In this paper, we analyzed the development process of the resident association system in Korea and tried to derive strategic implications for the resident association system in Korea by comparing the resident association system in the United Kingdom and Japan, which are developed countries for resident autonomy. In Chapter 2, the current status and progress of the residents' associations were analyzed through “Introduction of the resident autonomy center and resident autonomy committee under the Kim Dae-jung administration”, “Introduction of the resident autonomy association under the Lee Myung-bak administration”, and “Pilot implementation of the resident autonomy association according to the standard ordinance of the Ministry of Public Administration and Security”. In Chapter 3, the difference was analyzed by comparing the Parish of England, Ichikai in Japan, and Korea's Residents' Autonomous Association. In Chapter 4, the implications of Korea's residents' autonomous association were drawn through the comparison of the Korean and residents' autonomous association systems of the England and Japan. From advanced cases such as the England and Japan, the strategic implication of Korea's residents' autonomous association is that, first, in terms of the installation unit of the residents' autonomous association, it is necessary to reorganize the residents' autonomous association by reducing the unit of eup, myeon, or dong, or to introduce a resident's autonomous association in the unit of tonri or apartment. Second, in terms of the institutional composition of residents' autonomous associations, it is necessary to recognize the status of quasi-governmental organizations as local divisions of residents' autonomous associations in eup, myeon, and dong. In addition, the legislative right, organizational right, office handling right, financial right, etc. stipulated by the ordinance should be gradually transferred to the residents' association. Third, in terms of the functions and affairs of the Residents' Autonomy Council, it is necessary to expand the subject of residents' autonomy by separately regulating the autonomous affairs through the revision of the Decentralization Act, etc. Fourth, in terms of financial resources for residents' autonomous associations, it is necessary to secure independent financial resources such as membership fees, public facility usage fees, and rental income. Lastly, in terms of residents' autonomy councils (associations), in order to vitalize the operation of city, county and district residents' autonomy councils, it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of management and strengthen financial power through membership fees and financial support from local governments.
An important element of the autonomy decentralization based on the residents autonomy is the residents 'self-government committee and the residents' self-government association which are now being promoted in government dimension. In this research, it is a residents autonomous organization, to grasp...
Don Quixote Meets Mr. GradgrindA Neglected Proof for Immortality Andrew Cummings (bio) Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. You can only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts: nothing else will ever be of any service to them. This is the principle on which I bring up my own children, and this is the principle on which I bring up these children. Stick to Facts, sir! the character of thomas gradgrind; from hard times, by charles dickens But after all, Sir, if I know anything of the Matter, you have no Occasion for any of these Things; for your Subject being a Satyr on Knight-Errantry, is so absolutely new, that neither Aristotle, St. Basil, nor Cicero ever dreamt or heard of it. Those fabulous Extravagancies have nothing to do with the impartial Punctuality of true History; nor do I find any Business you can have either with Astrology, Geometry, or Logick, and I hope you are too good a Man to mix Sacred Things with Profane. from “the author’s preface to the reader,” [End Page 135] don quixote, by miguel de cervantes Although it might appear strange to have selected the above two passages as a lead-in to this article, they capture, I believe, the essence of what we have come to know as the “fact-value” distinction, albeit at an extreme level. Thus, Mr. Gradgrind shows in exaggerated fashion the obsession with facts, to the neglect of values. And the very image of a Don Quixote, bravely pursuing his own world of values, utterly cut off from the harsh world of facts, speaks for itself. A fair amount of discussion on this issue has tended to focus on the supposed divide between the “is” and the “ought” that David Hume so famously put forward.1 Yet at a general level, there is hardly a need today to enter into the details of any particular thinker in order to grasp what is at stake.2 It is captured succinctly by Hilary Putnam, who claims that “the idea that ‘value judgments are subjective’ is a piece of philosophy that has gradually come to be accepted by many people as if it were common sense.”3 Putnam further clarifies this position as holding that “‘statements of fact’ are capable of being ‘objectively true’ and capable, as well, of being ‘objectively warranted,’ while value judgments . . . are incapable of object truth and objective warrant.”4 The central contours of this position arguably can historically be traced, as Charles Taylor reminds us, “to a central feature of the great seventeenth-century revolution in natural science, that we should cease trying to explain the world around us in subjective, anthropocentric, or ‘secondary’ properties.”5 The resultant dichotomy between fact and value that has come down to us has assumed prejudicial proportions such that, even when one wishes to argue against it—as Putnam and Taylor do—the onus probandi is upon the detractors. As with so many other foundational philosophical distinctions, the real meaning is often not seen until at least some of the implications are brought to light. The fact-value distinction happens to have had an effect on the discussion of life after death—and consequently on the very notion of a “proof for the immortality of the soul.” A term like “wish-fulfillment,” so dear to Freudian analysis, and building on the Feuerbachian notion of a “human projection,” can be viewed as [End Page 136] just such an implication. Indeed, although many of the traditional lines of thought on the soul’s immortality appear in the form of “demonstrations,” it is easy to see how a Feuerbach or a Freud would claim that they are thinly disguised human longings, masquerading as facts (albeit of a metaphysical stature). That is, subjective phenomena like wishing not to die would be seen as sorely out of touch with the objectively warranted facts of the matter—which latter seem to point all too decisively to ultimate extinction. While these and other such claims do not necessarily discredit traditional proofs...
