Blockchain Papers

Kabiru Uba Ibrahim, Muhammad Samir Tahir, Dr. Auwal Salisu

No abstract is available for this record.

Mohammad K. Elshqirat

Since its inception in 2009, cryptocurrencies have been a subject of debate in literature. In the general literature, the debate is mainly about the legality and application of these currencies while in Islamic literature, the debate is about its compliance with Sharia rules and directions. The primary objective of this study was to analyze current cryptocurrencies using a novel methodology and propose a new Islamic cryptocurrency, called “Halal Coin”. To achieve the objectives of this study, a qualitative research method was followed by analyzing how the included cryptocurrencies work, analyzing some of its data for the period from January 1, 2023 to May 31,2025, and determining the characteristics of the proposed coin. Data used in this study were analyzed using descriptive statistics and the measure of “value at risk”. The results revealed that none of the current cryptocurrencies are Sharia-compliant, and the proposed Halal coin is characterized by 15 attributes, including being accessible to all people, serving as a unit of account, and being free from high volatility.

Essa Al-Mansouri

This article critically evaluates the Sharia legitimacy of Bitcoin by applying Usul al-Fiqh—the foundational principles of Islamic jurisprudence—to several influential fatwas that prohibit it. Despite stemming from sincere concerns, many such fatwas rely on incomplete factual understanding, unverified analogies, or secondary policy considerations rather than explicit textual or consensus-based evidence. Consequently, these rulings risk conflating genuine harms (fraud, volatility, illicit use) with Bitcoin’s inherent characteristics, which classical fiqh frameworks may otherwise recognize as permissible if carefully regulated. Drawing on examples of fatwas that deem Bitcoin permissible, the study demonstrates how thorough subject comprehension and methodologically robust legal derivation (ijtihad) often yield more nuanced conclusions. It further underscores that well-established Qur’anic and Prophetic principles— such as avoiding excessive uncertainty (gharar) and upholding wealth preservation—need not preclude thoughtful, evidence-based engagement with emerging financial technologies. Concluding that clear methodological grounding and accurate technology assessment are indispensable, the paper advocates ongoing dialogue between Sharia scholars, economists, and technical experts to ensure balanced rulings that protect Muslims’ interests while fostering innovation.

Mubashir Husain Rehmani

I received the BEng degree in computer systems engineering from Mehran University of Engineering and Technology, Jamshoro, Pakistan, in 2004, the MS degree from the University of Paris XI, Paris, France, in 2008, and the PhD degree from the University Pierre and Marie Curie, Paris, in 2011. I am currently working as a Lecturer in the Department of Computer Science, Munster Technological University (MTU), Ireland, since January 2019. Prior to this, I worked as a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Telecommunications Software and Systems Group (TSSG), Waterford Institute of Technology (WIT), Waterford, Ireland, from 2017 to 2018. I also served for 5 years as an Assistant Professor at COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Wah Cantt., Pakistan. Before joining COMSATS, I worked as a Postdoctoral Researcher at PASNET, LIGM, Université Paris Est Marne La Vallée, France in 2012. Over the last two decades, my research focused on wireless networks, smart grid, Internet of Things, cognitive radio networks, energy harvesting, privacy preserving algorithms, renewable energy systems, Terahertz communication, cybersecurity—protecting critical infrastructure, biomedical image analysis, generative artificial intelligence, blockchain, non-fungible tokens, tokenization, tokenomics, decentralized finance, metaverse, and cryptocurrency. Initially, I was in doubt that I didn't do anything extraordinary in teaching and learning. Thanks to my MTU colleagues, who motivated me to think and write about my leadership role and how I influenced others in teaching and learning. These few words of appreciation and motivation from colleagues boosted my confidence and now I am proud to share that I have achieved the status of Senior Fellowship from Advance HE, United Kingdom. I am serving in various academic leadership positions to shape the future of teaching and learning and participate in policy making for higher education. I am a member of the Academic Council, MTU, and a member of the Research and Innovation Committee, MTU. I extensively serve in international scientific community in various roles and capacities. I am currently an Area Editor of the IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials and IEEE Open Journal of Communications Society. I am also serving as an Editorial Board Member of NATURE Scientific Reports. Additionally, I served for 3 years (from 2015 to 2017) as an Associate Editor of the IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials. I served both as Column Editor for Book Reviews and Associate Editor in IEEE Communications Magazine. I am currently serving as an Associate Editor for IEEE Transactions on Green Communication and Networking and IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking, Elsevier Journal of Network and Computer Applications (JNCA), the Journal of Communications and Networks (JCN), and several other journals. I served as Lead Guest Editor and Co-Guest Editor for more than 40 special issues which were published in top leading journals such as IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, Elsevier Future Generation Computer Systems, Elsevier Physical Communications, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications—Series on Network Softwarization and Enablers, Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies, Elsevier Ad Hoc Networks, IEEE Communications Magazine, and Elsevier Pervasive and Mobile Computing. I served as Chair, Co-Chair, and Technical Program Committee Member of prestigious international conferences and workshops such as IEEE ICC, IEEE Globecom, IEEE PIMRC, Infocom, IEEE VTC, IEEE WCNC, and so forth. I served as Industry Exhibits Co-Chair (Industrial Forum and Exhibition) in the IEEE Conference on Communications (ICC) 2020 held in Dublin, Ireland. My research profile is well established and recognized nationally and internationally. I am leading research by developing multi-disciplinary, industry-focused research with national and international partners. It focuses on United Nation's Sustainable Development Goals encompasses “sustainable cities and communities,” “affordable and clean energy,” and “industry, innovation and infrastructure.” I have authored/edited total 10 books—published by international publishers such as Springer, IGI Global, USA, CRC Press—Taylor and Francis Group, UK, and Wiley, UK. I have published 130 peer-reviewed publications in high impact journals/transactions/magazines and international conferences. My total Accumulative Impact Factor is more than 600, H-Index = 50, i-10 index = 115, Citations = 13,163—according to Google Scholar. I received “Best Researcher of the Year 2015 of COMSATS Wah” award in 2015. I received the certificate of appreciation, “Exemplary Editor of the IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials for the year 2015” from the IEEE Communications Society. I received Best Paper Award from IEEE ComSoc Technical Committee on Communications Systems Integration and Modeling (CSIM), in IEEE ICC 2017. I consecutively received research productivity award in 2016–2017 and also ranked # 1 in all Engineering disciplines from Pakistan Council for Science and Technology (PCST), Government of Pakistan. I received Best Paper Award in 2017 from Higher Education Commission (HEC), Government of Pakistan. I am the recipient of Best Paper Award in 2018 from Elsevier Journal of Network and Computer Applications. I am the recipient of Highly Cited Researcher award thrice in 2020, 2021, and 2022 by Clarivate, USA. My performance in this context features in the TOP 1% by citations in the field of Computer Science and Cross Field in the Web of Science citation index. I am the Only Researcher from Ireland in the field of “Computer Science” who received this International prestigious award. In Oct 2022, I received Science Foundation Ireland's CONNECT Centre's Education and Public Engagement (EPE) Award 2022 for my research outreach work and being a spokesperson for achieving a work-life balance for a career in research. The author declares no conflicts of interest.

