Blokzincir teknolojisi ve kripto paralar, günümüz dünyası finansal ekosisteminde giderek daha fazla önem kazanan unsurlardır. Blokzincir, dağıtık defter teknolojisi olarak tanımlanmakta olup, güvenli, şeffaf ve değiştirilemez bir veri yapısı sunarak merkezi otorite ihtiyacını ortadan kaldırmaktadır. Bu teknoloji sayesinde Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple ve Litecoin gibi dijital varlıklar, ekonomik faaliyetlerde alternatif bir araç olarak değerlendirilmeye başlanmıştır. Söz konusu teknoloji, toplumlarda hızla bir farkındalık oluşturmuş ve yatırım aracı olarak kabul edilmesi çabuklaşmıştır. Ancak bu yeni nesil finansal araçların İslam fıkhındaki konumu ve meşruiyeti üzerine ciddi tartışmalar söz konusu olmaktadır. Hızlı finansal etkileşimler, Müslüman yatırımcıların da dikkatini çekmiş; dolayısıyla kripto paraların meşruiyeti hususunda çeşitli tartışmalar gündeme gelmiştir. İslami finans prensipleri, riba (faiz), gharar (belirsizlik) ve maysir (şans oyunu) gibi unsurları yasaklamakta, bu nedenle kripto paraların doğası ve işleyişi üzerine ayrıntılı bir inceleme yapılması gerekmektedir. Bu çalışmanın ana amacı, bu belirsizlikleri ele alarak kripto para teknolojisini derinleme şeklinde olmasada genel hatlarıyla açıklamak ve İslami finans perspektifinden meşru bir araç olup olmadığını irdelemektir. Araştırma, söz konusu teknolojinin bazı İslami otoriteler ve bazı İslam alimlerinin görüşlerini inceleyip analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Blokzincir teknolojisi ve kripto paraların İslam fıkhındaki yeri, geniş bir literatüre ve tartışmaya tabi olan karmaşık bir konu olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Yapılan inceleme ve araştırmalar sonucunda, bu kuruluşların ve uzmanların büyük ölçüde kripto para teknolojisine yönelik ciddi itirazları olduğu ve bu itirazlar giderilmediği sürece, İslami olarak meşru bir finansal enstrüman olarak görülemeyeceği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Çoğunluk görüşünü yansıtan bu yaklaşımın yanında, kripto paraların meşru olması gerektiğini savunan önemli sayıda da alim bulunmaktadır. Bu alandaki görüşlerin çeşitliliği dolayısıyla kripto para konusunun, Müslüman toplumlar arasında helal olup olmadığıyla ilgili tartışmaları bir süre daha sürdüreceği ve yeni söylemlere zemin hazırlayacağı öngörülmektedir. Ayrıca ilgili konudaki fetva, görüş vb. Müslüman yatırımcıların karar alma süreçlerinde önemli bir etken olmakla birlikte gelecekte bu konudaki çalışmaların artacağı öngörülmektedir.
Bitcoin'in popülaritesinin artması ile ölçeklendirme sorunları da kaçınılmaz hale gelmektedir. Blok boyutu sınırlamaları ve işlem ücretlerindeki artış, tartışmalara yol açmakta ve alternatif çözüm arayışlarını tetiklemektedir. Ethereum, Bitcoin'in sınırlı işlevselliğini aşmak ve akıllı sözleşmeler gibi daha karmaşık işlevler sağlamak amacıyla tasarlanmıştır. Ancak Ethereum ağının yaygın olarak benimsenmesi, ağın hız ve/veya maliyetten ödün vermeden artan işlem hacmini sürdürebilmekte zorlanmasına neden olmuştur. Bu zorlukların üstesinden gelmek için, Optimistik Rollup gibi katman-2 ölçeklendirme çözümleri geliştirilmiştir. Bu çalışma, Ethereum ağının ölçeklenebilirlik zorluklarını ve katman-2 ölçeklendirme çözümlerinden Arbitrum ile Optimism'in ölçeklenebilirlik üzerindeki etkilerini ele almaktadır. Çalışma sonuçlarına göre, Arbitrum ve Optimism'ın etkinleştirilmesi sonrasında Ethereum hem günlük ortalama işlem sayılarında hem de ortalama işlem ücretlerinde bir artış meydana gelmektedir. Bu bulgular, Arbitrum ve Optimism gibi katman-2 çözümlerinin Ethereum ağının ölçeklenebilirliğini artırma ve işlem maliyetlerini azaltma potansiyeli hususunda başarılı olmadığını göstermektedir.
The Gülen Movement's growing power and influence, followed by its public criticism of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in 2010 and 2013, and finally the coup attempt in July 2016, has led to an unprecedented crackdown on the Gülen Movement in Turkey. The purge has ousted thousands of employees from major state and civil society institutions, including military, judiciary, and education institutions, as well as the mass media. The rise and fall of the Gülen Movement has been one of the defining issues in Turkish politics in the twenty-first century.The turmoil following the gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire during the late nineteenth century led to the sharp rise of Turkish nationalism. During this period, the Young Turks (Jöntürkler) attempted to define the “nation” and what it meant to be “Turkish.” Following international and domestic chaos that precipitated the fall of the Ottoman Empire during the Balkans Wars and the Great War, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the Turkish Republic