Blockchain Papers

Morshed Mannan, Simon Pek

Academic, practitioner, and policy interest in digital labor platforms (DLPs)–businesses that use their digital infrastructure to intermediate transactions between workers and clients who need their services–is surging. While these transformational platforms have brought many benefits, there are growing concerns about the harms and entrepreneurial risks they create for workers. As such, there is a growing interest in problematizing the ownership and governance of DLPs. Our paper critically compares three increasingly common archetypes–Corporate DLPs, Cooperative DLPs, and Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) DLPs–to discern their likelihood of addressing or exacerbating platform workers’ exposure to harms and entrepreneurial risks. Our analysis identifies promising new opportunities for those interested in cultivating a digital solidarity economy by highlighting the merits and demerits of different alternatives to Corporate DLPs, as well as promising new hybrids like Cooperative DAO DLPs. Furthermore, it advances our understanding of factors that contribute to DLPs’ being structured in particular ways and how choices about DLPs’ structures, in turn, prompt the evolution of organizational archetypes. • Calls for regulating a plurality of organisational archetypes in the digital economy to mitigate harms and risks to workers. • Evaluates the harms and entrepreneurial risks of workers across 3 archetypes: Corporate DLPs, Cooperative DLPs, and DAO DLPs. • Identifies two variants of DAO DLPs, the Non-Cooperative DAO DLP and the Cooperative DAO DLP. • Furthers our conceptual understanding of the benefits, risks, and harms of the burgeoning digital solidarity economy.

Shivam Sharma, Sakshi Singh, Manish Pal, Sumit Paswan · 5 authors

Millions of informal workers are able to work in the economy without the ability to be subjected to formal fiscal recognition or empirical employment history. The Majdoor Digital Trust-Ledger (MDTL) is a decentralized and privacy-sensitive framework according to which evidence of informal labor is converted into self-sovereign digital assets. MDTL combines Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs), Verifiable Credentials (VCs), escrows based on smart contracts, and Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) to implement verifiable, but confidential proof-of-work. The system proposes a 5-layer architecture, i.e. Identity, Credential, Ledger, Privacy, and Verification, which is designed to be scalable, interoperable, and it can be run on resource-constrained deployment. MDTL progresses the agency of workers by creating portable and tamper-evident labor records to allow financial inclusion without degrading privacy.

Stefano Balietti, Pietro Saggese, Stefan Kitzler, Bernhard Haslhofer

This chapter explores how Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), a novel institutional form based on blockchain technology, challenge traditional centralized governance structures. DAOs govern projects ranging from finance to science and digital communities. They aim to redistribute decision- making power through programmable, transparent, and participatory mechanisms. This chapter outlines both the opportunities DAOs present, such as incentive alignment, rapid coordination, and censorship resistance, and the challenges they face, including token concentration, low participation, and the risk of de facto centralization. It further discusses the emerging intersection of DAOs and artificial intelligence, highlighting the potential for increased automation alongside the dangers of diminished human oversight and algorithmic opacity. Ultimately, we discuss under what circumstances DAOs can fulfill their democratic promise or risk replicating the very power asymmetries they seek to overcome.

Tara Merk

This paper asks why startups in the blockchain industry are exiting to Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), an outstanding phenomena in the wider digital economy which has tended to retain centralized ownership and governance rights of many platforms, products and protocols. Drawing on a narrative analysis of three case studies, I find three possible drivers: (1) exit to DAO is motivated by both financial and stewardship goals which it simultaneously promises to realize via the issuance of tokens; (2) exit to DAO adds an additional layer of ownership and governance rights via tokens, without requiring existing rights to be relinquished, thus making it a lucrative strategy; and (3) markets, laws and social norms underpinning the broader environment in which exits to DAO occur, seem to play an important role in driving the decision. This paper contributes to the academic literature by situating DAOs as a hybrid (and perhaps incomplete) entrepreneurial exit strategy and identifying plausible drivers of the phenomenon which warrant further dedicated research.

Janga Bussaja

This research paper presents a theoretical framework for the development and deployment of 'Smoky,' an innovative artificial intelligence system designed to confront systemic racism. Grounded in Africancentered scholarship, 'Smoky' represents a pioneering endeavor in leveraging technology for social equity. The paper explores the conceptualization, development, and potential applications of 'Smoky' within the decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) framework of Planetary Chess. Control theory and automation principles are integral to the design and operation of 'Smoky,' ensuring its effectiveness in addressing racial injustice. The paper highlights the role of control theory in system design, automation of monitoring and response, feedback mechanisms for learning and adaptation, integration with blockchain technology, decentralized control, and continuous evaluation and improvement. By integrating control theory and automation into the 'Smoky' system, the paper contributes to the advancement of technologydriven solutions for social justice. This paper serves as a call to philanthropists and potential collaborators to join in the realization of this vision, contributing to the advancement of technology-driven solutions for social justice.

Mauricio Olavarría Gambi

No abstract is available for this record.

