On 11 November 1755, Christopher Smart and Richard Rolt signed a contract with the stationer, Thomas Gardner, and the printer, Edmund Allen, to provide material—whether their own or that of collaborators—for a new periodical, to be entitled The Universal Visiter or Monthly Memorialist. The first number of this periodical (henceforth UV) appeared on 1 February 1756, and it ran for twelve monthly numbers, terminating in December 1756.1 The progress of UV was troubled from an early stage. Smart’s health was poor, and assistance in production of material for the periodical—from David Garrick, Charles Burney, Thomas Percy, possibly Arthur Murphy, and most famously Samuel Johnson—was called upon almost immediately. Contributions were not signed but were sometimes identified by initials or other marks. Smart’s own contributions were most prominent in the early numbers, between January and April 1756. A number of Smart’s contributions to UV, in both prose...
In the era of strengthening and accelerating globalization processes the necessity of establishing intercultural dialogue is becoming of high priority, significantly altering its fundamental principles and objectives of its creation. After the end of the era of bipolarity the new concepts of world order are emerging and spreading. There is a need to find new tools for the competitive development of states and other approaches for international relations. In this context the role of flexible factors increases together with the effectiveness of «soft» influence instruments on the system of international relations by promoting a positive image of a country based on the attractiveness of the values and culture of the nation.Analysis of the specifics of cultural diplomacy functioning in different EU countries reveals the following three traditional European models, each of which is characterized by the specificity of national political strategies of France, Britain and Germany.Thus, the first model reflects the foreign policy of France that systematically includes intercultural cooperation in the practice of international relations. Cultural diplomacy of France is characterized by a rigid centralization and direct state control.The second model – British – is based on the principle of indirect control (so called principle of «arm’s length») when intercultural collaboration is funded wholly or partly by the government, usually via the Foreign Office, while the administrative and coordinating functions delegated to non-governmental institutions (such as the British Council, which has departments worldwide) .A kind of intermediate option between French and British models is German decentralized organizational model. On the one hand, it is partly controlled be the state and international cultural activities are partially centralized, and on the other – is based on the principle of power distance («Staatsferne»), characteristic feature of the federal government of Germany.Creation of the brand «Europe» is directed towards the development of mode of thinking across the whole Union and positioning «Europe in the world» format. At the same time it is not directed towards searching and focusing on the differences and peculiarities of the individual European countries. In this respect, it is important to actively develop new areas of cultural dialogue and exchange both within the Union and beyond.The realities of European societies have such peculiar features as the multifaceted contributions of other cultures and civilizations; localization and nationalization of cultures; linguistic and ethnocultural pluralism as a result of the historical formation of the European nation-states; deepening current presence of other cultures in Europe; and finally, the cultural diversity of European society. These features require appropriate solutions, strategies and programs in the field of establishment and further development of cultural diplomacy at European as well as on the national levels.European cultural diplomacy will always be dealing with the sum of individual national cultures, languages, historical heritage. Moreover, the cultural programs of all 27 Member States are very actively and almost autonomously developing. On the one hand, it can be seen as enrichment and enhancement of European culture and subsequently diplomacy; on the other hand, it gives rise to the emergence of discussions about its absence and utopianism. At present Europe is cannot be seen as an example of goal-oriented and effective common cultural diplomacy, but the potential for this is significant. The main thing for the EU in this context is not to turn into a «giant museum», caring only about preservation and maintenance of cultural sites of individual countries. Taking all this into consideration, the question of what should be the European cultural diplomacy in the modern era is now considered the most controversial.
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Scottish History and National Identity
Globalization, Historical Perspectives, and International Relations
The purpose of this dissertation is to accurately identify, categorize, and describe a large and previously unexplored portion of the Long Parliament's military spending during the period before the creation of the New Model Army. Specifically, it focuses on the money and the administrative machinery that was used to construct and support the central government's first regular army, a force that was placed under the immediate command of the third earl of Essex. \n \nA collection of important works have shown us how the English civil wars of the mid-seventeenth century were, in many ways, a decentralized series of phenomena in which local communities armed and waged war against both themselves and outsiders. However, from the outset the revolutionary central government at Westminster played a crucial role by legitimizing and facilitating a concerted, nationwide struggle against the king and his friends. It accomplished this by issuing parliamentary ordinances concerning taxation and strategy, and by providing a centralized hub for money and other military resources. This dissertation integrates a new financial and administrative history of Essex's army into this broader picture by developing and deploying a new organizational taxonomy of civil war armies. Furthermore, it shows how this taxonomy can be used to help shed new light on the messy evolution of what Michael Braddick and others have termed the 'fiscal-military state' in the British context.
