The French intellectual Dominique Venner, who was born and died in Paris (1935–2013), is today a key reference for the European Identitarian right, which aims to replace conservatism with Identitarianism as the default position of the Right. Identitarians view conservatism as inadequate for confronting contemporary challenges, particularly demographic fears and threats to Europeans, due to its inoffensive, overly accommodating nature and adherence to liberal norms and values. In contrast, Identitarianism presents itself as radical, addressing the root causes of societal decline (the erosion of heritage, identity, and ethnic continuity) rather than settling for superficial reforms or accommodating decay as mainstream conservatives frequently do.A sociocultural European movement of intellectuals and activists that emerged at the dawn of the twenty-first century, Identitarianism prioritizes not only the recognition of the cultural and ethnic identity of Europe's autochthonous populations but also its inherent and ancestral distinction from nonnative and non-European cultures and peoples. Identitarian groups see themselves as locked not merely in an ordinary political battle but also in a civilizational and transcendental struggle in which the literal survival of European cultures and peoples is at stake. A mentality of group survival is at the heart of Identitarian activism which is focused not on purportedly “universal” bonds such as humanity—a modern abstraction erected and celebrated at the expense of national, ethnic, and racial distinctions—but aimed at the particular territorial, cultural, and ethnic traditions and heritages that constitute “traditional” Europe and its peoples. If what defines a liberal society is the promotion of individualism and individual freedom, Identitarians believe that, to save Europe, group interest must trump self-interest. Thus, tribal feelings of belonging and ethnic loyalty must be reborn and must constantly renew themselves to reverse what they perceive as Europe's tragic fall into submission and decadence.1This inquiry, set against the rise of Identitarianism, explores how vanguardism and vanguardist ideas shaped Dominique Venner's life and thought over time. It specifically examines Venner's vanguardist framework, which asserts that a select group, endowed with authentic knowledge, will overcome the forces of evil and decadence to reverse Europe's historical crisis and initiate a revitalized era.2 Furthermore, this article demonstrates Venner's vanguardism through his words, activism during his lifetime, and his enduring posthumous legacy.Dominique Venner's life falls into two distinct phases. The first period, spanning the 1950s to the mid-1960s, centered on militant activism and military engagement, marked by his participation in the Algerian War and radical nationalist causes. The second period, beginning in the 1970s and continuing until his death in 2013, focused on scholarly contemplation and historical writing, reflecting a deliberate withdrawal from political agitation. These phases highlight Venner's evolution from a combative nationalist to a reflective historian, shaping his legacy within the Identitarian Movement.During the first period (1950s–mid-1960s), Venner embodied the role of a soldier and activist. He volunteered at a young age for the Algerian War (1954–1962), serving as a paratrooper, and upon returning to France, became a political prisoner in 1961 for his involvement with an antigovernment dissident paramilitary group. This phase was characterized by intense street activism, including frequent confrontations with police and left-wing rivals. “I was savagely beaten several times by police officers, scalp split, ribs fractured, in the police van, hands tied behind my back with handcuffs,” he wrote in his diary. “It seemed to me to be part of the game. The risks of the job in a way. And it would have been humiliating, I would have demeaned myself, lowered myself, if I had complained. That would give them [the police] too much honor. [Instead I chose] to suffer with impatience and contempt and not to whine like a woman.”3In this activist phase, Venner also emerged as a nationalist entrepreneur, deeply engaged in militant publications and networks across France and Europe, while supporting nationalist politicians. As one of the founders and the director of the mid-1960s magazine and Euro-nationalist movement Europe-Action, he actively championed European nationalist causes. Although later he continued to be an active member of the radical right intellectual milieu—for example, contributing in the early years of the new-right think tank GRECE (Groupement de Recherche et d’Études pour la Civilisation Européenne, “Research and Study Group for European Civilization”)—Venner gradually withdrew from political activism, and the 1970s mark the beginning of the second period of his life, when he retired from all political agitation and militancy.This second period (1970s–2013) saw Venner embrace a contemplative life, relocating to the countryside of Normandy, raising a family of five children, and dedicating himself to scholarship. He described himself as a “contemplative historian,” though not a professional academic. His third wife, Clotilde, 36 years his junior, who shared the last dozen years of his life with him, described him as a “thinker of history.”4 In this role, Venner authored nearly fifty books on topics ranging from European and American history (including wars, revolutions, and the Civil War) to biographies, to politics, nationalism, and European identity, to spirituality and tradition, to enigmas and political crimes, to even hunting and hunting weapons, in which he was an expert. Several of these works, such as his 1981 History of the Red Army, won accolades, including an award from the Académie Française, and many were translated into other European languages. Additionally, Venner