This article explores how Thai men construct and perform masculine identities through cryptocurrency trading, using the concept of crypto-masculinity to examine how digital finance becomes a site for gendered self-making. While existing scholarship on masculinity in financial contexts often centers on transnational business masculinities in Western corporate settings, little attention has been paid to how masculinity is enacted in decentralized, digital financial spaces, particularly in non-Western contexts. Addressing this gap, this article draws upon in-depth interviews with 21 male traders in Thailand to analyze how masculinity is shaped by the internal instability of masculinity and local cultural norms. This study identifies three key themes through which Thai men's subjectivity is negotiated: valorizing failure, homosociality, and âbecoming a good Thai man.â As a result, this article challenges assumptions about the naturalized links between men and finance, suggesting the need for further research on how exclusions within digital finances are taking place to better support equality on crypto platforms.
In 1986, the Filipino people made history by overthrowing the 13-year Marcos dictatorship through a peaceful people power revolution. As a result, the country restored democracy and free elections through the 1987 Constitution which promised to empower citizens and Local Government Units (LGUs). Decentralization and local autonomy were further enhanced to put greater freedom and autonomous powers to local governments. However, it was the shortcomings of decentralization that paved the way for the interest of conversion to federalism. Thus, the present administration of the Philippine government has planned to convert the country's political system from democratic to federal. The study employed descriptive research design. The 58 local government officials in SAMARICA area were purposively selected. It includes the municipality of San Jose, Magsaysay, Rizal, and Calintaan in the province of Occidental Mindoro. The instrument underwent validity procedures and in the reliability test, it was found reliable. Result shows that the local government officials are middle-aged, male, and college graduate. In addition, they are the only politician in the family, members of the Liberal party, and councilors serving in the third class municipalities with short political experience. Lastly, officials have been attending seminars and trainings in the national level with few membership in organizations. The officials are "moderately perceptive" about the issues surrounding the proposed federal system of government. There is a significant difference in the respondents' perspectives when they are grouped based on age, the class of municipality, position, and attended seminars and trainings.
The virginity test as a practise stretching back to at least the Middle Ages has, in recent western popular discourse, been firmly connected with cultures in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Its appearance, then, in the western-authored sheikh romance is not entirely surprising. This chapter explores the representation of the virginity test in English Orientalist romances from two distinct historical moments: the late Middle Ages and the twenty-first century. This cross-period approach takes a long view of the virginity test, considering how current romance ideologies contrast with those of medieval romance. It antagonises exactly what is at stake in persistent reference to the virginity test in romance literature, focusing on their articulations of certainty and uncertainty, loss and possession. Through close readings of six popular sheikh romances featuring virgin heroines published by the genreâs biggest publisher, Harlequin Mills & Boon â Lynne Grahamâs The Arabian Mistress (2001), Lucy Monroeâs The Sheikhâs Bartered Bride (2004), Penny Jordanâs Possessed by the Sheikh (2005), Sarah Morganâs The Sultanâs Virgin Bride (2006), Lynne Grahamâs The Desert Sheikh's Captive Wife (2007) and Chantelle Shawâs At the Sheikhâs Bidding (2008) â alongside two popular English medieval romances â Bevis of Hampton (c.1300) and Floris and Blancheflur (c.1250) â the chapter considers how the test is positioned in each text and what this reveals about the importance of virginity. To put the testing in context, I first offer a brief overview of virginity testing in European culture. Next, I examine the role virginity plays in these romances, outlining their narrative importance. I then move to a focus on the test itself, indicating how testing for virginity is, in these romances, inherently unstable. In the two medieval romances, virginity test can be manipulated, highlighting the unreliability of the test to prove virginity. In sheikh romance, the ultimate virginity test for heroines is penetrative sex with the hero. Therefore, the moment at which the sheikh realises the heroine is a virgin is precisely the moment she ceases to be a virgin; any proof of virginity identified by penetration during a sex act can only be retrospective. Encoded in the very basis of the sex act as virginity test, then, is a fundamental ambiguity; as Kelly argues, âin the end, all tests for verifying virginity are inherently flawedâ (2000, 18). Yet while these retrospective, liminal tests might not be reliable as clear indicators of virginity, they do indicate what is at stake in the âlossâ of female virginity; ultimately, testing for virginity functions to secure male ownership of women as part of the romance genreâs celebration of a heteronormative gender system within which virginity is valued.
