Blockchain Papers

Patrick Oschwald, Robin Anderl, Tanja Kirn

This article examines how Switzerland’s decentralized welfare structure shapes the outcomes of Basic Income reforms. Using SWISSMOD, a static microsimulation model based on EUROMOD, we simulate unconditional transfer schemes of varying generosity at federal and cantonal levels, combined with alternative financing. Our results show that Basic Income reduces poverty and inequality across all scenarios, but effects differ by implementation level: federal schemes achieve stronger redistribution and uniformity, while cantonal schemes produce heterogeneous outcomes and maintain interregional disparities. Progressive taxation enhances equity but risks excessively high marginal rates; wealth taxation offers fiscal relief but does not automatically enhance poverty reduction or social protection in a decentralized setting. Thus, centralized implementation enhances uniformity and equity across regions, while decentralized administration preserves local differentiation but risks perpetuating spatial inequalities. These findings underscore the importance of aligning social policy design with fiscal federalism when considering unconditional transfers and equitable access to income security.

Maxwell Jones

The two outstanding trends in 1966 had been: (a) the organizational development of the hospital, resulting from a flexible social structure and evolution toward a largely decentralized hospital; and (b) the increasing quantity and quality of trained staff. These trends continued, resulting in three county units for both patients and staff. The total separation of the hospital into three semi-autonomous units based on their geographical identity was not fully realized. Our total patient population of 400 patients did not make it practicable to have three separate admission units with their inevitable drain on staff. The same applied to the special unit for the mentally retarded. So we ended up with a mixture of geographical and functional hospital units.

John Edmunds

No abstract is available for this record.

Miels, Kareen

Inter-local cooperation (ILC) has long served as a pragmatic governance response in the Philippines, enabling local government units (LGUs) to address policy challenges that transcend administrative boundaries. Yet national experience under Section 33 of the 1991 Local Government Code shows that cooperation has often remained voluntary, procedurally thin, and dependent on Memoranda of Agreement rather than on institutionalized legal personality, pooled fiscal authority, and durable governance systems (Republic of the Philippines 1991; DILG, NEDA, and GIZ 2010; Miels and Mayer 2025). This article examines the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) as a case of subnational legal innovation following the enactment of the Bangsamoro Local Governance Code (BLGC) in 2023 (BAA 49, 2023). Drawing on documentary analysis and national ILC experience, the study analyzes how the BLGC reconfigures statutory authority for inter‑LGU cooperation and why BLGC‑aligned institutions have not yet consolidated in routine practice. The findings show that the BLGC provides one of the most explicit statutory foundations to date for horizontal cooperation – authorizing joint organizations, shared authority, and multi‑stakeholder participation – yet inter‑local cooperation in BARMM remains largely MOA‑based at present, reflecting an early, pre‑institutionalization stage (BAA 49, 2023; Miels and Mayer 2025). Interpreting this as reform sequencing rather than policy failure, the article demonstrates that rules‑in‑form are in place while the rules‑in‑use required for implementation – procedural clarity, pooled fiscal systems, organizational capacity, and integration into regional governance – are still being developed (Ostrom 1990; Pierson 2000; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). In doing so, the study reframes early implementation gaps as expected features of institutional transition and highlights the BLGC’s broader contribution to modernizing the legal foundations of inter‑local cooperation beyond Section 33, offering insights relevant to decentralization reform and intergovernmental governance in the Philippines.

Gil-Hwan Park

Regarding recently increasing governance phenomena, this article examines the modern conception of ‘fiscal decentralization,’ drawing on previous major theoretical discussions over centuries especially from a perspective of political economy. As the financial and economic component of ‘autonomy,’ fiscal decentralization may embrace both the technocratic and systematic notion of ‘management’ and governmental and legitimate notion of ‘political power.’ In this regard, the essence of this political economic component of autonomy lies local governments’ endogenous growth in their economy and finance from internalizing external economies of scale under monopolistic competition among themselves through multilayered and pluralist ‘economic’ governance whose dynamics are nested constestingly within the central government. The representative political economic agent to determine the eventual allocation of resources in this dynamics is an innovated Tieboutian consumer-voter revealing preferences for local public goods according to their increasing ‘regional ability to pay’ (RAP) when external economies of scale are internalised to expand the ‘scale’ of regional economies or finances under monopolistic competition. This simplified new ‘monopolistic competition’ model of local public goods distinguishes the (long-run) fixed cost of local public fixed asset or (social overhead) capital from the scale-variant variable cost of local public service although its basic aggregate structure of linear function of output and consumption originates from the canonical functions of the ‘new economic geography.’ Our model of local public goods newly embraces externalities, and scale economies under monopolistic competition, although its welfare analysis, whose in-depth analytics and theoretical and policy implications are to be further investigated in subsequent research, have not presented.

Akira Matsutani

No abstract is available for this record.