and transformed the remnants of the Ottoman Empire into a modern, secular nation-state. The state abolished the caliphate, controlled the appointments of imams, rescinded religious courts and schools, and created new laws that further limited the power of religion in Turkish public life. These political and cultural reforms were intended to transform civic culture by strengthening loyalty to the new Turkish Republic. Nevertheless, winning popular acceptance for this new secular nationalism was an uneven and complex process that was not fully embraced by all sectors of Turkish society.Accordingly, leading religious intellectuals such as Bediuzzaman Said Nursî sought to challenge the new nationalist ideology or Kemalism, which was influenced by the work of Ziya Gölkalp, who strongly suggested suppressing any connections to the former Ottoman regime. Nursî believed that reinforcing Islam would establish a balance with secularism in all areas of Turkish society, particularly in education and intercultural dialogue. When the Turkish political system moved from a one-party authoritarian regime to a multiparty system in the middle of the twentieth century, discussions of Islam that had long laid dormant began to emerge, and the scale of this divide between Kemalist secularists and religious Turks became clear. Beginning in the 1960s, these cultural and religious tensions during a period of economic turmoil gradually prompted civil violence and led the military to intervene in government affairs. It was only with the 1980 coup d'état, and the sweeping reforms that were initiated following the deaths of thousands, that the Turkish-Islam Synthesis (Türk-İslam Sentezi) was introduced. This was an attempt to establish a political balance between Kemalism and Sunni Islam (Hanafi). Political parties—like the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) and the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi)—were shut down in 1998 and 2001, respectively, leading to a cycle of socio-political tension. It was in this atmosphere that the AKP emerged.The AKP's initial success was due to support from influential religious and social institutions, like the peculiar and autonomous Gülen Movement. Strengthened by this significant and influential alliance during the first decade of the twenty-first century—particularly with leading figures in the judiciary loyal to the Islamic movement's leader, Fethullah Gülen—tensions surfaced between the ruling AKP and Gülen. Namely, after Gülen criticized the government for its anti-Israel rhetoric following the May 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis in Gaza and additionally for its use of excessive force during Gezi Park Protests in May 2013. The political alliance was ruptured when notable AKP figures were arrested or questioned for corruption, money laundering, and bribery charges, in what became one of the largest and most controversial legal cases in Turkey, leading Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to brand the Gülen Movement a “parallel structure” (Paralel Devlet Yapılanması) or a state-like organization without democratic legitimacy. It is important to distinguish between the enigmatic figure of Fethullah Gülen, who leads an ascetic lifestyle in the remote Pennsylvania countryside of the United States, and his persona as a contemplative Sufi cleric who vis-à-vis the movement holds identifiable wealth and influence in Turkey and across the globe. Turkey's political polarization and the AK Party's use of pro-government discourses has served as a platform to promote an authoritarian legitimacy, thus deepening the confusion.Caroline Tee's The Gülen Movement in Turkey: The Politics of Islam and Modernity is an essential introduction to the topic that addresses the Gülen Movement's intentions, networks, and its broad influence in Turkish society. The book begins with Fethullah Gülen and the influence of Islamic theologian Bediuzzaman Said Nursî—particularly, the effect his seminal work Risale-i Nur—on Gülen's own spiritual framework. Raised in Erzurum, which is located in socially and religiously conservative Eastern Anatolia, Gülen gained his traditional religious education at a Sufi tekke (lodge), which were the religious institutions of both the Naqshbandi and Qadiri Sufi Orders. He continued his formal education in Islamic jurisprudence and by the age of eighteen became a state-qualified Imam. Several years later, Gülen was posted to the center of Izmir as the director of the Qur'anic school in Kestanepazan Mosque. Although he desired to move to a more conservative environment, and away from the liberal atmosphere of the western provinces of Turkey, he remained in Izmir and developed his vision of spiritual reform with the