This work complements our previous paper, which studies borrower-side strategies in decentralized lending markets, by focusing on lender-side capital allocation. We consider a lender who seeks to allocate a fixed budget across multiple markets sharing the same supplied asset. Accounting for the impact of supplied capital on lending rates, we derive closed-form solutions under three interest-rate models: linear, kinked, and adaptive (Morpho's AdaptiveCurveIRM). Backtests are conducted first on USDC and then on WETH Morpho lending markets on Ethereum. We also show that, under the kinked rate model, an allocation that brings a market exactly to the kink is never optimal on the lender side, whereas it can be optimal on the borrower side. This asymmetry may create tension between lenders and borrowers around the kink and thereby exacerbate rate volatility.
Cryptocurrency exchange-traded products (ETPs) listed on European exchanges provide a regulated environment for studying intraday market anomalies. We study four Bitcoin and Ethereum ETPs traded on Xetra and Nasdaq Stockholm over the period January 2024 - December 2025 using one-minute bars. As a benchmark, we adopt an extreme value theory approach in which anomalous bars are defined as returns falling below a threshold estimated by fitting a generalised Pareto distribution to left-tail exceedances. We then propose three new binary anomaly indicators. The first, a cross-venue divergence anomaly, identifies venue-specific price divergence between the two exchanges. The second is a no-recovery anomaly that identifies extreme price drops followed by little or no recovery over the next ten active bars. The third is a momentum-reversal anomaly that identifies extreme price drops following positive short-term momentum. Although each anomaly type represents fewer than 1% of one-minute bars, statistical analysis using Mann-Whitney U tests shows that anomaly observations exhibit significantly higher effective spreads, higher values of liquidity-related ratios, and more pronounced order-flow imbalances than non-anomalous bars. Furthermore, employing an out-of-sample prediction methodology with four classifiers - random forest, logistic regression, extreme gradient boosting, and light gradient boosting machine - shows that all four anomaly types are predictable one bar ahead, with AUC-ROC values of up to 0.82. Permutation importance indicates that short-term volatility and drawdown measures are generally more useful for prediction than microstructure variables.
In this paper, we develop an open-economy macroeconomic model of a Proof-of-Stake network to analyze nominal token-price dynamics and the systemic effects of speculative capital. We first consider a network populated solely by active utility users, who finance network activity through a steady exogenous inflow of fiat currency. We prove the existence of a unique, globally asymptotically stable steady-state equilibrium with a well-defined nominal token price and derive a closed-form expression for the network's relaxation time. Calibrating the model using parameters representative of the current Ethereum network, we estimate a relaxation half-life of approximately 46 years. This extreme macroeconomic inertia implies that the token price may remain persistently displaced from its evolving steady-state benchmark, producing sustained price overshooting as the network adjusts to changing fundamentals. We then introduce an Investor class to examine the effects of passive and active speculative capital. We show that passive institutional staking compresses the native staking yield and creates a structural imbalance that systematically raises the nominal token price while shifting consensus ownership away from active utility users. Active speculative capital has a qualitatively different effect. In response to capital shocks, the Consumer class's rigid preference for fiat-denominated consumption generates an endogenous constant-value strategy. This mechanism shifts staked-token ownership from the Investor class toward active utility users, with potentially favorable implications for consensus decentralization.
This paper presents an open-economy macroeconomic equilibrium model for Proof-of-Stake (PoS) networks with fee-burn mechanics (EIP-1559) that formalizes the strategic interplay between a Kelly-optimizing rational institutional investor and a utility-driven retail consumer. We analyze network dynamics across two behavioral regimes. In The Unbounded Accumulation Model, the consumer purely accumulates tokens, creating an exclusive buy-side pressure that interacts with institutional portfolio rebalancing to fuel an ever-expanding speculative bubble and generate compounding excess returns for investors. Conversely, in The Utility-Consumption Model, the consumer dynamically buys and sells tokens to balance crypto wealth against real-world fiat consumption. Within this framework, we derive an explicit steady-state equilibrium price for ETH, demonstrating how token valuation anchors to a stable fundamental baseline that scales directly with network adoption while completely dissolving the institutional yield premium. Our numerical simulations show that while exogenous traditional finance (TradFi) shocks propagate through portfolio rebalancing to drive high token price volatility, network inflation remains highly stable. Furthermore, we prove that network security is insulated from institutional monopoly by counter-cyclical consumer behavior. Our findings reveal that institutional excess wealth creation in PoS ecosystems is not native to the staking protocol itself, but is strictly driven by the leveraged extraction of the retail consumer's continuous demand for transactional utility.