Pehlivan, Hazal

Crisis constitutes the most critical test for decentralized governance. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed stark differences in the regional crisis management capacities of Lombardy and Veneto, two Italian regions operating under the same national legal framework but governed by distinct models of healthcare decentralization. This paper argues that the effectiveness of regional decentralization hinges upon a triadic condition of efficiency: policy-making must be community-sensitive, regional decision-making must be centralized, and policy implementation must be autonomous. Drawing on Bob Jessop’s strategic-relational approach (2008), which conceptualizes the state through the interrelated dimensions of representation, organization, and intervention, the study explores how different regional healthcare models of Lombardy and Veneto shape regional crisis governance capacities. This framework is operationalized through Şengül’s assemblage (2023) to examine multi-scalar and multi-actor governance of implementation, which allows for an in-depth examination of territorialized crisis responses. While Jessop’s framework theorizes the causal dynamics behind crisis responses, Şengül’s assemblage (2023) captures the relational and scalar mechanisms through which regional actors navigate and negotiate institutional constraints. Together, these approaches provide a robust analytical lens to explain why Veneto’s anticipatory, territorially embedded, and community-sensitive interventions were more effective during the first wave of the pandemic, whereas Lombardy’s fragmented and hospital-centric strategy resulted in systemic overload.

Ilya Kokorin

This article explores the phenomenon of the decentralisation defence, which refers to instances where ‘decentralisation’ is invoked either as a shield against liability or as insulation from the reach of the law. This defence is rooted in the technological features of distributed ledger technology and smart contracts built on the blockchain settlement layer, including pseudonymity, programmability, immutability and decentralisation. Together, these features enable transactions while reducing reliance on centralised intermediaries. Although major decentralised finance (DeFi) applications, such as decentralised crypto exchanges, are not harmful per se, their misuse by bad actors creates risks for market participants. The recent cases of Uniswap Labs and Tornado Cash illustrate that the decentralisation defence can result in unaddressed harms and produce other negative externalities. These outcomes have prompted efforts to identify regulatory hooks along the centralisation vectors. The search for a responsible party in blockchain-enabled decentralised arrangements resembles processes observed with two other key technological advancements in the digital space – the internet and artificial intelligence. Drawing inspiration from the modern EU regulation of these transformative technologies, this article focuses on the role of user interfaces as DeFi gatekeepers, and software developers engaged in the creation of smart contract code and blockchain protocols.

Ya. V. Trofimova

In accordance with the Imperial Constitution of 1871, the German Empire of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a federal state. The governments of the center (the Reich) and the federal states pursued a fiscal policy that had some features of “proto-competitive” federalism. Over the subsequent fifty years, however, German federalism evolved toward fiscal federalism. This transition was finally consolidated during 1919 and 1920 due to some endogenous factors and even more to exogenous ones. The article is based on statistical material as well as research from various studies, including those available from the library of the Goethe-Institut. The article compares the extent to which there were indications of proto-competitive federalism in the German budgetary system prior to Matthias Erzberger’s (finance minister of the German Empire) financial reforms (1919–1920) and indications of fiscal federalism after them. The transformation in both the distribution of power and responsibility as well as in provision of resources by various levels of the budgetary system to support those changes during the transition from proto-competitive to fiscal federalism is analyzed. The attempt to strike a balance between the fiscal interests of the center, federal states, and municipalities is explored; and equalization is singled out as a new function of the empire’s budget process. The creation of a so-called self-sufficient economy in the empire just before the First World War and its subsequent survival under pressure from sanctions and international isolation demanded a flexible balance between centralization and decentralization of spending powers along with an appropriate allocation of resources. Fiscal federalism through centralization of funds allowed Germany to begin recovery from geopolitical and socio-economic challenges, while maintaining decentralization primarily in non-tax revenues encouraged local governments to continue developing their economies. The logic derived from this historical study of the changing models of German fiscal federalism is also applicable to Russia: the reduction of revenues and growth of expenditures in the Russian Federation’s federal budget in recent years makes centralization of fiscal resources at the federal level more important, and the growth of expenditures in the regions and municipalities necessitates transfers and equalization measures.