İrfan Doğan, İbrahim Yıldız, Lokman Doğan

Blokzincir teknolojisi ve kripto paralar, günümüz dünyası finansal ekosisteminde giderek daha fazla önem kazanan unsurlardır. Blokzincir, dağıtık defter teknolojisi olarak tanımlanmakta olup, güvenli, şeffaf ve değiştirilemez bir veri yapısı sunarak merkezi otorite ihtiyacını ortadan kaldırmaktadır. Bu teknoloji sayesinde Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple ve Litecoin gibi dijital varlıklar, ekonomik faaliyetlerde alternatif bir araç olarak değerlendirilmeye başlanmıştır. Söz konusu teknoloji, toplumlarda hızla bir farkındalık oluşturmuş ve yatırım aracı olarak kabul edilmesi çabuklaşmıştır. Ancak bu yeni nesil finansal araçların İslam fıkhındaki konumu ve meşruiyeti üzerine ciddi tartışmalar söz konusu olmaktadır. Hızlı finansal etkileşimler, Müslüman yatırımcıların da dikkatini çekmiş; dolayısıyla kripto paraların meşruiyeti hususunda çeşitli tartışmalar gündeme gelmiştir. İslami finans prensipleri, riba (faiz), gharar (belirsizlik) ve maysir (şans oyunu) gibi unsurları yasaklamakta, bu nedenle kripto paraların doğası ve işleyişi üzerine ayrıntılı bir inceleme yapılması gerekmektedir. Bu çalışmanın ana amacı, bu belirsizlikleri ele alarak kripto para teknolojisini derinleme şeklinde olmasada genel hatlarıyla açıklamak ve İslami finans perspektifinden meşru bir araç olup olmadığını irdelemektir. Araştırma, söz konusu teknolojinin bazı İslami otoriteler ve bazı İslam alimlerinin görüşlerini inceleyip analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Blokzincir teknolojisi ve kripto paraların İslam fıkhındaki yeri, geniş bir literatüre ve tartışmaya tabi olan karmaşık bir konu olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Yapılan inceleme ve araştırmalar sonucunda, bu kuruluşların ve uzmanların büyük ölçüde kripto para teknolojisine yönelik ciddi itirazları olduğu ve bu itirazlar giderilmediği sürece, İslami olarak meşru bir finansal enstrüman olarak görülemeyeceği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Çoğunluk görüşünü yansıtan bu yaklaşımın yanında, kripto paraların meşru olması gerektiğini savunan önemli sayıda da alim bulunmaktadır. Bu alandaki görüşlerin çeşitliliği dolayısıyla kripto para konusunun, Müslüman toplumlar arasında helal olup olmadığıyla ilgili tartışmaları bir süre daha sürdüreceği ve yeni söylemlere zemin hazırlayacağı öngörülmektedir. Ayrıca ilgili konudaki fetva, görüş vb. Müslüman yatırımcıların karar alma süreçlerinde önemli bir etken olmakla birlikte gelecekte bu konudaki çalışmaların artacağı öngörülmektedir.

Muhammad Aslam Latang, Fathurrahman Fathurrahman, M. Isnin Faried

This study aims to analyze the Islamic legal rulings on cryptocurrency as established by the 7th Ijtima Ulama Fatwa Commission of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) held in November 2021. The research focuses on clarifying the status of cryptocurrency in Islamic law amid growing digital financial innovations. Methodologically, the study employs a qualitative approach based on an in-depth review of fatwas, Islamic jurisprudence, and Indonesian legal frameworks, supported by deliberations involving over 700 scholars, religious leaders, and academics. The findings reveal that MUI declared the use of cryptocurrency as a digital currency haram due to the presence of gharar (uncertainty), dharar (harm), and incompatibility with Indonesian monetary regulations. Similarly, cryptocurrency transactions as commodities or digital assets are deemed invalid because of gharar, dharar, and qimar (gambling), as well as failure to meet the shariah condition of sil’ah (clear ownership). However, an exception applies to cryptocurrencies backed by clear underlying assets, definite value, and proven benefits, which may be permissible. This research contributes original insight into contemporary Islamic finance by addressing cryptocurrency’s evolving legal status within Indonesia’s socio-legal context. The results serve as essential guidance for Muslim communities and policymakers in navigating digital finance consistent with shariah principles.

Timur Kuran

Among the requirements of a liberal order is the ability to pursue collective goals through enduring private organizations. Such organizations contribute to political checks and balances, which sustain individual freedoms. In the Islamic Middle East, a possible starting point for autonomous nonstate organizations was the Islamic waqf, a trust that an individual formed under Islamic law to provide designated social services in perpetuity. Waqfs came to control vast resources. They might have used their enormous wealth to constrain the state and advance the freedoms of their constituents. The resulting decentralization of power could have placed the Middle East on the road to liberalization and perhaps also democratization. However, despite their immense wealth, waqfs remained politically powerless. A key reason is that they were governed according to their deeds, not the preferences of their caretakers or beneficiaries. In these respects, Islamic waqfs differed from European corporations, which were self-governing organizations enjoying legal personhood. In the Middle East, waqfs supplied services that the corporation provided in Western Europe. For instance, whereas churches and universities operated as corporations, mosques and madrasas (Islamic colleges) were financed by waqfs. This institutional difference contributed to the interregional divergence in political patterns.

Idrus Idrus

The invention of the computer which was originally a calculating machine (Difference Engine no. 1) which was discovered by Charles Babbage (1791- 1871) is something very famous in the history of computer development and is the first automatic calculator. With the very rapid development of the digital world, in 1983 an American cryptography expert David Chaum used cryptographic electronic money called e-cash, and in 1995, he implemented it through Digichash, which became the initial form of collaboration between the digital world of computers and Money, which is a cryptographic electronic payment instrument that requires user software to pull notes from the bank and designate a specific encrypted key before it can be sent to the recipient. And in 1996, the NSA, namely the United States National Security Agency, which was founded by President Harry S. Truman on November 4, 1952, had the task and function of collecting and analyzing communications from other countries, as well as protecting information belonging to the United States. The agency published a paper entitled How to Make a Mint: The Cryptography of Anonymous Electronic Cash, describing the Crypto currency system that first published it on the MIT mailing list, later in 1997, in the journal The American Law Review (Vol. 46, Issue 4). It was these researches that eventually led the developers to start developing what is known today as blockchain which is basically a distributed open ledger to record transactions between two parties efficiently and in a verifiable and permanent way. The discovery of Bit coin in 2009 which was declared as electronic money was developed by an institution or individual who has the initials Satoshi Nakamoto, the technology used is using a peer to peer network without centralized storage so that verification can be done anywhere in the world anywhere that dedicates a computer, to do this or it is called mining. Since 2009 other coins and tokens have started to appear, as we can see on CoinMarketcap which has more than 6000 coins and tokens. The utilization and use of this technology is still being debated from the point of view of Muslims in Indonesia, as stated by Yenny Wahid in the activities carried out by the Islamic Law Firm (ILF), this is due to the uncertainty of the asset value which can change at any time.