Financial options are fundamental to traditional markets, enabling strategies ranging from hedging to speculating. Yet, while the Automated Market Maker paradigm has revolutionized decentralized spot markets, no equivalent standard has emerged for on-chain options. Typical designs attempt to replicate centralized exchange mechanics, requiring high-frequency oracles and robust liquidation engines which may fail during stress events. This paper presents a design for amortizing perpetual options tailored to the operational and adversarial constraints of blockchain environments. Leveraging this primitive, we introduce a decentralized market framework with minimal consistency requirements. We demonstrate that this contract functions as a foundational risk primitive for DeFi, enabling applications such as endogenous collateralization and explicitly priced de-peg insurance, thereby showing that this design provides a layer for mutualizing tail risk across protocols without reliance on centralized clearing institutions.
We derive five tractable credit risk metrics for DeFi lending vault depositors, grounded in a formal three level decomposition of vault risk into mechanical loss channels (Level 1), governance quality (Level 2) and smart contract code integrity (Level 3). For Level 1, we show that six structural features of onchain execution (oracle execution divergence, endogenous recovery, full information run dynamics, timelock constrained governance, oracle manipulation and congestion driven liquidation failure) break canonical TradFi analogies and generate depositor loss channels absent from standard credit frameworks. Vault credit risk metrics translate these channels into measurable risk components which are aggregated into a vault credit score. The empirical contribution is an implementable estimation architecture for credit risk metrics, including required onchain data, identification strategies for core parameters, partial identification bounds and a coherent stress scenario methodology. The results have direct implications for vault risk management and for minimum transparency standards necessary for depositor risk assessment.
Steven Campbell, Natascha Hey, Ciamac C. Moallemi, Marcel Nutz
Auto-deleveraging (ADL) mechanisms are a critical yet understudied component of risk management on cryptocurrency futures exchanges. When available margin and other loss-absorbing resources are insufficient to cover losses following large price moves, exchanges reduce positions and socialize losses among solvent participants via rule-based ADL protocols. We formulate ADL as an optimization problem that minimizes the exchange's risk of loss arising from future equity shortfalls. In a single-asset, isolated-margin setting, the \emph{minimax leverage} policy -- minimizing the maximum leverage among participants -- is optimal for all monotone risk measures. This policy has a transparent structure: positions are reduced first for the most highly levered accounts, and leverage is progressively equalized via a water-filling (or ``leverage-draining'') rule. The policy is distribution-free, wash-trade resistant, Sybil resistant, and path-independent. It provides a canonical and implementable benchmark for ADL design and clarifies the economic logic underlying queue-based mechanisms used in practice. We further study the multi-asset, cross-margin setting, where the ADL problem becomes genuinely multi-dimensional: the exchange must allocate reductions across accounts with portfolios exposed to correlated price moves. Under the expected loss objective, asset-level shadow prices separate the problem across accounts, yielding a scalable numerical method. Naive gross leverage misleads here, ignoring within-portfolio hedging. When prices are driven by a single risk factor, the optimal policy is again water-filling, but in a factor-adjusted leverage, so better-hedged portfolios are deleveraged less. We apply the framework to the October~10, 2025 Hyperliquid ADL event. Relative to the exchange's realized allocation, our risk-minimizing allocations achieve lower expected shortfall.
Liquidation of collateral are the primary safeguard for solvency of lending protocols in decentralized finance. However, the mechanics of liquidations expose these protocols to predatory price manipulations and other forms of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). In this paper, we characterize the optimal liquidation strategy, via a dynamic program, from the perspective of a profit-maximizing liquidator when the spot oracle is given by a Constant Product Market Maker (CPMM). We explicitly model Oracle Extractable Value (OEV) where liquidators manipulate the CPMM with sandwich attacks to trigger profitable liquidation events. We derive closed-form liquidation bounds and prove that CPMM transaction fees act as a critical security parameter. Crucially, we demonstrate that fees do not merely reduce attacker profits, but can make such manipulations unprofitable for an attacker. Our findings suggest that CPMM transaction fees serve a dual purpose: compensating liquidity providers and endogenously hardening CPMM oracles against manipulation without the latency of time-weighted averages or medianization.