Nicolin Decker

The Doctrine of Anchored Decentralization constitutes the first comprehensive constitutional and statutory framework capable of reconciling decentralized digital architectures with the legal, regulatory, and jurisprudential structure of the United States. Developed within the broader scholarly series <i>The Republic’s Conscience</i>, this thesis represents the second installment in that corpus—building directly upon the constitutional and structural principles articulated in the inaugural paper and extending them into the domain of digital-asset governance, administrative delimitation, and federal statutory coherence.This work advances the nation’s first universal, architecture-based commodity-versus-security classification framework designed for deployment across American constitutional, statutory, and judicial systems. By replacing rhetorical claims of decentralization with empirically verifiable and legally cognizable structural tests, the Doctrine furnishes courts, Congress, and administrative agencies with a coherent, adjudicable methodology capable of withstanding scrutiny under established Supreme Court jurisprudence, including <i>Howey</i>, <i>Reves</i>, <i>Forman</i>, <i>Marbury</i>, and the post-<i>Chevron</i> administrative landscape.The Doctrine challenges the prevailing assumption that blockchain-based ecosystems may operate as “stateless” economic systems while still participating in markets governed by constitutional law. Through sustained analysis of constitutional text, statutory construction, cryptographic system design, and post-Chevron administrative jurisprudence, the work demonstrates that decentralization cannot acquire legal legitimacy unless it remains anchored to the Chain of Consent — the constitutional requirement that all economic power be traceable to accountable authority.Drawing upon Article I, § 8 (monetary and commercial power), Article I, § 9 (appropriations and fiscal discipline), and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Doctrine establishes that most contemporary decentralized systems operate within a constitutional vacuum: they perform value transfer, economic coordination, and pseudo-monetary behavior without satisfying the representational prerequisites of the American constitutional order. This analysis is further grounded in <i>Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward</i>, <i>Gibbons v. Ogden</i>, <i>Wickard v. Filburn</i>, <i>United States v. Lopez</i>, <i>NFIB v. Sebelius</i>, and the post–<i>Loper Bright</i> landscape of statutory interpretation, revealing how modern digital governance architectures strain the boundaries of jurisdiction, accountability, and enforceability.At the systems-engineering level, the Doctrine reframes decentralization not as a monetary phenomenon but as a cryptographic lineage derived from Haber and Stornetta’s foundational timestamping architecture. This lineage demonstrates that Bitcoin’s core innovation was not the creation of new money, but the operationalization of a distributed verification engine. The work therefore distinguishes decisively between decentralization as architectural substrate and cryptocurrency as asset behavior, establishing that most digital tokens cannot qualify as commodities under the Commodity Exchange Act absent a constitutionally anchored framework for origin accountability, managerial neutrality, and market integrity.The Doctrine exposes structural defects in modern legislative approaches — including H.R. 3633 — demonstrating how contemporary statutory efforts misapply classical commodity theory, create jurisdictionally unanchored digital entities, and institutionalize anonymity architectures that undermine due process, enforcement capacity, and market legitimacy. In response, this work develops the Anchored Decentralization Test, the first system-level doctrine to allow Congress, courts, and regulators to classify digital assets based on verifiable architectural behavior rather than semantic self-description.The Doctrine further introduces the novel concept of Autonomous Commodity Primitives (ACPs) — a sovereign-grade digital infrastructure class designed not as speculative instruments but as immutable, cryptographic attestations of real-world sovereign reserve assets. ACPs are engineered to function as Treasury-grade verification rails, enabling real-time auditability, ledger-level integrity, and constitutionally compliant Asset-Backed Digital Currency (ABDC) architecture. Unlike cryptocurrencies, ACPs do not manufacture value; they attest to value that already exists within sovereign reserve systems.To harmonize privacy with constitutional accountability, the Doctrine integrates Zero-Knowledge Proofs, privacy-preserving audit layers, and non-custodial verification mechanisms, allowing digital systems to preserve Fourth Amendment-equivalent privacy while maintaining lawful traceability through institutional channels. This design restores the Chain of Consent without creating surveillance architecture.The Doctrine concludes that decentralization without accountability constitutes a structural form of constitutional evasion — an economy operating beyond representation. By restoring constitutional anchoring to distributed architectures, the Doctrine preserves innovation while reaffirming the Republic’s foundational principle: that economic power is legitimate only when traceable to those whom the Constitution recognizes as sovereign.Ultimately, The Doctrine of Anchored Decentralization provides a constitutional roadmap for the next century of digital infrastructure. It is <i>not a rejection</i> of decentralized technology, but a <i>restoration</i> of its lawful purpose: to function as a verifiable architecture of trust, anchored to the constitutional principles that have sustained the United States for more than two centuries.

Pablo Podadera, Immaculada Colomina Limonero

Abstract Spain’s system of governance is characterized by a complex web of vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relationships, reflecting its unique historical evolution from centralized authoritarianism to decentralized democracy. The continuous evolution of this framework aims to balance regional autonomy with national and European unity, ensuring effective governance in a diverse political landscape. Horizontal coordination refers to the cooperation between different levels of government, sectors, and organizations to achieve coherent policy outcomes. This approach is crucial in managing the complex administrative structure, which includes autonomous communities with significant powers. Effective horizontal coordination ensures consistent policy implementation, reduces redundancy, and promotes innovation through shared resources and knowledge. Experience with horizontal coordination highlights the importance of clear communication channels, joint decision-making processes, and the integration of different perspectives. However, regional disparities and political tensions can hamper these efforts, requiring continuous dialogue and adaptability of coordination mechanisms.