Simon Sorgenfrei

In Terrains of Exchange: Religious Economies of Global Islam (2014), historian Nile Green suggests a theoretical framework that could be employed to analyse Muslim responses to colonialism. Especially he analyses how individual Muslims as well as Islamic organisations transformed themselves or developed as they struggled with each other in order to stake claims on an increasingly connected world. One such development was the ideology of Pan-Islamism, which strives to unite Muslims of all creeds in an effort to meet the challenges posed by colonialism and modernity. The Pan-Islamic current was, however, merely one of many Islamic ideologies that developed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and rather than being a time of Muslim unity, the period in question witnessed the emergence of a multitude of Islamic factions. One of these was the Aḥmadiyya Jamāʿat which will be in focus in the current article. In his study, Green turns the spotlight on such processes and attempts to “look beyond the discursive surface similarities of Muslim ‘beliefs’ to probe instead the multifarious – and indeed competing – social producers of religion.”11 Nile Green, Terrains of Exchange: Religious Economies of Global Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014): 2. A further objective of his study is to suggest a terminology that will, in contrast to using emic vocabulary, better allow us to analyse Islam as an “internally competitive field of social actors and organizations.”22 Green, Terrains of Exchange, 10. The aim of this article is to make use of Green’s conceptualisations and terminology in order to analyse the evolution of the Aḥmadiyya Jamāʿat as it transformed from being a Sunnī reform movement into the world’s largest Islamic new religious organisation. The Aḥmadiyya Jamāʿat is to be understood here as an Islamic new religious movement based upon the fact that it was founded by a charismatic leader, Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad (1835-1908), who emerged as a preacher connected to Islamic reformist currents in nineteenth-century India but who later increasingly developed a theology rejected by other Muslims.33 For a discussion of the concept of new religious movements, see David, G. Bromley, “The Sociology of New Religious Movements”, in Hammer, Olav & Rothstein, Mikael (eds.). The Cambridge Companion to New Religious Movements. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 13-28. For a discussion of the Aḥmadiyya Jamāʿat as an Islamic new religious movement, see Brian Arly Jacobsen; Göran Larsson & Simon Sorgenfrei, “The Ahmadiyya Mission to the Nordic Countries”, in James R. Lewis & Inga Bårdsen Tøllefsen (ed.), Handbook of Nordic New Religions, (Brill: Leiden, 2015): 359-373. In his framework, Green directs our attention to what he labels “firms” and “entrepreneurs” as “producers” of religious goods through “adaptations” and “innovations” used to attract “consumers” on a developing religious “market”. “Adaption,” in Green’s usage, is employed to signify how such Muslim entrepreneurs might use and modify the techniques of their competitors in order to suit their own purposes while “innovation” refers to forms of religious strategies that go beyond adaptation so that new (often hybridised) religious forms may be generated.44 Green, Terrains of Exchange, 9-10. A subordinate aim of Green’s book is to develop an analytical terminology and we must therefore not confuse the analytical term “innovation” with the emic use of the term, i.e., as a translation of the Arabic bidʿa. As in other economies, religious entrepreneurs and firms are dependent upon consumers for their success and therefore might need to adapt their products so that they become more attractive and desirable than the goods offered by their competitors. This might be done by making use of new forms of technology; novel and more effective organisational structures; or various interpretations of religious sources or practices, some of which may be more creative than others. In regard to such new markets, Muslim entrepreneurs having educational backgrounds other than the traditional madrasah education became more common, and they also increasingly disseminated their teachings through novel forms.55 Francis Robinson, “Technology and Religious Change: Islam and the Impact of Print”, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, (1993): 229-251; Göran Larsson, Muslims and the New Media: Historical and Contemporary Debates, (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011). The growing popularity of such preachers gradually undermined the authority of the ʿulamāʾ in regard to a market where “any Ahmad, Mahmud or Muhammad could claim to speak for Islam.”66 Francis Robinson, “Technology and Religious Change: Islam and the Impact of Print”, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, (1993): 245. Mattias Dahlqvist, The Politics of Islam, Non-Violence, and Peace: the Thought of Maulana Wahiduddin Khan in Context. Diss. (Umeå: Umeå University, 2019): 54. Let us now take a closer look at the market context in which Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad emerged. By 1834, when the American Presbyterian Mission was established in Ludhiana near Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad’s hometown of Qāḍiān, British missionary churches had already been active in India for some twenty years, and they were then bustling with activity.77 Spencer Lavan, The Ahmadiyyah Movement: A History and Perspective. (Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1974): 44. Missionary stations were built, and through them new forms of religious organisations were introduced alongside novelties such as the printing press. Missionaries published apologetic Christian tracts and refutations of local religions as well as grammars and dictionaries of Punjabi, Urdu, Persian, Hindi, and Kashmiri. Shortly afterwards came translations of Hindu, Sikh, and Islamic religious texts. Through such new and often belligerent methods of evangelism, Christian missionaries quickly expanded their activities throughout the Punjab and the so-called North-West Frontier.88 Simon Ross Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at: history, belief, practice, (London: Hurst & Co, 2008): 44. This antagonism could not go unanswered for long and demanded therefore responses from local religious leaders. The new situation both provoked and intrigued them, and efforts were subsequently made to learn about the competing religions and the methods of the European missionaries. It also forced them to engage creatively with their own traditions. This situation resulted in a wide range of Sikh, Hindu, and Muslim reform and fundamentalist movements.99 Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, 44. Historical developments were, however, also great sources of inspiration when developing such new responses. In regard to Islamic developments, which is the main focus of this article, Islam in India had been negotiated by a growing number of competing preachers and groups at least since the time of Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī (1703-1762), who argued for the need of ijtihād – active interpretations of the Islamic sources rather than taqlīd, conformity to institutionalised earlier interpretations – and who developed a means of Islamic reform that combined elements from both historical Sufi and modern Wahhabi currents stemming from the Arabian peninsula.1010 For a thorough discussion of ijtihād and taqlīd, see Rudolph Peters, “Ijtihad and Taqlid in 18th and 19th Century Islam” in Die Welt des Islams, vol. 20, no. 3–4, (1980): 131–145. The Barelwī movement could be described maybe as a of and the movement is a Sufi while the were to the Wahhabi Islamic in British Oxford University Press, The emergence of religious reform therefore be understood both as a to and as by the and by the British and the of modern for and the of on the of the in in & and the of University of the Press, with and Global Religious in of the American of vol. no. The about by also resulted in the development of a new and the of this often had a more or European education that became dependent upon British to their in Modern Islam in A 2. New also a in time as a to this a growing number of religious subsequently a need to their religious and them in a to and with the modern then In his study Modern Islam in analyses the development of reformist Islam in India in the development of Aḥmad by European educational founded Muslim University in This was to be a modern educational based upon a European to the new than being Islam to similarities and Islam, and developed a to Islam as being with European and Modern Islam, The in is who was active during a period when the was developing a of in regard to the British and was also a new of that resulted in European and a in Islamic than Aḥmad Islam, to was not with but the of therefore argued that was as a to Islam, and through such of he was to attract or of the new than the that were to Aḥmad Modern Islam, The development is by the was in and was a when Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad while at the local was to become a and in as well as in and from to his to he developed from the Islamic since Aḥmad In his book The of Religious Thought in Islam for for a but Islam, one that take into both the and of Islam while being to modern developments in and other of Modern Islam, also Muhammad The in Contemporary of Press, were also other currents and active that must be in such as the or Wahhabi current with a themselves that had in with Arabian in of their of or sources for Islam other than the and the of the was the which could be as an made by ʿulamāʾ to develop a that of the of Aḥmad and the of Lavan, The Ahmadiyyah For a thorough see Islamic and the who argued for a Islam that to and charismatic Islamic the nineteenth a wide of Muslim themselves in to Islamic sources and through of all in to and and the of Christian missionary not by to the of Christian missionary firms religious by in and preachers to a traditional of The of religious to new by Christian missionary firms and later by both and Muslim missionary new as well as new Green, Terrains of Exchange, One of the in which Christian missionary churches new religious economies, a that be and developed by the of colonialism and missionary was to and which were by Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad was into a Punjab of historical for the but which at the time of his in and in to in the by the and later by the to A Muslim in University Press, 2015): an education for a of his with by when he was was by a Sunnī of who in the and the of he Arabic with a connected to the he Arabic and with a In to the he also with his who was a of and in to The of he had the of the Islamic of nineteenth-century India and also Ghulām Aḥmad’s later that the fact that Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad had madrasah education could be of for his later evolution as he was therefore to the of such an of Religious Thought and Oxford University Press, he not a or also in with other Islamic of the late nineteenth and early twentieth to In Aḥmadiyya this fact been used to develop an of Ghulām Aḥmad as i.e., in the as the to as Khan Ghulām Aḥmad’s education was which could some of the in his when to historical Sunnī the development of his later theology and Spencer and Khan that Ghulām Aḥmad had a or some other of Sufi as a number of his and of his terminology be to Sufi teachings that were in in Punjab and the India of the Lavan, The Ahmadiyyah Khan that is the it Ghulām Aḥmad in with earlier such as the Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī as it he indeed with and also Sufi Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad was employed as a in the of the of which also was a for Christian missionary in not Ghulām Aḥmad time to religious in and and in that other to As Khan also a of during the he in but what he was his had It is Khan these the which later came to of Ghulām Aḥmad’s to to Green’s concept of of this is an of how the methods and of their and them into of Ghulām Aḥmad was not the to and in he also the of Aḥmad and other currents of Islamic It however, that he was to a by the more of than by the of Aḥmad to It is also during these that we Ghulām Aḥmad’s Sufi as it was then that he the to In Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad was in and with his It as he his religious on his but is also to been in with local as well as with of the to his in Ghulām Aḥmad to a on both a and had by then for local but was a of that allow to the of he had to was forced to on his own and his in the world. By Ghulām Aḥmad in the reformist and the more fundamentalist as well as the Christian active in the to and develop into a and with his and of increasingly being by his and the he was about to the Aḥmadiyya The of Christian missionary churches in India to the of a of who also were in to Lavan, The Ahmadiyyah to It was these and as a to such challenges that Mīrzā Ghulām in the published his of the It was in and Christian and In a to he so by to the Islamic sources to new interpretations which he argued were more for his time and the challenges of his In the the of Ghulām Aḥmad’s described is creatively in a was now developing his own of what a of an modern Islam might look The book was well and was a by of the who Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad’s of and the religious Lavan, The Ahmadiyyah in the early Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad was a reformist Muslim and was for his apologetic who his in other he had a to attract consumers on the religious market of which he was now a One of the we that Ghulām Aḥmad with Christian missionaries in the is the of Christian missionaries in India used the about not being on the but instead being to to their that they then it must also be the that is to since and but as an Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, to of Christian to to and the of his had a for many Khan and he was indeed the then was it who was in while Muhammad in to This also to Mīrzā Ghulām and he to develop his interpretations of the and Islamic on throughout his theology on the was published in a book in in and published translation of the book is The is a of how the competitive situation could and to their own as well as their religious and with the being creative new be the Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad to to the Islamic while a to the as the of that not from the and to which he was he argued Islamic that had in fact on the and was later and the of his as a in and where he of as other had done and as Mīrzā Ghulām in from the and to Islam Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, to the of in Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad’s teachings about as an early of what Green an “innovation” made to a Christian on Islam and of how might and in the of teachings and upon in University of Press, Christian missionaries to use Islamic teachings about in order to Islam, and as a Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad creatively developed an about the Christian A later of his it “The of was, by the of the Aḥmadiyya movement as the of Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, In developing his own interpretations of the of however, Mīrzā Ghulām not Christian but also interpretations It is in to that Ghulām Aḥmad and the Ahmadiyya been as being in to Islamic Göran Larsson, of in & the of Muslims in in of In later he came to the or and the or of where was the and was the of the and was the of the Muslims instead to be the and to from a based upon the is not the of but he is the of and the of the and is of all by which was by of the was to Ghulām that had the of but rather that be a they are the of The of the he is that had he had who might be his of and were while came not with a new but instead came to the of also Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, the which are the of of the and the In a and a of Muslim must in religious from also Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, in to his Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad argued for his and through the he to which was in by in his he was in a to the of the which increasingly on from Sunnī charismatic see Olav & Mikael Rothstein, to New Religious Movements”, in Olav & Mikael The Cambridge Companion of New Religious (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012): Ghulām Aḥmad’s as a was, however, also his his and was one of the of the what become as the and the the regard Mīrzā to be a the the of i.e., that was the In Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad that had to a i.e., an that and the of Islam” and the of Islam all from Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, also to As the the of the the was to the often in the of that was late nineteenth-century The in and in the the of the Aḥmadiyya Jamāʿat was Ghulām Aḥmad by then had as well as Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, to Green, this of was not at a time when a number of such Muslim religious firms were founded by who had in the religious of their and he also how such in organisational more Christian than Green, Terrains of Exchange, In the of Ghulām Aḥmad’s a of was the the Jamāʿat developed as an to local religious in India and the teachings of Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad in a that the Christian but the and of the Jamāʿat were also connected to Islamic For the of Mīrzā through a in a to for Sufi or as the be to the in Islamic in of Islam, Ghulām Aḥmad’s to on a market was through a to Islamic as it was connected to a that not the from the of Muhammad Book was understood as a of in the and Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad was as being that that Islam to and it throughout the Muhammad The of the Ahmadiyya Ahmadiyya Through such an and the could be as missionary of at a time when that Ghulām Aḥmad was increasingly attention from other Muslims in This use of a that Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad and his Jamāʿat at a in time and also be as a with other new religious & Rothstein, to New Religious The organisational that had by then developed was to missionaries and by Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad and his the Jamāʿat was by a of who their to Ghulām but the of his he however, to the organisational framework of the In the of the Aḥmadiyya was to his his Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, One of the of the was, and to a i.e., Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad’s Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, we might to modern forms of and to early Islamic and the of the The organisational of the Jamāʿat developed further the and the and is by Simon Ross of Muslim reform Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, As of this Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad also established educational to the further and of his In the was founded in as a for the education of the of the and to them the of Mīrzā Ahmad, Ahmad, Press, the was a modern connected to Islamic and in the Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad as the that Islamic as well as modern so that may to 2. In the education at the which by then had into a was into own – the The the developed into own the which was established in in Punjab as a missionaries to be into the in order to local Aḥmadiyya are established in in and in of Islam in the Vol. In developing the educational and missionary Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad and the Aḥmadiyya Jamāʿat were by traditional Islamic as well as by their Christian Islamic in the (New York: Oxford University in their educational activities and in their translation and of the and Ghulām Aḥmad’s in an growing number of their activities methods employed by Christian missionaries in and who and published the in local and also the for apologetic The of the Islamic of the movement the into the Aḥmadiyya to the European in India was to and One of Christian missionary activities in British India that Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad and other Muslim was the of on Islam and translations of the in and local done by British such as and which and Islam on The The Muslim or the in Vol. No. 1, In order to engage in the disseminated by both Aḥmad and had their published in in and with a in Modern Islam, As we Ghulām Aḥmad to the on a and the the Aḥmadiyya Jamāʿat in being founded was the that Green as the religious at that time and one of the in the missionary that was then – a printing Valentine, Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, the of the printing in Muslim see Larsson, Muslims and the New As Ghulām Aḥmad had and his own was he with to his own to his own tracts as well as other Islamic he their own printing them not to Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad’s but also and i.e., modern a The and were published in Urdu, but already in they published the of The of in a that is in as a In The of Religions, Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad’s teachings and the activities could be to the in India more to As European missionaries and also translations having and that many Muslims as A was long the translation of the into done by a Muslim was by an early of Mīrzā Ghulām In published his translation The with on the and the of the and been The that his translation a and Islam, from developments throughout as well as from by it rather than Muslims might on it is a European that he had in The he for his to a of the to the For a of Aḥmadiyya translations of the into see Sorgenfrei, of the into by Aḥmadiyya A in of Studies, and Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad however, a and it that already the that his translation was on a new translation was by of Mīrzā Ghulām Maulana who also Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad’s into Maulana translation of the was published in and is introduced by a long about Islam as a and the as Muhammad The the Arabic with and Islamic and translations – with their what they to be European at the time that they an Aḥmadiyya of Islam – might therefore be to be what in which the to or in of Studies, vol. no. the time that the of Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad to be as a period during which his developed into a but their in their own the of techniques and missionary methods such as the printing new and translations of the into Ghulām Aḥmad and the to develop as an Islamic new religious movement and into an increasingly As the market a market Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad was but one of many Muslim active in British India during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as he argued for the of ijtihād and therefore the of the ʿulamāʾ by that was a need for a Islam that could meet the challenges of Lavan, The Ahmadiyyah use of Green’s we regard as a religious making use of and and in a he be attractive on the religious market of his his and were well but his popularity in to the of his The he was was or to attract the the and from Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad developed his theology the and of the it further be argued that Mīrzā Ghulām his and the development of other new religious in such as the and the of Through an use of both Christian and Islamic he developed his own both as a religious and as an in an As Ghulām Aḥmad his from a Islam that could be attractive to the of Muslims to as a and his market in as the market Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad and the Aḥmadiyya Jamāʿat increasingly developed of such as translation and a of Green’s and theoretical framework as these were the new of that Muslims other of in the nineteenth Green, Terrains of Exchange, the the Aḥmadiyya Jamāʿat being established was a printing so that Ghulām Aḥmad’s could be in and then increasingly in Through the of his the of Ghulām Aḥmad and his and the Aḥmadiyya became increasingly as by a growing number of who Ghulām Aḥmad and the Aḥmadiyya in a later refutations of Ghulām and the Aḥmadiyya Jamāʿat as he had to the they were to be as or see also Larsson, of It was rejected and developed into an Islamic new religious movement the charismatic and later of Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad and his It could here be that this is not in to Ghulām Aḥmad and the Aḥmadiyya As we he was but one of many more or interpretations of sources to a market of consumers for religious to a social In to some of the other Muslim he was in his efforts to attract the Sunnī but in to he was charismatic or to a that on with of the world.

