Blockchain Papers

Teodor Hryvna

This philosophical inquiry examines the Bitcoin phenomenon through the lens of Ren Girard's mimetic theory, exploring how human desire and imitation have shaped the trajectory of this revolutionary digital asset.By analyzing Bitcoin's rise as a manifestation of mimetic desire, we uncover profound insights into the nature of value, the spread of ideas, and the human condition in the digital age.The study argues that Bitcoin, with its inherent scarcity and potent symbolism, has become a uniquely powerful object of desire in our interconnected world.We explore how the mechanisms of imitation and rivalry described by Girard have been amplified by global digital networks, leading to unprecedented patterns of adoption and volatility.Our analysis reveals Bitcoin as a mimetic proxy for broader philosophical and ideological aspirations, including financial sovereignty, technological utopianism, and resistance to established power structures, and later the embodiment of the power novel power structures themselves.Through this lens, Bitcoin emerges not merely as a currency or investment, but as a mirror reflecting collective hopes, fears, and desires.By synthesizing insights of Girard's philosophy with contemporary digital phenomena, this paper offers a novel perspective on the intersection of technology, finance, and human behavior.It challenges us to reconsider our understanding of innovation and adoption, suggesting that the success of new technologies may be as much or even more about fulfilling mimetic desires than solving practical problems.This philosophical exploration of Bitcoin through mimetic theory provides a deeper understanding of how human desire shapes our economic, technological and social landscapes.It invites us to reflect on the nature of progress, the role of imitation in society, and the complex interplay between individual agency and collective behavior in our increasingly digitized world.

