Blockchain Papers

Thomas K. Birrer, Dennis Amstutz, Patrick Wenger

No abstract is available for this record.

Paul Haynes

Georg Simmel depicts money as an evolving entity that will continue to evolve to a state of ‘perfect money’ disconnected from any external guarantor of value. This article examines some of the different approaches to substantial value underpinning money, suggesting that they represent different types of fictional underwriting. Money is then contrasted with cryptocurrency, suggesting that their respective value is not only derived from different fictions but from different standards of value as major and minor currency. This analysis suggests that far from evolving into a fully abstract and functional instrument for creating stable social relationships, the divergence in currencies and currency fictions is a force for overturning such ‘expedient’ stability.

Olga Bychkova, Artyom Kosmarski

Blockchain technologies loom large among the controversial topics of public debate. Like any technology, blockchain offers various ways to imagine alternative models of politics and society. Arguably, the most common interpretation treats it as the technology for techno-anarchism and a tool for total decentralization. This paper focuses on an overlooked genealogy of the politics of the blockchain – the classic republican theory. We consider whether republican practices could shed light on certain aspects of blockchain communities and understand their governance better. Our paper offers a historical analysis of governance visions inscribed in Bitcoin and Ethereum, arguably the most influential applications.

Katrin Becker

peer reviewed

Simon Butler

Money has been a polarising and unresolved socio-economic issue for more than 300 years. In this article, we explore how the state became increasingly involved in money and, through the words of prominent monetary theorists, identify the problem of the state in money. We analyse Bitcoin to see if it is a solution to this problem but move on to contend that the political dimension needs to be the focus of theory in the 21st century and that control of the supply of money, and the power that it gives, is the root of contention.

Alexander B. Kinney

As global economic crises place the issue of money at the forefront of media attention, a growing minority are turning to “cryptocurrencies” as an emerging digital alternative to state-issued currencies. Bitcoin, the most popular version of this emerging medium, is a useful proxy to answer a key question to the sociology of money: how do people embed themselves into an emerging money system, and what role does value play in this process? Drawing on 23 interviews with Bitcoin adopters, I find that embedding into Bitcoin is closely tied to personal experience and temporal contexts. This study demonstrates that the adoption of Bitcoin follows a distinct process. First adopters discover the value Bitcoin on their own terms. Next, they reflexively overcome challenges to these initial perceptions of value. Finally, they reaffirm their embeddedness in the system through rituals of commitment. This finding has implications for the sociology of money and economic sociology by distilling the connection between fictional expectations that are used to anchor value systems and the social construction of monetary utilities and group identities. Additionally, this connection helps to unpack how Bitcoin continues to mature as a money system despite being characterized by diverse adopters that often engage in economically inefficient activities.

Marcos Allende López

La identidad auto-gestionada propone que los individuos puedan administrar y presentar sus activos digitales utilizando billeteras digitales y que puedan compartirlos e intercambiarlos con garantías de seguridad y maximización de privacidad. En primer lugar, este modelo habilita que los individuos tengan soberanía en la administración y presentación de sus activos y credenciales digitales -como por ejemplo un pasaporte digital, un título académico, un título de propiedad, o divisas como dólares, euros, libras o pesos tokenizados- usando billeteras digitales personales y portables como por ejemplo un aplicativo móvil. En segundo lugar, elimina la necesidad de que la entidad tercera a la que se le presente un activo digital tenga que acudir directamente al emisor para comprobar su veracidad o validez, pues puede hacerlo contra un registro público y descentralizado como son las redes blockchain.

Siwittra Chainiyom, John Giordano

Georg Simmel in his book Philosophy of Money, described how money evolves through history and predicted that it will evolve to the point where it no longer relies on any substance. He called this stage “perfect money,” which he described as “money detached from every substantial value”. Today we are faced with the development of cryptocurrencies, of which Bitcoin is the best known. Bitcoin presents a new system of transaction which does not require governments or middlemen to regulate trade. Since such currencies are completely beyond substantial value, the philosophical question emerges whether Bitcoin is “perfect money.” This essay will argue that Bitcoin can be understood in connection with Simmel’s idea of “perfect money.” But will also consider Simmel’s claim that perfect money is only possible in a stable society and will show the limitations of cyrptocurrencies and Bitcoin in light of this.

Tobey Scharding

Abstract I investigate ethical questions concerning a novel cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, using a Fichtean account of the ethics of currency. Fichte holds that currencies should fulfill an ethical purpose: providing access, in perpetuity, to the material welfare that underwrites citizens' basic rights. In his nineteenth‐century context, Fichte argues that currencies fulfill this purpose better when nations control them (i.e., when they are “national currencies”) than when foreigners freely trade them (as “world currencies”). After exploring conditions in which national currencies fail to secure material stability over time, e.g., in corrupt regimes, I develop a Fichtean model for ethically evaluating currencies and evaluate the extent to which Bitcoin meets its standards for ethical currency. I argue that Bitcoin undermines the (monetary) power of nations and, as such, threatens their ability to provide access to necessary material goods. While offering citizens a means of defending themselves against corrupt regimes, Bitcoin forsakes the general welfare and is, as such, unethical by Fichtean lights.