William Ryle-Hodges

This thesis challenges the conventional view of Muḥammad ʿAbduh’s reform ideas in broad and binary terms as bridging a gap between ‘Islam and Europe’ or ‘tradition and modernity’. I offer instead an analysis of ʿAbduh’s reformist thought in his own words and local practical context in 19th century Egypt, based on a close-reading of his newspaper articles. I argue that ʿAbduh’s reform project, in terms of what was at stake in his job as Director of Publications for the Egyptian state from 1880-1882, is best understood as a bureaucratic publishing project or politics of adab that bridged journalism and the modern state, the Arabic Nahḍa and the Ottoman modernizing reforms known as the tanẓīmāt. He was pioneering journalism as a form of moral education (adab) to mobilize the souls of the reading public in what he conceptualized as a new biopolitical phase of state reform – reform and accountability to law that would operate bottom up from the people. His journalistic pedagogy worked by addressing readers with a polemic about a superficial nationhood and empty modernity that lacked both substance in the people’s souls and visible proof in ‘society’. Locating this project in Egypt’s emerging capitalist economy, I argue that his journalism particularly targeted Egypt’s cotton-enriched landed elite for failing to uphold rule of law and to distribute the benefits of modernization. ʿAbduh’s reform thus becomes a window into a wider dynamic of power taking shape between journalism, bureaucracy and law – itself crucial to understanding a pivotal moment in Egypt’s modern history, known for being the time of the so-called ʿUrābī Revolution.

Roger Owen

There are three interconnected discussions concerning the role of the state in the globalizing, post-Cold War world. The first focuses on the impact of globalization itself and the effect of the huge increase in cross-border flows of capital, information, people and ideas on the ability of governments to manage their own economies. A second, slightly older discussion, addresses the question of whether the state itself is in retreat as a result of both market forces and its inability to finance or sustain its previous levels of health, educational and welfare services. The third discussion concerns the ability of states to maintain their monopoly over the creation of values and the definition of citizenship in the face of new forces of pluralism, decentralization or local, ethnic and religious nationalism. Egyptian businesses practice a more direct form of avoidance when it comes to the establishment of new plants.

Erum Sattar

No abstract is available for this record.

Chris Berg

A blockchain is an institutional technology—a protocol—that allows for economic coordination between agents separated by boundaries of possible mistrust. Blockchains are not the only technology in history to have these characteristics. The paper looks at the role of the diplomatic protocol at the very beginning of human civilisation in the ancient near east. These two protocols—diplomatic and blockchain—have significant similarities. They were created to address to similar economic problems using similar mechanisms: a permanent record of past dealings, public and ritualistic verification of transactions, and game-theoretic mechanisms of reciprocity. The development of the diplomatic protocol allowed for the creation of the first international community and facilitated patterns of peaceful trade and exchange. Some questions about a generalised ‘protocol economics’ are drawn.