Johnathan Bi

What does a theorist of imitation have to teach us about innovation? What could a thinker focused on the distant past have to offer us in building the immediate future? The answer to both questions, I hope to show, is a significant amount. I aim to rescue and develop a neglected strand of Girardian thought from one of his overlooked essays on a topic seemingly antithetical to imitation: innovation. This task proceeds in five steps. First, I articulate two contemporary perspectives on innovation, one dominant and one in the minority. Second, I reconstruct Girard's historical argument from “Innovation and Repetition” in favor of the minority view and, third, his psychological argument against the dominant view. Fourth, I show how Girard's philosophy of innovation sublates crucial features of both poles and provides an alternative mode for conceiving the future.1 Lastly, I wrestle with an immanent objection that threatens the prescriptive force of his entire argument and, even when reconciled, leads me to depart from Girard's conclusions, albeit in the most Girardian of ways.The dominant view of innovation is that it is opposed to imitation. The foundational type of opposition between the two is metaphysical: imitation and innovation are actions different in kind and must be conceived of as such. Peter Thiel's famous formulation is representative: certain actions, companies, and countries are innovative, going from “zero to one,” while others are imitative, going from “one to N.”2 This distinction is mostly accepted without question in the social sciences, underpinning entire disciplines such as innovation studies.3 This near-universal consensus, however, is a modern phenomenon. The Latin innovatio, for example, described innovation as being inseparable from the imitation of the past: the Jews returning to Jerusalem, Job having his wealth restored, or the rebirth of a phoenix.4 The word itself reveals as much. Innovatio is derived by appending the prefix in- (within, from inside) to novitas (novelty). It meant novelty that preceded from within, or renewal. Under this view, innovation was not about breaking free or starting from a blank slate, zero to one, but rather rescuing and developing an already formed foundation, one to N. Innovation was identical with the imitation and adaptation of that which is essential but has been obscured. Only beginning in the twentieth century has imitation been so strongly demarcated from innovation.5Built on top of this metaphysical opposition is a practical opposition. Not only are the two actions distinct, they are incompatible: the more one imitates, the more one risks eroding one's ability to innovate. This stronger form of opposition is exemplified by the idea of the “untutored genius” whose source of creativity is solely internal: a fully formed natural endowment not requiring learning nor external inspiration from divinity or nature. This idea gained ascendancy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and proponents believed that imitation of tradition impeded the expression of one's own innate genius.6 If one wants to write a great book, this idea goes, one ought not read great books for fear that they will crowd out one's original ideas. Even in the twentieth century, Wittgenstein expressed this exact sentiment when he proudly claimed not to have read any Aristotle or engaged deeply with the history of philosophy and considered those who have “academic and therefore unauthentic philosophers.”7 Of course, not all modern thinkers see innovation and imitation as practically opposed in such a strong way.8 But even for most who treat the two as harmonious, imitation tends to be relegated to a secondary afterthought as the mere mechanism by which innovation, the primary source of value creation, spreads. This, then, is the third form of opposition drawn out between the two concepts: a normative one. Imitation is, at best, of secondary value when compared to acts of innovation.The practical and, to a lesser degree, normative oppositions appear so unsound as to not warrant serious engagement, and already contested by theorists who study innovation as to not require another rebuttal. What makes Girard's response to them interesting, however, is their prevalence as the default modality by which practitioners—artists, entrepreneurs, inventors, researchers, and activists—conceive of innovation. Thus, it is precisely their obvious unsoundness that raises an interesting question: how could such mistaken ideas be so widely adopted, by the very people who engage in innovation every Girard's answer will be that is a in that makes people to precisely the features of the dominant view. Under this the of “Innovation and Repetition” is not rescuing an alternative of innovation against of the dominant it is the of to a modern this dominant view, a minority of modern treat imitation as on a with in of a between the tradition is of past and innovation proceeds the imitation of Imitation is with innovation, not as an afterthought by which it but as a Even the between the two is so to that imitation and innovation be the without a only from one to the actions or only in and not a this minority of thinkers who that imitation and innovation on a The of Girard's which I to is a one. The of his philosophy of innovation is on the it out of historical historical of Girard's argument is the from of external seventeenth century and to eighteenth century and external the people are are distant they are historical in the past or they are considered such as the between and the are they are considered more or is the is about the of about the of the of the modern and more the and even has not to this is that the against which an value was from to a distant to from the for one of Girard's one distant whose will a crucial is the Thus, this from external to be as the of Of course, external all or the eighteenth century, and the Girard's is that been a in the dominant to with the was by First, from being to for past and This idea out of the from external and to which a of historical imitation. for is an that their being is of imitation. The of the imitation of the as and reveals the value to Second, the of innovation from to The of this is a in the with which innovation. to the seventeenth century, and the primary of innovation, it with and the the primary of innovation was it to The of the word but and that was This could be the from external to the external one's value is by one's to a distant the of innovation is, and, the one's value is by one's against a of the of innovation from others is, distinction and, This has been a from to different the third The idea is that are at even value is when compared to source is solely the to on tradition or to great to us will on to of the in innovation has in so it makes to out the has in a is not the a but a social and that to be from and the modern historical with two on imitation: an of with a to The for the in is in external imitation is and without to The the without even being imitation is and a a only to have in for the in from of the First, aim to be it to any any on a it was a question of to but to What was was not the of imitation but that of the and as who free from the of tradition to their own this modern was the The innovation, which was their of the the of is not one of but of of course, the with the imitation of tradition rather the from from Second, innovation is a to be rather a to be This, in with the dominant view that imitation and innovation are the for being a have from distant mostly in the past to in the more the their to us is and the the of Imitation does not as the have the of being or of so their contemporary on the are more on with they have could be and as imitation be an that they are to in the of external have to in from external to the in and the two on the historical he to innovation is in such in both and the has the such while the to have Even the of and of the must at the past century will be for more so Girard's answer is that different in the two the or the to in different If the that is the that it is If the is mostly for the of has so it the to the is a an of and This the to one is on the one is to the of the external not a of to be to so to imitation. the imitation one to to even for those who is a and are so that is in being a for This a of imitation and a that has a of and, the such of are Thus, the in the in of imitation. of is as in the mechanism to between and with to teach and those in of to the to the type of imitation described in or they to their by the to that of The to be a to be considered innovative, to not one's the of imitation are so strong that as is at all rather the of the even it against own in to Not rather in in is about this of is that it at the very it to is one is on the by being they is not It is to be of one is a who is from the primary Not only is not it even the of the with as an of from to more his This to show the of and such as with and for Thus, to be more of the to then, that is an immanent to the of and the of are two one to Girard's historical argument as could the of the historical has been more the for the imitation is for innovation. Even both the most to be is the of that obvious the mechanism by which the of innovation threatens innovation. The is that it is an of and not of that innovation in This answer to the historical is Girard's argument for the minority view. If the dominant view is the to have more of imitation. The that the is that imitation has more the practical opposition claimed by the dominant view. It the metaphysical and, normative oppositions strongly in the two actions are so practically are they different in If it even to one the the this question of the the metaphysical opposition is the foundational one. 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The was to tradition so that more to from of when to of as the is to to are with and demarcated by an or the and to from What is the of innovation. The is to tradition to it more of the then, most of his imitation only as a to historical This of course, that historical even the features of the dominant view as a this is the to Thiel's to the formulation of Girard's philosophy of have a of the past and a of a view that sublates two It the from the minority view that innovation is inseparable from imitation without that the is to the It the that tradition innovation from the dominant view without the past have Girard's argument in “Innovation and that of innovation proceeds and not imitation: one to N. 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But this is the two that this modern It is precisely the theorist of imitation that has the most to teach us about innovation. the without being in the past any more in Girard's own with in the