This thesis addresses the issue of devolution and its relation to the Scottish National Party (SNP) through the lenses of historical institutionalism. It aims at answering the question, how and to what extent the devolution influenced the policies and political behaviour of the SNP as well as its internal organization. The change of the SNP is also viewed on the basis of various political theories and typologies of political parties. Because the primary aim of the SNP is to deliver independence to Scotland, the special attention is also paid to the mutual relation of devolution as a weaker form of self-determination and independence. It is possible to define three waves of the impact of devolution on the SNP. The last one leads to the establishment of Scottish autonomous institutions. Althoutgh the Labour Party tried to minimized the SNP in the political arena, the SNP took a full advantage of a new institutional setting and managed to form a Scottish government. Keywords New Labour, Labour Party, devolution, Scottish National Party, decentralization, Scotland
Despite its supranational characteristics, the EU remains to no small extent an intergovernmental entity. By default, therefore, its key players are the governments of its member states. Consequently the EU has posed something of a challenge for its regions and stateless nations. Until recently, to no small degree, they were relegated to mere bystanders as the European ‘experiment’ progressed. Indeed, for the EC’s first three decades, formally, they were for the most part excluded from a direct involvement in EC policy formulation. More particularly, as the EC acquired more and more competence it encroached increasingly on those areas of policy which, hitherto, fell within the exclusive competence of the regions, or which they shared with their central governments. The net result was that, over time, authority to make decisions in a swathe of policy fields resided increasingly in Brussels. However, in the aftermath of the SEA, it became increasingly untenable for governments, in federal polities especially, to monopolise the conduct of European affairs. It was less feasible for them to defend the premise that relations with the EC in a classic sense could be regarded as ‘foreign policy’ and thus should remain purely within the ambit of the central government. Rather, domestic policy had been ‘Europeanized’. In effect the dividing line between domestic and European policy matters had become ‘blurred’ as a result of European integration (Jeffery 1997a). Accordingly, territorial administrations in the regions and stateless nations began to undergo ‘Europeanization’. Europeanization is a multifaceted term, and there is no consensus on its exact meaning. Olsen suggested that there was a number of possible interpretations, including ‘the emergence of European level institutions’ and the ‘domestic impact of European-level institutions’. Essentially, these two forms of Europeanization were inter-connected. Institutionally, the extent to which Europeanization evolved at the European tier of government had a resonance domestically (J.P. Olsen c2002). Thus it could be supposed that Europeanization has been an incremental process at the territorial level.1 Primarily, this can be attributed to the manner by which the EU has evolved as a result of successive treaties starting with the EEC (1957), followed by the SEA (1986), the Treaty on European Union (1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the Treaty of Nice (2001) and (if it is ratified) the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). As the EC and its policies began to affect the regions directly, the latter had little option but to respond. In addition, the reform of the structural funds in 1988 helped to fuel regional mobilization. Not only was EC regional aid more substantive than hitherto, from this point on, in theory at least, the regions were supposed to be ‘partners’ with regard to the implementation of the funds (Marks 1993). Yet territorial Europeanization was not merely concerned with acquiring EC aid, it was more pro-active. For example, it involved collaboration and networking, an underlying aim of which was to influence EU policy making. It therefore included the direct lobbying of the EU’s institutions and attempts to influence the EC’s wider agenda (John 1997: 133). In sum, sub-state actors re-structured their organizations over time and they reorientated their strategies, as bit by bit the EC began to affect their activities (see for example, Keating and Jones 1985; Jones and Keating 1995; Jeffery 1997b). Whilst few, if any, regions could ignore European integration, some were better able to mobilize than others by virtue of the political authority which they had at their disposal. This appeared especially to be the case in federal polities, where authority was ‘shared’ between the state and sub-state tiers of government. Transcending that was the ideal that both tiers of government aimed to work well together by dint of their commitment to ‘federal loyalty’. Consequently, the German Länder attained greater influence over European affairs during the latter part of the 1980s and continued into the 1990s (Gerstenlauer 1985, 1995, Jeffery 1997b). Initially they adopted a twin-track approach in their bid to secure more influence over the EC during the late 1980s. They played a leading role in the mobilization of the ‘third level’ (i.e. the territorial tier of government in the EC), and they also endeavoured to secure certain rights over the formulation of European policy in Germany (Börzel 2002, Jeffery 1997b). Third level mobilization did yield some tangible results at Maastricht, thanks to pressure from the Länder and the Belgian Sub-national Entities (SNE). Under the Treaty on European Union, where their state’s constitutions so allowed, ministers from sub-state administrations could vote in the Council (initially as representatives of their state). The formation of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) formally incorporated the regions into the EU’s policy