intent of reinvigorating Islam and bringing it to a wider audience. He gained a small following both at the mosque and through regular meetings at coffee houses, creating the Hizmet or “service” movement during the rigid secular posture of the state in the 1960s.The movement began to grow when his vision for an altın nesil, or “golden generation,” was implemented through organized summer camps that aimed to educate the next generation of Turks in both Islam and the modern sciences. This illustrates the influence of Said Nursî, who also envisioned the revitalization of Turkish religious culture, which had been vastly transformed by modern secularism, calling for positive action (müspet hareket) from pious individuals to engage in all areas of the public sphere. Said Nursî emphasized the importance of education in both Islam and the sciences, directly influencing Gülen's pedagogy. Nursî's attempt to change the impression that religion is inimical to science. Eventually, the summer camps became after-school centers (dershane) that gradually began to expand into other cities across Turkey, despite the growing social and political tensions between leftists and right-wing factions during the 1970s.A complete overhaul of the constitution following the 1980 military coup d'état ushered in a period of economic liberalization led by Turgut Özal. And the new Turkish-Islam synthesis (Türk-İslam Sentezi) that emerged removed some of the restrictions on religious life in Turkey. Tee explains how the Gülenists began investing in business and media interests and taking advantage of new international opportunities, particularly in Central Asia, which provided the movement with fertile ground for geographic expansion.The second part of the book contains the core of Caroline Tee's research into Gülen Movement's membership and its approach to scientific education. Tee uses anthropological fieldwork to explain how Gülen's Islamic creationist movement teaches science within an Islamic framework. Tee describes her experiences with the Gülenist educational system, which is characterized by strong academic achievement. Gülenist schools are preferred by conservative religious families for their moral and religious commitment and secular curriculum. Nevertheless, Gülenist schools are not explicitly linked to Gülen and are not promoted as such; instead the connection to Gülen is a matter of local knowledge illustrating the decentralized and low-key nature of the Gülen Movement. Tee notes, “Both he and his followers prefer to speak of a loose connection of initiatives that are all ‘inspired’ by his teachings, but do not constitute a single coordinated entity” (57). Any organized efforts to coordinate initiatives are usually through local affiliations between several schools in a given region or city, while well known and prestigious schools established by Gülen followers, such as Yamanlar Koleji in Izmir and Fatih Okulu in Istanbul, have franchised a number of schools directly.One intriguing element of the Gülen network that Tee brings to light is the concept of “service” (hizmet) in Gülen-run institutions, such as assigning a chemistry teacher, Irem, “against her personal wishes,” to a particular school far away from her home in northwest Turkey (54). Referred to as fedakarlik or self-sacrifice, they consider themselves as educators rather than mere teachers, thus functioning as a representative or role model to guide or inspire the ethical and personal education of the students. Such dedication lacks financial reward but is motivated by a spiritual eschatology and the belief in sevap (good deeds) that will be rewarded on Judgement Day. This clearly suggests a formal membership structure within the movement that transcends mere professional networking. Tee conducted her fieldwork in two Gülen schools in order to ascertain how science is taught within a secular curriculum yet framed by Islamic theology and the philosophy of Said-Nursî. Tee also exposes the considerable influence of religious ontology in science classes at the Gülen schools. For example, an educator in a middle-school science class, who was teaching students about a skin disease, claimed that the disease was given to a person as part of a divine test (sinav) and that the students should give thanks for not having such a skin disease. While remaining within the required boundaries of scientific education, the staff attached an Islamic ethic to the content, educating students through religious inferences in an attempt to establish coherence between science and religion.Tee discusses Islamic creationism as an essential belief within the Gülenist framework (Chapter 4), the Gülen Movement's argument being that science has become secularized, particularly through the