Joel Z. Garrod

Although it is still in early stages, many commentators have been quick to note the revolutionary potential of next-generation or Bitcoin 2.0 technology. While some have expressed fear that the widespread application of these technologies may engender the rise of a Terminator-style Skynet, others believe that it represents the coming of a decentralized autonomous society (DAS) in which humans are freed from centralized forms of power through the proliferation of distributed autonomous organizations or DAOs. Influenced by neoliberal theory that stresses privatization, open markets, and deregulation, Bitcoin 2.0 technologies are implicitly working on the assumption that 'freedom' means freedom from the state. This neglects, however, that within capitalist societies, the state can also provide freedom from the vagaries of the market by protecting certain things from commodification. Through an analysis of (1) class and the role of the state; (2) the concentration and centralization of capital; and (3) the role of automation, I argue that the vision of freedom that underpins Bitcoin 2.0 tech is one that neglects the power that capital holds over us in both organizing the structure of our lives, and informing our idea of what it means to be human. In neglecting these other forms of power, I claim that the DAS might be a far more dystopian development than its supporters comprehend, making possible societies that are commodities all the way down.

Zine Magubane

ion ‘‘the nation’’ once provided (Sassen 2010:3). Besnik Pula’s essay, ‘‘Urban Planning in the Colonial Cities of Italy’s Fascist Empire’’ is one example of how to challenge ‘‘nation centered’’ ways of viewing the world. Pula demonstrates that urban planners and architects in Italy ‘‘saw in colonial empire the opportunity to demonstrate the social utility and transformative capabilities of their trade’’ (p. 390). In other words, the development of ‘‘national’’ traditions in architecture and urban planning could only be fully realized in the context of transnational engagements. The chapters that make up Part III show the extent to which ‘‘Western’’ modernity is a product of what Bhambra (2013:296) calls ‘‘the colonial global.’’ Essays on topics like ‘‘Nation and Empire in the French Context’’ and ‘‘State Formation in British Malaya and the American Philippines’’ not only explode the myth of Europe and America’s endogenous development, they also throw into question the continued efficacy of theoretical and methodological apparatuses that have, until quite recently, un-problematically accepted this notion. Daniel Goh aptly sums up exactly what is at stake for all sociologists, not just sociologists of empire, when he explains why neo-Weberians have ‘‘carefully avoided the question of colonial state formation.’’ The comparison of empires, he explains, ‘‘poses theoretical problems, since they involved a complex jostling of states, institutions, and social groups that defies the state-society framework. The comparison of colonial states also poses methodological issues, since these involved the extension of metropolitan sovereignty into colonial territories through subsidiary state [sic], thereby complicating the independence of the neo-Weberian unit of analysis’’ (p. 465). Once sociology’s ‘‘imperial entanglements’’ have been un-masked and the ‘‘Pandora’s box’’ of new analytical possibilities has been opened, the question of what this means for the discipline as a whole still remains. Do we finally abandon our quest for ‘‘grand theory’’? Should we do away with the comparative method given its theoretical and methodological utility in displacing ‘‘imperial power over the colonized into an abstract space of difference’’ (Connell 1997:1530)? The four chapters that make up Part II, Current Sociological Theories of Empire, engage specific empirical questions such as the rise of a new security empire post-9/11 (Kim Scheppele) or China’s imperial thrust into Africa (Albert Bergensen) in ways that seek to avoid the theoretical and methodological traps of previous studies. The purpose of the chapters is not to construct a singular, overarching ‘‘grand theory’’ of empire, however. The essays are more in keeping with Merton’s idea of ‘‘middle range’’ theories, which recognize that any attempt to generate sociological generalizations must account for the fact that all complex systems are also historically variable systems. Michael Mann’s essay, which asks whether the ‘‘recent intensification of American economic and military imperialism’’ are connected or not, concludes that ‘‘societies are not systems and states are not cohesive. In fact, they are both a bit of a mess, full of contradictions, muddles, mistakes.’’ This is not to deny that societies have enduring and powerful social structures. Rather, it emphasizes the fact that ‘‘these are plural, with logics that are distinct’’ (p. 243). Bergensen speculates that we ‘‘may be entering a new twenty-first-century phase of neocolonial relations that are qualitatively different from what the world system has seen before’’ (p. 300). Although he cannot say for certain whether the evidence points to definitive proof of a new economic model or a ‘‘momentary instance’’ he nevertheless maintains that China’s pursuit of economic dominance in Africa via stateowned enterprises may mean that ‘‘historical development has outrun the scope of social theory’’ (p. 311). Scheppele’s essay on the ‘‘Terrorism and the New Security Empire After 9/11’’ likewise suggests that ‘‘empires are not what they used to be’’ (p. 244). Since empires are no longer ‘‘predictably universal’’ theories of empire must also seek to synthesize different schools of thought. ‘‘As we rethink this new security empire, we need to recall not just the 16 Review Essays Contemporary Sociology 44, 1 analyses of economic globalization but the lessons learned from postcolonial studies’’ (p. 252). Sociology and Empire should be seen as an important intervention in a longstanding trend whereby sociologists have charted a new course for the future by rewriting the history of the past. As Gurminder Bhambra pointed out in her reflection on ‘‘The Possibilities of, and for, Global Sociology,’’ our only hope of being able to ‘‘understand and address the necessarily postcolonial (and decolonial) present of ‘global sociology’’’ lies in ‘‘reconstruct[ing] backwards’’ our ‘‘historical understandings of modernity and the emergence of sociology’’ (Bhambra 2013:296–297). For at least two decades sociologists have worried about their declining prestige in the academic marketplace. The questions that sociologists have been pondering relating to their ‘‘value’’ in the marketplace have now hit the social sciences and the humanities as a whole. At the same time, the world has grown ever more complex and interdependent and politicians and lay people alike ponder everything from terrorism to ‘‘post-racialism.’’ A century ago sociology emerged in the context of the ‘‘political difficulties’’ and contradictions created by the co-existence of imperialism and liberalism (Connell 1997:1530). Sociology’s theories and models of the world ‘‘offered a resolution’’ (ibid.). Today we find ourselves in a similar position. Sociology stands poised, once again, to provide a level of analysis desperately needed by policymakers and the educated public. As Steinmetz points out in his preface, ‘‘today we are confronting two crises that are often experienced as separate but are actually interwoven: ‘the crisis of the universities’ and the ‘crisis of empire’’’ (p. xiii). With the benefit of hindsight, such as provided by Parts I and III of Sociology and Empire, we can avoid making the mistakes we did in the past. The questions, problems, and theories for understanding the world today, such as provided in Part II, open up the exciting possibility that we can chart a different course for the future.