founded and managed history magazines, including Enquête sur l'Histoire (1991–1999) and La Nouvelle Revue d'Histoire (2002–2017).Venner's shift from activism to scholarship mirrored Ernst Jünger's concept of The Forest Passage (1951), which describes the “internal exile” dissident thinkers undertake to live freely in an oppressive sociopolitical environment. Venner's friend, nationalist militant and historian Philippe Conrad, noted in a book-tribute that “entering the forest”—i.e., embracing a life of detachment and resistance—“allowed [Venner] to escape the hazards and disappointments of militant action, [because] he found in his encounters with the past and in the reflections that they inspired in him the means to join a continuity exceeding the limits of individuality alone.”5 Jünger's themes of world-weariness and outsiderhood, expressed in The Forest Passage and his post-apocalyptic novel Eumeswil (1977), resonated deeply with Venner. On his eighty-eighth birthday, Jünger wrote of “a sorrow that Hölderlin attributes to Hyperion: the feeling of being a stranger in one's own Fatherland,”6 a sentiment that permeated Venner's outlook during this contemplative phase.“What struck me [about Venner] was his reserve,” recalled journalist Claude Chollet upon meeting him,7 an observation reflecting Venner's widely noted aloofness and “rather cold character.” This guarded nature was both innate and deliberately cultivated, as Venner eschewed pleasure-seeking for ascetic self-discipline, earning descriptions of his “Prussian” demeanor from his inner circle. His wife viewed this sternness as embodying an “aristocratic ideal, you don't show your emotions.”8 This disposition aligned with Venner's philosophy of resilience against a hostile world. In his diary, while preparing his autobiography Le Coeur rebelle (Rebel Heart), he wrote in a dialogue with his younger self, “I had never imagined that there were other, much more vicious and perilous ways of living dangerously: being different, not bending to the herd, not content to seek pleasure, happiness, comfort, amusement (‘my dear friend, I hope you had fun’). Unless my weird idea of happiness is bound up with permanent confrontation.”9 Venner's ethos of rebellion against a degraded modern world defined his purpose, encapsulated in his oft-quoted maxim: to be a rebel “is to make yourself your own law. To find in yourself what counts,”10 even “in defiance of the herd, if necessary.”11Throughout his life, Dominique Venner was, in terms of strategy and method for achieving what he called a European “rebirth,” a Leninist. “I was a very attentive and very early reader of Lenin, who taught me enormously,” he noted in a TV documentary.12 In the early days of his political activism, Venner expressed his grief that, unlike the Left, the Right had no relevant guides for action. As a result, he set out to write the Right's equivalent of Lenin's What Is to Be Done? (1902), the famous pamphlet in which the Russian leader argued that the revolution would not arise spontaneously and proclaimed the need for a vanguard party to guide the masses. Venner wrote For a Positive Critique in the summer of 1962 while incarcerated in the Parisian La Santé Prison, and published it anonymously at the time.In For a Positive Critique, Venner wrote, “The works of Marx are immense, unreadable, and obscure.” Thus, A Lenin was needed to extract a clear doctrine and to transform this enormous hotchpotch into an effective weapon of political war. Nationalism has its own collective Marx, just as obscure and unsuitable as Engels’ partner was for Russia in 1903. It is imperative that we create our own Lenin.13In this short book (originally twenty-three typewritten sheets), Venner, in typical Leninist manner, makes the success of the nationalist camp dependent on two things: (1) a new revolutionary doctrine, and (2) a new revolutionary consciousness. Venner writes that this revolutionary consciousness is not spontaneous—it can only arise through education and the formation of a revolutionary elite, or, in his words, “a young and revolutionary elite, infused with a new conception of the world.” In particular, the section “A Living Order” has special relevance, for here he characterizes the “revolutionary elite” as a “lucid minority” upon which “the community and the future of civilization will rest” and ‘“a vocational political elite, endowed with an iron will that serves a historical mission.” In a word: a vanguard.He continues: The selection and the education, from youth, of this elite, will be one of the primary preoccupations of the new society. Their training will invigorate of and to intellectual will not only by to but also to will a living one constantly over but in Thus, the of will be by that of and of this idea of a Order” is not new in in the and it the idea of a elite” that will Europe more the can find these ideas in the works of and This idea was for by Identitarian with his for a new revolutionary a new this is the of revolutionary in his legacy of Venner's guide for has was translated in many in the Philippe one of the founders of the Identitarian movement in France in the first of the twenty-first century, in the of wrote, of reflections are relevant for who to out political with a revolutionary saw as and As he wrote in a diary, from is the the against the On he or one with is not to To that of the to be an to be It can be argued that Venner's in the second part of his life as a “contemplative was a that was and a revolution that was not just intellectual but for Venner's historical the idea of the of Europeans, who what they and have into “I hope that a new will from in the of a to our authentic he Venner's and and the of European the only out of its decadence and submission to to to to the of Europe's peoples in ancestral the only to Europe's and in the one of Venner's is viewed within the for In the of a Venner, hunting first