We develop a mathematical framework to optimize leveraged staking ("loopy") strategies in Decentralized Finance (DeFi), in which a staked asset is supplied as collateral, the underlying is borrowed and re-staked, and the loop can be repeated across multiple lending markets. Exploiting the fact that DeFi borrow rates are deterministic functions of pool utilization, we reduce the multi-market problem to a convex allocation over market exposures and obtain closed-form solutions under three interest-rate models: linear, kinked, and adaptive (Morpho's AdaptiveCurveIRM). The framework incorporates market-specific leverage limits, utilization-dependent borrowing costs, and transaction fees. Backtests on the Ethereum and Base blockchains using the largest Morpho wstETH/WETH markets (from January 1 to April 1, 2025) show that rebalanced leveraged positions can reach up to 6.2% APY versus 3.1% for unleveraged staking, with strong dependence on position size and rebalancing frequency. Our results provide a mathematical basis for transparent, automated DeFi portfolio optimization.
This study introduces a novel approach to walk-forward optimization by parameterizing the lengths of training and testing windows. We demonstrate that the performance of a trading strategy using the Exponential Moving Average (EMA) evaluated within a walk-forward procedure based on the Robust Sharpe Ratio is highly dependent on the chosen window size. We investigated the strategy on intraday Bitcoin data at six frequencies (1 minute to 60 minutes) using 81 combinations of walk-forward window lengths (1 day to 28 days) over a 19-month training period. The two best-performing parameter sets from the training data were applied to a 21-month out-of-sample testing period to ensure data independence. The strategy was only executed once during the testing period. To further validate the framework, strategy parameters estimated on Bitcoin were applied to Binance Coin and Ethereum. Our results suggest the robustness of our custom approach. In the training period for Bitcoin, all combinations of walk-forward windows outperformed a Buy-and-Hold strategy. During the testing period, the strategy performed similarly to Buy-and-Hold but with lower drawdown and a higher Information Ratio. Similar results were observed for Binance Coin and Ethereum. The real strength was demonstrated when a portfolio combining Buy-and-Hold with our strategies outperformed all individual strategies and Buy-and-Hold alone, achieving the highest overall performance and a 50 percent reduction in drawdown. A conservative fee of 0.1 percent per transaction was included in all calculations. A cost sensitivity analysis was performed as a sanity check, revealing that the strategy's break-even point was around 0.4 percent per transaction. This research highlights the importance of optimizing walk-forward window lengths and emphasizing the value of single-time out-of-sample testing for reliable strategy evaluation.
We formulate and solve stochastic control problems that model the core yield-generating strategy of the Ethena protocol, a decentralized finance (DeFi) stablecoin that earns yield by combining a long position in staked Ethereum (stETH) with an equal-sized short position in ETH perpetual futures. The combined position is delta-neutral with respect to the ETH spot price, yet earns carry from two sources: staking rewards on the stETH leg, and funding-rate payments received from long perpetual holders when the perpetual trades at a premium to spot. A key feature of our model is that the control -- the rate of simultaneously buying stETH and shorting the perpetual -- exerts two distinct types of price impact. \textit{Permanent} impact shifts the mid-market prices of both legs, compressing the basis and permanently eroding future funding income. \textit{Temporary} impact reflects execution slippage on each leg. We study both an infinite-horizon discounted problem and a finite-horizon problem in which the protocol maximizes total wealth up to a fixed date $T$, subject to a terminal cost for liquidating any remaining position. In both cases the optimal control is obtained explicitly.