Sara Aurorae

The Gülen Movement's growing power and influence, followed by its public criticism of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in 2010 and 2013, and finally the coup attempt in July 2016, has led to an unprecedented crackdown on the Gülen Movement in Turkey. The purge has ousted thousands of employees from major state and civil society institutions, including military, judiciary, and education institutions, as well as the mass media. The rise and fall of the Gülen Movement has been one of the defining issues in Turkish politics in the twenty-first century.The turmoil following the gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire during the late nineteenth century led to the sharp rise of Turkish nationalism. During this period, the Young Turks (Jöntürkler) attempted to define the “nation” and what it meant to be “Turkish.” Following international and domestic chaos that precipitated the fall of the Ottoman Empire during the Balkans Wars and the Great War, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the Turkish Republic and transformed the remnants of the Ottoman Empire into a modern, secular nation-state. The state abolished the caliphate, controlled the appointments of imams, rescinded religious courts and schools, and created new laws that further limited the power of religion in Turkish public life. These political and cultural reforms were intended to transform civic culture by strengthening loyalty to the new Turkish Republic. Nevertheless, winning popular acceptance for this new secular nationalism was an uneven and complex process that was not fully embraced by all sectors of Turkish society.Accordingly, leading religious intellectuals such as Bediuzzaman Said Nursî sought to challenge the new nationalist ideology or Kemalism, which was influenced by the work of Ziya Gölkalp, who strongly suggested suppressing any connections to the former Ottoman regime. Nursî believed that reinforcing Islam would establish a balance with secularism in all areas of Turkish society, particularly in education and intercultural dialogue. When the Turkish political system moved from a one-party authoritarian regime to a multiparty system in the middle of the twentieth century, discussions of Islam that had long laid dormant began to emerge, and the scale of this divide between Kemalist secularists and religious Turks became clear. Beginning in the 1960s, these cultural and religious tensions during a period of economic turmoil gradually prompted civil violence and led the military to intervene in government affairs. It was only with the 1980 coup d'état, and the sweeping reforms that were initiated following the deaths of thousands, that the Turkish-Islam Synthesis (Türk-İslam Sentezi) was introduced. This was an attempt to establish a political balance between Kemalism and Sunni Islam (Hanafi). Political parties—like the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) and the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi)—were shut down in 1998 and 2001, respectively, leading to a cycle of socio-political tension. It was in this atmosphere that the AKP emerged.The AKP's initial success was due to support from influential religious and social institutions, like the peculiar and autonomous Gülen Movement. Strengthened by this significant and influential alliance during the first decade of the twenty-first century—particularly with leading figures in the judiciary loyal to the Islamic movement's leader, Fethullah Gülen—tensions surfaced between the ruling AKP and Gülen. Namely, after Gülen criticized the government for its anti-Israel rhetoric following the May 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis in Gaza and additionally for its use of excessive force during Gezi Park Protests in May 2013. The political alliance was ruptured when notable AKP figures were arrested or questioned for corruption, money laundering, and bribery charges, in what became one of the largest and most controversial legal cases in Turkey, leading Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to brand the Gülen Movement a “parallel structure” (Paralel Devlet Yapılanması) or a state-like organization without democratic legitimacy. It is important to distinguish between the enigmatic figure of Fethullah Gülen, who leads an ascetic lifestyle in the remote Pennsylvania countryside of the United States, and his persona as a contemplative Sufi cleric who vis-à-vis the movement holds identifiable wealth and influence in Turkey and across the globe. Turkey's political polarization and the AK Party's use of pro-government discourses has served as a platform to promote an authoritarian legitimacy, thus deepening the confusion.Caroline Tee's The Gülen Movement in Turkey: The Politics of Islam and Modernity is an essential introduction to the topic that addresses the Gülen Movement's intentions, networks, and its broad influence in Turkish society. The book begins with Fethullah Gülen and the influence of Islamic theologian Bediuzzaman Said Nursî—particularly, the effect his seminal work Risale-i Nur—on Gülen's own spiritual framework. Raised in Erzurum, which is located in socially and religiously conservative Eastern Anatolia, Gülen gained his traditional religious education at a Sufi tekke (lodge), which were the religious institutions of both the Naqshbandi and Qadiri Sufi Orders. He continued his formal education in Islamic jurisprudence and by the age of eighteen became a state-qualified Imam. Several years later, Gülen was posted to the center of Izmir as the director of the Qur'anic school in Kestanepazan Mosque. Although he desired to move to a more conservative environment, and away from the liberal atmosphere of the western provinces of Turkey, he remained in Izmir and developed his vision of spiritual reform with the intent of reinvigorating Islam and bringing it to a wider audience. He gained a small following both at the mosque and through regular meetings at coffee houses, creating the Hizmet or “service” movement during the rigid secular posture of the state in the 1960s.The movement began to grow when his vision for an altın nesil, or “golden generation,” was implemented through organized summer camps that aimed to educate the next generation of Turks in both Islam and the modern sciences. This illustrates the influence of Said Nursî, who also envisioned the revitalization of Turkish religious culture, which had been vastly transformed by modern secularism, calling for positive action (müspet hareket) from pious individuals to engage in all areas of the public sphere. Said Nursî emphasized the importance of education in both Islam and the sciences, directly influencing Gülen's pedagogy. Nursî's attempt to change the impression that religion is inimical to science. Eventually, the summer camps became after-school centers (dershane) that gradually began to expand into other cities across Turkey, despite the growing social and political tensions between leftists and right-wing factions during the 1970s.A complete overhaul of the constitution following the 1980 military coup d'état ushered in a period of economic liberalization led by Turgut Özal. And the new Turkish-Islam synthesis (Türk-İslam Sentezi) that emerged removed some of the restrictions on religious life in Turkey. Tee explains how the Gülenists began investing in business and media interests and taking advantage of new international opportunities, particularly in Central Asia, which provided the movement with fertile ground for geographic expansion.The second part of the book contains the core of Caroline Tee's research into Gülen Movement's membership and its approach to scientific education. Tee uses anthropological fieldwork to explain how Gülen's Islamic creationist movement teaches science within an Islamic framework. Tee describes her experiences with the Gülenist educational system, which is characterized by strong academic achievement. Gülenist schools are preferred by conservative religious families for their moral and religious commitment and secular curriculum. Nevertheless, Gülenist schools are not explicitly linked to Gülen and are not promoted as such; instead the connection to Gülen is a matter of local knowledge illustrating the decentralized and low-key nature of the Gülen Movement. Tee notes, “Both he and his followers prefer to speak of a loose connection of initiatives that are all ‘inspired’ by his teachings, but do not constitute a single coordinated entity” (57). Any organized efforts to coordinate initiatives are usually through local affiliations between several schools in a given region or city, while well known and prestigious schools established by Gülen followers, such as Yamanlar Koleji in Izmir and Fatih Okulu in Istanbul, have franchised a number of schools directly.One intriguing element of the Gülen network that Tee brings to light is the concept of “service” (hizmet) in Gülen-run institutions, such as assigning a chemistry teacher, Irem, “against her personal wishes,” to a particular school far away from her home in northwest Turkey (54). Referred to as fedakarlik or self-sacrifice, they consider themselves as educators rather than mere teachers, thus functioning as a representative or role model to guide or inspire the ethical and personal education of the students. Such dedication lacks financial reward but is motivated by a spiritual eschatology and the belief in sevap (good deeds) that will be rewarded on Judgement Day. This clearly suggests a formal membership structure within the movement that transcends mere professional networking. Tee conducted her fieldwork in two Gülen schools in order to ascertain how science is taught within a secular curriculum yet framed by Islamic theology and the philosophy of Said-Nursî. Tee also exposes the considerable influence of religious ontology in science classes at the Gülen schools. For example, an educator in a middle-school science class, who was teaching students about a skin disease, claimed that the disease was given to a person as part