Harihar Bhattacharyya

The chapter examines the structures and processes in intergovernmental or centre–state relations in federations in Asia. The relations are the operative part of federalism. While there is a constitutionally mandated distribution of powers and responsibilities for each tier of government in federations, the actual operations may take different forms. Beyond the constitutional structure, there are factors such as the party system, leadership, fragmented society etc. which factor into whether the relations are to be cooperative, conflictual or both. Democracy is the silver lining in centre–state relations, for it alone provides the scope for dialogue. But often democracy can be an irritant for smooth federal-provincial relations when the federation is held hostage by some recalcitrant forces. A federation may be very centralized and authoritarian, in which case the federal units are dependent on the centre’s whims for disbursement. Structurally, Myanmar and Malaysia are centralized, but federalism there does not work. In India, constitutionally, the Union government is very powerful, but then administratively it is decentralized. The Finance Commission here has followed a particular formula in financial disbursement to the states which has ensured a good balance in centre–state relations. Finally, this chapter highlights the new role of the federal units in the wake of implementing neoliberal reforms.

Christiaan Luigjes, Frank Vandenbroucke

Subnational governments have become more involved in the ‘regulation of unemployment’ (the design, implementation and financing of unemployment-related benefits and activation), partly because they are thought to be better placed to activate the unemployed than federal governments. However, depending on its specific design, decentralization can reduce the incentives subnational governments have to implement effective activation. Such ‘institutional moral hazard’ is not yet systematically theorized. We examine how and to what extent it affects three federal countries. We distinguish three factors that influence whether institutional moral hazard is perceived as a problem and how it can be resolved. We identify two types of subnational challenges to federal control.

Teri L. Caraway, Michele Ford

This chapter examines the forces that produced Indonesia’s highly mobilized but politically independent labor movement. It describes the authoritarian legacies that shaped the first phase of its evolution when the labor movement had no choice but to use street politics as its primary weapon in the struggle for more worker-friendly labor policy. In a second phase, new opportunities opened by the decentralization process led unions to experiment with electoral engagement. The focus of these efforts was at the local level where union activists backed executive candidates from many different parties, pragmatically trading their political support for pro-labor measures. In a third phase, unions drew on their past organizational learning and experimentation to extend their electoral engagement to the legislative arena. Reluctant to tie themselves directly to a single party, union strategists chose to place union cadres on legislative tickets of many different political parties. Autonomous electoral participation now complemented street politics as central features of labor’s political strategy.

ZHANG Chu-lin, Yungang Liu

Abstract: Transformation of industrial districts has attracted much attention for long. The Ruhr area in Germany, which used to be a pillar of the industrial economy in the past and is a robust cultural and economic region now, is always a typical case. Based on field visits and semi-structured interviews, this paper takes Zeche Zollverein in Ruhr as an example, trying to find out how multiple agents take part in and cooperate with each other during its transformation and to summarize its mechanism of multi-agent governance. It is found that during the transformation in Zeche Zollverein, administrative, social and market powers actively participate and interact in the protection and development of industrial culture, financing and investment, renovation of buildings and environment, daily operation and management as well as social life and space activation. In the framework of multi-agent cooperation in Zeche Zollverein, different levels of governments combine top-down management and moderate decentralization, acting as a backbone; the public are important elements in the activation of social life while social organizations share public affairs with governments and citizens enjoy participating in public activities; market economies form a virtuous circle between their self-development and the regional transformation. From single subject controlling to multi-agent cooperation, the transformation of governance framework in Zeche Zollverein is a remarkable enlightenment for industrial districts in China. Under the realistic conditions of our country with Chinese characteristics, governments tend to be responsible for every stuff in cities and get overburdened. Learning from Zeche Zollverein, they can try to break away from the idea of "all-around arrangement", and to cooperate more with and release some functions to the society and the market, attracting them to locate in the district and develop themselves on their own initiatives, so as to promote regional transformation jointly.