Violeta Ruiz Almendral

Abstract This chapter focuses on the diversities within the Spanish State of Autonomies, shedding light on the asymmetrical nature of the devolution process, with an emphasis on the transformation of the constitutional framework concerning tax and finance power decentralization, juxtaposing Spanish Fiscal Federalism within the broader context of the European Union. An exploration of intergovernmental tax relations uncovers the limited efficacy of mixed commissions, leading to an assessment of the Spanish Constitutional Court's central role in mediating conflict. The analysis concludes by looking forward, speculating on the potential future trajectories of Spanish fiscal federalism.

Masatsugu Ito

Abstract In this chapter, the historical development of the relationship between the central and local governments in Japan will be analyzed in terms of three aspects – administration, finance, and politics – and the characteristics of the relationship between the central and local governments in Japan will be clarified by setting a framework of interfusion and separation. When modernizing, Japan studied the local government systems in place throughout the European continent and chose to adopt the interfusion model of the relationship between central and local governments, whereby the central government delegates its policies to local governments to ensure their implementation. The relationship between the central and local governments in Japan has undergone changes through functional centralization during the wartime regime, decentralization through reforms implemented during the Occupation, and decentralization reforms that have been taking place since the 1990s. However, the characteristics of interfusion have been maintained and reinforced through municipal mergers and the development of a system of fiscal adjustments. While Japan has a high ratio of local government to total government activities relative to other countries, this characteristic of Japan is supported by an interfusion-type relationship between the central and local governments.

JEAN-FRANÇOIS TREMBLAY

Abstract Canada has evolved into one of the most fiscally decentralized federations in the world. Provinces enjoy considerable autonomy and play a central role in designing and implementing economic and social policies. This chapter outlines key features of Canadian fiscal federalism, especially the extensive decentralization of legislative responsibilities and taxation powers to provincial governments, the wide-ranging intergovernmental transfer system designed to maintain fiscal balance between orders of governments and among provinces, as well as the mechanisms in place to promote some harmonization of policies and cooperation among provinces. Current challenges to Canadian fiscal federalism are outlined including pressures on horizontal and vertical fiscal balance associated with demographic changes, rapidly increasing costs in the public health care system which have been intensified by the Covid-19 pandemic, persistent tensions associated with the geographic concentration of natural resources, as well as pressures on municipal finance resulting from ongoing urbanization and growing infrastructure needs, among others.

Sisay Regassa Senbeta, Yakob Bekele Hundie

Abstract Fiscal federalism in Ethiopia has been implemented within a unique political context. The adoption of a multiethnic federal system has reshaped the fiscal and economic landscape of the country since 1991. Following the political restructuring towards federalization, the culture of centralization of fiscal powers and responsibilities, which had been witnessed for more than half a century, has significantly been altered. Yet, Ethiopia is a highly centralized federation, both in design and practice. The division of powers favors the Federal government in legislation and policymaking. The provision of most public services is, however, significantly decentralized. The lucrative sources of revenue are assigned to be either exclusive federal powers or concurrent. As a result, Ethiopia’s fiscal federalism has been characterized by a high degree of fiscal imbalances, the Federal General-Purpose Grant (FGPG), an equalization transfer, being the dominant mechanism to bridge the imbalances. Revenue sharing and specific purpose transfers constitute only a very small proportion of Subnational finance. States’ borrowing rights are limited to internal sources and are subject to stringent preconditions set by the federal government.

Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal

No abstract is available for this record.

Harihar Bhattacharyya

The chapter examines the structures and processes in intergovernmental or centre–state relations in federations in Asia. The relations are the operative part of federalism. While there is a constitutionally mandated distribution of powers and responsibilities for each tier of government in federations, the actual operations may take different forms. Beyond the constitutional structure, there are factors such as the party system, leadership, fragmented society etc. which factor into whether the relations are to be cooperative, conflictual or both. Democracy is the silver lining in centre–state relations, for it alone provides the scope for dialogue. But often democracy can be an irritant for smooth federal-provincial relations when the federation is held hostage by some recalcitrant forces. A federation may be very centralized and authoritarian, in which case the federal units are dependent on the centre’s whims for disbursement. Structurally, Myanmar and Malaysia are centralized, but federalism there does not work. In India, constitutionally, the Union government is very powerful, but then administratively it is decentralized. The Finance Commission here has followed a particular formula in financial disbursement to the states which has ensured a good balance in centre–state relations. Finally, this chapter highlights the new role of the federal units in the wake of implementing neoliberal reforms.

Kenneth K. Wong, Felix Knüpling, Mario Kölling, Diana Chebenova

No abstract is available for this record.

