Blockchain Papers

Amelia Lo, Clarie Ku

No abstract is available for this record.

Akira Matsutani

No abstract is available for this record.

S. V. Shitkov

The article is devoted to the analysis of key technological trends of the fourth industrial revolution and their impact on modern international re­ lations. Such areas of technological development as the Internet of Things and distributed ledger technologies are considered. Particular attention is paid to issues of digital sovereignty and the need for a balance between national regulation and international cooperation in the context of global digital transformation.

Gita Steiner‐Khamsi

Abstract This article discusses four significant changes in lesson drawing, policy learning, or policy borrowing. Thematically , the issue of educational expansion has preoccupied policy-makers worldwide for the past hundred years. They have been eager to learn from experiences elsewhere, initially how others decentralized the finance and management of schooling to enable universal access and later how they addressed the fallout of decentralization reforms, notably inequity and quality erosion. Regarding the modalities of policy learning, the ‘travelling observer’ has been replaced by myriad digital platforms that propagate best practices and ‘actionable’ policy recommendations. As a consequence of the decentralization of governance and finance and, in some countries, structural adjustment policies, the drivers of policy borrowing have shifted from ministries of education to a wide range of stakeholders, including ministries of finance, offices of presidents and prime ministers, and private foundations and businesses. Finally, changes in the objects of emulation or reference societies reflect a spatial reconfiguration of a special sort. Along with countries in the same geopolitical or cultural space, the education systems of league leaders in international large-scale assessments, such as Finland, Korea, and Singapore, have become objects of policy attraction for both OECD and non-OECD countries.

Matteo Bonotti, Zim Nwokora

Abstract This chapter argues that, although political finance rules should be normatively assessed in tandem with the party system, in order to develop more precise recommendations for political finance design and reform, tailored to specific political systems, we need to consider a number of contextual factors. These include electoral institutions, institutions of decentralization, form of government, and party organization. Some of these factors may directly impact on a country’s party system. But even when they do not, they should still be considered in the analysis at this stage as they can help to qualify the evaluation of party system/political finance combinations and thereby formulate more nuanced judgements that are well suited to the design of rules in a practical setting.

Olivier Jacques, Antoine Genest-Grégoire

Abstract This chapter compares tax policies of Canada with other advanced democracies. It starts by establishing the facts about tax policies in Canada at the federal level, which are characterized by an equilibrium of relatively low tax with a high degree of tax progressivity. Then, the chapter explains the size and shape of taxation in Canada by presenting three complementary perspectives. It presents a functionalist perspective focusing on revenue needs, a distributional perspective highlighting the role of Canada’s majoritarian electoral system and system of interest group representation and the sectoral perspective focusing on the country’s growth model. The last section explains the role of federalism in shaping Canada’s tax policies and stresses interprovincial differences in tax policy choices. Overall, this chapter contributes to our understanding of the political economy of the financing of social policy in the context of a decentralized federation.

Vanessa Villanueva Collao

No abstract is available for this record.

М.Л. Седова, Natalya Guz, М. Л. Дорофеев, Igor Viktorovich Balynin · 6 authors

In order to overcome negative demographic trends in the Russian Federation, measures to stimulate the birth rate have been developed and financed at the federal and sub-federal levels. At the moment, on the one hand, there is a tendency to centralize expenditures for these purposes at the federal level, on the other hand, the coverage of the subjects of the Russian Federation, which introduce sub-federal (subnational) maternity capital (SMC), is expanding. The study was recognized to answer the question: whether the widespread introduction of SMC is justified, whether the effect of its use depends on the level of subsidization of the region and the degree of decentralization of expenditures.

Prashasti Pritiprada, Ipseeta Satpathy, B. C. M. Patnaik, Park Thaichon

This chapter explores the transformative impact of artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, and metaverse technologies within the European context, highlighting the pioneering role of women driving innovation in these fields. Through inspiring case studies, it showcases European companies where women are leveraging these cutting-edge technologies to create positive change across diverse industries. The chapter delves into the remarkable contributions of European women in AI research and applications, blockchain implementation, and metaverse development. It underscores the significance of gender diversity in these domains and advocates for empowering women to lead the way in shaping a more inclusive and pioneering technological future. AI is revolutionizing industries in Europe, from healthcare to finance, by increasing efficiency, improving decision-making, and fueling groundbreaking research. Blockchain disrupts traditional sectors, promoting transparency and trust through decentralized solutions in finance, supply chain management, and digital identity. The metaverse, an immersive virtual environment, redefines human interaction and collaboration, with European innovators exploring its potential in entertainment, education, and virtual commerce. The chapter explores how AI, blockchain, and the metaverse contribute to women’s empowerment in Europe, creating new opportunities, breaking barriers, and promoting inclusivity. It highlights initiatives enabling access to education, bridging the gender pay gap, encouraging entrepreneurship, enhancing workplace diversity, improving healthcare access, combating gender-based violence, enabling work-life balance, and supporting women in STEM fields. Overall, this chapter underscores Europe’s commitment to responsible development of emerging technologies while preserving values of diversity and inclusion, setting the stage for a transformative digital future driven by the remarkable contributions of women in AI, blockchain, and the metaverse.

Masatsugu Ito

Abstract In this chapter, the historical development of the relationship between the central and local governments in Japan will be analyzed in terms of three aspects – administration, finance, and politics – and the characteristics of the relationship between the central and local governments in Japan will be clarified by setting a framework of interfusion and separation. When modernizing, Japan studied the local government systems in place throughout the European continent and chose to adopt the interfusion model of the relationship between central and local governments, whereby the central government delegates its policies to local governments to ensure their implementation. The relationship between the central and local governments in Japan has undergone changes through functional centralization during the wartime regime, decentralization through reforms implemented during the Occupation, and decentralization reforms that have been taking place since the 1990s. However, the characteristics of interfusion have been maintained and reinforced through municipal mergers and the development of a system of fiscal adjustments. While Japan has a high ratio of local government to total government activities relative to other countries, this characteristic of Japan is supported by an interfusion-type relationship between the central and local governments.

Sung Ho Cho, Young Hoon Moon

In this paper, we analyzed the development process of the resident association system in Korea and tried to derive strategic implications for the resident association system in Korea by comparing the resident association system in the United Kingdom and Japan, which are developed countries for resident autonomy. In Chapter 2, the current status and progress of the residents' associations were analyzed through “Introduction of the resident autonomy center and resident autonomy committee under the Kim Dae-jung administration”, “Introduction of the resident autonomy association under the Lee Myung-bak administration”, and “Pilot implementation of the resident autonomy association according to the standard ordinance of the Ministry of Public Administration and Security”. In Chapter 3, the difference was analyzed by comparing the Parish of England, Ichikai in Japan, and Korea's Residents' Autonomous Association. In Chapter 4, the implications of Korea's residents' autonomous association were drawn through the comparison of the Korean and residents' autonomous association systems of the England and Japan. From advanced cases such as the England and Japan, the strategic implication of Korea's residents' autonomous association is that, first, in terms of the installation unit of the residents' autonomous association, it is necessary to reorganize the residents' autonomous association by reducing the unit of eup, myeon, or dong, or to introduce a resident's autonomous association in the unit of tonri or apartment. Second, in terms of the institutional composition of residents' autonomous associations, it is necessary to recognize the status of quasi-governmental organizations as local divisions of residents' autonomous associations in eup, myeon, and dong. In addition, the legislative right, organizational right, office handling right, financial right, etc. stipulated by the ordinance should be gradually transferred to the residents' association. Third, in terms of the functions and affairs of the Residents' Autonomy Council, it is necessary to expand the subject of residents' autonomy by separately regulating the autonomous affairs through the revision of the Decentralization Act, etc. Fourth, in terms of financial resources for residents' autonomous associations, it is necessary to secure independent financial resources such as membership fees, public facility usage fees, and rental income. Lastly, in terms of residents' autonomy councils (associations), in order to vitalize the operation of city, county and district residents' autonomy councils, it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of management and strengthen financial power through membership fees and financial support from local governments.