KIMSEONGKOOK

In this paper, the German and Korean trade unions are investigated on their history, unionism and strategies. Through an international comparative study between the two countries, the author attempts to draw applicable implications from German-style unionism unique labor relations for Korean unions and their leaders. During the Weimar Republic, the German labor unions were divided along partisan lines, a situation that led to competition among the socialist, communist, Catholic, and liberal trade associations. After World War II, labor leaders wanted to break from the past, and to form a trade union federation independent of political parties. The result was the establishment of the Federation of German Trade Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund—DGB) in 1949. Four principles guided the founders of the DGB. First, the labor movement wanted representation through an organization that was unitary and autonomous, with no ties to particular religions or political parties. Second, labor leaders decided to organize the unions along with industrial lines so that all workers at one firm would belong to the same union irrespective of their individual occupations. This organizing principle provides unions with greater bargaining power when negotiating with employer associations, because one union represents the entire workforce of an industry. Third, a decentralized system of interest representation was created. Individual unions typically emulate the federal structure, with local, district, state, and national offices. Each level has some input into the shape of union policy. Fourth, the unions chose to rely on legislation for the protection of workers' rights, rather than on direct negotiations with business representatives. German Codetermination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz). The act implements the rule of parity (that is, equal representation of shareholders and employees on a supervisory board), especially for German stock corporations, German private limited liability companies and German limited liability partnerships with more than 2,000 employees. The German Codetermination Act was originally highly disputed, but has become an accepted part of corporate Germany in past decades due to attempts to balance the interests of shareholders and employees. ‘Social partnership’ has played a major role to integrate German society, and to alleviate labor disputes after the World War II in Germany. German unionism characterized by codetermination and ‘social partnership’ between the labor and management can shed light on Korea’s future industrial relations. Korea’s union participation rate of 10.2 percent is less than half of what it was in 1989. Among OECD countries, Korean workers’ unionization ranks near bottom. That does not mean that unions do not wield considerable power. Critics accuse union leaders of serving their own interests before those of their workers and undue participation in politics, and say the current setup harms Korea’s business competitiveness. To others, the unions are a necessary counterweight to the power of chaebol and to thank for gains in workers’ rights and working conditions―making the idea of curbing their power ridiculous if not sinister. An important development in Korean unionism after 1987 was the emergence and rise of a movement independent of the officially recognized Federation of Korea Trade Unions. There were many attempts to organize a separate national center by union activists who did not follow FKTU policy lines although Korean law allowed only one national center until 1997. Non-recognized unions formed the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions and the KCTU was officially recognized by the government in 1999.

Lucas I. González

What factors shape the distribution of funds and functions in Latin American federations? In this chapter, I empirically assess the capacity of the theoretical argument developed in Chapter 1 to account for changes in the distribution of funds and functions across cases and time in Latin America. The main hypothesis is that changes in the distribution of funds and functions in Latin American federations are more likely when either the president or subnational actors hold more political power and when the fiscal context in which they interact is more critical. I present statistical evidence to sustain some of the expectations in the argument and discuss some of its limitations. The immense majority of countries in Latin America, being federal or unitary, with relatively strong or weak subnational governments, have transferred funds and/or functions (or initiated some kind of decentralization policies1) during the last two decades. In political terms, this means that where subnational officials are usually appointed, many Latin American countries are electing intermediate governments, and the vast majority of them (in fact, all South American countries) have now elected local authorities.2 In fiscal terms, new resources have been transferred to lower levels of government across the region (Falleti, 2000, 1; 2005, 327; Rodden, 2006, 25-26; World Bank, 1998, 2001, 2004a).3 Likewise, new functions and administrative capabilities have also been transferred to subnational governments in several countries. Lower levels of government in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico (among other countries; see: Di Gropello and Cominetti, 1998; Falleti, 2000) now handle the administration of education and health care services. This dramatic convergence in Latin America toward the decentralization of funds and functions to subnational governments has generated a vast body of literature and theoretical frameworks to explain the dynamics and characteristics of these policies. A large share of the scholarly works on the topic have been interested in explaining the policy results rather than exploring the dynamics of the bargaining processes that led to the outcome. In the following sections, I first review some of the main arguments, which stress institutional factors (such as electoral rules or party nomination procedures), economic variables (such as fiscal crisis or the level of economic growth), external pressures (from international financial organizations), or demands from civil society as the main factors that promoted decentralization in the region. In this chapter, I attempt to, first, empirically assess the main theoretical contributions in these frameworks to explain changes in the distribution of funds and functions in all the federal countries in the region (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela) and some unitary ones (Chile, Ecuador, and Uruguay), stressing some of their shortcomings and limitations. I selected these cases in order to have the widest possible range of variation in the dependent variables. Second, I examine the empirical strength of the argument developed in Chapter 1, according to which the distribution of funds and functions is the result of power struggles between central and subnational governments in federal democracies in conditions of fiscal crises. This claim is valid for federal democracies with relatively autonomous states or provinces. But I also include evidence for unitary countries with more dependent subnational governments (although in some of these countries subnational governments have recently gained more power). This argument can help us to account for the distribution of funds and functions across cases (federal and unitary), and it can provide dynamic explanations for decentralization and centralization processes alike. In the following sections, I first define what I mean by distribution of funds and functions. Second, I put forward the central hypothesis and operationalize it. Third, I develop a statistical analysis of the main and the competing arguments. I present the results, analyze them, and conclude in the final section.