Ayoze Corujo, Carlos Fernández Esquer, José Rama

Spain is a country where the nationalist cleavage has a fundamental importance to understand the party systems and the dynamics of electoral competition in some Autonomous Communities. This article analyzes the electoral bases of the main regionalist parties in Spain and, specifically, it focuses on the electoral bases of Canary Coalition (CC). Despite its importance at the regional level, this party has received little attention by the academic literature. This article confirms the idea that CC is a party able to mobilize an electorate whose preferences are for a more decentralized territorial organization than the current one. However, the key finding is that, unlike what happens with the main regionalist parties in Spain, the identity associated with the Autonomous Community is not an explanatory factor of the vote for CC, what shows that the Canarian identity is not politically activated.

Antonio Bar

The participation of Professor Joseph Weiler in the debate on the conflict raised by Catalan separatism in Spain and, therefore, his response to López Bofill’s article, “Hubris, Constitutionalism, and ‘The Indissoluble Unity of the Spanish Nation,’” and to mine, “A Reply to Hèctor López Bofill,” is full of good intention. It intends to be balanced and tries to find a reasonable and adequate solution to the serious problem of Catalan separatism, at least from a formal—constitutional—point of view, but also from a moral and ethical perspective. His vision is, therefore, rational, formalistic, and normative. And, perhaps for this very reason, although well-founded, his vision does not comprehend the real dimension of the problem, which goes beyond the conceptual aspects, further from the mere nominal question of how Spain is defined in its current 1978 Constitution or how Catalonia should be conceptualized, also from the constitutional point of view. Basically, Professor Weiler’s argument revolves around three parameters: the concept of Catalonia as a nation; the inappropriate or unjustified Catalan separatist claim; and the inadequacy of the constitutional definition of Spain as an indivisible Nation. In regard to the first aspect, Prof. Weiler has no doubt in describing Catalonia as a nation. He says: “the Catalans are a textbook example of the notion of a People, a Demos, a Nation . . . in the full sense as understood by international law”; and he adds: “as such entitled to the right of Self-Determination.”1 And, in categorical terms, he completes his argument, rebutting mine, by saying: “It does not quite matter in my view, as it seems to matter to Professor Bar, what the original national identity of Catalonia was. These things evolve. There used to be a big debate, whether the Palestinians could be thought of as a distinct people or nation. Who can doubt that for at least the last fifty years.”2 There are thus two implicit problems in this question: one is the consideration of Catalonia as a national entity, and the other is the existence of a right to self-determination linked to that consideration of Catalonia as a nation. Concerning the conceptualization of Catalonia as a nation, I wonder what “textbook” Prof. Weiler refers to, since hundreds of books and articles of all kinds, from various and frequently contradictory perspectives—historical, political, legal, ethnic, philosophical—have already been produced on the concept of nation, among which it is difficult to find a single definition of it that could be commonly accepted at least by a majority of the members of the above-mentioned branches of the social sciences. And, in what refers to international law proper, that which derives from the United Nations system, there is not in it a single defining line of what is a nation. There are constant references to terms such as “peoples,” “countries,” colonized territories (“non-self-governing territories and trust territories”), “national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities,” and their rights; but even here there is no clear concept about what the defining profiles of these terms are. What is relevant here, from the point of view of the right to self-determination, is the existence of an occupation, a colonization, the oppression of a people by a foreign state. In fact, the problem is that the concept of nation is not univocal or neutral; it is, by definition, a political and utilitarian concept, invented—in its current meaning—in the nineteenth century with the specific objective of justifying the creation of new states, either by aggregation or by separation of territories belonging to other pre-existing states; territories with a common human component, generally distinguishable by a shared language and culture. And, from the second half of the twentieth century on, the concept has been used for the purpose of allowing the liberation of peoples subjected to colonization and their transformation into new states. That is to say, the concept of Nation is a political one designed at achieving a specific end: the formation of a State. So much so, that the concepts of Nation and State end up being interchangeable and meaning the same. Not in vain “Nation”—not “State”—is the term that the United Nations uses to define itself and in all its basic legal texts—after World War I, the “League of Nations,” and after World War II, the “United Nations”—although, in reality, those who have formed and are part of these organizations are, in proper terms, states and not simply human groups not politically organized. And, of course, the concept of “nationality”—not “stateness”—is used in international law to indicate the legal belonging of a citizen to a state. And the problem is that this is how the Catalan separatists interpret the concept of a Nation: a people with its own and homogeneous identity, which aspires to be a sovereign and independent State and which, given that—in their own interpretation—it is currently occupied—some say oppressed and colonized—by another State, namely, Spain, it demands the exercise of the right to self-determination which, according to Prof. Weiler, is recognized by international law. Prof. Weiler, however, says that the “political view of the relationship between Nation and State—One Nation=One State—which takes us back 100 years to the end of WWI . . . today has lost, in my view, much of its moral force”; to which he adds: “In my understanding of international law, the right to self-determination implies a right to secession only under circumstances which do not apply in the Spanish situation.” Therefore, although from a legal point of view, Prof. Weiler recognizes the foundation of the Catalan separatists’ argument—being a Nation—and the consequent right to self-determination, he immediately, from a political and conjunctural point of view, denies them the exercise of this right, because he understands that such exercise “today has lost . . . its moral force,” and because the circumstances that would justify it do not exist in Spain at present. Still on this question—the concept of Catalonia as a Nation—it