processes in those areas which fell within its competence. Last, the principle of subsidiarity promised much. It was in part intended that where possible, as a matter of principle, decisions would be taken at the closest level to the citizen (see Chapter 4 for further material on subsidiarity). By the early 1990s, the Länder had also secured a number of mechanisms within the German polity which ensured that they enjoyed, collectively, greater influence over those EU matters which fell within their competence, as well as a potential veto over further transfers of competence to Brussels. The same applied to Belgium’s SNEs (Kerremans and Beyers 1997). The situation was less clear-cut for Spain’s Autonomous Communities, however, with the Basques, in particular, appearing to lose a degree of autonomy as a result of European integration (Bourne 2000, 2002). Consequently, it could be supposed that a region’s constitutional status could have a distinct bearing on its potential influence vis-à-vis the EU, both internally in relation to its central government’s formulation of EU policy, and externally with regard to the EU itself (Bourne 2003). Given the relative success of the Länder and the Belgian SNEs, it could therefore be inferred that regions in federal polities were best equipped to reap the benefits of Europeanization, thereby calling into question the influence of territories in more centralized states, such as the UK. As far as the UK is concerned, it is a union state, comprising a number of distinct territories, where formally sovereignty resides with the Westminster parliament. In theory, this is where supreme political authority is situated. This arrangement does not lend itself to a federal system of government, whereby sovereignty is ‘shared’ between the different tiers of government, because that would subvert the Westminster model (Keating and Jones 1995) and so threaten the current constitution in its entirety. However, sovereignty itself is something of a chimera, thanks in part to European integration. It could be claimed that by virtue of their membership of the EU, the member states are no longer wholly sovereign, whilst the EU itself is not yet sovereign either. Thus the term ‘post-sovereign’ could be a more apt description of the current situation for the EU and its member states (MacCormick 1999, Keating 2001). Even so, a primary concern of successive UK governments since the UK’s accession to the EC in 1973 has been, where possible, to defend the country’s (perceived) ‘sovereignty’. Prior to constitutional change in 1999, the UK’s situation was complicated further by the system of government in the UK, or more precisely by the distribution of authority between the ‘centre’ and the ‘periphery’. So far as Northern Ireland, Scotland andWales were concerned, each had its own territorial branches of government, albeit that its autonomy differed. In the decades the of a in Scotland can be whereby it a degree of autonomy in relation to the implementation of domestic policies that were purely 2003). Under the of the of secured a of which the of by Westminster in as a result of ‘the did not secure its own territorial of government and to with at the had a than its in began to change in it secured the and governments it was a of including and Jones 1997: Despite the of there was the that the a degree of autonomy from the especially between and to there within the UK a In effect the had its own polity which on matters of such as and policy, whilst the also had a which on domestic or to this the to be by on the premise that the of this arrangement was on the of an in and the therefore, a could the membership of the EC posed its own to the not because it could consensus that from the the polity was the in the were in the of the UK’s the in the as part of its attempts at which into question the of the In addition, the polity was further by the situation in Northern and the for in Scotland and in in the the UK’s accession to the EC in as the UK was to the it was not with a of political authority to but also pressure from the for greater these to a system of government which, and was also as far as EC affairs were concerned, the administrations were to the where the aftermath of supreme political authority continued to at the of the and administrations especially, accession to the EC was something of a into the they to lose as to become both and more of decisions taken in that would in the aftermath of accession was that, where the EC’s treaties so allowed, policies would be in Brussels. it could be claimed that their political would be further by European integration. they had direct to in For each had its own of was a member of the UK thereby that their could be and at the of government. their to would be in those areas of policy which fell within As far as intergovernmental were concerned, their would be by UK ministers from the in the Council of the Council of the from the the UK the this the relative autonomy Scotland and if any, substantive autonomy However, the UK’s accession with for This was most in Northern where had been in the aim of which was the of Whilst the situation in Northern was to that of Scotland or as far as the latter were concerned there had been pressure for greater autonomy during the late as the to make at the to the of a on the in the aim of which was to there was a for this to be by the UK’s membership of the EC and the to within the it its in Whilst the that the case for would not be as a result of the two of its and a of The latter that would be a for as there would be over the of competence and there was no point for regional governments in the at that in They therefore that there was little for as a Despite the of the the UK a in for Scotland and The as a the at Westminster during However, the of the administrations could best be in had to be The therefore that European affairs with the UK government and that the of territorial would be on As it to on this in Scotland and in Even so, it had been for some time that the EC would have far for the UK’s territories, of the