Eric Neudorf

Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) funds community-based organizations to provide services such as official language training, job placement, and community engagement in a decentralized model of immigrant service provision. This approach to settlement services has been simultaneously praised as a model of best practice and criticized for inefficiency. Partly in response to criticism, in 2008 IRCC implemented the Modernized Approach to Settlement Services, a management strategy that maintains the department’s decentralized approach to funding settlement service provision but introduces several important changes. First, the Modernized Approach consolidates settlement services into a single Settlement Program to streamline the application process. Second, the Modernized Approach focuses on project outcomes rather than just measuring inputs and outputs. And third, the Modernized Approach creates avenues for grass-roots organizations to have a voice in the governance of the Settlement Program. While a few studies have discussed the Modernized Approach to Settlement Services as a promising way forward, this is the first article to examine its impact empirically. Using key informant perspectives as a guide, this article provides an overview of the areas and extent to which it has created improvements over IRCC’s previous approach to settlement services, and it identifies areas for potential improvements. Resume: Immigration, Refugies et Citoyennete Canada (IRCC) finance des organisations communautaires pour fournir des services tels que la formation linguistique, acces a l’emploi, et l’engagement communautaire dans un modele decentralise de la fourniture de services aux immigrants. Cette approche a ete simultanement salue comme un modele de bonnes pratiques et critique pour son inefficacite. En partie en reponse a la critique, en 2008 IRCC mis en œuvre l’approche modernisee de services d’etablissement, une strategie de gestion qui maintient l’approche decentralisee du ministere pour la prestation de services d’etablissement, mais qui introduit plusieurs changements importants. Tout d’abord, l’approche modernisee consolide les services d’etablissement dans un programme de reglement unique pour simplifier le processus de demande. Deuxiemement, l’approche modernisee met l’accent sur les resultats des projets plutot que des entrees et sorties juste mesure. Et troisiemement, l’approche modernisee cree des avenues pour les organisations de base d’avoir une voix dans la gouvernance du Programme d’Etablissement. Bien que quelques etudes ont discute de l’approche modernisee de services d’etablissement comme une voie prometteuse. Ceci est le premier article d’examiner son impact empiriquement. Utilisation de perspectives des informateurs cles comme un guide, cet article donne un apercu des domaines et dans quelle mesure il a cree des ameliorations par rapport approche precedente IRCC aux services d’etablissement, et il identifie les domaines d’amelioration potentiels.

Karen Nielsen Breidahl, Flemming Larsen

This article addresses the market for employment services. It adopts a dynamic perspective on welfare markets and demonstrates how the institutional design of quasi‐markets in the Danish Public Employment service has been promoted, altered, and re‐regulated over a period of 10 years. It was in 2002 when quasi‐markets have been created by using the instrument of contracting‐out employment services to private providers. Seen from the perspective of policymakers at the national level, contracting‐out is attractive as it has a buffering function and allows adapting the amount of the public financed employment services comparatively easy to changing needs resulting from changing labor market conditions. However, contracting‐out makes accountability to public goods more difficult as the chain of accountability is stretched or may even be broken. Against the background of accountability scandals, which have revealed the poor quality of privately provided services, the market design was re‐modeled again by replacing standardized national tendering with a decentralized, partnership‐based and dialogue‐oriented approach, where services are developed in joint efforts between purchaser and provider. All in all, the development of quasi‐markets in the Danish Public Employment system can be described as a partial reversal from marketization. Paradoxically, elements of network governance, which were abolished initially, have been introduced again.

Amanda K. Damarin

Purpose – Addresses labor control in fields where familiar organizational and occupational controls are weak, notably postindustrial arenas characterized by networks, heterogeneity, and change.Methodology/approach – Proposes that labor control operates via socio-technical networks composed of diverse ties to social actors, technologies, and typifications. Data from an interview-based study of early website production work is used to examine the impact of such a network.Findings – Socio-technical networks constrained web workers#x02019; actions but also offered opportunities for autonomous discretion. Some shifting between networked and hierarchical controls occurred in larger organizations.Research implications/limitations – The role of networks in the labor process is not well understood; this study provides a starting point.Social implications – Socio-technical networks are heterogeneous and lack common status metrics, making inequality among workers difficult to gauge and address. Further, since networked controls are decentralized, their pressures are not easily identified or resisted by workers.Originality/value – This chapter describes a form of labor control that may characterize some postindustrial fields more closely than traditional models. In addition, it contributes new insights on how work is shaped by technical networks and abstract typifications.

Eleanor Fisher

Scholars have largely ignored the roles played by government and public sector institutions in the fair trade movement. This article addresses the knowledge gap through examining government involvement in fair trade networks in the context of European devolution and the localization of international development action. Proposing a relational view of fair trade networks, and considering the Fair Trade Nation as a social category for development, it highlights how power sources outside the centralized nation-state permit a political community to associate itself with fair trade. Research from Wales demonstrates that government acts in a leadership role rather than as regulator, conferring political voice and finance while enhancing its international credentials and contributing to the politics of nation-building. Our conclusion is cautious; campaigners celebrate political commitment to fair trade embodied within the category of the Fair Trade Nation, but evidence suggests that government reliance on the market as a vehicle for decentralized development action is limited by how the Fair Trade Nation is currently executed.