Marco Dessalvi, Massimo Bartoletti, Alberto Lluch-Lafuente
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has revolutionized financial markets by enabling complex asset-exchange protocols without trusted intermediaries. Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are a central component of DeFi, providing the core functionality of swapping assets of different types at algorithmically computed exchange rates. Several mainstream AMM implementations are based on the constant-product model, which ensures that swaps preserve the product of the token reserves in the AMM - up to a trading fee used to incentivize liquidity provision. Trading fees substantially complicate the economic properties of AMMs, and for this reason some AMM models abstract them away in order to simplify the analysis. However, trading fees have a non-trivial impact on users' trading strategies, making it crucial to develop refined AMM models that precisely account for their effects. In this work, we extend a foundational model of AMMs by introducing a new parameter, the trading fee ϕ ∈ (0,1], into the swap rate function. Fee amounts increase inversely proportional to ϕ. When ϕ = 1, no fee is applied and the original model is recovered. We analyze the resulting fee-adjusted model from an economic perspective. We show that several key properties of the swap rate function, including output-boundedness and monotonicity, are preserved. At the same time, other properties - most notably additivity - no longer hold. We precisely characterize this deviation by deriving a generalized form of additivity that captures the effect of swaps in the presence of trading fees. In particular, we prove that when ϕ < 1, executing a single large swap yields strictly greater profit than splitting the trade into smaller ones. Finally, we derive a closed-form solution to the arbitrage problem in the presence of trading fees and prove its uniqueness. All results are formalized and machine-checked in the Lean 4 proof assistant.
We consider the interaction between centralized trading and decentralized Proof of Stake (PoS) blockchain ecosystems. Motivated by the increasing dominance of centralized exchanges and the institutionalization of crypto markets, we study how trading activities on centralized exchanges affect staking behavior, token allocation, and decentralization within a PoS blockchain. We formulate a continuous-time mean field model, where the miners simultaneously act as validators in the PoS protocol and traders in a centralized market with price impact. Under suitable assumptions, we establish the local well-posedness of the mean field system, and derive a semi-explicit characterization of the equilibrium trading strategy. Numerical results suggest that centralized trading activities may enhance staking participation, and promote decentralization of the staking distribution through market incentives. We also study the effects of transaction costs and token supply mechanisms on the equilibrium staking ratio and concentration profile. These results illustrate how market microstructure and centralized liquidity provision can exert significant influence on decentralized blockchain protocols.
Concentrated-liquidity automated market makers (CLAMMs), as exemplified by Uniswap v3, are now a common primitive in decentralized finance frameworks. Their design combines continuous trading on constant-function curves with discrete tick boundaries at which liquidity positions change and rounding effects accumulate. While there is a body of economic and game-theoretic analysis of CLAMMs, there is negligible work that treats Uniswap v3 at the level of formal state machines amenable to model checking or theorem proving. In this paper we propose a formal modeling approach for Uniswap v3-style CLAMMs using (i) networks of priced timed automata (PTA), and (ii) finite-state transducers (FST) over discrete ticks. Positions are treated as stateful objects that transition only when the pool price crosses the ticks that bound their active range. We show how to encode the piecewise constant-product invariant, fee-growth variables, and tick-crossing rules in a PTA suitable for tools such as UPPAAL, and how to derive a tick-level FST abstraction for specification in TLA+. We define an explicit tick-wise invariant for a discretized, single-tick CLAMM model and prove that it is preserved up to a tight additive rounding bound under fee-free swaps. This provides a formal justification for the "$ε$-slack" used in invariance properties and shows how rounding enters as a controlled perturbation. We then instantiate these models in TLA+ and use TLC to exhaustively check the resulting invariants on structurally faithful instances, including a three-tick concentrated-liquidity configuration and a bounded no-rounding-only-arbitrage property in a bidirectional single-tick model. We discuss how these constructions lift to the tick-wise structure of Uniswap v3 via virtual reserves, and how the resulting properties can be phrased as PTA/TLA+ invariants about cross-tick behaviour and rounding safety.
This paper presents an option pricing model that incorporates clustered jumps using a bivariate Hawkes process. The process captures both self- and cross-excitation of positive and negative jumps, enabling the model to generate return dynamics with asymmetric, time-varying skewness and to produce positive or negative implied volatility skews. This feature is especially relevant for assets such as cryptocurrencies, so-called ``meme'' stocks, G-7 currencies, and certain commodities, where implied volatility skews may change sign depending on prevailing sentiment. We introduce two additional parameters, namely the positive and negative jump premia, to model the market risk preferences for positive and negative jumps, inferred from options data. This enables the model to flexibly match observed skew dynamics. Using Bitcoin (BTC) options, we empirically demonstrate how inferred jump risk premia exhibit predictive power for both the cost of carry in BTC futures and the performance of delta-hedged option strategies.