Introduction The 18 th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan disentangles overlapping spending responsibilities between the federation and provinces in a wide range of functions, devolving them to the latter. The legislation was also a reaction to relatively poor service delivery and living standards that had fallen continuously behind those in other countries in South Asia, and, indeed, are now lower than sub-Saharan Africa in most respects. The Musharraf government had used this argument for its own decentralization effortâdelegating power to the districts and bypassing the political centers of power in the provinces. The 18 th Amendment reasserts the provinces' power and the associated political centers of power. It is designed to weaken the center, and correspondingly make it less attractive for the military to assume power by moving against an elected Prime Minister, as it has done periodically in Pakistan's history. But will this major reform work effectively and ensure higher living standards for all people in all the provinces? To what extent is the need for a national identity important in ensuring that the decentralization does not cause the federation to unravel or the overall delivery of public services to deteriorate and lead to greater exclusion of the poor? These are important issues and could well determine the fate of the 18 th Amendment as well as social stability in Pakistan. Section 2 outlines developments in theory linking governance and the decentralization process. The links between the two are critical. The main question is whether decentralized service provision can better provide for the poorer sections of society by utilizing information that may be available at the local level in tailoring services to local preferences and making access easier. How are these responsibilities financed? Does the process impede closer economic integration between the federating provinces? This chapter argues that positive approaches to intergovernmental reforms, as exemplified by the People's Republic of China, are perhaps more important for countries such as Pakistan that face significant structural challenges.
Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
PUTTING ON A PLAY IN AN UNDERWORLD COURTROOM: THE ââMINGPANââ (INFERNAL JUDGMENT) SCENE IN TANG XIANZUâS MUDAN TING (PEONY PAVILION) THOMAS KELLY University of Chicago This article is an attempt to present a new way of thinking about courtroom trials in traditional Chinese theater. I look at how one playwright, Tang Xianzu æčŻéĄŻç„ (1550â1616), used meta-theatrical devices to comically deflate and satirize judicial authority. At the same time, however, I argue that he used the scaffolding of the courtroom trial to experiment with theatrical scene composition in the chuanqi ćłć„ drama form. Tang not only used a theatrical idiom to parody the procedures of the courtroom, he looked to the format of the trial to stretch the representational possibilities of the dramatic medium. Questions of what constitutes juridical authority and what grounds an act of adjudication are equally pertinent to the role-playing of the courtroom and the illusionary domain of the stage in his most famous play, Mudan ting çĄäžčäș (The peony pavilion; preface dated 1598). I focus specifically on how these themes are treated in the complex courtroom scene in the twenty-third scene of the play, ââMingpanââ ć„〠(Infernal judgment). The scene as Tang wrote it, I suggest, displays a heightened awareness of how dramatic representations of the law in both the world of the living and the dead can call into question the nature and artifice of the theater itself. THE ââMINGPANââ SCENE IN TANG XIANZUâS MUDAN TING Tang Xianzuâs Mudan ting returns time and again to question the verifiability of charactersâ testimonies and the disputed status of actions taken within the world of the play.1 The burden of proof falls on the two lovers, Du Liniang æéșćš and Liu Mengmei æłć€ąæą , who each must justify and corroborate their testimony before juridical authorities and also prove to family and friends who they are from Scene 16 on. Liu not only has to prove his credentials as a promising scholar to Miao Shunbin èèèł when the latter is inspecting jewels (Scene 21) and metropolitan 1 As Tina Lu has argued at length, questions of personal identity are at stake throughout the play: Are characters who they claim to be? Can we trust their outward appearances? These questions assume