Thomas A. Kochan, Adam Seth Litwin

[Excerpt] It is not surprising that most theories of human capital treat the firm as the key unit of analysis, given the deep imprint that Becker (1964 [1993]) left with his early efforts to distinguish between general and specific human capital. It is especially understandable for research that focuses on American institutions and practices. Ever since the passage of the New Deal employment policies of the 1930s, firms have been assigned central roles in the delivery and financing of a variety of labor-market services, including the provision of workforce training and development (Osterman et al, 2001). Most of the chapters in this volume reflect this emphasis by exploring how individuals and firms allocate the costs and share the benefits of human capital, incorporating human capital development into alternative theories of the firm (such as transaction cost, resource-based, agency, entrepreneurial, and knowledge-based perspectives), and how human capital plays into emerging research on social capital, organizational capabilities, learning, and human resource strategies and architectures. But, as Chapters 12, 22, and 23 each suggest, firm-centric theories, particularly those founded upon the neoclassical economics framework, need to more fully take into account how firm boundaries, strategies, and practices relate to other institutions in society. This is particularly important given the changes in employment relationships that are acting to reduce the labor-market functions served by individual employers. In short, the central argument of this chapter is that a more up-to-date theory of the changing nature of employment relationships is needed to understand whether and how human capital is to serve as a source of competitive advantage in a modern economy—even one as decentralized as that of the US.

Maarten Keune

This article is based on the research project 'The functioning of sector level wage bargaining systems and wage setting mechanisms in adverse labour market conditions', commissioned and financed by the European Foundation for the improvement of Working and Living conditions, whose support is

Val Burris

No abstract is available for this record.