and a of with our and with the It was an of As Venner wrote in his La or weapons, through I to my the the the of the Venner's on nature and the are part and of his of and the idea of a and nature of or that the modern world. of and the new must be and from it you will and as with Venner thought that need to with past and historical Venner the of and have into a of or life into cultural and ethnic it will be to them and make a European Venner's a for European tradition, which for him is all a of a and and is its Venner's role is to the of that has been and in modern In The of from he of an that, being is very It is the of times the reference to this of is in an as a of that is by a select For Venner, to with the observation that the history of European civilization is an behind which a history up of is the of these are here two for the of Venner the Europe in a and at the a and a in this the role of the vanguard Venner his with one of the of the of a of In other words, that a particular individual or a group a in history and a to the that the of the here is the idea that will set you and will the for a new the Identitarian who authored a of Jünger Ernst A European the as his role his life, and Venner as living of the survival of a in He this would Europe's Jünger was an not by but by his and in an of his magazine Nouvelle Revue Venner wrote, Living of inner and authentic through the a of an of which the was the Ernst Jünger was an of this in our of History as not In one of his he noted that what the was “the hope of one's while in the is a that the the very with as a like in the who on these are to them what they who see the are The are who are the or in with the Venner called these to the his hope for not in the but in the of the (the as he wrote in The of itself first and by the of a which is of all authentic founded not on but on and a for That will an revolution of ideas and The idea of a the European also at the heart of Venner's his political Le of the The of the which has been published in during the the of this Venner the and the for ascetic and minority” to an over the Venner this with the “The would by in the of of of the the very of of the Venner wrote that in to into a and the of European and were this of a be with and These Venner's on the of 2013, the a in his and himself at the of in That he several who were of his had his death for two at a the he them of them him to the Venner I my on the that will be the And it will only be one not both I like this to be as of As his later would “I believe it is to to the that I what is of my life to and to Venner wrote many are of my an of I give over to death to I rebel against It was his last political and his his family his in the the in Normandy, the of a as his not to his life he he had his to European He that his and activism had the and for a European which he was would to French a his and family such that his was a deliberate political and rather than a to Venner's frequently deeply the of embodied in the adherence to the that is to a life not in the that Venner's his at a vanguardist with the from to in Venner's deliberate to Europeans, an to cultural identity and a new for a which the to found Venner's radical by modern political with both vanguard to enduring cultural the in a of the Venner what he saw as a who had a and died in the of a by and and he had an in the hands of the being to escape The of death viewed through a a from life, for in of an and and Venner's own Venner this until the by his of for his last and the of a by the a to his the that to a death that is the of a all the and all the like To be not all have the his of as if he were a member of a elite, have been or at its have with the In a novel and at at the of him just the and you that what you are to will the from you will be in the for a and they will It will be of no the to the of a of and of a activist community that his and his and he been Venner's Venner's in the of a will be in the of an example, this the that has his Venner has a of role and for a of young and Identitarians across He is celebrated as a cultural and political soldier who his to its very last and the of as an of for a Venner's life is at the very of and by groups across Venner's death became a that at our Europe was wrote the militant in the magazine He that Venner's was a upon by a of a to “the of Europe at its up against is on in street or on by of and against the the of the time. “The battle that and “the that are when the of Venner is celebrated in and Venner's such as is to all that or be a rebel is to make that never of your frequently in these and and are through of Venner was on on the of his marked by an of and publications to him only in France but across several other European how an activist in the of Venner the to up our that history was not that it was not over and that the had its his life as by his he the that would a new in a in to the of from the for all to the of the young need to themselves in the of Dominique Venner, who had of these who find in Venner are frequently as a group by a consciousness of the Europe and by the to its survival and This of role to in the to Venner that several groups across Europe years his his was described as to the who are the masses. are the last Europeans, on our the of the of with of the of Venner and the of nationalist and Identitarian groups tied to activism and the of the and a more of his legacy the in of a think This was Venner's last and also one of the topics of during Venner's last with his on the of his think tank founded by his to It is the the European first was Philippe Conrad, who the of Venner's magazine of history his and also one of the who shared Venner's last in is the reference to the one of the of that, with the for Venner the of it “the of our of The reference in the to “the European both the Venner to and to Venner's on the for European with the of the the idea of an a