Donato Di Carlo, Óscar Molina Romo

This paper analyzes the role of public sector wage-setting (PSWS) in Mediterranean countries before and after the Eurozone crisis. Extant literature suggests public sector wage inflation to be the norm in these countries due to the lack of institutional preconditions for wage restraint and the role of PSWS in shoring up the publicly financed domestic demand-led growth regime. Yet, the cases of France, Italy, Portugal and Spain do not to neatly fit these predictions, showing instead notable cross-country and intra-country diachronic variation. We provide an alternative account by treating PSWS as fiscal policy under EMU. Variation in PSWS outcomes before the Eurozone crisis is best explained in terms of the institutions governing PSWS. In France and Portugal, PSWS is highly centralized at the national level, and a strong Finance Ministry plays a central role in the oversight of PSWS to ensure budgetary discipline. To the contrary, Italy and Spain underwent processes of disorganized decentralization of PSWS through the 1990s and 2000s, leading to fragmented – and often clientelist – practices resulting in disorderly inflationary wage increases across the country. After the sovereign debt crisis, all countries relied on restrictive PSWS to support internal devaluation and fiscal adjustment, though with different intensity related to the country-specific problem load and external constraints.

Сузана Борнарова, Наташа Богоевска

The new Law on Social Protection (LSP in further text) in the Republic of North Macedonia was adopted in 2019 as part of a social reform process in line with the key strategic goals within the social protection system. The main aspects of the new regulation focus on types, procedures and realization of social protection activities, the system, organization and institutional framework of social protection, as well as cadres, financing and oversight and other issues of importance for realization of social protection. The new LSP introduced many systemic changes which are reasonably interlinked in the text and provide for unhindered accomplishment of the key ongoing processes in social protection, such as deinstitutionalization, decentralization and pluralization in social services delivery. This article aims to identify impact and challenges related to implementation of the new social legislation, with focus on delivery and financing of social services. The content of this paper is a result of an analysis conducted in 2021 based on qualitative methodological approach and application of techniques of content analysis of relevant laws, bylaws, statistical data, reports, as well as expert interviews with representatives from relevant institutions – Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Institute for Social Activities and representatives from national social service providers (public and private).

Michael J. Carpenter, Benjamin Perrier

In the context of neoliberalism and its consequences for the economy and for democracy, this article offers a distinct framing of the political nature of the French “Yellow Vests” ( Gilets Jaunes ) movement. Fundamentally, the movement should be understood as a popular and radically democratic response to the growing social inequalities of top-down austerity governance. The movement, which began in 2018, was spontaneous, autonomous, and decentralized, made up primarily of loosely connected citizen networks and popular committees not bound by political affiliation, social class, or age group. Responding to the neoliberal policies of the government of President Emmanuel Macron, symbolized by an unpopular fuel tax, the Yellow Vests quickly developed into a wide-ranging movement with diverse forms of action and organization. Despite a carrot-and-stick response from the government, the movement continues to the present, though its impact was greatest in the first year, which is the focus of this paper. Difficult to classify, we understand the Yellow Vests as an instantiation of “popular politics”, or an atypical social movement, primarily defined by and significant for its ardent anti-austerity and pro-democracy positions. The movement is only misleadingly labeled populist or associated with populism; there is a collective intellectual awakening of political consciousness, with participants and supporters articulating their structural dispossession and setting out to strengthen their common good through collective action and more direct democracy, not through party politics or existing institutions, nor through charismatic leadership or other forms of centralized or top-down politics. The Yellow Vests therefore signify the prospect of democratizing democracy, or re-democratizing democracy, in the face of the legitimacy deficits of neoliberal governance.

Márcia Miranda Soares, Encarnación Murillo García, Jesús Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell

Abstract The article compares the patterns and territorial inequalities in the funding of two social policies that are pillars of the welfare state and present a high degree of territorial decentralization in Spain and Brazil: education and health. The analysis uses specialist literature, national legislation and government documents to describe the policies and their financing mechanisms. Fiscal data are used to analyze subnational government inequalities in the funding of education and health in both countries. The conclusion is that the Spanish experience has significantly leveled spending on health and education between the autonomous communities of common regime, with lower levels of inequality than those observed in Brazilian states and municipalities. The Spanish result derives from an incremental process of improvement of the country’s fiscal federalism, which culminated in a model marked by prioritization and territorial solidarity in the funding of social policies. This model is reference for the analysis and discussion of the Brazilian case, which has configured its fiscal federalism with little concern for reconciling efficiency and equity in the distribution of resources between subnational governments, but which has presented important advances in the reforms of education and health funding.

Anna Bernhardt, Katrin Kaufmann-Kuchta

International research on adult education systems reaches certain limitations when explaining differences between and within countries. Often, research within the multilevel system of adult education examines issues located at the macro-level, meaning policy and legal frameworks, and at the micro-level, dealing with impacts on learners. This article focuses on the meso-level of adult education in two sample countries, referring to providers and their educational offers of publicly financed basic and community education. Guided by the theoretical approaches of educational governance and neo-institutionalism, we identify governance regimes and organizational fields and analyze the impacts of legal and financial regulation on providers and their provision. Based on document review and expert interviews, relations at the national and regional levels are analyzed. We find a decentralized system supporting the regional provision of basic adult education in Spain and a mixture of national and regional regulations leading to regional provision based on learners’ needs in England.

Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, Klaus H. Goetz

The COVID-19 pandemic that hit Europe in early 2020 radically reshaped the political agenda at all levels of Europe's multi-level system within a matter of weeks. It continued to overshadow all other public concerns throughout 2021. The single most important development that distinguished the second year of the pandemic from the first was that, from early 2021, COVID-19 vaccines became widely available and were rolled out throughout Europe. Early hopes that vaccination might offer full protection against infection were soon dashed. However, the availability of vaccines propelled governments to reorient policy from strict containment to approaches that meant ‘learning to live with the virus’. This shift was not linear. Partly driven by the emergence of new COVID-19 ‘variants of interest and concern’, policy changes and reversals were frequent. But during 2021, restrictions on individual and civil liberties justified on public health grounds became complemented by the reliance on vaccination as the chief means to combat the pandemic. Vaccination meant that public policies became increasingly differentiated between the (fully) vaccinated and the non-vaccinated (for details, see Hale et al., 2022), often provoking intensive protest. The year 2021 was also when the full political and institutional implications of the pandemic became ever more apparent, as the long-term nature of the fight against COVID-19, with its ever-changing variants, sunk in, economic and social costs escalated, and initial emergency measures at EU and national levels became routinized, normalized and, in some instances, institutionalized. Throughout 2021, political scientists continued to engage intensively with the fast-moving pandemic-related policy, institutional and political developments, building on an early wave of empirical work conducted in the first weeks and months of the pandemic (for a review, see Goetz and Martinsen, 2021). Empirical inquiry into this post-vaccine phase of COVID-related governance is still very much ongoing. At the risk of over-accentuating shifts in research foci, one can discern several trends that partly reflect the post-vaccine reality. Initial work in public policy was strongly focused on public health. The diversification of policies from public health to those addressing the economic and social fallout of the pandemic has been reflected in work that seeks to trace the wider scope of policy responses triggered by the pandemic. An early focus on how regional, national, EU and multi-level institutions shaped political and policy responses has become complemented by work that seeks to understand how Europe's multi-level architecture is being reshaped. In writing on pandemic politics, contestation of, and protests against, public measures designed to contain the pandemic have emerged as important themes. Following an initial ‘rally round the flag’ effect and evidence of high public trust in public policy-makers, system support seems to have become strained (Bor et al., 2021). This review focuses on the intertwined multi-level and democratic implications of the pandemic, as it progressed into its second year, and on political science scholarship that has sought to describe, explain and make sense of policy, institutional and political responses and consequences. Given its transboundary nature, it was clear from the outset that the pandemic called for co-ordination across regional, national, EU and international levels. The inadequacy of existing European multi-level institutions to respond effectively was readily apparent from the onset of the pandemic and there were calls for rapid far-reaching reforms, for example in the form of a European health union. Academic observers have taken different views on both the extent to which the pandemic has changed the institutional balance and power relations between the EU and its member states and on its democratic implications. Disagreements are evident between crisis accounts that suggest an incremental ‘failing forward’ logic of integration, on the one hand, and studies of European ‘emergency politics’, on the other. The ‘failing forward’ argument regards crisis-driven institutional change in the EU multi-level system as inherently insufficient to provide rapid and effective functional responses (Jones et al., 2016, 2021). EU institutions tend to be little prepared when faced with sudden crises due to the thresholds of intergovernmental bargaining. When a crisis hits, the incompleteness of previous institutional responses becomes apparent. Member states are forced to the negotiation table to re-examine existing institutions, but disagreements prevent more than lowest common denominator outcomes. Thus, ‘failing forward’ is a repetitive, incremental institutional response. By contrast, ‘emergency politics’ accounts see the institutional impact of crises as more profound, albeit in highly problematic ways (Kreuder-Sonnen and White, 2022; White, 2019, 2022). When major challenges arise, urgency can be cultivated, exploited and made to serve political ends (Kreuder-Sonnen and White, 2022, p. 954). Politics of ‘the last resort’ may propel – or force – actors into unprecedented agreements, and put normal rules of procedure and ordinary decision-making on hold. It sets aside usual democratic processes and controls (Schmidt, 2022). Decisions taken in the emergency mode are consequential, since they are capable of creating novel and lasting institutional outcomes. In particular, European emergency politics shift power from the national to the supranational level. Next to multi-level shifts, emergency accounts also engage directly with the democratic implications of this mode of policy-making: emergencies empower ‘technical executives’ and experts at the expense of democratically elected actors (Kreuder-Sonnen and White, 2022, p. 956; Schmidt, 2022, p. 980; White, 2019, p. 2). In the following, we first address major developments along the vertical and horizontal axes of the multi-level system, before turning to key democratic challenges of post-vaccine politics, focused on democratic performance, democratic quality and democratic support. Much research on the institutional impact of the pandemic on the EU has concentrated on the domains of health and the economy (see, for example, Becker and Gehring, 2022; De la Porte and Heins, 2022; De la Porte and Jensen, 2021; Deruelle and Engeli, 2021; Fabbrini, 2022; Forman and Mossialos, 2021; Rhodes, 2021). In both domains, we see vertical institutional shifts of powers and responsibilities towards the EU, with the Commission taking centre stage. Whereas 2020 was the year of game-changing decisions, such as the agreement on the Next Generation EU funds, and of novel EU powers, in 2021 the decisions had to be implemented and the new powers used, while executive action at all levels became exposed to intense public scrutiny and contestation. When struck by the pandemic, the EU's weak capabilities, dispersed authority and limited budget in health security stood out (Forman and Mossialos, 2021). With catastrophic health news beginning to emerge first in Italian Bergamo, followed soon by fears that the US would monopolize coronavirus remedies and that member states would outcompete one another in the race for vaccines, the need for a pan-European response was soon acknowledged (Becker and Gehring, 2022; Deutsch and Wheaton, 2021). In retrospect, the decision-making speed is notable. Already in June 2020, the European Commission was endowed with the novel power of collective vaccine procurement and member states had approved a supranational vaccine plan (Becker and Gehring, 2022; Rhodes, 2021). On 21 December 2020, the Commission and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) authorized the first COVID-19 vaccine. Throughout 2021, another four vaccine authorizations followed suit. On 6 May 2021, the Commission presented its COVID-19 therapeutics strategy to complement the vaccine strategy and to deal with the long-term effects of the infection. Also in 2021, the Commission developed the EU Digital COVID Certificate, which entered into force by 1 July and became interoperational across EU borders. Given that member states had traditionally guarded their health sovereignty closely, this upshift in EU powers is notable and demonstrates that under emergency rule, a recalibration of political authority can occur rapidly and on a scale that would previously have been considered highly improbable (Tesche, 2022; Vollaard et al., 2016; Vollaard and Martinsen, 2017). However, as a concomitant, the Commission also came under increasing scrutiny for its actions. Soon after the major decision to let the Commission directly purchase vaccines and the provision of a considerable budget to do so, the Commission's abilities became subject to severe criticism. The objection was that the inexperienced Commission had chosen the wrong strategy, aiming for lower prices rather than speedy delivery of vaccines and thus fell behind the US and the UK. Also, at the end of 2020, the EMA was fiercely criticized for being too slow in the approval of COVID-19 vaccines. On 2 December 2020, the UK approved the BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine, followed shortly after by the US and Canada. EMA's approval came just three weeks later, but the Commission and the agency had already lost the game for public approval. Their claim to carry out a more thorough authorization procedure did not resonate in the midst of public critique (Deutsch and Wheaton, 2021). The following year became no easier. Early 2021 was marked by severe supply shortages and delays in delivery (Becker and Gehring, 2022). Again, the Commission was subject to condemnation, this time for not having secured enough vaccines and for unfair distribution between its member states (De Gruyter, 2021; Deutsch and Wheaton, 2021). In the spring of 2021, there was public criticism of severe production problems and of the relatively slow vaccine roll-out in the EU, which fell notably behind the US, the UK and Israel. By May 2021, the EU had apparently caught up. The Commission had set up a vaccine procurement task force, funded in part by a new BioNTech/Pfizer production site in Germany, and it had secured 1.8 billion doses of vaccine from the same company (Cokelaere, 2021; De Gruyter, 2021; Rhodes, 2021). Only a year later, problems of supply had turned into problems of demand. The European Commission had now secured 4.2 billion doses of vaccine. After an informal meeting of health ministers on 18 May 2022, officials from a number of EU countries prepared a letter asking the European Commission to redraw its existing coronavirus vaccine procurement agreements and to allow member states to take up only the vaccine doses they actually needed (Martuscelli, 2022). In economic policies, too, the pandemic implied considerable vertical institutional dynamics, centralizing more powers around the European Commission. For the first time, the European executive was endowed with the power to borrow money on the financial markets and to transfer funds to member states (Fabbrini, 2022). In this regard, the European Council meeting in July 2020 is noted as a turning point at which the EU heads of state and government agreed on the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery plan as part of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) (Hillion, 2021). The early negotiations in March and April 2020 of the recovery plan