Colin Crouch

Trade Unions and the State: The Construction of Industrial Relations Institutions in Britain, 1890–2000 by Howell, Chris . Princeton University Press , Princeton, NJ , 2005 , xi + 243 pp., ISBN 0 691 12106 0 , £26.95 That the history of British trade unionism in the twentieth century was a story of hubris would be widely accepted; but in this detailed, highly scholarly historical account of the case, Chris Howell proposes an original and far from widely accepted key component of that hubris. While the unions, their opponents and most academic observers have considered that the classic British system was a voluntarist one, Howell argues that union strength was always dependent on support from the state. When, by the end of the 1970s, the state withdrew that support from both unions and the institutions of collective bargaining, the apparently autonomous and resilient edifice of union power collapsed easily. Howell's account is thoroughly convincing and signals a need to reconsider much more in the history of British industrial relations, and indeed of British society. Is this a country in which civil society is so strong that it can procure its collective goods through the autonomous actions of its citizens without much action by government? Or is it one that just tries to get by with a minimum of collective goods? The author offers the following periodization of his terrain: 1890–1940, the construction of the collective laissez faire system; 1940–1979, dissension and the decentralization of industrial relations; and 1979–1997, decollectivization. The trap of the hubris is set during the second, essentially unstable period, being finally sprung early in the third. During the first period, the basic framework was established of a system that brought a degree of order and industrial relations stability to an economy that was highly fragmented, with disorganized, medium-sized firms and a highly divided workforce. It was during this period that governments more or less consistently perceived the need for some institution construction to avoid chaos and disorder. British capital, dominated as it was by the financial sector on one side and a fragmented set of manufacturing industries on another, was unable to solve its own collective action problem of establishing an order from which it would itself benefit, so government acted. Central to Howell's highly convincing account is the idea of the state simultaneously supporting and constraining the power of employers by nudging and prodding them towards collective industrial relations arrangements. Employers were being reluctantly constitutionalized in their relations with the collectivities of their employees, just as the state itself had been constitutionalized in its relations with its collective public. Because the liberal British state proceeded by nudging and prodding rather than by the elaboration of formal structures of rights and duties, unions came to believe that they had brought employers to the construction of these institutions by their own strength. They failed to notice that they gradually became dependent on government encouragement of employers' associations, on whom the unions relied in turn more or less to recruit their members for them and enforce agreements. And they came to prefer the acquisition of immunities from the free trade logic of common law to the gaining of positive collective legal rights of labour. The theoretical position that underlies Howell's account of institution creation, stability and change is that of the French régulationistes, with change being driven primarily by shifts in the forms of capitalist accumulation, although — like most contemporary régulationistes— his account is considerably more nuanced than that school's original division of pre-Fordism, Fordism and post-Fordism. Complex changes are perceived as sectors and firm types rise and fall, but towards the end of the 1890–1940 period, the new one of mass-production, primarily domestically oriented, large firms of Fordism had become evident. These corporations were better able to achieve an industrial order within themselves than the earlier generation of craft-based or smaller-scale firms, and had less need of one that was imposed externally by the machinery of state encouragement, employers' associations, unions, industry-wide collective bargaining, and collective labour law. The second period, after 1940, was therefore one in which the earlier edifice was gradually being undermined. At another, more political, level, however, that edifice was reaching the acme of its strength. The decade of the 1940s, characterized by mass mobilization for war and then by Labour government, saw a major ramification of collectivism in industrial relations. Howell's excellent account thus enables us to make sense of the labour struggles of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s in ways that go considerably beyond the existing literature, extensive as that is. Government and union leaderships remained wedded to the path dependence of the earlier period: collective bargaining and the other industrial relations institutions were still definitely ‘good things’, even if unruly elements kept stimulating a need for reforms; the purpose of the reforms, including the Industrial Relations Act 1971, was still to make the model work better. On the other side, an unconscious alliance of managers seeking a firm-level model and shop stewards seeking to exploit the power of organized labour made possible by government commitment to full employment was undermining the premises of collective laissez-faire. Eventually, government was left in the hopeless position of seeking simultaneously to centralize wage-setting and decentralize other aspects of industrial relations. But both sets of actors on the labour side, central leaderships and shop stewards, continued to believe that it was organized labour's own strength that guaranteed its position in British society, that it owed little to government for its survival, and that government would have to accept its enduring presence. Given Howell's thesis that state support was always central to union strength, all that was really required to undermine that strength was a departure from the assumptions of the previous 90 years by the political class. This, of course, came with the election in 1979 of a Conservative government fully converted to neoliberal economic ideas and a leading member of the array of political and economic forces that was set to undermine most of the assumptions of the postwar political economy throughout the industrial world. Once presumptions in favour of collective action and the maintenance of full employment were dropped, the firm-level model could become one in which managers confronted, not shop stewards, but individual employees with no capacity for joint action. End of contradiction. The dramatic act that laid bare the hubris was the miners' strike of 1984–1985, conducted by a union believing completely in the myth of the autonomy of union strength. Howell possibly underestimates the role of pure political conjuncture in producing this particular dénouement. The chance occurrence of the Falklands War and the fact that the Labour Party chose to split itself in two, both occurring in the early 1980s, together gave the Conservatives an insulation from what might have otherwise been the political consequences of the abandonment of full employment policies. In that case, neoliberalism might have had to advance through the compromises with organized labour that have characterized its path in most of the rest of western Europe, leading to a restructuring of the collective system rather than its collapse. Howell would claim that the illusory nature of the British collective laissez faire model meant that the collapse was inevitable, and that sooner or later, another contingency would have occurred. This is perhaps the case, but when one considers how European systems as diverse and as potentially unfavourable to organized labour as the Irish, the French and the Spanish have all mutated into new compromises between neoliberalism and various forms of collectivism, one wonders. Howell ends his third period at 1997 and then considers in a separate chapter the changes consequent on the election of a Labour government in that year. At the time he was writing, he had only a few years of that government to write about, and he can be forgiven for not feeling able to get any kind of perspective on it. However, his historian's instincts should have warned him that a periodization that has made no concessions to events as momentous as the election of the Liberal government of 1906, the First World War, the General Strike, or the interwar depression, is unlikely to need to take much notice of a change of government between what are today two essentially neoliberal parties. In fact, his account of the post-1997 years makes it clear that, once the passing of time has afforded him better perspective, he is likely to see a continuation of the trajectory of 1979–1997: Labour has continued primarily with a model of individualized work relations, changing the emphasis a little by conceding more individual rights to employees. The more recent study of the period by Davies and Freedland (Towards a Flexible Labour Market, Oxford University Press, 2007), which has the advantage of surveying a longer post-1997 period and of concentrating on an analysis of labour law, corroborates Howell's account, and draws a further conclusion: with the exception of measures required by European Union directives, most of Labour's extensions of labour rights are designed to encourage labour force participation by groups like single mothers and immigrants who, without certain rights, might not work. British labour rights have therefore moved from being collective immunities from common law offences to being individual encouragements to work. This kind of right belongs to a discourse concerning the balance between rights and responsibilities: one acquires a right because one offers something of value. This is often opposed to a concept of rights as part and parcel of citizenship: under a universal citizenship regime, one does not have to work in order to have the right to a fair trial or to vote. This is, however, a legalistic view of citizenship. In reality, various social groups