elite, with a historical of Le of the to Venner's last no He wrote, the has a a and an is of European as as there of and of the European will be to is it a of and of the that history will its has training for young on European politics, and as as and book These and to of new and Identitarian in to the in in the hope that they will the European in the future and the vanguard of the new revolution of of the nature of the It was by of the that the early had that [Venner] imagined and an as the of a new European and which would the are of the who will the intellectual and the first of its the more than young in the nationalist and Identitarian of its in to them for into of society they have and on and political In the of of the politics, set up cultural or write and into more hostile in the actively the enduring of Dominique Venner's which to many In the Paris a of the French of the the Venner's it and the in the of the of and the this as In a the Paris the it and and the to to the The to Venner's his to his through and the of the collective identity and to Venner's These Venner's as a to the of the The published a the as “the of the by the two were in the in founded in and the in founded in the to European its and education and the formation of new to a future aligned with these to and Venner's role in and vanguardist ideas and is This is both in his life and as as in his Venner the role of a he a and the of the the for its and how to with it and overcome and this he the of as as own of the role they in the he also the role of a this was both early on in his more combative political and also by what he saw as the and of the of European history and its only the his of his role as a vanguard of it also the identity the leader and the collective he which in of the this This was even by the of death the leader a and death that, in the of only his as a one of the who saw Venner as a role that “in the Dominique Venner is a a a his death as a it as a of and which he in of the of the think tank be as a of of in which his and the of his own for the on and are in the of a future or, as by the community of a of
Thomas Jefferson’s fame as an advocate of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, equal rights of men, religious freedom, and democracy has been frequently questioned. For many scholars, his racist statements, his scant concern for women’s rights, his apparently unrealistic anti-slavery policies, and his anti-Federalist politics suffice as proof of the very opposite of his reputation. This article argues that politics can be viewed as the centerpiece of Jefferson's worldview, according to which all purposes needed to be brought into compliance, to the effect that one ended up with different politics for advocating democratic institutions, for progressive science, for personal self-development, and for socioeconomic issues, including slavery. The never-ending process of creating policies for bettering American society also gave politics its own character as a moral concept.
Like most theories of democracy, democratic republicanism has usually taken for granted who the demos is. However, precisely one of the most frequent sources of political conflicts in contemporary history is the determination of its boundaries, particularly –though not only– in secession conflicts. This article aims to answer a related question: what kind of right to secede from a modern democratic state,1 if any, can be acknowledged from a democratic republican viewpoint? By answering this question, I hope to make a contribution both to republican literature (in which secession has barely been analyzed) and also to the normative literature on secession (in which republicanism has very rarely been used as a normative framework). The core tenet of the republican theory of secession developed here is the recognition of a non-unilateral2 right of secession for any democratic secessionist community within a democratic state, coupled symmetrically with a non-unilateral right to territorial unity for that democratic host state. The rationale behind this theory is to deny both sides the power to impose their will without having to consider the interests and opinions of the other side; that is, to deny arbitrary power, which in republican terms is synonymous with domination. As we will see, this in turn minimizes the chances of permanent majorities and powerful minorities achieving arbitrary power in center-periphery conflicts. This article does not discuss secession as a general phenomenon, but focuses particularly on secession conflicts where both secessionists and the host state (and the unionists within it) are peaceful3 and democratic. The rationale behind this analytical choice is to minimize what we might call normative noise, i.e., normative issues that distract our attention from the ones that we initially intended to discuss. Modern democracies, however imperfect they may be, are the closest polities to democratic republican ideals that exist in our contemporary world. Thus, when neither the host state nor the potentially seceding territory are attempting to move away from this political model in a non-democratic direction, secession appears normatively “naked” in democratic-republican terms. I am not trying to find out whether democratic secessionists are legitimated in seceding from undemocratic states, nor whether democratic states are legitimated in suppressing an undemocratic secessionist attempt. The article presents this theory over eight sections: (1) a review of current theories of right of secession, pointing out why republicanism can be a useful framework to overcome their weaknesses; (2) an overview of the main tenets of republicanism, explaining why (and how) republicanism must analyze secession conflicts as a type of factional conflicts; (3) the presentation of the normative core of my republican theory of secession, based on non-unilateralism; (4) the