constitutional within the UK. such was Scotland where well the UK’s accession to the its political and was over the and of EC In the of the to the of the and on the that Westminster the authority to sovereignty to the In the Union was to membership on the that it would with the However, the of the of was in By this time, in the accession with a of and the they were concerned that it result in the they if the would the in relation to those areas of policy which Scotland they to little more than By however, it was that this was not to but were at the on that key were to so that they could on the In the aftermath of accession it became that EC membership was less in Scotland and Northern than in or As far as Northern was concerned, the from the that membership UK and in so it a to the of the regarded membership more for the same (Keating and Jones regard to there was the concern that the EC was and that the of did not the Thus in the to the on membership of the some in the for a on the that Scotland should from the of the UK and for membership on its own In within the were on the that the EC was concerned with the of shared to those of the for the EC during the early of UK membership from that of Scotland and Northern Whilst in in during the the for Scotland and Northern Ireland, were and with for and an of for the UK as a Yet it was early as far as the UK’s membership of the EC was concerned, it was that the latter was an impact at the territorial The for example, could not in European affairs. It a in EC and the It had also been concerned with the the of which was to was because the member states had a policy on to the UK’s accession with the result that the UK was with a whilst and government did not as a The was especially of the because the of UK was in Scotland and the was a in the and of the Consequently, during the first of the with some to defend the of as the more The on in the of the the and the of a could each be regarded as However, as time the became increasingly both in Scotland and in of the the the Europeanization of the with the SEA of As more and more decisions were taken in for European matters was from to This did not so to which the of the in it was concerned with more areas of policy such as or This was because the in were it sense for the to on European In addition, it was that the to influence the EC more directly, as it could not wholly on the to the of the the increasingly with the European albeit that it was on that its activities would not with the UK line on The also a degree of In its and European became key players Jones 1997: As far as the was concerned, that was the of EC structural In addition, at the of its of it relations with regions in the such as these were because they that the was not wholly on the by in it to in the European political as a in its own However, as was the case with the in of this was Whilst a number of Northern was involved in EC affairs the of and the of and had the in so far as it was by virtue of its involvement in the implementation of EC structural funds in the and However, that that most of its was to the of the therefore, Europeanization in Northern was to Europeanization there had been, was to no small degree by its More particularly, there was an of political Given the such as these were would have been more concerned the than the European Despite the which they the territorial of government were by no in with the also an in European their European activities to the Council in EC the SEA was something of a that on, were with a of European The SEA also the reform of the structural funds in a result of which was that in the which bid for if they were EC aid Consequently, a number of EC in to their EC and some or in Brussels. For their the the of part of was to in the EC (Keating and Jones However, the of the to with regional in the EC was by and the of did relations with such as the of Regions and the of European Regions Jones the of as the for government, or more especially the to with the EC on a to a they were in For a a more leading role but that was it and its EC by the actors from the UK’s territories to a in European affairs. The same applied increasingly to territorial pressure such as the and the had been involved in lobbying from the the UK the The same applied to the became involved in lobbying it became that they could no longer ignore the such was This had been in part because of the and also because of the of a in the As far as the latter was concerned, the underlying concern was that regional such as the in could Consequently, helped to the of European thereby its to a in the The situation for as a was less with the of the and the of a became more during the of government (Keating and Jones time pressure did direct in part because they did not that they would from In sum, from a territorial activities such as these that authority a swathe of policy areas no longer resided in Rather, increasingly it was in something which was to the of in and also in Despite their the and became more to the as time from the EC’s for small and in areas in the of the (Keating and The change of can be in to a member of the had been to EC to own which the By the to the of Scotland from the UK and a member state in the EC in its own for example, the was by no a with regard to however, and the key became in as the 1980s to a in therefore, the of territorial in the EC became more during the late 1980s and on into the The net effect was that, the with the UK government to that territorial were in its during a the impact of the EC was more was especially so for In the to the the a of its EC a was by no to the however, as in the government did the same 2003). However, the of the were by virtue of the extent to which the EU had on its The that some to of its were in work and that of its were The for EC to be more to the EC’s institutions and a further of with the EC As far as the latter was concerned, it was suggested that should remain in for an or so they so that they could with European However, by this time each of the three territories was to have its own in