of a divine test (sinav) and that the students should give thanks for not having such a skin disease. While remaining within the required boundaries of scientific education, the staff attached an Islamic ethic to the content, educating students through religious inferences in an attempt to establish coherence between science and religion.Tee discusses Islamic creationism as an essential belief within the Gülenist framework (Chapter 4), the Gülen Movement's argument being that science has become secularized, particularly through the theory of biological evolution that has created an unnecessary rift between science and an Islamic education. Gülen has written about evolution in his book Yaratılış Gerçeği ve Evrim, among other sources, and not only rejects the theory of evolution but views it as an attempt to justify atheistic materialism. Tee shows that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk advocated for evolutionary biology and the secular policies of his time, enforcing the addition of evolution in the school curriculum at the founding of the Turkish Republic. Said Nursî opposed this change, which radically changed the fabric of Turkish society through what Nursî saw as the coercive disassociation with Islamic values. Accordingly, Gülen opposes the inclusion of evolutionary theory in the curriculum, and an antievolutionary agenda has allowed the movement to reconcile modern science with Islam and harmonize what were once two mutually exclusive categories.Overall, the Gülenist target is to combat atheism through education. The Gülenists' belief that failing to adapt to the social requirements of modernity by refusing a scientific education favors Darwinian adherents; thus Gülenists battle atheism by teaching science through an Islamic lens. Tee explains that from the outset the movement has prioritized spreading Islamic values through local recruiting and international networking, particularly engaging students in Gülenist schools in foreign countries. The schools provide scholarships, educational and employment opportunities, and other opportunities for self-improvement. This emphasis on competitive achievement is one reason why Gülenist schools emphasize participating in the Science Olympiads, a prestigious international competition that provides students with the opportunity to compete for financial rewards, as well as improving their chances of getting admitted to prestigious universities. These competitions also play a vital role in changing the status quo, by allowing “Islamic actors to engage successfully with a critical aspect of modernity” (77). Higher education institutions, such as Irfan University—which is economically supported by a group of investors sympathetic to the movement, hosting a number of high-achieving students and staffed by academics with strong credentials and research excellence. Higher education offers the movement a way to increase its global influence.The exact number of Gülen-run educational institutions remains unknown as they do not “publically affiliate with one another” (55) nor do they identify with Gülen or even share a common name or logo as institutions often do. Tee tackles—albeit briefly—some important questions that lie at the heart of the movement's ambiguous status. For example, is there an Islamist agenda at the core of its endeavors? Skeptics label the movement a cemaat (religious community), implying its interests do not lie solely in the principle of positive action in civil society, which is what the movement emphasizes. These concerns have been exacerbated by Gülen's public sermons reminding his followers to be responsive to the dangers of materialism. However, the movement's economic interests allow it to continue to project its influence and demonstrate the strength of Islam by building international institutions of higher education. In a similar vein, staff members working at Gülen-run institutions straddle an ambiguous personal and professional line, where spiritual goals are integrated into their curricula. While this educational homogeneity strengthens the quality of teaching and increases overall academic achievement, its lack of clarity has led to several legal cases against Gülenist schools in the United States, for mismanagement of funds and failing to clearly outline their affiliation with the Gülen Movement. Other contradictions include Gülen's statements that he supports secularism and seeks only to change the nature of Turkish secularism, which actively opposes Islam. Yet in other statements, either directly or indirectly, Gülen encourages the complete collapse of Turkish secularism and its replacement with an Islamic state.Caroline Tee focuses much of her work on the structure of the organization and its ambiguous position in Turkish political, judicial, and civil society. She argues that while there is no official criteria for joining the movement, it consists of a multitiered level of commitment that includes not only the core followers, such as teachers at Gülen-led schools, but also those on the periphery of the movement, including sympathizers (onaylayanlar) and consumers. Consumers are those who use the movement's products and services, whether consciously or unconsciously, and play a vital role in strengthening the success of the movement. Tee's analysis slightly differs from Joshua Hendrick, author of Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World (NYU Press, 2013), who argues that the movement consists of four—rather than three—groups of affiliates that engage with the movement. Hendrick divides the core group of Gülenists into two: the “aristocracy” who are surrounded by “friends.” The third part of Tee's book, “The Wider Context” (Chapters 6–8), provides an overview of the Gülen Movement's place in Turkish politics, vis-à-vis their impaired relationship with the AK Party, as well as its global status, particularly with respect to the United States.The Gülen Movement's intercultural dialogue initiative through The Journalists and Writers Foundation (Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfi), where Gülen himself serves as honorary chairman, promotes dialogue between Muslims and other religions and cultures. The Gülen Movement's emphasis on intercultural dialogue stems from Said Nursî, who also promoted interfaith communication. The movement attempts to find common ground between the major religions of the “People of the Book” (Christianity, Islam, and Judaism) as a strategy for peaceful engagement and effective networking, promoting Islam as well as Turkey and the movement as a whole. Since 1999, Gülen has lived in Pennsylvania and is often referred to by Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as Pennsylvania'daki adam (the man from Pennsylvania). Gülen's move to the United States has been subject to allegations that he has a relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Indeed, it is interesting to note that a former CIA agent and senior staff member at the National Intelligence Council supported Gülen's for a Nevertheless, the move to the United States established the global of the movement and the that The movement has a in membership with and Turkish despite its It is not what led to Gülen's to to the United States, but his there has allowed the movement to on an international most of the the movement has or religiously instead engaging in that and which allowed the Gülen Movement and AKP to to the movement has not embraced political despite the that loyal Gülenists were the leading figures in the against senior AKP The led Erdoğan to on the movement, or loyal Gülenist and the movement was a to by to the Tee attempts to whether the Gülen Movement is an or more public with a of it is that the Gülenists' was to Erdoğan and a change in the Turkish the of the AKP had to Gülen from the United States to to the Gülen Movement as a organization or after Tee's book was that her research to explain the movement as an Islamic group of the of science and as part of her yet attempts to the political between the a approach in the of political Islam. The AKP and the Gülen movement were by their common Islamic in the school of Sunni Islam and the of the power of the military The collapse of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in 1998 led by and the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) in led to the of the AKP which the belief that Islamic would as long as a strong military continued to play a role in Turkish The AKP has to the given to the military through the and which the military as a that was intent on the These were only with support from senior and staff loyal to Gülen. figures were arrested and given life all of have been the rift began in late 2013, Gülen has any in the Nevertheless, Tee it that Gülen is of contradictions and and even his of an and nature as to his acceptance of intercultural a of the Gülen which other Islamic a strong emphasis on science education, Caroline Tee's book provides an of the into the political or social of the which be in other sources, explains the and of the about the sweeping against Gülen schools and the including and the public against the movement. She also provides a of the movement's schools by engaging with students and teachers at within these institutions in several cities Turkey. Tee's fieldwork is a vital to the on the Gülen it light on some of the of the movement and its global She also exposes some of the movement's such as the to public order and as part of even there are no formal or any clearly for membership However, positive with the of Islam into modern society, is a part of the Gülenist the of whether followers actively this agenda would have been a addition to Tee's This is what Joshua Hendrick has is the movement's which is due to the political and social in Indeed, as Tee Gülen Movement as an but one which has to significant power and The use of social as a framework to the and structure of the movement is a approach that to of the movement's social influence, which has become the for its success and