were, however, ripe with political disagreements (De la Porte and Jensen, 2021; Ferrera et al., 2021). De la Porte and Jensen three which under normal would have a deal or turned it into a lowest common denominator emerged on the member states as to financial support to member states be only or by a of and with came to support the and the – the and – also came to the of and to was on the of The Commission and the of member states to to from the and the to and the of and strongly negotiations were with a policy member states between those that to to be to and and those that emergency recovery to be (De la Porte and Jensen, 2021). severe the was agreed The deal considerable changes in the EU vertical institutional balance (Becker and Gehring, 2022). It with the of no common and an of (De la Porte and Jensen, 2021). to it the EU's to and new institutions as a crisis response. than ‘failing Europe's multi-level has forward’ 2021, p. In particular, the Commission has new political and institutional to borrow on the markets on of the EU all the up to billion (De la Porte and Jensen, 2021, p. major shift by are new of The European Council agreed on a to its common in part the system and new a new a and a (Fabbrini, 2022, p. On December 2021, the Commission of three new in of the effects on EU economic governance that the policy measures by the EU to address the economic of COVID-19 were a for the European and a major between the economic and the of and as such a in the of European (Fabbrini, 2022, p. Whereas since its had on a between a policy with the European at its and a economic policy at the state the for the first time endowed the EU with its powers (Fabbrini, 2022, p. The key of – the and – was by the European and the Council on 18 December The a of billion in and available to support and by EU 1 only has the Commission been to borrow but it is also in of its and of and the member recovery and to the June 2021 the Commission its first of national recovery and the extent to which the national the of and social the Commission to the of and throughout 2021, due to The plan was only on 1 June 2022, the plan is still at the time of writing 2022). By 2021, and became the first countries to a under the 2 countries followed soon all an initial of their were to be authorized by the on the of the and in the national recovery and The Commission's executive is as it has unprecedented financial means to or member Next to vertical institutional shifts, the multi-level system has also been reshaped by new horizontal institutional dynamics, national intergovernmental the European EU experts and the European the of the pandemic, a new EU health governance architecture has to take In this take centre stage. that become increasingly important institutions for European at the expense of supranational institutions, most notably the Commission et al., However, rather than institutional are new horizontal by and and between the and health The European for and came to a in the pandemic and Engeli, 2021). Deruelle and that COVID-19 became a functional for the which changed its from risk to a of risk This co-ordination in with the intergovernmental in the Council of the and with the Commission. than a power between the institutions, the that the of the have been to the the institutions have to when co-ordination in the and Engeli, 2021, p. Thus, the intergovernmental of national has had to and with both the Commission and the The EMA became another in EU in it is one of the more EU health institutions with its to EU approval to new and Mossialos, The agency was thus for the COVID-19 vaccines. for the first time, this (Schmidt, its to was and by the as experts centre in national did the EMA with the Commission's had to respond to political and public to its The the US and the EU in a political vaccine race on would be first to to the vaccine. At a on 21 December 2020, the approval of the BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine, the EMA its approval three weeks behind the UK called the a while that the had not been public the last EMA has the intense taking in the public some for a approval. were that development was too of interest at EMA have and been by the of the evidence and After the first BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine approval on 21 December 2020, the authorization of vaccines followed at a rapid On 6 2021, the Commission that the vaccine had been authorized on the of EMA's and quality The vaccines developed by and followed on March and December 2021, The year 2021 thus became when the Commission and EMA vaccine authorization at unprecedented The of did however, the from criticism. EMA's too, had a to and in The became in the vaccine processes of the COVID-19 vaccine 2022; et al., 2022). of the vaccine were up after some of In 2021, disagreements between the EMA and national became more and EMA that the vaccine was to that the of the vaccine for most (Deutsch et al., 2021). However, national increasingly the vaccine, its and, by the of EMA and its to the the European Commission towards a European In 2020, several were for EMA as as for the The EMA was approved in At the time of writing 2022), negotiations are between the member states and the European on the the most important European by the Commission was the of a new the and At the was to a new European agency to as a to the US and However, for those aiming for a the of was of an became a within the European for and It became in a of member states had changed from a considerable of EU health to more or of such a transfer of powers 2021). It is that was by means of a Commission by 2021. The European was thus in In the horizontal institutional in health are by the EU and experts as the new of actors in EU crisis At the same time, we see disagreements between supranational and national The European by contrast, in the In economic policy, too, horizontal and disagreements came to the in around the (De la Porte and Jensen, 2021; 2022). out that the crisis a around the which to (Tesche, 2022, p. The of emergency politics thus only be for in the of crisis but in of consequences. to the Council decision on the the and the horizontal institutional have been On the one hand, the Council decision marked a turning the Commission in the of the COVID-19 recovery On the the and heads of government had to some extent in the Council a the Council on the and more Council when the Commission the (Hillion, 2021, p. 2). after the European Council agreement on the and the in July 2020, the political in the European against the intergovernmental deal and to the budget the became and more The European and the Council a on the budget in 2020, only to be by from and the a was and the budget in December However, soon and continued the the The member states before the of of the European that the the put the of the on hold. On 2022, the its 6 in the the from and and the for the Commission to the to democratic governance became apparent very early on during the pandemic and have concerns and research and around three major can European with the the pandemic a in and democratic and can trust and support of, or in of, the measures taken to combat the pandemic and its economic and social is at in democratic performance, democratic quality and democratic support. The most scholarship on three increasingly their empirical For example, between restrictions on liberties and public et suggest that the pandemic an for the to individual 2). from Germany, and the they that COVID-19 had a on restrictions on civil liberties ‘the that the impact of trust the a key for the of civil liberties was with of civil 2). et on performance, trust and across European that both levels of social and political trust and in trust – notably between government and – are in in in European as a key The of European multi-level would be to with the pandemic – and how they would be to – the of the challenges was on states were not to the of restrictions on that the pandemic to for and to empirical work that democratic countries to have a COVID-19 2022), that we be of that democratic be to the from the we do not between the of and COVID-19 et al., 2021, p. However, most research has focused on across to explain both in policy responses and policy outcomes. In with approaches in public policy, political and and their are to For example, of in national have been to make a and 2021; and 2022), et that between policy and political trust national responses and is in for in outcomes. in responses to the pandemic, politics have also been to Thus, et they the of to the pandemic and to be a of the responses of both and The of responses a of democratic quality has much public and 2021, the with democratic and civil and individual liberties has been in some European countries by public to regards democratic the on ‘emergency politics’ and its effects on democratic quality the pandemic, as noted of ‘emergency politics’ have been to the to the pandemic as another of a by now of executive and by empirical work has to a more et have a countries and and of democratic for emergency measures across that countries have in at some of democratic since the beginning of the pandemic. more common in such are also in democratic also however, that weak and of democratic be of as take of the to and In has in particular, on and 2022), evidence of democratic throughout 2021. of and democratic trust and support of Much initial work on focused on responses and trust in ‘rally round the flag’ that an in trust in was in some European but was in et al., 2021; and 2021). research a differentiated and, in some For example, et evidence that to a marked in democratic system support as the pandemic on from and the US, they a of system support in all four countries throughout their also that ‘the to system support is more at that system support may not the of the pandemic When the COVID-19 pandemic hit it set in a of slow in system and as the crisis rather than to a key Thus, et suggest that and different democratic for democratic support. This with the of and on from the UK from 2020 and 2021, they evidence of a between levels of COVID-related and and lower of government and trust in of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on European multi-level be and and institutional changes take time to their full implications become only apparent and, empirical research on how multi-level has and been reshaped the pandemic is still very much in This three developments stood out in 2021. at the of the European the decisions taken in 2020 that far-reaching new powers and to the EU and, the were put to in 2021, as the and was rolled out and as the European executive emerged as the authority in vaccine authorization and It became clear that, in important the EU had from it to the pandemic. the post-vaccine phase of pandemic governance meant that, at national some of the measures taken to contain the of the to be albeit et al., 2022). At the same time, had as such as the of or the to carry vaccination and became the of thus to emerge in a a to individual and liberties and ways of and an that of the public health measures to combat COVID-19 would be to for the evidence is still accounts suggest that the effects on may and be more than might have at In this the of in the to on the pandemic has become For example, has that, in the of the pandemic and a development that did not the as by it its ever of the in the April In the of to from the pandemic and to do very in the for The pandemic in 2021 may not have new in European but it may out to have and political