Brussels. The of Scotland the Northern in and the European in was of the for a more in the EC’s Even so, their was The was that they be as applied to Scotland as both the Union and it with concern as a to a agenda in the EC and In time however, the As far as was concerned, it would some of its and the had no as first and Scotland role on than political The latter therefore a in EC aid, and it its with on EC Despite the concern that they not have a political however, it was that these would their influence within the applied to As of its the its was that it would the of the in the the that played a Yet it was also that a number of including a of and a with the direct claimed that not only did ministers to the to and to on the work of but also the direct had a and approach to policy and For its whilst the European could be as something of a because it in it was by and with the over its role Jones 1997: each of these endeavoured to with the EC’s institutions and with regional their to influence the EC’s policy agenda appeared to be during the in with their German which better and which were more (Jeffery it is to that there was something of a in the sense that territorial pressure in and Northern to they to influence the EU, the was more no small extent the UK government as a between the territories and by virtue of the of the Council of the In addition, the government was for the implementation of EU policy in the UK. the and Northern were territorial branches of the UK government. The net result was that to ignore or the territorial administrations they to influence EU policy making. applied to the for example, the that the had its own the 1990s the a number of a number of which was to the is that competence for with the EU as a result of the which the of the were the to reform the and the accession of states from and than direct with the of and in the Union Scotland its on the at the In so it the approach adopted by pressure in Northern and in the case it did not have its own territorial as such and it therefore The underlying was that by of their territorial in relation to a such as the reform of the or the of they could greater pressure to on the government. however, on the that their territorial influence within and that the UK government itself was able to influence in Brussels. was not the The was (see also Chapter because it little influence the UK at over EU affairs. The to a in concern that which had could be to The UK government that UK of would be but the EU that there should be a this did not to in Northern Ireland, their in the UK less Despite the of the UK government, there was it could from a challenge in the and EU and the in to the of the The was as far as the of territorial was it was of the extent to which resided in Brussels. It to that the EU could its on of the UK, of the UK government or it to the UK’s relative of within the EU at that in is the adopted by the and governments (see Chapter The however, was by no the only that into question the extent to which territorial actors in the UK could influence European Whilst the UK secured a with regard to the in (see by the of the and on into the 1990s the was in as began to The was whereby the were more to such as In effect their potential to three to with the in option would have been to a of the In the EC would have aid for its the government to in with the result that the for example, did not in of the number of and more pressure during the 1990s The situation was to The of for during the if an had been in at the of the the not have evolved in the that it The implementation of the structural funds also to the extent to which the UK’s territories could be by decisions taken in In theory, EC aid was supposed to be to UK regional In the the was taken by successive UK governments that this was not to as EC structural funds were to be to the UK’s to the EC’s Keating and 1985; was because the a net to the The net result was that EC were not the of at the Even the of helped as late as 2000, that the constitutional reform of Consequently, Scotland and less regional aid than they were This was especially in the aftermath of the reform in 1988 the of by the EC to the In sum, these to the potential of the mechanisms within the UK. the which territorial over the formulation of European policy within the UK, were a of the and the The have been well by in and European were an of in a which on together with a of less the European was ‘the key in as the with regard to EU were to the it was to the latter to if there was a territorial to a that were so, the would be to the territorial the This arrangement was not For example, there were the was or late in the However, attempts were to this in the would an which would be by from a of government if those from territorial this was not its some that the from the territorial were and were to influence the to their and where the was to the matter could be to their In the however, ministers from the territorial the Council of the EU, of the three ministers from the to be more in Consequently, ministers at the territorial were in some within the UK so far as European affairs were They could as a if their the influence in they to influence a in the with regard to a from the EU, they could to the concerned or have a the in the of they could the matter to their of The territorial of on of which with European they had an involvement in EC albeit that this to matters of such as or the than policy such as a on In the of these was on the extent to which the territorial could and defend the at within the UK it was also on the of the UK to a territorial it was its with regard to EC it was also on the of the and by the UK government to and defend that within the This became more as the 1980s to a and it was further during not because an which was over the More particularly, there was little of political at the territorial level with regard to Scotland and the same applied to which shared a of territorial albeit with less autonomy than the there was no that subsidiarity would to the territories of the UK in the aftermath of the