an added urgency in the underworld trial scene, which Lu only discusses in relation to issues of counterfeiting and slippage between material and nominal worth in the determination of monetary value (see Tina Lu, Persons, Roles and Minds: Identity in Peony Pavilion and Peach Blossom Fan, [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001], pp. 106â13). CHINOPERL: Journal of Chinese Oral and Performing Literature 32.2 (December 2013): 132â155 # The Permanent Conference on Chinese Oral and Performing Literature, Inc. 2013 DOI: 10.1179/0193777413Z.00000000010 civil service examination candidates (Scene 41), he also has to prove that he is not guilty of robbing the grave of Liniang, the daughter of (the playâs chief patriarch) Du Bao æćݶ. Liu is arrested (Scene 50) and undergoes harsh interrogation and physical torture by Du Bao (Scene 53). It is not until the final scene (Scene 55) that Du Baoâs charges against him are finally dismissed by the emperor, even if this does not lead to Du Bao recognizing Liu as his son-in-law. Du Liniang never suffers judicial torture,2 but she also is required to repeatedly prove that she is who she claims to be and that her loveâa love that both kills and resurrects herâis genuine. Although the final scene is initially presented as a contest between the counterclaims of Du Bao and Liu Mengmei, and it seems that Du Liniang only attends as a witness (she even arrives unescorted), after her arrival the key question becomes whether she is presently a ghost or not.3 Prior to that, however, Liniang is the main ââdefendantââ in ââMingpan,ââ the playâs most elaborate and complex courtroom scene, a scene that appears almost half-way through the drama and marks an important turning point in the narrative.4 Earlier, Du Liniang encountered her lover in a dream (Scene 10), was unable to repeat the experience (Scene 12), became love-sick enough that she felt the need to paint and leave...
This paper is about the âlong fought forâ self-autonomy in Muslim Mindanao as conceived in the peace agreement between the government and the Muslim organization and the prospect of federalizing the ARMM to achieve good governance and quality public service. The realization of self-autonomy can be actualized through federalization or the creation of the BangsaMoro federal state. Given the prevailing conditions of the ARMM as an autonomous region, is federalization politically viable? The focused area of examination is the ARMM specifically its political structure. Also considered in the analysis is the political culture like how patronage politics affects certain aspects of fiscal governance of the ARMM and its repercussion to the delivery of basic services to the people. The methodology used in this study is basically a single-country or area studies which is extrapolative for informational purposes but are also useful for comparison. It is also considered a case study where the unit of analysis is a specific region - in this study the ARMM region which is said to be a test case for the potential of federalism. The most significant outcome of this study is that federalism is politically viable in the ARMM in terms of its political structure of decentralization arguing from Brillantes Model that the next viable step to decentralization is federalization. However, there is much to be desired in actualizing decentralization and the need to enhance governance capabilities through accountability of public officials and transparency as well as providing solutions to the serious problem of patronage politics in the region.
Decentralization and autonomy can potentially increase public sector efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability, as well as fulfill a conflictâmitigating role. There is no guarantee, however, that decentralization, once implemented, would automatically produce the expected benefits. Using the case of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in the Philippines, this article explores the importance of organizational capacity and the cultural, political, and social conditions in the region to explain the performance of the autonomous government. The article concludes that for autonomy to work, the administrative and institutional capacity of the regional government should be revitalized and the current politicoâadministrative structure redesigned to accommodate local customs and practices and facilitate a consultative and collegial local governance arrangement.