Sarah Marchal, Bea Cantillon

Social assistance provides a last safety net to protect against poverty. Because it often assists individuals with multiple problems and an accumulation of biographical risk, it is an important tool for promoting social inclusion. Highly decentralized and personalized social assistance schemes are important tools in helping multi-problem families and tackling cumulative deprivation while taking into account local opportunities and needs. However, the chapter highlights that in order to guarantee a dignified minimum income, uniform guidelines on means-tests, conditions and implementation are needed, whilst access should be secured and guaranteed. To ensure poor regions are able to guarantee legal minimum incomes, the responsibility for financing must also be borne, at least in part, by the governing entity that guarantees the right. Moreover, to be effective, social assistance must be articulated as part of the broader edifice of the welfare state with different, distinct, and mutually complementary layers.

Giliberto Capano, Andréa Lippi

Southern European countries have always been a problem in the varieties of capitalism (VoC) framework. In particular, the Old Southern Fours (OSFs), together with France and Turkey, have been characterized by a hybrid type of capitalism. According to Hall and Soskice (2001, 21), “they may constitute another type of capitalism, sometimes described as 'Mediterranean', marked by a large agrarian sector and recent histories of extensive state intervention that have left them with specific kinds of capacities for nonmarket coordination in the sphere of corporate finance but more liberal arrangements in the sphere of labor relations”. Thus, these four countries appear to be different from liberal market economies (LMEs), in which there is arm's-length interaction among market actors and the State behaves as a distant regulator, and coordinated market economies (CMEs), in which the State matters greatly since it plays the role of active promoter. In the four Mediterranean countries, the State is considered to play an active interventionist role to compensate for the weaknesses of institutional arrangements/complementarities. As a result, the State is a significant driver of the development of capitalism.
\nThus, economies embodying this third type of capitalism have been variously called mixed market economies (MMEs) (Molina & Rhodes, 2008; Featherstone, 2008; Hopkin and Blyth, 2012; Paraskevopoulos 2017) or state-influenced market economies (SMEs) (Schmidt 2007). This hybrid type of capitalism is characterized by a high level of “statism” in the political economy due to the weaknesses of institutional conditions. At the same time, the high grade of statism does not guarantee effective policies that compensate for institutional weaknesses. From this point of view, then, statism has not been capable of ensuring some form of coordination to ensure the needed institutional complementarities. The State has been particularly weak in guaranteeing three pivotal drivers when the quality of government is assessed: (i) government effectiveness; (ii) bureaucratic efficiency; and (iii) regulatory quality (Rothstein, 2012; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). It could be said, then, that the hybrid type of capitalism is characterized by a paradox: the need for active statism in the presence of a weak state is clearly represented by the inefficient and often ineffective performance of the related public administration. Thus, exactly where there is the need for dense and deep intervention by the State, the State has been as weak, ineffective, inefficient, and often characterized by particularistic, rather than universalistic, actions. As is well known, a full Weberian state did not develop before the beginning of the democratization process, and this fact has been the cause of porosity and a lack of resistance with respect to the invasion of new democratic political élites (Morlino 1998). Thus, as described by some seminal studies (Sotiropoulos, 2004; Kickert, 2007 and 2011; Ongaro, 2010a), in Southern Europe, the State has been characterized by recurrent evidence of (i) centralism; (ii) political control over bureaucracy; (iii) lack of reputable administrative elites; (iv) party patronage and clientelism in personnel recruitment (including a conservative role played by public sector unions); (v) legalism rooted in the Napoleonic tradition, complemented by informal shadow governance structures; (vi) uneven distribution of resources; (vii) institutional fragmentation; and (viii) insufficient mechanisms for policy coordination (Barzelay and Gallego, 2010). These common characteristics had driven us to emphasize the trajectories and the results of the common efforts toward pursuing administrative reforms as very similar. However, as we will see, not necessarily similar conditions of departure lead to common results.
\nIt is not a case, for example, that even if they are very similar with respect to the role of the State and the characteristics of public administration (as well other social, cultural and economic aspects), the OSFs also experienced relevant differences in the timing of democratization and in their political systems and decentralization. Thus, we could expect that some differences should have developed over time in the role and characteristics of the State and its contribution to expediting the modernization and development of these countries.
\nFurthermore, inefficient state action is a common problem that has often appeared in the policy and political agendas of these countries. The idea that the State, its bureaucracy and the features of policy making should be reformed has always been very high on the agendas of all four countries. Thus, these countries’ public administrations have been targets of repeated attempts at reform. For instance, since 2010, all four countries have shared the commonality of external pressures promoting State reforms in light of fiscal crises (Ongaro, 2010a). While regarding Greece, this fact has been documented by a steep path of provisions enacted by the central government to adjust the public sector to financial needs (Featherstone, 2015:301), similar evidence is not available for all remaining three. However, in general, the prevalent and diffused poor performing that induced the fiscal crisis is well displayed by financial indicators and the subsequent recommendations provided by the EU and the World Bank. As a result, reforms have been adopted in light of different contingencies and with different intensities but are uniformly associated with financial indicators (e.g., the spread).
\nThese attempts at reform have obviously tried to remove the obstacles to a more strongly performing role for the State in the related socioeconomic systems and thus to render it more coherent and congruent with respect to the need for systemic coordination. Overall, the comparative literature has substantially agreed on the OSFs not only having a common Napoleonic tradition but also having modernized in very similar ways with very similar results (Sotiropoulos 2004; Ongaro 2010b; Kickert 2011). Thus, the contribution of public administrations to the socioeconomic development of these countries and to the transformation of the forms of national capitalism have been very poor or negative. However, is this statement completely true? Have these countries developed similar administrative reforms with similar timing and similar targets? Have these four states changed in very similar ways in terms of centralization/decentralization and roles in public policies? Are the national bureaucracies so politicized that they impede the effective neutrality/proactivity of state intervention? Finally, are the results of the diachronic evolution of the four states truly as similar as argued by the literature?
\nAs we will show in this chapter, the response to these questions will not confirm, unlike the literature that has underlined and emphasized the similarities among the OSFs, that they underwent different trajectories of administrative reform that have produced different outcomes in terms of improvement of the state policy capacities. Portugal emerges to have developed a very deliberate and effective trajectory that has allowed the country to significantly improve its State policy capacity. Spain has reached some improvement despite institutional resilience and conflictual intergovernmental relations, while Italy has not been capable of improving its weak policy capacity due to the schizophrenic oscillation of the reforms (Italy). Finally, Greece has not been capable at all of improving its original very weak State policy capacity due to a substantial lack of real attempts to improve administration performance.