theory of biological evolution that has created an unnecessary rift between science and an Islamic education. Gülen has written about evolution in his book Yaratılış Gerçeği ve Evrim, among other sources, and not only rejects the theory of evolution but views it as an attempt to justify atheistic materialism. Tee shows that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk advocated for evolutionary biology and the secular policies of his time, enforcing the addition of evolution in the school curriculum at the founding of the Turkish Republic. Said Nursî opposed this change, which radically changed the fabric of Turkish society through what Nursî saw as the coercive disassociation with Islamic values. Accordingly, Gülen opposes the inclusion of evolutionary theory in the curriculum, and an antievolutionary agenda has allowed the movement to reconcile modern science with Islam and harmonize what were once two mutually exclusive categories.Overall, the Gülenist target is to combat atheism through education. The Gülenists' belief that failing to adapt to the social requirements of modernity by refusing a scientific education favors Darwinian adherents; thus Gülenists battle atheism by teaching science through an Islamic lens. Tee explains that from the outset the movement has prioritized spreading Islamic values through local recruiting and international networking, particularly engaging students in Gülenist schools in foreign countries. The schools provide scholarships, educational and employment opportunities, and other opportunities for self-improvement. This emphasis on competitive achievement is one reason why Gülenist schools emphasize participating in the Science Olympiads, a prestigious international competition that provides students with the opportunity to compete for financial rewards, as well as improving their chances of getting admitted to prestigious universities. These competitions also play a vital role in changing the status quo, by allowing “Islamic actors to engage successfully with a critical aspect of modernity” (77). Higher education institutions, such as Irfan University—which is economically supported by a group of investors sympathetic to the movement, hosting a number of high-achieving students and staffed by academics with strong credentials and research excellence. Higher education offers the movement a way to increase its global influence.The exact number of Gülen-run educational institutions remains unknown as they do not “publically affiliate with one another” (55) nor do they identify with Gülen or even share a common name or logo as institutions often do. Tee tackles—albeit briefly—some important questions that lie at the heart of the movement's ambiguous status. For example, is there an Islamist agenda at the core of its endeavors? Skeptics label the movement a cemaat (religious community), implying its interests do not lie solely in the principle of positive action in civil society, which is what the movement emphasizes. These concerns have been exacerbated by Gülen's public sermons reminding his followers to be responsive to the dangers of materialism. However, the movement's economic interests allow it to continue to project its influence and demonstrate the strength of Islam by building international institutions of higher education. In a similar vein, staff members working at Gülen-run institutions straddle an ambiguous personal and professional line, where spiritual goals are integrated into their curricula. While this educational homogeneity strengthens the quality of teaching and increases overall academic achievement, its lack of clarity has led to several legal cases against Gülenist schools in the United States, for mismanagement of funds and failing to clearly outline their affiliation with the Gülen Movement. Other contradictions include Gülen's statements that he supports secularism and seeks only to change the nature of Turkish secularism, which actively opposes Islam. Yet in other statements, either directly or indirectly, Gülen encourages the complete collapse of Turkish secularism and its replacement with an Islamic state.Caroline Tee focuses much of her work on the structure of the organization and its ambiguous position in Turkish political, judicial, and civil society. She argues that while there is no official criteria for joining the movement, it consists of a multitiered level of commitment that includes not only the core followers, such as teachers at Gülen-led schools, but also those on the periphery of the movement, including sympathizers (onaylayanlar) and consumers. Consumers are those who use the movement's products and services, whether consciously or unconsciously, and play a vital role in strengthening the success of the movement. Tee's