is very surprising that Prof. Weiler uses the Palestinian people as an example of a process of identity formation comparable to the process of formation of the identity of the Catalan people. I would say that we face here two processes that are inverse and, therefore, contrary. Catalonia is today a plural reality, with a diverse sociological component, whose plurality, far from disappearing, forming a homogenous whole with increasingly precise profiles, has expanded and become more and more heterogeneous. In this sense, Catalonia not only includes diverse geographical areas with their own economic and social structure, but also areas with different linguistic and cultural components. For instance, the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia specifically recognizes the existence of the Aran Valley, as a distinct “Occitan reality endowed with cultural, historical, geographical and linguistic identity,” which it “recognizes, protects and respects.” In addition, there are even human groups with a similar (if not identical) culture and language to that of the Catalans, which are not included within the territorial and political borders of present-day Catalonia—what the Catalan nationalists call països catalans, Catalan countries. Furthermore, Catalan society has been enriched over the years—mainly throughout the last 100 years of its history—by successive waves of immigration which have diluted that pretended uniformity and homogeneity of the Catalan people; first, immigration from other regions of Spain and, in recent years, immigration coming mainly from other Eastern European and African states. And this is precisely what has led the nationalist and separatist authorities of Catalonia to carry out a series of identity policies, fundamentally in the field of education, tending to artificially produce and enforce that uniformity, or linguistic and cultural homogeneity. And this is also what inspires the intolerance and daily harassment with which the Catalan nationalist authorities and the radical separatist groups punish any differentiation and all political dissent or deviation from the identity-nationalist-separatist objectives. Furthermore, now in strictly political terms, it is also clear that the Catalan society, far from being a uniform, homogeneous one, is at most a fifty-fifty divided society between those who seek the independence of Catalonia and those who want it to remain as a part of Spain. Thus, in successive elections of all kinds—local, regional, national, European—from 1979 onward, only on very few occasions did the nationalist/separatist groups surpass 50 percent of the popular vote, while in the vast majority of cases it was the non-nationalist/separatist groups that got more than half of the votes. On the other hand, Catalonia is not only a plural reality, but it is also fully integrated, without any differentiation or discrimination, within the whole of the Spanish society, making it, for this reason, also a plural society. The basic institutions of the State—Parliament, government, courts of justice, army, police, national health, public administration at all levels, etc.—are absolutely permeable to all the human groups that make up the plural reality of Spain and are composed of people coming from all corners of the Spanish territory, whether Catalonia, Galicia, Basque Country, Castile, Andalusia, Valencia, or any other region of the State. This is further emphasized by the Spanish Constitution, according to which no discrimination among Spaniards “on account of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion or any other personal or social condition or circumstance” is allowed (art. 14). Concerning the right to self-determination, which Prof. Weiler recognizes for Catalonia, I cannot help but recognize that the right to self-determination of peoples is one of the basic principles that inspires the very formation of the United Nations (and thus it is enshrined in article 1 of its Charter). However, this right was then defined as a right recognized to peoples under colonization or oppressed by foreign powers, within the general framework of the processes of decolonization that followed World War II, but not as a right that authorizes the disintegration of already consolidated states, members of said Organization. Accordingly, this right was already established by the early Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV), of December 14, 1960, which, although in its section 2 establishes that “all peoples have the right of self-determination,” in section 6 clearly states that “any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” And this formula has been repeated in subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.3 And, of course, in the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Helsinki Final Act of 1975 (§ 1.a.VIII). What is relevant here is to underline that although the United Nations intends to preserve the territorial integrity of its member states, as we have just seen,4 international law limits this principle and ensures the primacy of the right to self-determination of peoples, which must prevail in those cases in which the states do not conduct themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and do not possess a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or color.5 Therefore, only in this case would the dismembering of a sovereign State—a member of the United Nations—be justified. This is what is called the “right of remedial secession.”6 So, according to international law, if Catalonia is a Nation and/or an oppressed people, without political representation and without recognized fundamental rights, it has the right to self-determination and ultimately to become an independent State. But, if Catalonia is not a Nation and/or an oppressed people, if it enjoys political representation and the full and judicially guaranteed exercise of fundamental rights—as is the case, under the current democratic and constitutional system of Spain, governed by the Constitution of 1978—it lacks the right to self-determination, in accordance with the provisions of international law. Moreover, it is not only that Catalonia enjoys political representation in the State and the full exercise of fundamental rights, but—as Prof. Weiler acknowledges—it also enjoys a broad political autonomy and a system of competences that surpasses by far that of many members of federal states, both in Europe and in other parts of the world. In this sense, if we accept the distinction that some internationalists make between the right to “external self-determination” as the right to become a sovereign State and the right to “internal self-determination” as the right to self-government or political autonomy within the State, there is no doubt that, in accordance with international law, Catalonia lacks the right to “external self-determination,” but it already enjoys and exercises daily—since it was granted political autonomy, in 1979—the right to “internal self-determination.” Concerning the inadequacy of the constitutional definition of Spain