José M. Alonso, Judith Clifton, Daniel Díaz‐Fuentes

Abstract Corporatization—arguably as important as privatization regarding public service reform—remains an under‐researched topic in Public Administration. In this paper, we explore the extent to which the implementation of different types of corporatization strategies can be explained by the ideology of the ruling party in the Spanish public healthcare sector, selected for study because this sector was subject to reform, particularly, decentralization and marketization. To do so, we use count‐data regression models to analyze secondary data from the 17 Spanish regional governments for the period 2003–2017. Our estimates reveal that right‐wing controlled regional governments exhibit a clear preference for corporatization strategies that actively involve the private sector, such as Public–Private Partnerships and Public Finance Initiatives. Further analysis suggests that left‐wing governments are positively associated with the implementation of corporatization strategies that do not involve the private sector, such as the creation of Public Enterprises and Public Entities. These results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications.

Edgars Eihmanis

Abstract This chapter offers an in-depth look at health politics and the tax-financed health system in Latvia. It traces the development of the Latvian healthcare system, characterized by tension between central and local government, increasing commercialization, and chronic public underfinancing. Since independence in 1991, Latvia first decentralized then recentralized health financing. The state has taken the back seat in provision of health services and allotted larger roles to private providers and to solutions such as out-of-pocket payments that emphasize individual responsibility. In Latvia, life expectancy is among the lowest, and unmet needs are high. As the chapter argues, because of the country’s cultural politics, healthcare rarely tops the political agenda.

Tasos Kitsos, Antonios Proestakis

Abstract We examine the role of political alignment and the electoral business cycle on municipality revenues in Greece for the period 2003–2010. The misallocation of resources for political gain represents a waste of resources with significant negative effects on local growth and effective decentralization. The focus of our analysis is municipality mayors since they mediate the relationship between central government and voters and hence can influence the effectiveness of any potential pork-barrelling activity. A novel panel data set combining the results of two local and three national elections with annual municipality budgets is used to run a fixed-effects econometric model. This allows us to identify whether the political alignment between mayors and central government affects municipality financing. We examine this at different stages of local and national electoral cycles, investigating both direct intergovernmental transfers (grants) and the remaining sources of local revenues (own revenues, loans). We find that total revenues are significantly higher for aligned municipalities in the run-up to elections due to higher intergovernmental transfers. We also find evidence that the 2008 crisis has reduced such pork-barrelling activity. This significant resource misallocation increases vertical networking dependency and calls for policy changes promoting greater decentralization and encouraging innovation in local revenue raising.