outline of a non-unilateralist framework for secession conflicts; (5) an outline of three problematic scenarios for the theory, and of the role that unilateral mechanisms can play in order to tackle one of them; (6) an exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of two possible institutional translations of this theory (constitutionalization and internationalization); (7) a discussion of some foreseeable criticisms of the theory; and (8) a summary of my conclusions. For the purposes of this article, a secessionist movement is a group of people that seek secession for a broader group of people, namely the target group. When secessionists are a clear majority within the target this group as a secessionist of a secessionist movement is this is not of secessionist when a secessionist community to a modern democratic state as a democratic secessionist secession is as of for of of right of secession are usually three on who they to i.e., i.e., that are and the state, particularly not in terms of i.e., The two of secession as a i.e., a right to which some of people are a with to their the the of which are to this right are usually as an (1) i.e., to and to (2) the i.e., the of minorities the power to the can be (3) its is to an of the that a group of people must in order to be a and (4) the of who in the territory of the group that is to secession, but who not its might to be as and be from the on secession, from to some of which secession as a in the of are is a of but on some as of However, theories been as the they the of current and the of on This is problematic most are the of that are from the democratic that theories an answer to this as as states are are However, in a of states, minorities and are of permanent which are usually the sides in on issues related to state the territorial of political to that they must this of a in the for Thus, that current are in some for unionists I that the behind this is that current an a in secession that is to the territory make this choice of a of as as a state is secession is and and on the other make the choice of theories of that are not based not based on order to their I this is to and is of what be political the that is, what the of political and is of who make the political and that to this of and they this the as a of I that when we political and two the people who we to we their of may not be the people who we consider legitimated to For we may a of to the we can a with a as as as has power we as and I the is to as an of the is to As we a the of and who are to and for the who are are to from that However, the with a and is that political conflicts to to very and on the of when our interests are This is, one of the main why we and that we to that is, in the and if we that the who is who has the on is the who we will be in and not the This is why political and that to and make in a that can be as who that and are other political and in order to political conflicts of in a I that and are right not to a and secessionist The is that they the of over the my the is the of the of is When the and in the on the of who is the to power in polities a of and to tackle political conflicts without to a is not a to the might does make This is the of that the of of in is also the of most secession conflicts. For who is right in secession a and be a theory that out a institutional framework for secession conflicts. to be a theory that be within a turn that is in the an a of a unilateral right to secession, are and mechanisms which secession conflicts be this who a very and I will that democratic republicanism can for a This article is based on the contemporary of the republican developed on the of this is the in current republican to this (1) for as (2) as the arbitrary power of the group over the group i.e., as a power that can be over without having to consider interests and opinions (3) in order to republican sources of power must be and the (4) in order to the state from a must be as a with its and in and the of and (5) that and are democratic as to (6) for republican to as people as possible Thus, and as are the main of democratic in this republicanism as to but a is, a of political on as as on not in the of but also in that of this a in republican is the (and the of factional conflicts when to political political political conflicts in a that can power over the The of power is not to but also to the of a factional also this of power to has not with that are to secession in which the neither seek to power within a state, nor to power for a state, but to a state out of one to group with an to republicanism, as not used republican and in their on secession when on secession from a republican of they in a usually as a within broader on as the republicanism and but on on has some of potentially secessionist in one Thus, is to be in a democratic republican my as I a secession can be as a of factional is usually the of a a permanent majority and a permanent both of the of permanent on the state be and in terms of its territorial territory the territorial of political and this a secession may in democratic republican terms. The one is the of i.e., the that some people who be the of the seceding may be from on the of secession, from of the This in my is one of the of if the group with a right to secede is one who not may be from the of on in they may be from of the state, they are not of The is in the of of achieving unilateral secession an which to be particularly powerful of its be in a to the of the of the with to consider interests and opinions arbitrary power over This is a that but for they are of people seceding two of and republican to I as to a that of arbitrary permanent that secessionists must the of the to permanent who may what of they will to permanent This a may be with the the of a democratic For a to the republican of its its be in a to to the interests and opinions of the is a (and a be the