic bursts in volatility and volume at one-minute, five-minute, and quarter-hour marks. Using trade data for six Binance perpetual contracts, we link these bursts to algorithmic participation: trade-size roundness declines sharply during them. The Autocorrelation Map, a clock-phase-resolved display, reveals serial dependence in order flow and returns at quarter-hour openings that conventional measures obscure. Opening returns are predictable out of sample, while opening order imbalance predicts returns over four to twelve hours, with much weaker effects at finer clock-time frequencies. Together, these findings characterize periodic algorithmic trading and its cross-frequency variation.
Prediction markets increasingly list contracts settling on an asset price that holders can move by trading the underlying. We build a model showing that such contracts transfer wealth from prediction-market liquidity traders to manipulators and harm price discovery in the underlying, even as it becomes more liquid. After the launch of Polymarket's five-minute Bitcoin contract, settlement-time spot order flow spikes, causing large price reversals after settlement. Manipulators capture a large amount of profit, mostly from retail. Manipulation is largely absent in the fifteen-minute contracts: lengthening the contract horizon removes it, providing the market-design remedy our model and evidence support.
We investigate the evolving structure of interactions in cryptocurrency markets using a network-based framework constructed from high-frequency price data spanning 2020-2025. Directed and weighted networks are constructed from statistically significant Granger causal relationships between cryptocurrency log-returns, enabling us to quantify the flow of influence across assets. We find that normalized returns exhibit heavy-tailed distributions, consistent with the presence of large intermittent fluctuations and in line with stylized facts of financial markets. The resulting networks display pronounced heterogeneity in link weights and nodal strengths, indicating that a small subset of cryptocurrencies contributes disproportionately to market dynamics. By ranking cryptocurrencies based on their nodal out-strength, we uncover a dynamically evolving hierarchy of influence. Ethereum consistently emerges as the most influential asset, while Bitcoin shows a gradual decline in its relative importance. The ranking structure exhibits substantial temporal variability, with multiple cryptocurrencies entering and exiting the top positions over time. Our findings reveal a highly competitive and non-stable organization of the cryptocurrency ecosystem.
Automated Market Makers based on concentrated liquidity, such as Uniswap v3, significantly improve capital efficiency but expose Liquidity Providers (LPs) to adverse selection costs, formalized as Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (LVR). While theoretical literature quantifies these costs, the interplay between realistic blockchain microstructure and endogenous pricing mechanisms remains under-explored. This paper develops a granular Agent-Based Model of a Uniswap v3 pool interacting with a stochastic reference market governed by Heston volatility dynamics. The framework incorporates discrete block propagation, mempool latency, and a heterogeneous population of agents, including latency-sensitive arbitrageurs, smart routers, Maximal Extractable Value searchers, and active LPs benchmarked against a frictionless rebalancing strategy. We propose and evaluate dynamic fee schedules driven by volatility and order-flow toxicity proxies intended to compensate LPs for adverse-selection losses. Our simulations investigate the conditions under which LPs can achieve positive hedged Profit and Loss (fees minus LVR). The analysis suggests that dynamic fee adjustments can improve hedged LP profitability mainly by increasing fee income in states associated with stale-price risk. Depending on the configuration, these rules may also affect realized LVR, but the current aggregate results support compensation for LVR more directly than a reduction of LVR itself.
We study the evolution of transaction speed and fees from January 2024 through March 2026, comparing Ethereum Mainnet and its Layer 2 (L2) networks, as well as Solana and Polygon. Ethereum has undergone upgrades that have increased block size and blob count. These upgrades have doubled transactions per second (TPS) on both the Mainnet and the L2 networks. Mainnet median fees have fallen from over \$2 to under \$0.02, and L2 median fees have fallen more than 95% from \$0.05 to \$0.0015. We forecast that Mainnet median fees will converge with Solana in August 2027, but TPS will remain below 100 until 2034. The L1 Strawmap, proposing EIP-7938, a potential exponential increase in the gas limit, brings the Mainnet to only 100 TPS in January 2028. With continued blob expansion, L2s will surpass Solana TPS in March 2029 and have lower median fees by October 2026.