Barry Colfer

This introductory article to the European Policy Analysis special issue on “Public Policy Responses to COVID-19 in Europe” proceeds through four parts. Part I presents an abbreviated timeline of how the COVID-19 pandemic first emerged in China in late 2019, its recorded arrival in Europe in February, and the lockdown measures and public policy responses which followed during the first six months of 2020. Part II briefly reviews some of the contributions that an analysis of the public policy responses to COVID-19 in Europe might make to the debates in the social sciences. Part III briefly presents potential areas for future research that lie beyond the limited scope of this issue. Part IV introduces each of the fifteen contributions that follow. On 31 December 2019, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission in Wuhan City, Hubei province, China, reported a cluster of 27 cases of pneumonia which were said to be linked to a wholesale fish and live animal market in the city. The first recorded cases of what would become known as coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and the virus that causes it (the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 -SARS-CoV-21) was confirmed in China in early January. The genetic sequence of the virus was shared publicly on 11–12 January shortly after the first death had been recorded in China—that of a 61-year-old man with underlying health conditions. By 13 January Thailand had recorded its first case—the first outside of China—and by 20 January human-to-human transmission of the disease was confirmed by the Lancet medical journal (Chan et al., 2020). The first cases of COVID-19 in Europe were recorded in France and Germany on 24 and 28 January 2020, respectively. In each case, infections related to persons who had recently traveled from China. On 26 January, the Stockholm-based European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)—an independent EU agency responsible for strengthening Europe's defenses and preparedness against infectious diseases—reported that there was “a high likelihood” of cases being imported into those European countries with the greatest volume of people traveling to and from Wuhan and Central China (ECDC, 2020) and on 30 January the World Health Organisation (WHO) designated the outbreak of novel coronavirus a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) (WHO, 2020a). Over the coming weeks, several European countries implemented screening measures for travelers arriving from China and many airlines suspended flights to and from the region altogether in a bid to limit the spread of infection. On 04 February, a first major outbreak of COVID-19 was recorded outside of China on board the Diamond Princess, a British-registered cruise ship. The ship, along with its passengers and crew, was quarantined for almost a month in the Port of Yokohama in Japan. By mid-March, more than 700 of the 3,711 on board had tested positive for COVID-19, accounting for more than half of the recorded infections outside of China, and at least seven passengers died with the illness in the following month (Mallaparty, 2020). By mid-February, amid increasing cases of human-to-human transmission around the globe, the ECDC considered the risk for capacity in European healthcare systems to be overwhelmed by any outbreaks of COVID-19 at the peak of the influenza season (typically between November and April in the northern hemisphere, which includes Europe) to be “low to moderate,” while the risk to the health of visitors and residents in areas with elevated rates of infection to be high. On 22 February, in what was the first major case of community transmission in Europe—that is, where infection was not associated with travel to an infected region—Italian authorities reported clusters of COVID-19 across northern Italy in the regions of Lombardy, Piedmont, and Veneto. In a bid to better understand the nature of the virus, including its symptoms and methods of transmission, and the potential for prevention and containment, ECDC and WHO began a joint twelve-day mission to the region on 24 February. By the start of March, ECDC had identified the risk associated with COVID-19 infection in Europe to be moderate to high, based on the probability of transmission and the impact of the disease. On 08 March, the Italian government became the first in Europe to introduce restrictions on movement and to impose social distancing requirements in the country's most affected regions. The measures were extended to cover the whole country on 11 March as the reproductive rate of the virus increased—the same day the WHO declared the COVID-19 outbreak to be a global pandemic (WHO, 2020b). In the weeks that followed, most other European countries introduced similar public health measures in a bid to combat the spread of the virus. The suite of COVID-19 responses introduced by policy-makers across Europe was broadly similar, involving restrictions on economic activity, the promotion of social distancing, and the interdiction of large gatherings, and typically included the closure of schools, universities, and businesses that were deemed non-essential. While broadly similar in nature and design, the modalities, specificities, and duration of restrictive measures differed markedly, as did the timing of their introduction. Most European governments introduced legislative measures to underpin the measures by mid-March, including in France, Germany, and Spain, while a handful of governments opted not to, aiming instead to promote voluntary practices to halt the spread of the disease and to reach for “herd immunity,” whereby society would gain immunity through widespread exposure, as occurred in Sweden and the United Kingdom (see Petridou, 2020; Colfer, 2020a. It is now clear that the introduction of lockdown measures across Europe early-on in the pandemic saved millions of lives (NIHR, 2020). Meanwhile, as the pandemic took hold, economic activity fell, supply chains seized up, and tax revenues dwindled. European and US stock markets reported historic losses throughout the first half of the year as the IMF predicted a deep recession in 2020 and a slow recovery in 2021, with global output projected to decline by almost 5% (Gopinath, 2020). At the same time, government expenditure on healthcare and social protection rose dramatically, as unemployment in the EU rose to 7.4% in August (Eurostat, 2020) and many workers were temporarily laid off. In what may be one of the most enduring structural changes brought about by the pandemic, up to 40% of the European workforce began working from home, at least in part, while many frontline workers in healthcare, transport, and delivery services were unable to do so (Ahrendt et al., 2020). At the time of writing (October 2020), there have been over 34 million recorded cases of COVID-19 and over 1 million deaths associated with the disease globally, of which more than 5 million cases of infection and more than 200,000 deaths have been in Europe. Over only a few weeks, the pandemic introduced fundamentally new economic, political and social realities across the globe. Government responses, and the nature of their implementation, present important questions and lessons for the practice and study of public policy. This episode has also laid bare the capacity, preparedness, and willingness of policy-makers in Europe and elsewhere to respond to an unanticipated crisis as it develops. In particular, differing levels of capacity in healthcare and social protection systems became apparent as the crisis unfolded. The analysis of the onset of COVID-19, and the public policy measures mobilized in Europe in response to it, contribute to a range of related and overlapping debates in the social sciences. This includes as regards: the role of the state; how policy-makers respond to crises; the nature of political behavior; the legitimacy of public policy; and the future of the EU, to give only a few examples. COVID-19 has ushered in a new era of state-sponsored and state-directed activity around the globe, and the crisis has seen a changing and increasing role for public policy in the day-to-day lives of most Europeans. Arguably this episode provides an opportunity to assess the role and functioning of state institutions and programs in people's lives—and even to reimagine what the fundamental role of the state can be in the 21st century. The capacity of states to manage and oversee lockdowns, including by meeting the surge in demand for intensive care beds and personal protective equipment (PPE) in hospitals and care settings, as well as the enormous social protection costs associated with supporting citizens experiencing a sudden loss of income, was exposed during the initial months of the pandemic (Hassenteufel, 2020). This gave rise to debates about the prospect of fiscal burden-sharing between member states in the EU, as we shall see (Camous & Claeys, 2020; van Overbeke & Stadig, 2020). The early stages of the pandemic also tested the resilience of state institutions and their ability to function without permanent or stable governments following inconclusive elections, as was the case in both Belgium and Ireland. The pandemic in Europe also provided a number of examples of multicentric (Neuvonen, 2020) and multi-level governance in action as some states tailored responses to the specific needs and interests of different communities, regions, and devolved authorities, as was the case for example in Italy and the UK (see Colfer, 2020b; Malandrino & Demichelis, 2020). Building on this, an analysis of public policy responses to COVID-19 in Europe can contribute to the crisis management literature (Boin et al., 2017; Brändström & Kuipers, 2003; Drennan et al., 2014). For example, COVID-19 shows how a similar set of circumstances—in this instance, the onset of a global health crisis—can be managed and framed differently across various polities and political contexts. For example, 't Hart (2014) argues that crises may be best understood as situational in nature, involving events and forces that are largely exogenous and temporary, or institutional in nature, involving factors that are more fundamental, intrinsic and deep-seated, and it is possible that a situational crisis could evolve into or merge with an institutional one. For example, in the case of Cyprus, lesson-learning from the early Chinese experience of COVID-19 is said to have allowed that country to prevent a situational crisis from morphing into an institutional disaster as the country's policy response prevented public services from becoming overwhelmed (Petridou et al., 2020). Relatedly, an analysis of public policy responses to COVID-19 can reveal much about political behavior, and how leaders deal with uncertainty, risk, and expertise. and are an of and risk and the is to what governments do Colfer, et al., during the functioning of institutions is tested and policy-makers make with uncertainty, time and levels of & Demichelis, 2020; with a crisis COVID-19, governments could a to an issue and to or or a for and political The pandemic presents to understand how and governments to or by on questions of and COVID-19 et al., 2020). The pandemic also questions about the role of in public policy. is between and public health and economic realities during a that on the of (see also and and van and that can present for policy-makers to in the and of a The to which public policy responses to COVID-19 were based on or economic and the to which or were to the in political across Europe and had a major on the nature and timing of COVID-19 can also reveal about how citizens respond to restrictive public policy and crisis are as or can become COVID-19, in some cases