The first section of this paper discusses the scope and nature of the familial rights at stake in a termination of parental rights action. This section demonstrates that familial rights are defined as relational rights throughout our Anglo American tradition and constitutional jurisprudence and thus protect the relationship between the parent and child rather than an individual right of either. The second section of this paper establishes that life is a which, like culture viewed on any scale, shares learned behavior among members and functions as a means of protecting the group and insuring the continuity of its values, beliefs and organization. This section describes United States Supreme Court decisions which expressly protect the familial activities constituting and reflecting the private culture of the family. In view of the United States Supreme Court's recognitions of private culture, this second section concludes by suggesting that a family's private culture is entitled to the same deference accorded to larger cultural groups in other contexts. Taken together, then, the first and second section stand for the proposition that the proper inquiry is never whether removal from parental custody is in the child's best interest but rather whether a family exists, in the constitutional sense. If a exists, the inquiry must end. There should be no inquiry into whether the child's emotional needs are fully met, whether some future likelihood of harm exists or whether it would be better for the child to spend some time with grandmother, or indeed with anyone else. The state is neither permitted to evaluate the of a functioning nor, as an impersonal political institution is it qualified to do so.The third section of this paper provides a selective overview of termination of parental right statutes focusing on recent trends which have increased the incidence of both procedural and substantive due process problems within the statutes. This third section also describes Congress' own, quite different response to some of the criticism of child welfare legislation, a response which is embodied in the Indian Child Welfare Act (hereinafter ICWA). The third section concludes by proposing a more constitutionally acceptable approach to child welfare legislation utilizing the general principles embodied in the ICWA.The fourth and final section of this paper argues that the appropriate burden of proof to place on state actions to remove a child from his or her parents' custody or to terminate parental rights to the child is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The ICWA requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in termination of parental rights actions falling within its jurisdiction; the principles Congress endorsed in enacting the ICWA should be applied to all families. This paper reaches this conclusion despite Santosky v. Kramer's apparently different resolution of the issue of the burden of proof required in parental termination actions.
R. v. Oakes is widely regarded as one of the most important judgments interpreting Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In addition to laying down its famous proportionality test to assess the reasonableness of limits on Charter rights, it clarified the Supreme Court of Canada’s Court’s interpretive methodology for Charter cases, perhaps most centrally that rights are of presumptive importance, and limitations the exception that are only acceptable if governments meet a demanding test of justification. The citation of Oakes by courts in Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Fiji, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Namibia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe has made Oakes one of the central models for rights-based constitutional adjudication. So the almost immediate retreat from Oakes is of broader constitutional significance, both domestically and abroad. There is a dominant narrative on what the true legacy of Oakes and the retreat from Oakes are. The argument is that Oakes set out a uniform approach for assessing justifiable limitations on Charter rights irrespective of differences in context, but that in the decade following Oakes, the Court searched for criteria of deference, to reliably and predictably categorize cases where deference was warranted and those where it was not. These categories were not applied consistently by the Court, and, indeed, produced disagreement within the Court over how they should be applied in specific cases. Underlying both trends were concerns regarding the cogency of the distinctions employed by the Court to delineate the boundaries of these categories. Although the dominant narrative captures much of Oakes‘ legacy, it misses much of what is at stake in many recent s. 1 cases, and by implication, what the true legacy of Oakes and the retreat from Oakes are. Oakes created an enormous institutional dilemma for the Court, by setting up a conflict between the demand for definitive proof to support each stage of proportionality analysis, and the reality of policy making under conditions of factual uncertainty. The legacy of Oakes is that the central question of s. 1 is how the Court should allocate the risk of factual uncertainty when governments legislate under conditions of imperfect information. If Oakes is a comparative model for proportionality analysis under other rights-protecting constitutions, then these kinds of problems are not particular to Canada. Foreign courts would be wise to grapple with these difficulties with the benefit of two decades of reflection by Canadian courts instead of simply applying the Oakestest in its original and undeveloped form.