as an indivisible Nation, I cannot but agree with Prof. Weiler in his perception of Spain as a plural entity from sociological, cultural, linguistic, and historical points of view. That is precisely what led the drafters of the Constitution to recognize the autonomy of the “nationalities and regions” that make up the Spanish “Nation” in its article 2. In fact, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 adopts several formulas to define Spain—not just one—depending on the aspect of the political reality called Spain that it defines. Thus, Spain is defined in the constitutional text as “a social and democratic State, subject to the rule of law,” as a “parliamentary monarchy,” as a Nation (“the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible country of all Spaniards”),7 as a Nation of nationalities (“The Constitution . . . recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it [the Spanish nation] is composed”), or as a people endowed with full sovereign power (“the Spanish people ratify the . . . Constitution”; “National sovereignty is vested in the Spanish people”). The term “people” is identified with the “Nation,” whose will is expressed through the Cortes (name of the Spanish Parliament) and, directly, through referendum (“The Spanish Nation . . . proclaims its will to . . . the Cortes pass and the Spanish people ratify the following Constitution”). Referendum that the Constitution enacts in general terms in article 92, for the ratification of political decisions of special importance, and also in other sections related to the Constitution of the Autonomous Communities, the approval or modification of the Statutes of Autonomy, the reform of the Constitution, and the possible integration of Navarre in the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. This constitutional definition of Spain was not adopted in the constituent process in a frivolous or hasty manner and, of course, none of these defining formulas was adopted as an obsessed response (“hubris”) to the conflict created by Catalan nationalism, or as a concession to Francoism, as López Bofill maintains in his article and Prof. Weiler acknowledges somehow. On the contrary, the introduction of the term “nationalities”—in fact, the terms “nationalities and regions”—was an initiative of the communist—and also Catalan—member of the drafting team, Jordi Solé, which was immediately supported by the representative of the Catalan nationalists, Miquel Roca. They had though a slightly different perspective, since the communists intended to generalize the process of political decentralization to all the “nationalities and regions” of the state, creating by this a federal State, while the Catalan nationalists had mainly in mind to give a special autonomous status to Galicia, the Basque Country, and Catalonia, which, in their opinion, were the authentic “nationalities” of the Spanish State.8 But what should be highlighted here is that, for the drafters of the constitutional project, the term “nationalities” had the same meaning as that of “nations” since, for them, both terms served to represent the plurality of the Spanish Nation, which is composed of different languages and cultures. Thus, in the debate, terms such as a “Nation of nations” or a “multinational State” were frequently used to describe Spain.9 The problem then was not so much whether to describe Spain as a Nation of nations but whether the term “nationalities” should be included in the constitutional text at all, since there was tough opposition in some sectors. What is clear, be that as it may, is that those who defended the inclusion of the term “nationalities” in the constitutional text actually meant by this constitutional acknowledgment to reflect the plural reality of Spain, with the existence of different languages and cultures. “Nationalities” and “Nations,” for the constituent fathers, in this sense, were terms of equal significance.10 In fact, this cultural and linguistic plurality is now enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution (“The Spanish Nation . . . proclaims its will to . . . Protect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, of their cultures and and of their languages and in article 2 of the nationalities and regions of which it [the Spanish nation] is composed”), and in article (“The other Spanish languages also be in the Autonomous in accordance with their of the different language of Spain is a cultural which be the of special and among And this is even more so, since none of the political groups in the constituent process at the any of those terms to the right to self-determination and the of Therefore, nations and nationalities for them had only that single and same it is also that a and radical of the Basque fact, the political of the to at the end of the constituent debate, an to the constitutional text in to recognize the right to However, the was since it was with the democratic and system that was being The then not so much the of to Spain as a “Nation of nations” in the constitutional Prof. Weiler the of of what those “nationalities” and In any case, the conceptual and the of a definition did not to a right to political autonomy of the “nationalities” but simply to recognize the sociological plurality of Spain and to the Spanish territories to define as as a or a the Constitution several to become an Autonomous Community and different of political on the followed to political but at the end of that the between the competences of the various Autonomous are In for the drafters of the Spanish Constitution, and the cultural and linguistic the same and their in the Constitution is the of their will to recognize the plurality and sociological of Spain and to it politically by of a broad and system of Nation is equal to State as recognized in international law, and to say that the Spanish Nation is indivisible is to that the Spanish State is that, in of being an of State, the Spanish Constitution to be through a constitutional in its article Furthermore, since the last of of the Statutes of Autonomy between and many of them define the Autonomous Community either as a or Country, Galicia, Andalusia, Valencia, as a or as a or three Autonomous do not any of these to define and In the case of Catalonia, its Statute of Autonomy uses a formula intended to what the Statute to be the will of the people of Catalonia to define it as a with the constitutional of Catalonia, the and the will of the of Catalonia, has defined Catalonia as a nation. The Spanish Constitution, in its second article, recognizes the national reality of Catalonia as a And, in this its article 1 establishes that as a exercises its self-government as an Autonomous Community in accordance with the Constitution and with this which is its basic Therefore, to say that the definition of Spain as a of nationalities and or that the of the of the Spanish Nation, are the of an of the drafters of the Spanish Constitution Catalonia, or a concession to the already Francoism, is but a clear of an and/or of a serious of how the constituent process was in Spain.