This study proceeds from the obvious assumption that without revenue powers and expendi-ture autonomy any devolution of functions on local governments remains hollow. Without resources local self-government is an exercise without much scope for decision-making. But even if local governments do have adequate revenue powers, their fiscal autonomy may be curtailed by utterly restrictive and, often Byzantine, administrative regulations of the central state, erratic interventions by the central government and â for fear of being not returned to office in future elections - a lack of will among local leaders to utilize the revenue powers vested in local authorities. <br>\tAlthough there is a plethora of literature on decentralization in the Philippines, the literature reflects what Linn,48 Smoke,49 and Smoke, Martinez-Vasquez and Peterson 50 have deplored elsewhere in relation to fiscal decentralization in more general terms: there is not much systematic research on how the Local Government Code of 1991 affected the fiscal capabilities of local governments. Most of the decentralization literature stands in the tradi-tion of the old institutionalism 51 and thus strongly centers on legal-institutional aspects and the historical evolution of decentralization in the Philippines. The few serious studies are by now dated 52 or are difficult to access because they are studies commissioned by bilateral and multilateral donor organizations.53 <br>\tThe main objective of this study is thus to explore as to what extent in the Philip-pines the devolution of functions has been accompanied by an adequate allocation of re-sources to local governments. Local fiscal capacities are thus considered as the litmus test for the success of decentralization reforms in the Philippines. <br>This dissertation is organized into five parts. Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical foun-dation of decentralization as well as the studyâs significance, scope and limitations, and methodology. In particular, the theoretical foundation lays down the debate between centrali-zation and decentralization as well as the differing contexts â political and economic - of de-centralization. The research question and the studyâs possible contribution were also ex-plained in this chapter. <br>Chapter 2 describes the Philippinesâ political-legal structure and its local government system. It also briefly outlines the major changes brought about by the Local Government Code of 1991, the most extensive reform legislation on local governments in the countryâs history. <br>Chapter 3 presents the overall or macro-view of decentralization in the Philippines. First, decentralization and local autonomy were explained using the Local Government Code of 1991 wherein the new Code became a catalyst to personnel, functional and fiscal decen-tralization. Second, the local financing structure was described by presenting the trends and dynamics between the central and local governments in obtaining the consolidated LGU in-come and expenditures from 1985 (pre-LGC of 1991) until 2001 (after the passage of the LGC of 1991). Third, the Local Government Code and the LGU Performance were evaluated using the results of the Local Productivity and Performance Measurement System (LPPMS) as a self-assessment tool. <br>Chapter 4 presents the case studies in Bataan and Pampanga on fund sourcing as well as the performance of the Central Luzon Region in local fiscal administration. The case studies will show the experiences of the provinces, cities and municipalities in resource mobilization under the regime of decentralization. This Chapter will also show the impact of inflation or increase in prices in the increase in income on whether the inflation to increase in income leads to real growth in a particular locality. <br>Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the results and observations of the study.
Across the broad issues of decentralized governance in the Philippines, the process of fiscal decentralization continues to require thoroughgoing analysis vis-Ă -vis the incessant protests against purportedly unfair distribution and use of the countryâs fiscal resources. This paper analyzes the institutional framework defining the countryâs intergovernmental fiscal relations that would highlight the critical role of central-local political structures in shaping fiscal decentralization. It examines how the policy standardization, resource coordination and allocation, and monitoring and evaluation in the countryâs intergovernmental finance affect the distribution, generation and use of fiscal resources. Key issues noted include : 1) limited devolution of budget; 2) constrained intergovernmental fiscal transfer system (insufficient and unlawful allocation of funds; lack of transparency and exercise of discretionary powers in the use of fiscal resources); and 3) low levels of local revenue generation. These issues intersect along a contradiction of powers between the local and central government politicians which predominates in an intergovernmental fiscal structure evaluated in this study as lacking in meaningful institutionalization. The basic paradigm of this paper is based on the assumption that decentralization as a political process can best be operated within the framework of centrally-led institutionalization.
The position of local and provincial elites in the Philippines has changed in character. At the beginning of the century the landed elite was relatively autonomous, keeping the state weak and using it to reinforce its position. Since the 1950s a new elite of mercantile entrepreneurs has emerged, dependent on state credit and political protection. Under the martial law regime in the 1970s the state ceased to be an extension of regional elites and acquired the features of a separate level of organization. The transition to the Aquino administration has led to some degree of decentralization. However, provincial politicians are more than ever interested in finding their slot in the central state apparatus.