The digitization of financial markets has produced two classes of platforms that price, in principle, the same state - contingent payoffs: centralized crypto-option exchanges and blockchain-based prediction markets. This paper provides the first option-implied benchmark test of prediction-market pricing for cryptocurrency threshold contracts. For each hour in a matched sample, we compare the Polymarket Yes price with the discounted risk-neutral binary value implied by a listed Binance call option on the same underlying, strike, and maturity, and study the gap between them. In the main September 2023 Bitcoin contract, the mean pricing gap equals 5.6 percentage points across 214 hourly observations (t = 6.46, p < 10^{-9}). Pooling three Binance-compatible Bitcoin threshold markets yields a mean gap of 6.3 percentage points across 287 observations, robust to HAC and block-bootstrap inference. The gap is persistent - with an AR(1) half-life of roughly four hours - yet mean-reverting, consistent with slow information transmission between segmented venues rather than mechanical noise. Cross-sectional regressions reveal that the wedge is largest at low option-implied probabilities and long maturities, a pattern consistent with speculative demand for prediction-market contracts rather than measurement error. A delta-hedged arbitrage proxy remains profitable after conservative transaction costs, though with marginal statistical precision. A Deribit extension on the same three Bitcoin contracts produces a larger pooled gap of 11 percentage points, while a smaller Ethereum exercise yields mixed evidence. The results demonstrate that digital fragmentation of financial markets generates systematic, persistent pricing wedges even for economically identical payoffs.
Sunshine trading theory predicts that publicly disclosing trading intentions can reduce adverse selection and attract liquidity provision, lowering execution costs. Evidence is scarce, because explicit preannouncement of large orders is rare in traditional markets. We study Hyperliquid, a fully on-chain limit order book for cryptocurrency perpetual futures, where protocol-native TWAP orders disclose their terms from inception and remain visible while active, a natural form of sunshine trading. Using address-level data, we reconstruct 4.3 million hidden metaorders and compare them with 465,000 visible TWAP executions. The two execution styles differ sharply: hidden metaorders follow front-loaded, U-shaped schedules consistent with transient-impact optimal execution, whereas TWAPs trade nearly uniformly. We test the preannouncement predictions of Admati and Pfleiderer (1991). Visible TWAPs face lower execution costs than comparable hidden metaorders and leave a smaller permanent price impact. Hidden metaorders executed alongside already-visible same-direction TWAP flow incur higher permanent costs: adverse-selection costs shift toward non-announcers. Finally, visible TWAP programs elicit liquidity provision: while active, displayed depth rises and the book tilts toward the absorbing side, the more so the larger the announced order.
This study aims to determine whether the application of Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) as a specialized execution overlay can enhance pair trading in highly volatile cryptocurrency markets. Although classical implementations of the strategy have proven successful in traditional equities, they frequently exhibit rigidity and suffer from severe divergence risks when applied to high-variance environments. To address this need, this research introduces novel concepts. To construct a robust system, we developed a hierarchical "Filter-then-Rank" pair selection methodology and a proprietary "Fixed Risk, Adaptive Mean" execution model. The system employs a Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) agent with a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) layer to govern execution decisions within strict deterministic risk management boundaries. Evaluated on 1-hour interval data from the Binance USD-M Futures market, the optimized RL policy achieved an out-of-sample performance that substantially outperformed the heuristic baseline. A stationary circular block bootstrap robustness check confirms that the agent's risk-adjusted outperformance is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Although falling marginally short of the stricter 5 percent threshold, this result highlights the extreme idiosyncratic variance characteristic of digital assets. Ultimately, this thesis contributes to the quantitative finance literature by introducing a hybrid architecture that combines statistical arbitrage with DRL execution policies. Furthermore, it delivers a novel framework for safe reinforcement learning via deterministic shielding, proving that anchoring a neural policy to statistically robust boundaries successfully mitigates severe divergence risks.