democratic republicanism majority The of (in democratic republican is not to but to to in to be to people and majorities Thus, in a democracy, we can to be in a majority and in a for I am a I will be a in a and I will be a if I am a This of majorities majority the imperfect to to the interests and opinions of However, in center-periphery conflicts and the majorities is to the without for the interests and opinions of permanent if their are with democratic For a permanent majority can the of but democratic to the of the of a permanent from This does not that they will but that they are to in republican this is a i.e., a of arbitrary are two that been developed in order to overcome this arbitrary permanent (1) the of of and (2) the within the of for secession, of of recognition However, neither of the of arbitrary permanent both are is that the host state must of center-periphery without that the of a for a center-periphery is precisely the very of that this is a that can be on a in the in the will usually be the permanent both the they are trying to that the of to the to permanent majorities permanent make to their one of the two of is to be the other to the for democratic republican i.e., of secession conflicts not is to domination. I developed this republican of current my in order to overcome democratic republicanism a based on a non-unilateralist I will the to this I that a democratic republican non-unilateral without unilateral This non-unilateralist is both secessionists and the host state to their the to the interests and opinions of the other which is to permanent majorities and permanent in center-periphery to interests and opinions can this in the of and in the and the The out two in the secession the right to unilateral secession, within the but the acknowledged that the the to with a secessionist in if a clear majority of to a clear The both the and the and the of the to in can why a question: what if the not to in the of a that the secession of been in terms. However, this is not the the that they not to within the will of but to the of unilateral secession what the the secessionists who initially been for the to a role in the I may be to to the I may be the of without with in any of my may that my is of a and may that I am to be to away with I in the to its without the interests and of the other the the chances of in both that this in this appears to be and to both be for of to with as a and in the of both this be a in terms of political and is out in the aims to of in order to of aims to political conflicts an institutional framework in which (1) a and are from and (2) as a of the political to away from Thus, republican and political in secession conflicts within modern democracies, this be in my a framework in a non-unilateralist to that of the the I outline what this framework my a democratic republican framework for secession conflicts be based on three (1) a non-unilateral of secession for any democratic secessionist coupled with a non-unilateral right to territorial unity for its democratic host (2) a unilateral right of secession for in which democratic secessionist are with an and (3) a unilateral right to territorial unity for in which democratic host states are with an secessionist The of three the of a non-unilateral framework to secession which the in the (1) a democratic the of the secessionist target with a clear secession, in order to find out whether they are a secessionist and (2) in the of a clear a in the host state and the secessionist this framework the secessionist community the right to secession, also the host state the right to its territorial Thus, the will both and normative will find out whether the target group is a secessionist and will (1) a for its to secession, in with the host state, and (2) an for the host state to with in this the of who a and the framework as a we will to that in For in order to a of this non-unilateral right of secession we must discuss the what is a clear can a be what is a clear and a in unionists and secessionists the the on secession must be in is not a for will be to that the in the the in the the be and the majority be clear in order to make that we are a secessionist The of the has to with in order for to be a the of the majority has to with in order to that we are with a democratic secessionist The of the has two territorial territory is potentially seceding in of a and in the the territorial I is to secessionists the territory that will potentially where the be This a must be based on a that This has some problematic that I will discuss in for that in the territory out secessionists for a a The not be the for the of a on the of a state, the of democratic republicanism a the right of who be the of that state to this in that without other possible on the the of the majority the what and for the is in order to consider that has been a clear secessionist my this is However, I that we can two the the the of the target group as a political the the the and the target group is, the the to two the for a in and in the of and be in The rationale behind is that in secessionist are as an (1) based on in can be to play a role in in and (2) the of minorities can be particularly in of two can be within one in a secession the the secessionist target group can be a people (in terms of and the the for a clear I call this the people This might to that my to secession is based that is not one and on what a is. However, this is not the current the people is not based on a of what a is as a of aims to an that in as a of the of a and of what is, is to be of the of a from a of the of a to a state. The people does not deny a to secession, but for of the and of their secessionist is who be to call the my be an democratic that the target this is the in target as within modern democratic However, this will not be the the target group may to a state. that the host state has for the target group with some