at it was clear with a initial restrictions were with by a of citizens and a the was recorded which & as the initial of the crisis gave to new and as states of for on economic and social activity began to in some et al., 2020). This was framed in by the to which are seen as & and the experience of the into the political by political and public risk over time, people can their first their of being infected (see 2020; et al., 2020). The public policy responses to the pandemic and fundamental in the of public in some to of the lockdown measures have been be it against or restrictions on public gatherings, for example, in Germany (see et al., 2020) or from for a different between economic and social as has been seen in (see & 2020). there is the of restrictions being to this an important for and (see 2020; 2020). COVID-19 as the EU had its of following the from the economic and social the crisis on many of Europe's and the of the UK to a few of the most the from the public health and social protection the pandemic it is clear that the introduction of measures at any time a of and of the prospect of and political in some of Europe's more (see 2020; 2020). the onset of COVID-19 has the role of and on the of workers to many including and 2020). the impact of COVID-19, the of the market and the of the was by the pandemic (Camous & Claeys, 2020). this, the EU to in the of to the regions affected by the crisis through the recovery from several northern member with The being the most the be from on markets by the Commission on of the EU and a fiscal at EU one of the most important in EU in a 2020b; 2020). This in to the and around the at a response to the and crises over the and an important for research and of the in this many more and in the contributions in this special issue. are many more debates and that a analysis of this deal that the contributions in this issue on public policy responses to COVID-19 in Europe in the first six months of 2020. we that this issue can a on which future research can be research with a may on a range of and of for public policy that are not in in this issue. In the the impact of the pandemic on the and health of the and on the social that the of public policy as the impact of COVID-19 on the market and the future of The for this is by the role by frontline workers in society functioning throughout the pandemic and the increasing for many et al., 2020). to promote the health and of frontline workers and how to and an workforce be of The the pandemic changes how we and and how and are COVID-19 policy of as of personal are in new for example, with and The delivery of a one be one of the greatest in and future research how supply chains be to the needs of the COVID-19 Relatedly, restrictions on the prospect of the for and the potential to supply may new policy and that research might the impact of the pandemic has been differently across the are with the greatest social and health of COVID-19, while people and market deal with the recession in a and the prospect of economic and social and policy This special issue reviews public policy responses to COVID-19 in more than European countries in the first months of the coronavirus crisis from January to 2020. This includes the the WHO declared a pandemic on 11 March 2020, most European countries first introduced on social and economic activity that were to halt the spread of the virus, and governments began to restrictions from While in this issue presents a of how the initial stages of the COVID-19 crisis were by policy-makers across a range of different European countries and including Cyprus, France, Germany, Spain, the United and the as well as in China and at the of the reviews the public policy responses in countries and to the by policy-makers their and settings, and to to debates in the social sciences. The to this issue from a range of and including from political and public and are based in more than across Europe and The issue on a at the for European at in and most of the were at during the The of this briefly reviews each of the contributions that make up this special issue. Italy was one of the countries most affected by the outbreak of COVID-19, and became the first European country to both a and lockdown in the of the health Malandrino and how the response to the public health brought with it a high of the of along the government and the of by public The article shows how this and the and in this, the first the of between and authorities the of by The based on both political and public the of policy and case and for an of the Italian response to the crisis as a case in which the of institutional uncertainty, which in affected and how the COVID-19 crisis was in France by policy changes and in the public health argues that the response is at least by the of a health that of in which was as a and which to the of the agency to to and This health authorities were for the as by the of and intensive care beds the pandemic as well as by the large number of infections and in the The a that public policy responses in France, the of political and in the as the of and of for which did to The also the of the impact of COVID-19 on future health in France, and on the role of in the of health policy & 2020). the case of Spain, one of the countries affected by the pandemic in of rates of infection and The article the of the crisis for and the to the pandemic by on the political and structural factors that a more and response in that the public policy responses to COVID-19 in and the United their countries took different in the early stages of the The government to introduce restrictions on movement and social activity and introduced a lockdown on March in with most of the of Europe. Meanwhile, after a slow initial response with for the United Kingdom restrictions only on 20 March and became a in cases of analysis of cases different of the role of and how risk is by policy-makers that the to the Meanwhile, as the pandemic the responses to the pandemic in different of the UK as the leaders of the devolved governments different political on to introduce or This questions about the of in the and the and the public policy response to the pandemic in what see as in that country's crisis occurred elsewhere in the government to introduce measures to limit the infection rate and to while the on health and outside the and the country's lockdown the shows clear of as the to the lockdown was by economic following by interests in the most by for The that in institutional even by a state of as COVID-19 Europe with an While the virus to be in nature, not of government responses were largely governments in multi-level policy at the and In their Overbeke and at the crisis response in the and the to understand the impact of that on the political The that multi-level policy in both countries has up against the of to political In slow between the and governments the into while in the the of European institutions with fiscal policy has the of the EU fiscal in public The response to COVID-19 was to “herd without the of restrictive measures on economic and social not only from other European also from other countries that are and The that from an analysis of the case the the country to a response to the onset of the pandemic with most of the of Europe. the response to the pandemic in Sweden as the which to through an analysis of the of in the of public and the devolved governance that on public and public The that the between and in Sweden in an initial set of responses that was The response in with high political the and was to, than restrictive The with a that the response in for how initial policy response to COVID-19 the of with legislative by the The article first the between and the of the in the of COVID-19 policy. The analysis shows how during the state of about to and the of public This case is considered in the of multicentric and the for by government a in the in the conditions. 't (2014) of et the public policy response to a situational the authorities lessons from the Chinese experience to prevent the onset of the virus from into a institutional The between situational and institutional 't Hart is that the events that are largely considered exogenous temporary, while institutional crises more intrinsic institutional and a that is brought into during a The lessons the authorities from the Chinese experience of COVID-19 the impact of the of and the of in the response The article with on what this might for public et at the cases of and and how leaders and policy-makers may to or in of uncertainty, and political a by and it with from Brändström and the article the factors the of of and the of public policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis in The the in the political and with for political as leaders to public political and public health during the Meanwhile, on that in the early of the more governments were better to than their the lockdown measures are to and economic and social activity is more at a and this might be in a global pandemic that public and In and across the pandemic a in The by governments to a is to introduce fiscal policy policy to be limited to a of market a of willingness by governments to be exposed to market fiscal policy this This occurred in the of the public policy response to COVID-19 not government that fundamental and EU governments have as travel and to citizens from Central and European countries could not COVID-19 in this European and the between and in those a on the case of and with to and the the and that policy and argues that systems a role in policy as for policy and as for from one occurred to a country's the economic and political of the COVID-19 crisis for the states of the on and and this article how factors the sudden in brought about by the the of of and the of fiscal to from the EU, and other of and in the early months of the an of the between government and EU in the this article argues that while in the in the fiscal risk state and the on et at the of assess public for COVID-19 in The first the during the first weeks of restrictions and on from the how public for the most important has been In so the article on the of the social and political of the on the article the to which the measures were seen as or not by a of this is important for policy-makers as the to which a policy is seen as people that policy. The analysis shows following initial widespread for the lockdown measures in March, for on economic and social activity The onset of COVID-19 many of the and economic the and the measures by the European institutions in the initial stages of the pandemic and were to the of the economic crises as The article first reviews how institutions the European Central its programs and the European to member This and political which the for a and institutional a first a fiscal with between countries and This to be for This article this issue by on what this might for the future of Europe.

Christiaan Luigjes, Frank Vandenbroucke

Subnational governments have become more involved in the ‘regulation of unemployment’ (the design, implementation and financing of unemployment-related benefits and activation), partly because they are thought to be better placed to activate the unemployed than federal governments. However, depending on its specific design, decentralization can reduce the incentives subnational governments have to implement effective activation. Such ‘institutional moral hazard’ is not yet systematically theorized. We examine how and to what extent it affects three federal countries. We distinguish three factors that influence whether institutional moral hazard is perceived as a problem and how it can be resolved. We identify two types of subnational challenges to federal control.