First, the study is defined first that the welfare finance is a financial system executed by the public responsibility for the welfare user who have the livelihood problem to do human life. Secondly, the welfare finance in the contemporary society clarifies contradiction to which a quasi-surplus value has been raised while a quasi-value of usability of social welfare has been decreased. Finally, the problem of the decentralization type finance to improve the contradiction of the welfare finance is discussed. In a word, the problems are to be expanded local taxes and to construct a local sovereignty and financial system.
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Diverse Approaches in Healthcare and Education Studies
[I]t is the transformation of custom into customary law—into something that State courts will recognize, enforce and require—that disrupts the continuity of the indigenous systems. In pre-colonial times … [the settlement of disputes] … depended … on the mutual processes of negotiation and compromise. There is no need to romanticize these processes…. But the important point in this context is that norms play a very different part in negotiations to that which they play in legal processes. They may be used to stake out negotiating positions as a starting point from which to proceed or as a sounding board as to the correct procedure in the cultural and symbolic sense, but they cannot be cited as rules or conditions that will be imposed. 1
As men and women with an abiding commitment to public service, the participants in this symposium will surely be forgiven if they occasionally yield to the temptation to paraphrase Charles Dickens by saying: It is the worst of times; it is the worst of times. But even the worst of times has something to offer those blessed with a sanguine temperament. Banished to the fringe of events, we need not pass our days languishing in irrelevance. Instead, we should make use of our present unhappy condition to reflect upon how we might do better when public service once again enjoys popular support -- as it surely will some day. I believe serious reflection along these lines is already underway and has been for some time. I take the salience of the word governance in our recent literature as a sign of repentance for past transgressions and firm purpose to mend our ways. The transgression was our failure in happier times to link administration to governing, preferring instead to see it as some sort of neutral technique or even as a science. The marked tendency today to criticize the new-found enthusiasm for management for neglecting the rule of law should be seen not as a rejection of management, but as a constructive effort to tame its excesses by grounding it in the well-established norms of governing a constitutional republic. The salience of governance in our field has spawned a renewed interest in constitutionalism. Indeed, a symposium in Public Administration Review just three years ago identified a school of constitutional thought within the public administration community. The purpose of this article is to contribute to this growing interest in constitutionalism by adding a comparative dimension. Comparativists in the field of political science are fond of quoting a line from Kipling -- what knows he of England who only England knows? -- to make the point that one can learn much about one's own country by studying another one. Comparative studies stimulate the political imagination. They prepare us to think creatively about how we might integrate administrative institutions into traditional constitutional structures and how these structures themselves might be adapted to suit the times that lie ahead. My choice of Canadian federalism as a topic of inquiry needs a word of explanation in view of the seemingly endless string of constitutional crises that have bedeviled that otherwise pleasant land over the past three decades. I focus upon Canada for two reasons: 1. Frequent comments have been made by both Quebec sovereigntists and Ottawa federalists on the need to find administrative solutions to the Canadian constitutional crisis. Here is a bold claim that students of public administration would ignore at their peril. Since the referendum of October 1995, there has been precious little progress -- administrative or otherwise -- toward accommodating Quebec's demands within the present constitutional order, but the mere fact that serious people would even talk about administration doing the deeds of high statesmanship challenges the crabbed American view on the possibilities of administrative activity. In Canada, constitutional debates over the very survival of the regime evoke detailed discussions of such classic administrative themes as environmental management, immigration policy, public finance, civil service pensions, education, manpower and training, unemployment benefits, and control of natural resources. I hope that my article will provide a helpful, albeit rather sketchy, constitutional background for American administrationists who take the trouble to follow the dramatic events unfolding among our neighbors to the north. 2. There is a current American rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment, which promises a pronounced redistribution of authority away from Washington and to the states. There can be little doubt that we are about to enjoy (or, alas, endure) still another round of new but this time all signs point to a more profound and more lasting reprise on this theme than Presidents Nixon and Reagan were able to deliver The political culture of Canada is sufficiently similar to our own to warrant the expectation that by studying its highly decentralized federalism, we can learn something of the advantages of decentralization while avoiding its excesses. …
The certification of suicide as the manner of death is frequently contested in court by the victim's survivors, particularly when there are life insurance benefits at stake. The evidence upon which the opinion of suicide is based must, therefore, meet the standard of proof required in law, if it is to be sustained by the courts. This standard of proof and some of its contingent common law doctrines are discussed, with references to several judicial opinions from cases which involved contested suicides.