John W.P. Veugelers

Reviewed by: Max Weber’s ‘Objectivity’ Reconsidered John Veugelers (bio) Laurence H. McFalls. Max Weber’s ‘Objectivity’ Reconsidered. University of Toronto Press. viii, 390. $75.00 ‘All the analysis of infinite reality which the finite human mind can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that only a finite portion of this reality constitutes the object of scientific investigation, and that only it is “important” in the sense of being “worthy of being known.” But what are the criteria by which this segment is selected?’ These words come from ‘The “Objectivity” of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy’ by the great sociologist Max Weber. Like his better-known The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, this essay was published in 1904, when Weber became the co-editor of the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik. His practical task was to lay out the [End Page 327] standards by which the journal’s editors would judge submissions. In doing so he entered the Methodenstreit, the debate among German historians and political economists over the goals and methods of the human sciences. The advocates of a scientistic and law-seeking approach (the followers of the Manchester school) argued against those for whom the uniqueness of historical individuals and events meant that knowledge could only be particular (and certainly not valid ‘across cases’). Weber disagreed with both sides. To stake out an alternative, his essay promotes the concept of the ideal type, analyzes the relationship between knower and known, defines the realm in which values belong in social science, and elaborates upon the kind of knowledge toward which social science might legitimately aspire. In my opinion, Weber took an overly restrictive view of the possibility of arriving at non-trivial generalizations that hold under specific social and historical conditions. With its mix of discernment, depth, and passion, his essay remains riveting nonetheless, and even today we can gain much from reading it. The hundredth anniversary of the essay’s publication provided the occasion for the conference that gave birth to this edited volume. Questions its fourteen chapters address include: What does objectivity mean for Weber? How do his ideas relate to those of others (Durkheim, Mannheim, Gramsci, Parsons, Wittgenstein, Winch, Kuhn)? In his substantive research, did Weber follow his own prescriptions on method? What are the advantages or disadvantages of applying a Weberian approach to the study of European as well as non-European societies? In general the answers this volume gives to the first two questions are insightful. The opening chapter by John Drysdale argues convincingly that Weber’s essay says more about what objectivity is not than what it is. Yet Weber does cast doubt on the assumption that the knower (subject) can know anything without also holding presuppositions about the known (object). Further, we can learn what Weber means by objectivity (as well as ideal types, historical individuals, and cultural significance) when he puts these concepts to work in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. John B. Gunnell’s chapter draws on Kuhn to show that Weber’s argument that social science can provide valid knowledge rests on the implicit notion that the categories used by social scientists and those they study are different. Oddly, Gunnell does not really develop the Kuhnian insight that Weber’s portrait of how science works (in the selection of problems, methods, evidence, and rules of proof) is fixed on the practices of the individual researcher and thus quite unsociological. Just as strange in Weber’s essay is the neglect of power. Typically his sociology gives much attention to social conflict. In the essay on [End Page 328] objectivity, however, Weber argues that knowledge arrived at impartially can help policy makers to make responsible decisions. Drawing on Mannheim and Gramsci, Peter Breiner’s chapter points out practical limits to the implementation of ‘impartial knowledge’: the barriers put up by incommensurate ideologies and antagonistic political forces. Among other outstanding chapters, that by Catherine Colliot-Thélène provides an adept comparison of Weber and Durkheim (though contemporaries working to institutionalize sociology in their respective countries, apparently they never read each other’s work). And the chapter by Jeffrey Kopstein poses a riddle. Elsewhere...