kind of in order to call a secession if secessionists clear democratic in order to call the this of that they be a clear majority in the they also an of over that we can be that has a its this be in with the people that a secession has been in a that has been in with the I and that has in a clear this not to any the target group be to arbitrary permanent that on the other to to unilateral secession, this make the host state to this in order to both both sides an to in I we can state that two in when both their the and trying to in a For if the potentially seceding territory a that to be for the host neither over the a they seek some kind of in order to an in and from the The that a a secession is a arbitrary permanent the other the that a in a is a does not make to the host state with secession in order to if the to secession is a with that host state. However, an this institutional framework has the secession and its also the of a secession and the a The here is the host state this two (1) to the terms of and (2) to and a unity that is to the secessionist within the host state, that to be secessionist in the the the in the we a my this we the the secessionist non-unilateral right of secession, on the one and on the the host non-unilateral right to territorial to the this both to their and the their the host state the this will that to make a for territorial unity this is the of a in which the host state and the secessionist with neither particularly are both very to their to this be to an to this with other democratic in order to For if the host state in for the and neither the secessionist are to nor the host state to (and a be in the secessionist in this be to whether they secession if they what the host state is The if is very be taken in order to a The and the secessionist community to in its for secession, the be for the host state to but to a also a question: the secessionist that has the the power to call my secessionists to call as as they they will the host state the of a on the will the secessionist target group the of arbitrary permanent Thus, in with this theory to secessionist to call for a a but a The of this to be the of an and be the that can their For the of we that when this general is to if to the might three problematic (1) one of the territory secessionists as potentially seceding is not of the political in which the secessionist movement the democratic power to call for a in the of an secession in the (2) one of the territory secessionists as potentially seceding is, in a majority of people who secession the of and (3) one of the two of the this non-unilateralist the I be not to the territory in the secession the of that territory to be democratic The can be I the very of non-unilateral The of this to this be on the democratic republican that its to the secession However, I that we must this two a majority of the to secede from the broader a majority of the to secede from the broader territory if the broader territory to secede from the host state. I the for a majority be in the in the The rationale behind this is the people an will that is of the secession of the broader territory a on the of the as a people if they to in the of the broader territory seceding from the host state. the that one of the two is attempting to impose its the of the democratic host state, I that this is (1) secession a of of minorities the potentially seceding territory (2) the target group be, any a secessionist i.e., of a (3) the secessionists are attempting to secede in the unilateral secession a democratic secessionist community be (1) is the host state (in the (2) the host state is a (3) the host state is to its territorial unity and a secession in the Thus, the for having a right to be for both they this right if the to be be that this non-unilateralist when to to out but a (1) on the we other the secessionist (2) what be the for a clear (3) in the of a clear can be whether the host state and the secessionist community are in (4) can be whether the host state the secessionist community are any of the scenarios that The to be Thus, we to who answer i.e., who be the of the and what and political framework that are two possible of (1) and (2) the is usually that and secession are synonymous the of a right of secession has the attention of to to but of the has been out from the of of democratic The of this right that the of this non-unilateralist framework be a the in state, with the of i.e., the host state its its on the my this a a right of secession, in terms of and will be the that the of will be, in the one of the to the host that is, a power to one of the does not that this power will be to be the but in terms of this However, the of and secession, in the is I is a possible institutional of this republican its non-unilateralist be taken within the a of and to democratic states, as as and democratic secessionist to This outline an institutional framework for a non-unilateralist of secession political conflicts. the in this framework be a the with the of the the of this non-unilateralist framework within the a This be in with the in their to current republican within usually for a (1) democratic and (2) the of and and the of a state the to this and a state. to an is to and of of and two The of republican in the that of the to republican and a of republican the they are two that republican for a (1) the of and (2) that is not to a state. However, has been on the of the of the republican who with secession, an for the to be the is states, be in the we an to be a is that is not a is states, the in one secession are not states one secessionist but one state one secessionist to that an be to be an as the host state. a the be to that the of of is that they are the states that are to be they are usually a of one state that an institutional of this republican be an framework to secession conflicts. if the be problematic of the of a the be problematic