David Llewhelin Foulkes

The government is organised principally on a functional basis, there being Departments of, for example, health, agriculture, education, trade, employment, industry. Each is headed by a Secretary of State appointed by the Prime Minister from members of either House of Parliament. Acts of Parliament have created a system of local government. In England and Wales there are 43 county councils and some 350 district councils, there being therefore an average of some eight district councils within the area of each county council. A crucial point about the authorities is that their membership is elected. Parliament and the local authorities are the only elected bodies within the UK Central government departments have various powers of intervention over local authorities’ activities. Although local authorities have a taxing power, the tax base is such that the amount they are able to raise falls far short of what is required to finance the services they provide.

André Borges

This chapter analyzes how multilevel elections, strong subnational governments, and decentralized electoral rules shape the workings of Brazil’s democratic institutions. I seek to answer two major questions. First, to what extent have institutions adopted by the 1988 Constitution created effective incentives for party nationalization and integration and, therefore, for organization of party competition around the dispute over the national executive? Second, what is the impact of multilevel elections on electoral coordination and party fragmentation in congressional races? The core argument is that the institutional mix chosen by the drafters of the 1988 Constitution created cross-cutting incentives. Concurrent presidential, national legislative, and state elections since 1994 have tended to strengthen presidential coattails and the related incentives for party coordination around presidential campaigns, and extensive presidential legislative powers facilitate centralization of the policy-making process. But, although these institutions foster the organization of a nationalized party system and effective intergovernmental coordination, incentives and opportunities provided by multilevel elections in the context of autonomous subnational party branches and highly permissive electoral rules allow for the survival and growth of poorly integrated, office-seeking party organizations organized around subnational races. The chapter concludes that Brazil’s federalism weakens the connection between presidential and legislative races, while at the same time fostering high levels of party fragmentation, therefore increasing the costs of coalition formation.

Petro PATSURKIVSKYY, Ruslana Havrylyuk

The article considers the Swiss model of fiscal municipalization from the ideological and methodological positions of the anthroposociocultural approach. Such components of this approach as historical and genetic methods together with the method of system-structural analysis were applied especially thoroughly and consistently. By means of them it was found that the Swiss model of fiscal decentralization is an attributive part of the construction of public power in Switzerland – municipalization from bottom to top. Special attention is drawn to defining the basic legal features of the Swiss model of fiscal municipalization. It is argued that subsidiarity does not paradigmatically coincide with decentralization: the principle of subsidiarity postulates the sovereignty of the basic territorial collectives and considers the possible conditions for its limitation for general social needs and values. On the contrary, the principle of decentralization has the national level of governance as the starting point and considers the conditions of delegation of certain tasks and competences by the state to the lower levels of public power hierarchy in the principal frames of state sovereignty. Specificity of the principle of subsidiarity in Switzerland is that cantons play dual role from the standpoint of administrative federalism. On the one hand, they are the bearers of sovereignty of public power, including taxation. On the other hand, they are the sole bearers of administrative authority and are obliged to serve national interests, that is, the needs of the entire Swiss Confederation. Paradox is that this service function of the cantons gives them considerable benefits in the inevitable opposition to the Union state, when it comes to provision of services of the entire fiscal system and the entire system of public finance.

Héctor Díaz Polanco

Regional autonomy is being discussed in Latin America as one of several proposals for resolving the indigenous issue. As a political collectivity, an autonomous community or region is established as a component of the corresponding nation-state. Autonomy seeks not only to satisfy the interests and aspirations of partial communities but to ensure a more adequate integration of the national society. The regime of regional autonomy is a response to the need to ensure democratic representation of the country&s;s sociocultural regions within the state&s;s political and administrative organization in a way compatible with the plural ethnic-national makeup of the society. In these terms, regional autonomy implies a certain political and administrative decentralization of the state. The decentralization brought about by autonomy is juridical-political rather than simply administrative. It depends on the law rather than on the assignment or transfer of functions by a higher administrative organ that can also revoke them.