We introduce the Polymarket-v1 Database: the complete on-chain trade archive of Polymarket's first-generation CTF Exchange on Polygon, spanning 2022-11-21 to 2026-04-28 and covering the full contract lifecycle from first settlement to natural termination. The dataset comprises 1.20 billion trade records across 1.30 million markets with $61 billion in nominal volume. Its defining feature is 100% ground-truth aggressor direction derived from the blockchain settlement layer, a property unavailable in existing prediction market archives, which rely on heuristic inference. We use this truth-aligned archive to benchmark standard microstructure tools and document three findings. First, the tick rule and bulk volume classification achieve near-random aggregate accuracy (49.83% and 50.51%), but this masks a systematic, correctable price-level gradient driven by positive trade direction autocorrelation and concentrated market-making -- two structural features of prediction markets that violate the mean-reversion assumption embedded in classical classifiers. Second, these classification errors propagate into downstream metrics: inferred VPIN diverges substantially from ground-truth VPIN, and OFI estimates are directionally biased, with material consequences for Transaction Cost Analysis. Third, ground-truth microstructure quality predicts forecasting performance in ways that classification-based proxies cannot recover: True VPIN positively predicts Brier scores, while Gibbs spread negatively predicts them -- a selection effect reflecting that high-spread niche markets attract informed specialists rather than noise traders. Replacing ground-truth metrics with classified proxies attenuates both relationships, illustrating that measurement accuracy at the transaction level is a prerequisite for reliable inference about prediction market design and probability calibration.
This paper analyzes transaction fees on blockchains by considering that they form a priority queue and users play a queueing game. Using an M/G^K/1 priority queue model, we provide new insights into the dynamics governing transaction fees and their impact on user behavior. We derive semi-closed form expressions for steady-state quantities and extend the relationship between user delay costs and transaction fees to general block generation times. We apply the model to the Bitcoin network and simulate user responses under various scenarios. Cross-chain analysis across Bitcoin, Dogecoin, and Litecoin reveals similarities in normalized cost structures.
Cryptocurrencies are increasingly adopted as investment assets, making their interactions with traditional financial markets central to cross-asset diversification and systemic risk. This paper studies the integration of cryptocurrencies, fiat currencies, and S&P500 equities using a balanced panel of 381 assets from October 2017 to February 2024. We combine rolling correlation networks, community structure, market-specific and system-wide Turbulence Indices, and VAR-based connectedness analysis to examine how market stress, network structure, and shock transmission vary across financial regimes. The results show that cross-asset integration is episodic. In calm periods, the three asset classes remain relatively segmented, whereas under stress, local clustering increases, modular separation weakens, and communities become more compositionally mixed across asset classes. Connectedness analysis further shows that regime shifts alter the structure of transmission rather than simply increasing spillover magnitudes. In high-turbulence states, fiat-market turbulence becomes the dominant propagation channel, while network clustering and modularity play a greater role in transmitting forecast uncertainty. These findings support the interpretation of network structure as an emergent, state-dependent transmission layer rather than a persistent exogenous driver of turbulence. The results highlight the need for regime-aware risk monitoring, since full-sample connectedness estimates can understate the cross-asset coupling that emerges precisely when diversification benefits are most fragile.
Yurii Kvasiuk, Tianyi Li, Owen Colegrove, Moritz Münchmeyer
We explore the application of LLM-driven algorithm optimization to several common tasks in quantitative finance. MadEvolve, a general-purpose algorithm optimization framework inspired by DeepMind's Alpha-Evolve, was recently developed to optimize algorithms in computational cosmology. Here we demonstrate the utility of MadEvolve to optimize algorithmic trading strategies and alpha generation at the example of Bitcoin trading. On our simulation and backtesting setup, we achieve significant improvements on all tasks we considered, such as evolving feature sets for signal generation, optimizing separate components of the trading strategy, and jointly evolving the feature pipeline together with the execution strategy. Additionally, we compare our method to other agentic search approaches, specifically Claude Code, and carefully evaluate p-hacking probabilities on our simulation setup. Our findings strongly support the utility of AI-driven agentic and evolutionary algorithms for algorithmic trading and quantitative finance.