The programmable and composable nature of smart contract protocols has enabled the emergence of novel market structures and asset classes that are architecturally frictional to implement in traditional financial paradigms. This fluidity has produced an understudied class of market dynamics, particularly in coupled markets where one market serves as an oracle for the other. In such market structures, purchases or liquidations through the intermediate asset create coupled price action between the intermediate and final assets; leading to basket inflation or deflation when denominated in the riskless asset. This paper examines the microstructure of this inflationary dynamic given two constant function market makers (CFMMs) as the intermediate market structures; attempting to quantify their contributions to the former relative to familiar pool metrics such as price drift, trade size, and market depth. Further, a concrete case study is developed, where both markets are constant product markets. The intention is to shed light on the market design process within such coupled environments.
An automated market maker (AMM) provides a method for creating a decentralized exchange on the blockchain. For this purpose, individual investors lend liquidity to the AMM pool in exchange for a stream of fees earned from its operations as a market maker. Within this work, we reinterpret the loss-versus-rebalancing as the implied fee stream generated by an AMM so that a risk-neutral investor is indifferent in the decision of providing liquidity. With this implied fee structure, we propose a novel fixed-for-floating swap on the fees generated by an AMM in order to quote the implied volatilities and implied correlations of digital assets. We apply this theory to realized fees in different markets to empirically validate the relevance of the deduced fee-based volatility.
We introduce a novel rough Bergomi (rBergomi) model featuring a variance-driven exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) time-dependent Hurst parameter $H_t$, fundamentally distinct from recent machine learning and wavelet-based approaches in the literature. Our framework pioneers a unified rough differential equation (RDE) formulation grounded in rough path theory, where the Hurst parameter dynamically adapts to evolving volatility regimes through a continuous EWMA mechanism tied to instantaneous variance. Unlike discrete model-switching or computationally intensive forecasting methods, our approach provides mathematical tractability while capturing volatility clustering and roughness bursts. We rigorously establish existence and uniqueness of solutions via rough path theory and derive martingale properties. Empirical validation on diverse asset classes including equities, cryptocurrencies, and commodities demonstrates superior performance in capturing dynamics and out-of-sample pricing accuracy. Our results show significant improvements over traditional constant-Hurst models.
Accurate volatility forecasts are vital in modern finance for risk management, portfolio allocation, and strategic decision-making. However, existing methods face key limitations. Fully multivariate models, while comprehensive, are computationally infeasible for realistic portfolios. Factor models, though efficient, primarily use static factor loadings, failing to capture evolving volatility co-movements when they are most critical. To address these limitations, we propose a novel, model-agnostic Factor-Augmented Volatility Forecast framework. Our approach employs a time-varying factor model to extract a compact set of dynamic, cross-sectional factors from realized volatilities with minimal computational cost. These factors are then integrated into both statistical and AI-based forecasting models, enabling a unified system that jointly models asset-specific dynamics and evolving market-wide co-movements. Our framework demonstrates strong performance across two prominent asset classes-large-cap U.S. technology equities and major cryptocurrencies-over both short-term (1-day) and medium-term (7-day) horizons. Using a suite of linear and non-linear AI-driven models, we consistently observe substantial improvements in predictive accuracy and economic value. Notably, a practical pairs-trading strategy built on our forecasts delivers superior risk-adjusted returns and profitability, particularly under adverse market conditions.
This paper examines whether Bitcoin realized volatility admits a measurable pathwise roughness index and how stable that estimate is across time and measurement designs. Using one-minute BTC/USD close prices from Bitstamp between 2017 and 2024, realized-volatility paths are constructed at 1-, 5-, 10-, and 15-minute frequencies and evaluated with the model-free normalized p-variation estimator of Cont and Das (2024). A unique root is obtained in 341 of 380 rolling 90-day window-frequency configurations, or 89.7 percent, and in 113 of 128 non-overlapping configurations, or 88.3 percent. Conditional rolling medians of the roughness estimate are 0.054, 0.065, 0.086, and 0.080 at the four respective frequencies, and all finite estimates from the temporal, window-length, and jump-robust analyses are below 1/2. Root availability and estimate magnitude nevertheless vary across periods and measurement procedures. Truncation affects root availability primarily at one minute, while bipower variation yields a unique root in 20 of 24 eligible fixed-window configurations. In the eight five-minute fixed-window samples, comparisons with iterative amplitude-adjusted Fourier transform surrogates identify excess MF-DFA width in three samples and excess log-moment curvature in one. Bitcoin realized volatility therefore generally admits a low pathwise roughness estimate, but that estimate is not invariant to time or measurement design. The results concern observed realized volatility and do not directly identify the roughness of latent spot volatility.