Dimitri Van Den Meerssche, Geoff Gordon

On the heavily polluted soil of De Ceuvel-a former shipyard in Amsterdam turned into an eco-tech playground-the Sovereign Nature Initiative (SNI) recently convened its first Experimental Zone: a 'celebration of ecology, art, theory and emerging technologies' (Sovereign Nature Initiative 2022a).Bringing together crypto-poets, ecophilosophers, blockchain developers and tech start-up investors, the gathering sought to spark 'radical approaches toward sustainability'.How could the non-human speak for and sustain itself when seen, sensed, mediated and multiplied through new technological tools or interventions?Which worlds can be crafted where 'trees, hyenas, snails, rivers, elk and algae preserve their own value' and 'humans … have a stake in their thriving' (Sovereign Nature Initiative 2022b)?How can one govern with and through the sky and subterranean?Situated at the 'intersection of ecology, economy and emerging web3 technologies', SNI nurtures 'radical approaches' that aspire to 'reconfigur[e] nature's value' and to enact a 'non-exploitative, non-consumerist' relation between 'nature, humans and technology'.De Ceuvel in Amsterdam Noord proved a perfect place for this experimental exploration.Built on the site's toxic soil, creative workspaces nested in old houseboats are tied together with natural surroundings through a winding wooden jetty.Phytoremediation plants labor (and die) to clean the polluted earth-a process that is measured, mapped and materialized into a vibrant, hybrid and digitally mediated ecology.De Ceuvel describes itself as 'never finished'-in a 'perpetual state of development' (De Ceuvel 2022).It does not only strive for specific sustainability solutions but also for a 'cultural transition', claiming that 'people have to learn new modes of thought and how to apply new techniques and technologies'.Operating on this 'cleantech playground' of De Ceuvel, Metabolic-a technology development and consultancy organisation-developed a 'sensor network' to provide

Changhee Kim

The Biopolitical Effect of Cold War Containment in a Coming-of-Age Narrative:On Postcolonial Subjectivity in Hagedorn's Dogeaters1 Chang-Hee Kim (bio) Amritjit Singh and Peter Schmidt posit that the migration of Third World immigrants, transferring their "existence globally to the promised land" by fleeing from local colonizers to the United States, is "symbolic of the transcendent postcolonial" (28). Such postcolonial migrations to the country rose remarkably in the 1960s when the ideological cause of Cold War containment began to wane with the rise of civil-rights movements. In escaping the terrorist or totalitarian regimes of their homes, these migrants seek universal human rights, political freedom, and economic success in the United States. Instead, the U.S.-led free-market economy of late capitalism became globally dominant and increasingly disempowered the regulatory power of vested institutions, deepening social inequality, income disparity, and political injustice (Douzinas 96). As a result, Third World immigrants, in their endeavor to assimilate into the United States and succeed in its neoliberal market economy, never fulfilled the bourgeois fantasy called the "American dream," for the desire to "become American" only worked to facilitate and sustain the excessive, incessant supply and consumption of human capital that configured and incited the very dream itself. Accordingly, the price of Third World immigrants blending in society [End Page 89] and achieving their American dream was assimilation, as they became "processed" in terms of what Robert Lee calls "symbolic castration" (39); their particular ethnic identities ended up being tamed and disempowered by, and in turn adapted to, American nationalism, thereby enabling them to pass as "good" subjects of U.S. consumer culture. The American dream remains a reified fetish, even as they are exploited to sustain the myth as commodities. They are simultaneously celebrated as good neighbors, with an exotic otherness that supposedly diversifies society, yet deplored as bad neighbors with an unfathomable otherness posing a threat to the social order. Particularly in the post-Cold War milieu of neoliberal multiculturalism, they held a negative valence as a potential threat to be eliminated from society unless offered up for its "healthy" consumption. In other words, only as tokens are migratory subjects essential to the liberal constitution of the U.S. body politic where they are exoticized but "prized possessions," "living proof of desired diversity even as their voices are ignored or silenced" (Singh and Schmidt 28). However, the postcolonial, as well as migratory, subject's accommodation to the ideological edifice of United States' free-market capitalism and its related "melting pot" polices began in earnest with the advent of the Cold War rather than in its wake. In response to the post-WWII formation of the Communist bloc, the United States strategically employed a biopolitical technique of regulation and control in its attribution of citizenship to immigrants. It aimed to secure and integrate a Free World without communists and their sympathizers as much as possible, engaging in a soft war against communist popular front tactics of winning people's minds by nonmilitary means during the Cold War. Thus, Third World immigrants, especially from countries in Asia and Latin America, increasingly became pivotal to rationalizing the United States' containment policy of keeping Soviet communism at bay from the 1950s through the 60s. In an effort to pull themselves out of the uncertain state of identitarian ambiguity, they strained to "become American" to the extent that they put their migratory life on such a biopolitical threshold that "distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside" (Agamben 131). To put this in a historical context, in 1957, the year of the "Sputnik crisis," then Vice President Richard Nixon claimed that the dictators of Moscow aimed to subvert the governments of free countries, not by military means but rather by seeking to foment "economic, psychological, and [End Page 90] subversive activities," fooling the minds of "well-intended people" to plot "ruthless control and domination" all over the world (130). At stake in this speech is a Manichean division separating the human from the non-human race: "We [the human] believe in the spirit of man; they [the non-human] treat man as a machine. We believe in justice and the...