Aleksei Adadurov, Sergey Barseghyan, Anton Chtepine, Antero Eloranta · 6 authors
Ethereum block builders run sealed auctions among searchers, but nothing in the protocol forces a builder to honor the auction outcome after observing submitted bundles. This paper studies the commitment problem. We model a builder who defects with probability $\varepsilon$ and, upon defection, replicates a type-specific fraction $γ(τ)$ of the winning MEV opportunity. Searchers anticipate this behavior and choose between a risky first-price bid and a safe deterrence bid that makes frontrunning unprofitable. The resulting equilibrium is piecewise, with the cost of imperfect commitment depending jointly on replicability and competition. Using the libMEV dataset, we estimate $γ(τ)$ from right-tail bribe plateaus and decompose observed auction revenue against the surplus a defecting builder could capture. The results show sharp heterogeneity across MEV types: sandwich opportunities are already highly competitive, while naked arbitrage and liquidations leave substantially more surplus exposed to builder defection. Credible MEV auctions, therefore, require not only an auction format, but also constraints on the builder's ability to use observed bid and payload information ex post.
This paper investigates whether machine learning forecasts of hourly BTC-USDT returns can be converted into economically meaningful trading performance after transaction costs. Using approximately 70,000 hourly observations from 2018-2026, XGBoost, LSTM, and iTransformer are evaluated in a 27-fold walk-forward protocol. All three models produce positive gross trading performance in selected configurations, but naive sign-based strategies fail once transaction costs of ten basis points are imposed. A cost-aware execution filter, which prevents trades only when the forecast magnitude exceeds a transaction-cost-based threshold, sharply reduces turnover and restores profitability in selected configurations. The strongest long-only XGBoost strategy produces annualised returns above 65% with a Sharpe ratio above one. Additional tests show that technical indicators improve performance in selected cases, EGARCH-derived features do not provide uniformly robust gains, and XGBoost is descriptively stronger than the neural alternatives, although bootstrap evidence does not support formal statistical dominance. Loss-function and model-selection effects are secondary and statistically fragile. The results show that the main obstacle in hourly cryptocurrency trading is not only weak predictability, but also the way forecasts are converted into trades.
This paper develops a model to evaluate the viability of blockchain markets as the sole venue for price formation. Blockchains clear at discrete intervals called block time, and transactions are executed sequentially according to priority fees paid by traders who compete for queue position. We show that these features undermine the viability of markets. Paid-priority ordering induces endogenous selection, where only traders with sufficiently high valuations participate. The participation cutoff rises with competition, which intensifies with lower information costs or higher liquidity demand. This hinders price discovery and biases prices. It also impairs liquidity: the cutoff concentrates trading among aggressive traders and increases adverse selection that liquidity suppliers absorb in a single clearing round. Although longer block times enhance consensus security, they amplify these effects and can cause markets to shut down.
Privacy-preserving cryptocurrency exchanges alter what the pricing mechanism observes about order flow. We derive the unique linear Kyle equilibrium when a committed Bayesian market maker observes order flow perturbed by independent Gaussian privacy noise. The price-impact coefficient and informed-trader strategy rescale by reciprocal factors of the privacy parameter (one down, one up), so their product is invariant. A welfare decomposition then identifies a closed-form per-period transfer from the protocol's LP pool to traders -- the "privacy subsidy", the break-even fee any privacy-aggregated exchange must charge. The result is the single-period closed-form privacy-noise analog of Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (Milionis et al. 2022). The primary application is shielded AMMs with explicit additive-noise injection (e.g., differential privacy); related designs (batched swaps, sealed-bid auctions, oracle-pegged crossings) require separate frameworks that we leave to future work.