The cryptocurrency options market is notable for its high volatility and lower liquidity compared to traditional markets. These characteristics introduce significant challenges to traditional option pricing methodologies. Addressing these complexities requires advanced models that can effectively capture the dynamics of the market. We explore which option pricing models are most effective in valuing cryptocurrency options. Specifically, we calibrate and evaluate the performance of the Black-Scholes, Merton Jump Diffusion, Variance Gamma, Kou, Heston, and Bates models. Our analysis focuses on pricing vanilla options on futures contracts for Bitcoin (BTC) and Ether (ETH). We find that the Black-Scholes model exhibits the highest pricing errors. In contrast, the Kou and Bates models achieve the lowest errors, with the Kou model performing the best for the BTC options and the Bates model for ETH options. The results highlight the importance of incorporating jumps and stochastic volatility into pricing models to better reflect the behavior of these assets.
In cryptocurrency markets, a key challenge for perpetual future issuers is maintaining alignment between the perpetual future price and target value. This study addresses this challenge by exploring the relationship between funding rates and perpetual future prices. Our results demonstrate that by appropriately designing funding rates, the perpetual future price can remain aligned with the target value. We develop replicating portfolios for perpetual futures, offering issuers an effective method to hedge their positions. Additionally, we provide path-dependent funding rates as a practical alternative and investigate the difference between the original and path-dependent funding rates. To achieve these results, our study employs path-dependent infinite-horizon BSDEs in conjunction with arbitrage pricing theory. Our main results are obtained by establishing the existence and uniqueness of solutions to these BSDEs and analyzing the large-time behavior of these solutions.
Hardhik Mohanty, Giovanni Zaarour, Bhaskar Krishnamachari
Everlasting options, a relatively new class of perpetual financial derivatives, have emerged to tackle the challenges of rolling contracts and liquidity fragmentation in decentralized finance markets. This paper offers an in-depth analysis of markets for everlasting options, modeled using a dynamic proactive market maker. We examine the behavior of funding fees and transaction costs across varying liquidity conditions. Using simulations and modeling, we demonstrate that liquidity providers can aim to achieve a net positive PnL by employing effective hedging strategies, even in challenging environments characterized by low liquidity and high transaction costs. Additionally, we provide insights into the incentives that drive liquidity providers to support the growth of everlasting option markets and highlight the significant benefits these instruments offer to traders as a reliable and efficient financial tool.
Andrey Urusov, Rostislav Berezovskiy, Anatoly Krestenko, А. А. Корнилов · 5 authors
Concentrated Liquidity Market Makers (CLMMs) represent a fundamental innovation in market microstructure, transforming liquidity provision from passive portfolio allocation to active risk management. This evolution creates significant challenges for performance evaluation and strategy optimization, particularly due to the absence of comprehensive historical liquidity data. We address these challenges through a novel methodological framework that reconstructs historical liquidity states from swap transaction data, enabling rigorous backtesting of dynamic liquidity provision strategies. Our parametric reconstruction method achieves high accuracy (approximation errors averaging around 2\%) without relying on historical liquidity snapshots, addressing a critical data gap in decentralized finance research. We apply this framework to evaluate tau-reset strategies--dynamic liquidity reallocation approaches that respond to market movements--across multiple Uniswap v3 pools. Using machine learning to optimize strategy parameters based on market conditions, we identify consistent outperformance (13--23\% higher fees) compared to uniform allocation benchmarks. Our analysis reveals important insights into the risk-return tradeoffs in automated market making, including the critical role of impermanent loss as a dominant risk factor and the effectiveness of asymmetric strategy modifications for capital preservation. These findings contribute to the broader understanding of market microstructure in decentralized exchanges, providing both methodological innovations for performance evaluation and practical insights for liquidity providers navigating this evolving financial landscape.