Jon Roffe

That ancient rhetorical trope, symbolic patricide, is alive and well in contemporary philosophy. One need look no further than the fate of Gilles Deleuze at the hands of those who amass beneath the plural banner of contemporary philosophy for proof of this. Of course the great, unavoidable irony is that the position of father is often only occupied post mortem, symbolic murder being at the same time the installation of this or that thinker at the head of yesterday’s table. I mean here simply that in the rush to stake new theoretical ground beyond ‘post-modernism’, hermeneutics and deconstruction, wild empiricism, correlationism — in sum, all of those avatars of imperialism our autochthonous fairy tales warn us about in such dire tones — Deleuze’s name comes to stand in for everything we must not anymore want or think, despite his demonstrable innocence in many regards. This prosecutory fervor leads to critical attacks that engage very little with the work itself, unconsciously exemplifying Walter Benjamin’s ninth thesis for the critic: ‘Polemics mean to destroy a book in a few of its sentences. The less it has been studied the better’ (2008: 67). These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Judith Scherer Herz

Ring the bells that still can ring Forget your perfect offering There is a crack, a crack in everything. That’s how the light gets in. Leonard Cohen, “Anthem” What does it mean to count the days in Paradise Lost , to plot its chronology? Indeed, can one count out the poem’s time and by such counting account for time, and what is at stake in this arithmetic? Why do we need to be assured that thirty-three days pass? Or maybe only twenty-eight or twenty-nine plus four, those four being days of a different durée , not days as we know them (as if the others were, although Raphael says that he has “measure[ed] things in Heav’n by things on Earth” [6.893] – but what “things”?). Accounting for time – so many days for fighting, falling, weltering, circling, traversing each colure, destroying, creating – assumes (and is then offered as proof of) a narrative coherence and an epistemological certainty, which may be more illusory than not. Of course, the materials are all there and as readers suspended in our own time, we are busy counting; arithmeticians all, we sum those thirty-three days to make them (Eureka!) equal the life span of Christ and we know with numeric certainty that the absolute center of the original ten-book text is the word “ascended,” as the Son, “the copious matter” of the poet’s song as he had promised in Book 3, caesura to follow, steps up into the chariot of paternal deity. No doubt Milton liked to play numerological games (one might pity the amanuenses who had to do the counting and the adjusting to make it work out), but even as the text asks us to count, it baffles our certainties. Indeed as reader-accountants we are rather like Satan, the ultimate literalist, time’s accountant. Surveying the Eden he has returned to undo in Book 9, Satan glories how: in one day [he had] marr’d What he Almightie styl’d, six Nights and Days Continu’d making, and who knows how long Before had bin contriving, though perhaps Not longer then since I in one Night freed From servitude inglorious welnigh half Th’Angelic Name. (136–42; emphasis added)