have won rights when they had something to offer that the state needed. This dates back to the original obligation on Athenian citizens to offer military service. While this can appear to undermine rights, as they become conditional, it can also be seen as strengthening them. If a right is given through benevolence or adherence to abstract principle on the part of the state, there remains doubt as to what would happen if that benevolence of adherence to principle were to slip. Such rights can be lost. Indeed, it can be said that Howell's book is a demonstration of what happens when groups become dependent on governments for their rights. In his story there is added piquancy in that the unions believed that they had won their rights, that they had offered something in exchange for them, and that they would therefore be able to reclaim what they had offered as a deterrent against withdrawal of the rights. What unions essentially have to ‘offer’ in this sense is (negatively) restraint in their capacity to disrupt society and (positively) collaboration in the pursuit of shared national economic goals. This is rather similar to the deals that medieval nobilities offered to monarchs as the latter tried to fashion systems of social peace. But it would seem, from Howell's account, that the unions' offer had over the decades become too dependent on the state's definition of its terms. They had become more like the Russian aristocracy of the nineteenth century, whose originally autonomous rights and powers increasingly became translated into a table of ranks maintained and controlled by the tsars. There is therefore a major difference between an exchange of rights for obligations when both parties maintain some autonomy over the terms of the deal, and one in which one party administers the whole. Mistaking the latter for the former is the British union weakness that Howell identifies. Different again is the contrast that Davies and Freedland identify between those collective rights and those currently given to individuals in exchange for their commitment to participate in the labour force. The exchange here is unpolitical, or rather is political on one side only. Government continues to act highly politically and strategically in framing its labour policies, but individuals in an increasingly decollectivized labour market cannot respond in the same way. They cannot offer counterplans, or try to amend the terms of the rights/obligations exchange. They are more like customers than citizens; and customers do not have rights, only products. How durable is this new model of industrial relations likely to be? Howell concludes his book by saying: . . . the third system of industrial relations has achieved the kind of political consensus enjoyed by the first system but which eluded the second, and there is a strong case for seeing this as a long-lasting, stable set of industrial relations institutions (p. 193). However, in line with Howell's régulationiste approach, one must now ask how durable is the accumulation regime on which that political consensus and industrial relations regime have been based. Also, while there have been important historical specificities in the British case, for the discovery of which Howell's historical method is ideally suited, the British case is also one of a large number of societies which have gone through certain similar experiences. Throughout the advanced capitalist world, the years from the 1940s to the 1970s constituted a period defined by growing mass prosperity and a growing size and strength of the manual working class, within which trade unions were rooted. This differed from the years of depression and repression which had preceded it, and from the neoliberal period which started, with different timings and nuances, some time from the late 1970s onwards. The so-called Fordist period was rooted in manufacturing (particularly mass production and within that particularly motor vehicles), and therefore usually associated with a mass working class, which produced organizations and had to be propitiated if it were not to present challenges to the social order. Keynesian demand management operated similarly to Fordism in making possible a mass supply of goods and services, which supply itself stimulated demand. This in turn created employment, which further stimulated demand. Keynesianism also made possible the provision of social citizenship rights, as the provision of public services and rights-based transfer payments were the basis of the large sums of government spending that demand management required. Together, therefore, the production model and demand management model served the purpose of class propitiation, from which process labour also acquired rights. For the first time in history the economic and political advance of the mass of the population was both possible and the foundation of the prosperity and stability of the whole of society. In a real sense, Marx's idea of the working class as the class that embodied the future of the whole society was realized, albeit in the form of a class compromise and not as Marx had envisaged it. It was also a far more temporary model than Marx anticipated, although it did follow his Hegelian assumptions (which he had thought would cease with the working class) about how history changes by successive periods carrying within themselves the of their own as Howell's history of his period those of with its of the Keynesian state, had an and it a different set of leading class This to be at the when the of manufacturing employment had and the class of industrial society was The neoliberal period has been rooted in services, particularly financial the important exception of public the of the services sectors not to the citizens of they demand goods and services from government and market but the they have do not need to to it, and not to to make collective In some this is because their terms and are established on an individual in labour market they the consequences for their employment of any collective action. for the social order to only from from the challenges of and the of While the neoliberal economy is one in which the purpose of government is to rather than support in the Keynesian it is even more dependent on mass than the Keynesian This is by two neoliberalism is associated with and with a major of There is therefore a growing supply of goods from with labour and of the of British other no longer on the work of other demand is by if is often the case in the are not and is can to maintain their to increasingly in it has been possible for to their and other as In like the and British into acquisition far than could be to by in and Because are in their are not considered to be and can while neoliberal is on and While the goods with their increasingly from they can also to services, which are less likely to be further stimulating the from manufacturing to services employment within the advanced world. The system can be defined as governments have been as about mass prosperity as during the previous but of to themselves through public demand they have only to and encourage the of The of Fordism and Keynesianism was this was by growing for in the growing power of organized and individual labour in the to public and the universal provision of of those The neoliberal economy has the The of in and the of the of in from have all to favour financial and all other forms of The of the concept of the of as the of a firm has further a of all economic While the model primarily through its of has more widely in the population than financial are more than any the of and therefore the to more to a in of and that had operated throughout most of the twentieth century have been during the two or decades — on when a country to the neoliberal The leading sector of the economy has therefore become financial services, and the class whose for those of the society as a whole the of and in financial if the period of the of the manual working class was associated with a in and a rise in collective goods and the rise of the financial class is associated with and a or of collective There is little in a model for something like a system of industrial relations, or social or for participation in the system by the of labour There is a need for an of the more labour that is the more for its into financial the from labour rights as collective political to individual of rights for the of The Keynesian or the period of Howell's for to on the one considers or the one The neoliberal model is now just its it of The of the in financial which is as to the model as was to might not be to but and have an is what its that believe that believe . . . that he can it is to make the model work. has been late by the fact that did not the full of that they were and and some were into of more they could all believe that this did not because they could it on to would not because he could it on . . . then all was But some did the of the It clear how far financial had Keynesianism when one how governments are to of the collapse of financial are to them in a that could not possibly be for other and are by governments and central to other even if they have little for the system is on about what there need be no as for the terms of this there is a public in And if government is this kind of it is not really a neoliberal model at the neoliberal model therefore itself in the same of time that Keynesianism to do the Or the government that are to the whole back on the While the former more given the nature of the the of any model in the neoliberalism in the during makes the latter more What has been particularly in this is the of any social or class that might appear as the of a new model — as financial institutions were to be the of It would be to write the history of the changing of the previous century and more without as Howell has to the role of in various sectors of the economy in the between them and their organizations on the one and government and on the At in the and the one can write the story of the of neoliberalism and the model without much to and their organizations at working do appear in the as and as major political if a there are also major of in relations between and But for the of work and its Howell's about a long-lasting, stable set of industrial institutions been established by the does not appear at all