Book Reviews139 Thaddée Soiron, O. F. M., La condition du théologien, Introduction et adaptation française par Yves Becker et Jean-Robert Hennion, O.F.M. (Coll. Credo, Paris: Librairie Pion, [1953]; 193pp.) This booklet is the first volume of a new collection, pubUshed under the direction of H. I. Marrou, Professor of the Sorbonne, and of the Franciscan A. Hammann. "Credo" wants to publish theological essays for educated Christians of our time, assays showing the connection between our living Faith and the doctrinal (scientific ?) expression of it. A leading principle of the coUection will be the famous "Back to the sources", meaning here the Bible, the Fathers and Liturgy; consequently, history will be emphasized. The Editors intend to include works originally written in foreign languages, but corresponding to their program. A representative of the so-called ,,Verkündigungstheologie", Soiron first pubUshed his work in 1935, under the title „Heilige Theologie". La condition du théologien is an "adaptation", viz. certain passages are dropped (e. g. pages 7—35, and more phrases in the subsequent text), most of the references, which in the German original were printed in the text, are now in footnote, etc. The translations are quite fluent, though not ideal: for instance, in the first chapter the translators were obviously confused by Soiron's speculations about "Ustening" as first requisite of Faith. They confuse the reader by translating "Hören" and "Haltung" by "attention" (cf. p. 46—47 of the French with p. 35—37 of the German edition); the version of "Haltung" is rather "attitude"; "attention" is a possible translation of "Hören", but does not always render the idea of Soiron. Becker and Hennion note that for the translation of biblical texts (of the New Testament) they usually took Le Nouveau Testament of E. Osty. On principle this method is acceptable . In certain instances, however, an other translation better fits the context: e.g. p. 48, Soiron is speculating upon "hearing the word", and, consequently, Rom. X 17 requires the translation "Ainsi la foi vient de ce qu'on entend; et l'on entend, lorsque la parole du Christ est prêchée". The version of Osty (la foi naît de la prédication et la prédication se fait sur l'ordre du Christ) is correct of course, and, perhaps, better renders the idea of St. Paul; but the version we propose corresponds to the letter of both the Greek and the German, and is required by the context of Soiron. We say it regretfully, but we prefer rather to recommend reading the German original of Soiron. Eligius M. Buytaert, O. F. M. Franciscan Institute The Moral Obligation of Voting. By Titus Cranny, S. A., S. T. D. (Washington, D. C. : The Catholic University of America Press, 1952. Pp. XXVII—155.) The Lawyer Looks Beyond the Law. Essays in Human Dignity. (Issued by the WilUam J. Kerby Foundation. The CathoUc University of America Press, 1951. Pp. 91. % 2,50.) 140Franciscan Studies The moral obUgation of voting, expounded principally in the Ught of certain papal and episcopal documents, is the subject of Fr. Cranny's doctoral dissertation. After a brief discussion of the concept and nature of voting, the author devotes the bulk of his material to the principles governing the obUgation of voting; the dissertation ends with a chapter on particular duties that foUow the duty of voting. In the opinion of the reviewer, the nature of the right to vote has received a far too meager and inadequate discussion. Moreover the title is somewhat misleading: its connotation is wider than the intent of the proofs contained in the mass of material assembled together. The papal and episcopal pronouncements cited by the author deal with the obligation of Catholic to vote, particularly in circumstances where the CathoUc religion, the Church and its institutions are at stake. In the main the work is a restatement of opinions current among theologians; nevertheless it is a timely topic designed to awaken the CathoUc to his civic responsibilities. The other volume under consideration is a collection of seven compact lectures deUvered by specialists in the field of American and reUgious thought at the Twelfth Annual...