is states, democratic to be of their over their the when they in their with secessionist in the the most for the of this republican (1) to as democratic as possible state and of the of this non-unilateralist to secession that they to when secessionist and (2) to for the of this both in as as in when and where I that main criticisms can be this democratic republican republican and two The republican be a to as an factional not be for a democracy, the to a right of if majority are a in the host state, this is they a factional my factional does not nor is that is the other an institutional that factional arbitrary power in will to discuss and other The republican namely that of of that republicanism to to in of the This can from a with the political secession can this and a republican secession in very As in the I this one and secession conflicts precisely when this kind of is people to a state does not in any that they are to to we that this be based democratic we that that two the is not particularly their to the of and the of the and and the in the this the of a non-unilateralist framework for a secession can two (1) an to a (2) an for unity and the the host state, as as the seceding will political the host state to in the the host state will the secessionist community that to be secessionist in the Thus, is to that this democratic republican if will be in terms of political which are to their republican be that of The be that this precisely the of in are some people a right to secede from a modern democracy, a non-unilateral (1) to some people over a that the political and (2) to the of the political community as i.e., as my both of this be the we can consider that secession political if we for granted that political one is the host state, which be secession the host state in the as taken the of the host state its this is an secession, be an the of the host state. this a for the host state and its in a non-unilateral framework for secession conflicts. not the of this secession does not the people the other of the in the in for from in the the a in which been to and if are to the the people of the of not be any from they are from the in any they be from the but not from which the of the will to be of a democratic The territorial of their will be their within that will republican one of as the republican to that will in Thus, secession will be to any republican However, I this is The that and modern as in the of and the related of and on the one and of on the the what for democratic republicanism is to and as as to may the the one that this theory, if in be in terms. Modern democratic states are states, and as they to their not to However, for The of the as having a of the of the a useful in order to the of the states their its in an framework has not been in order to that states but (1) has a to and (2) to has an of power for I hope the in this republican if they a on the of states and The the for for center-periphery However, I (1) my theory does not the of (2) secession for any a over the a majority with its state, that an for its and (3) is some that the very of a secession the and of Thus, the of a secession and not in the of is also a for a permanent to a permanent majority from an The democratic republican developed here can be as (1) secession conflicts must be as factional ones (in as the the of center-periphery (2) a democratic republican framework for secession conflicts within modern be based on a non-unilateralist that be a non-unilateral right of secession for any democratic secessionist a non-unilateral right to territorial unity for its democratic host state, a right for both sides to when the to be and (3) the and of the framework be institutional is that are that out of the of this article, but which to be in order to this are two main of issues that to be (1) the of the of the theory what a on secession we an for secession be the of an to a in a on and (2) the of this theory on its be to non-democratic they be to other territorial as I secession conflicts as not having a based on answering the the demos question, to current I that is clear answer to this question, in in the has to be if states are to be demos if also is whether this of power the main of a democratic republican theory is not to is but to that are to and I to and for their and useful and the and the to this I conflicts of to is an the of and as as a of its interests are theories of and its its and its and its and weaknesses in with normative issues in modern
This chapter provides an exegetical and critical survey of the reception of Mill’s proof of the principle of utility in the scholarly community. The point is to take stock of all the relevant objections, most notably the longstanding charges of fallacious reasoning, thus identifying exactly what is at stake without attempting to clear the proof of any errors, which is a task reserved for subsequent chapters. The general agreement among the critics consulted here is that Mill commits the logical fallacies of equivocation and composition in addition to exhibiting signs of a conceptual confusion later classified as the naturalistic fallacy, the supposed mistake of identifying the good with natural phenomena and explaining goodness in naturalistic terms. These charges emerge from a cluster of seminal reactions by highly influential scholars shaping the secondary literature on the subject, including, in chronological order, John Grote in An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy (1870), Henry Sidgwick in The Methods of Ethics (1874–1907), Francis Herbert Bradley in Ethical Studies (1876/1927), William Ritchie Sorley in The Ethics of Naturalism (1885/1904), John Dewey in Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics (1891), John Dewey and James Hayden Tufts in Ethics (1908/1932), John Stuart Mackenzie in A Manual of Ethics (1893–1929), and George Edward Moore in Principia Ethica (1903).