We study permissionless spot--perpetual basis trading in decentralized finance as a collateral control problem. The strategy holds spot inventory, hedges directional exposure with a short perpetual, and allocates capital between spot inventory and derivative margin under on-chain liquidity and execution frictions. The paper delivers three results. First, it solves a static control problem for the collateral share and shows that the risk-constrained formulation provides a more robust operating benchmark relative to the economic optimum. In comparative calibration, the required collateral rises monotonically under volatility stress. The collateral is the lowest for BTC and increases significantly for long tail assets such as LINK and DOGE. Second, the paper derives an asymmetric dynamic extension in which the lower boundary of intervention is solvency driven, and the upper boundary is determined by a trade-off between carry-loss and the cost of rebalancing. Monte Carlo simulation shows that the lower boundary remains structurally relevant, whereas meaningful interior upper triggers survive mainly in the regimes with high carry and low costs. Third, the paper validates an execution-aware implementation with live routed execution and historical backtests. The execution layer shows that the realized wedges are significant, but become worse in the case of selling the basis. This justifies a minimum effective rebalancing size and a positive execution buffer. The historical validation shows that in the case of a fixed control rule the realized performance is predominantly explained by the funding environment.
LLM agents are promising tools for empirical discovery, but their flexibility can also turn discovery into uncontrolled search. We study how to use agents under a reproducible protocol through cryptocurrency factor discovery. Our framework casts the task as sequential hypothesis search: an agent reads an append-only experiment trace, proposes falsifiable factor hypotheses, and maps them to executable recipes, while a deterministic engine enforces fixed data splits, selection gates, transaction costs, and portfolio tests. Candidate actions are restricted to a point-in-time factor DSL, making both successful and failed hypotheses auditable. A ridge-combined portfolio trained only on 2020--2022 data achieves a 44.55% annualized return and Sharpe ratio of 1.55 in the 2024--2026 pure out-of-sample period after a 5 basis point one-way trading cost.
Ethereum's EIP-1559 fee mechanism was designed under the assumption of homogeneous, myopic agents responding to a single congestion signal. We examine how this assumption interacts with the heterogeneous demand structure of real-world Ethereum users. Analyzing 62,142 confirmed transactions from seven operational firms across seven industries (January--March 2026), we document significant intraday gas-fee variation: fees peak at hour~12 UTC (7\,AM ET, $\hatβ_{12}=\$0.054$ above the U.S.\ evening baseline, $p<0.001$) and are associated with periods of elevated speculative-arbitrage activity. Operational firms exhibit heterogeneous scheduling responses moderated by transaction deferrability and gas intensity. Residual cost floors, i.e. the gap between observed expenditure and the counterfactual under perfect off-peak scheduling, range from 40.7\% to 92.5\% of actual expenditure, and persist even during the lowest-cost hours ($h\in\{20,21,22,23\}$ UTC, 3--6\,PM ET). We introduce an On-Chain Scheduling Matrix that maps firms to four scheduling regimes as a practical framework for managing gas-fee exposure under the current mechanism.
Transfer-based anti-money laundering (AML) systems monitor token flows through transaction-graph abstractions, implicitly assuming that economically meaningful value migration is sufficiently encoded in transfer-layer connectivity. In this paper, we demonstrate that this assumption, the bedrock of current industrial forensics, fundamentally collapses in composable smart-contract ecosystems. We formalize two structural mechanisms that undermine the completeness of transfer-layer attribution. First, we introduce Principal-Execution-Beneficiary (PEB) separation, where intent originators, transaction executors (e.g., MEV searchers), and ultimate beneficiaries are functionally decoupled. Second, we formalize state-mediated value migration, where economic coupling is enforced through invariant-driven contract state transitions (e.g., AMM reserve rebalancing) rather than explicit transfer continuity. Through a real-world case study of role-separated limit order execution and a constructive cross-pool arbitrage model, we prove that these mechanisms render transfer-layer observation neither attribution-complete nor causally closed. We further argue that simply expanding transfer-layer tracing capabilities fails to resolve the underlying attribution ambiguity inherent in structurally decoupled execution. Under modular composition and open participation markets, these mechanisms are structurally generative, implying that heuristic-based flow tracing has reached a formal observational boundary. We advocate for a paradigm shift toward AML based on execution semantics, focusing on the restitution of economic causality from atomic execution logic and state invariants rather than static graph connectivity.