analysis slightly differs from Joshua Hendrick, author of Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World (NYU Press, 2013), who argues that the movement consists of four—rather than three—groups of affiliates that engage with the movement. Hendrick divides the core group of Gülenists into two: the “aristocracy” who are surrounded by “friends.” The third part of Tee's book, “The Wider Context” (Chapters 6–8), provides an overview of the Gülen Movement's place in Turkish politics, vis-à-vis their impaired relationship with the AK Party, as well as its global status, particularly with respect to the United States.The Gülen Movement's intercultural dialogue initiative through The Journalists and Writers Foundation (Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfi), where Gülen himself serves as honorary chairman, promotes dialogue between Muslims and other religions and cultures. The Gülen Movement's emphasis on intercultural dialogue stems from Said Nursî, who also promoted interfaith communication. The movement attempts to find common ground between the major religions of the “People of the Book” (Christianity, Islam, and Judaism) as a strategy for peaceful engagement and effective networking, promoting Islam as well as Turkey and the movement as a whole. Since 1999, Gülen has lived in Pennsylvania and is often referred to by Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as Pennsylvania'daki adam (the man from Pennsylvania). Gülen's move to the United States has been subject to allegations that he has a relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Indeed, it is interesting to note that a former CIA agent and senior staff member at the National Intelligence Council supported Gülen's for a Nevertheless, the move to the United States established the global of the movement and the that The movement has a in membership with and Turkish despite its It is not what led to Gülen's to to the United States, but his there has allowed the movement to on an international most of the the movement has or religiously instead engaging in that and which allowed the Gülen Movement and AKP to to the movement has not embraced political despite the that loyal Gülenists were the leading figures in the against senior AKP The led Erdoğan to on the movement, or loyal Gülenist and the movement was a to by to the Tee attempts to whether the Gülen Movement is an or more public with a of it is that the Gülenists' was to Erdoğan and a change in the Turkish the of the AKP had to Gülen from the United States to to the Gülen Movement as a organization or after Tee's book was that her research to explain the movement as an Islamic group of the of science and as part of her yet attempts to the political between the a approach in the of political Islam. The AKP and the Gülen movement were by their common Islamic in the school of Sunni Islam and the of the power of the military The collapse of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in 1998 led by and the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) in led to the of the AKP which the belief that Islamic would as long as a strong military continued to play a role in Turkish The AKP has to the given to the military through the and which the military as a that was intent on the These were only with support from senior and staff loyal to Gülen. figures were arrested and given life all of have been the rift began in late 2013, Gülen has any in the Nevertheless, Tee it that Gülen is of contradictions and and even his of an and nature as to his acceptance of intercultural a of the Gülen which other Islamic a strong emphasis on science education, Caroline Tee's book provides an of the into the political or social of the which be in other sources, explains the and of the about the sweeping against Gülen schools and the including and the public against the movement. She also provides a of the movement's schools by engaging with students and teachers at within these institutions in several cities Turkey. Tee's fieldwork is a vital to the on the Gülen it light on some of the of the movement and its global She also exposes some of the movement's such as the to public order and as part of even there are no formal or any clearly for membership However, positive with the of Islam into modern society, is a part of the Gülenist the of whether followers actively this agenda would have been a addition to Tee's This is what Joshua Hendrick has is the movement's which is due to the political and social in Indeed, as Tee Gülen Movement as an but one which has to significant power and The use of social as a framework to the and structure of the movement is a approach that to of the movement's social influence, which has become the for its success and