Mari Sako

This chapter turns to intra-sectoral differences in union strategy and structure, an important aspect of the Strategy-Structure-Institutions (SSI) Framework explained in Chapter 1. The chapter compares the historical evolution of Nissan Roren and that of the Toyota Roren case presented in Chapter 4. Compared to Toyota Roren, Nissan Roren formulated a clearer strategy of organizing smaller suppliers in an earlier period (in the late 1950s). Consequently, Nissan's roren was much more centralized, with respect to union finance, personnel, and collective bargaining until pressure from the 1990s to decentralize and diversify.

Bente Rasmussen

One of the strategies of the modernization of public services is the decentralization of responsibilities and organizing work in autonomous co‐ operative teams with varied tasks. The empowerment of the public service workers in the front line is therefore a strategy in local government in Norway today. Under the assumption that women have ‘natural’ skills in caring, workers on the lowest levels are given responsibility for care and nursing. A study of the decentralization of public care for the elderly in their homes showed that being given interesting tasks and increased responsibility mobilized the efforts of the care workers. However, since the power of resources has been centralized, this has led to an intensification of work. In gendering the relevant discourses by explaining women's experiences of an over‐heavy workload as a result of their ‘mothering’ and their inability to set limits, women care workers were constructed by their managers as unprofessional and not to be taken seriously. This has made the public care organization a greedy organization for the women care workers.

Satoshi NAKANO

In an era in which neo-liberalism has strong societal influences, it seems particularly indispensable to look into the efforts and achievements in Europe to create the social dimension of the integration. Particularly focusing upon the European social dialogue at the macro level, this article depicts its history, function and the challenges it faces.In the main section, the social dialogue at this level is examined in terms of (1) actors, (2) tripartite concertation, (3) consultation according to Articles 137 and 138 of the Treaty and (4) the bipartite, autonomous dialogue between the social partners. With regard to the actors, such problems as the decreasing density and legitimacy of trade union representation in some countries and the lack of a sectoral institution of employers are described, along with some recent organizational developments In the context of the Lisbon strategy adopted in March 2000, the tripartite concertation has taken a significant, albeit embryonic step towards the advent of the corporatist configuration that relates economic and social policies. The consultation processes have created three directives that set minimum standards in the EU. Together with the increasingly autonomous bipartite dialogue that began with a work programme in November 2002, the social dialogue now serves as the driving force of labour market regulation and social integration.Nevertheless, with the national corporatist systems being encroached upon, the European system has been facing some challenges In the last section, its major problems are classified into five categories: the legitimacy of interest representation, the effectiveness of social legislation, dim prospects as a means of macro-economic regulation, the decentralized systems of industrial relations in the CEE countries and an unclear position in the future associational democracy. The European social dialogue may open up a new possibility of formulating innovative policies based on participative democracy that was only available in each member state. Nevertheless, whether or not such a possibility will come true in the near future remains to be seen.

Werner Fricke

Between 1974 and 2002 there were three state financed work life programmes at federal level in Germany, with a financial outlay of more than €1 billion. The author evaluates the programmes’ achievements, conflicts and deficits and pays special attention to the role of social science research in work design projects; he concludes by comparing the German experiences and the Norwegian tradition of work life programmes since the 1960s. The social partners participated at programme and project level from the very beginning. Many successes have been achieved: the easing of physical work load and unhealthy work; the development of flexible and decentralized work organization in industry and services; providing working people with opportunities to make better use of their qualifications. There were also lost opportunities: due to massive conflicts between trades unions, employers’ associations and the programme administration, the initial perspective of enhancing democratic participation and enlarging the scope of co-determination in industry was abandoned, after a series of successful experiments, as early as 1980. The implementation of modern forms of work organization, including semi-autonomous group work, largely failed; it was (and still is) restricted to less than 5% of enterprises in Germany. Recent tendencies in industry to return to Tayloristic forms of work organisation, to intensify work processes by introducing market-driven work organisation and flexible working time schemes, directly contradict the original intentions of the programmes.