Silke Noa Elrifai

Fear of a creeping Islamization of the “West” and its secular legal and constitutional orders has fueled debates on immigration in the media and politics for several years. With the ascent of the so-called “Islamic State” and the horrific terror attacks it claimed or inspired, as well as the waves of refugees from Muslim-majority countries reaching European shores, debates have further intensified. They are turning increasingly populist, further feeding the flames of fear. In the United Kingdom, the successful but divisive campaign for the UK to leave the European Union is said to have strongly benefitted from voters hoping to stop Muslim (alongside East European) immigration. In the US, president-elect Donald Trump appealed to supporters during his campaign promising a complete ban on Muslims’ entering the US, if elected president. In Germany, the far right and anti-Islam movement “Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West,” abbreviated “PEGIDA,” has won many followers; the AfD, a folkish-populist right wing party has prospered on a divisive anti-immigration, anti-Islam platform and threatens the dominance of mainstream parties. A common claim is that Muslims in the West are building states within states, where parallel legal structures in the form of Shari’a councils are the first step to erode the states’ secular constitutional order. The spread of extremist thought subversive to the state by homegrown Islamists further heightens the fear. Two recent books by Machteld Zee and John R. Bowen promise to take a closer look at Shari’a councils, their constitutional basis, practice and (in)compatibility with the constitutional order of Western states. Reviewing the books side by side, it becomes quickly clear that though they cover the same ground, and in fact, evaluate the very same institutions and their leaders, their assessment starkly diverges; itself a mirror of the prevailing polarization. The concurrent reading of both books also highlights the pitfalls of Zee’s book, while cementing Bowen’s reputation as distinguished expert on Islam and anthropology. Unfortunately, Zee’s book is beset with inaccuracies and errors, which are largely rebutted by Bowen’s book. Zee sets out asserting that “the development of British Sharia councils is the result of the combination of multiculturalism and Islamic fundamentalism.” She passionately stresses the need to talk about Islamic fundamentalism, which “challenges the relationship between religion and the state as we know it in the West” (Zee, at xi). Throughout the book, her main concern is women’s rights, a legitimate concern generally, but particularly so when considering the undeniable inequality in treatment of men and women in many Muslim majority states. In contrast, framing the background and purpose of his book, Bowen highlights “a moral panic . . . over claims that state-aided schools in Birmingham were promoting shari’a and Islamic extremism” and fears that “shari’a councils endanger[] the rule of law and gender equality throughout Britain” (Bowen, at 3). In his words, Shari’a councils “have become a flashpoint in British public debates, drawing the ire and fire of many commentators even as they adapt to the English legal environment” (at 4). In response, thereto, his book is intended as a “study of British Islam to “highlights issues and practices surrounding shari’a” (at 3). Accordingly, whilst Zee explicitly sets out her opinion on the desirability of Shari’a councils, Bowen frames his book as a descriptive and matter of fact analysis of the history and the current state of British Islam to unmask misconceptions. However, his work is not without bias either, and his underlying aim to calm the prevailing panic is apparent from the very start. Zee’s book is divided into three distinct parts, in which she sets out to cover, first, a theoretical discussion of the multiculturalist ideology, second, a summary of Islamic fundamentalism, and, third, Shari’a councils as the practical consequence of the prevailing multiculturalist ideology in the West and the Islamic fundamentalism practiced in our midst. The three parts are disjointed, as she acknowledges. In Part I, reading akin to a Bachelor or Master thesis, Zee confronts the reader with two tribes in the imaginary country of “Sea landistan,” expressing the hope “that after at least 25 years of multiculturalist sensitivities a fresh case of cultural twists can open the mind for healthy judgment” (at 19). In Sealandistan, two vastly different groups live side by side. One group kill their eldest when they reach 90, but greatly value animal welfare; another group celebrates a monthly feast during which they enjoy kicking animals to death. She then uses this artificial scenario in an attempt to deconstruct six tenets which she alleges underlie the multicultural ideology: (i) who someone authentically is, is determined by his or her cultural identity; (ii) non-recognition of this cultural identity constitutes psychological harm; (iii) culture is good; (iv) cultures are equal; (v) cultural differences are good, but if not, they should at least be tolerated; and (vi) minority cultures must not be criticized by the dominant culture which has the positive obligation to preserve these. To support her claims, she references and quotes well-known authors relevant to the multicultural debate. At the same time, the chapter is interspersed with polemic and often irrelevant statements: “We get told ‘if we were all the same the world would be a dull place’ (imagine those poor monocultural African tribes not mixed with Asian homosexuals and Maori)” (at 34). Perhaps for reasons of brevity, or perhaps for reasons of her polemic style and lack of detachment, the author does not succeed in setting out how the claimed tenets are arrived at or how the theoretical analysis and the example of Sealandistan are relevant to the remaining parts of the book. This is unfortunate as she does mention several pitfalls of multiculturalism. In Part II she addresses Islamic fundamentalism, which is built on the premise that “there is increasing competition between Islamic and secular law on Western soil” (at 52). While Zee succeeds in highlighting some of the main features of Islamic fundamentalism, it becomes apparent that the author’s knowledge of Islam, albeit not completely lacking, is limited. To illustrate, she equates Islamic fundamentalism “for the purpose of clarity . . . with the concepts of Islamism and political Islam,” while incorrectly classifying in the same paragraph Egypt’s al-Azhar University as espousing the same (at 52). Likewise, it is disappointing that she quotes Ahadiths (Arabic, plural of Hadith, the transmitted word of the prophet) by questionable secondary literature. Zee translates the infamous daraba (beating) verse of the Quran twice in her book, but fails to comment on the difference in translation, or perhaps even fails to notice it: On page 63, she translates it as “men have authority over women, for Allah has made the one superior to the other,” while quoting the same passage as “men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other . . .” twelve pages thereafter. Continuing her polemic style used in Part I, she introduces Saudi Arabia as “the most ‘complete’ Sharia state, to see what happens if Islamist principles are the basis of a nation’s blueprint, starting with the judicial foundation” (at 64). This is seemingly to indicate what awaits Europe if the spread of Shari’a councils is not halted. Subsequently she cites Malaysia as a nation that “intrinsically changed for the worst” and “islamised in a short period of time” (at 73). In Part II, Zee entertains and supports the belief that the term “Islamophobia” was invented to “stifle debate and suppress criticism of Islam” and that “the term was created by Islamists to create an atmosphere of victimisation, where Muslims are continuously portrayed as victims suffering from hatred, discrimination and negative stereotyping” (at 86). Sometimes the book has undertones of a conspiracy theory, such as when the author appears to espouse the belief that Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a well-known Islamic scholar, and Tareq Ramadan, Professor of Islamic Studies at Oxford University, together with Muslim and Islamist organizations are actively working towards establishing a global Shari’a state, whereby ghettoization and institutions such as Shari’a councils are only a pre-stage to the establishment of a worldwide Shari’a state. This is allegedly based on a pact between the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabi Saudi Islam, which together have succeeded in a short period to build media outlets, educational centers and, importantly Shari’a councils. That Wahhabi Saudi-Arabia has had a multifarious and regularly thorny relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in the recent past, is nowhere considered.1 Finally, in Part III and, so to speak, the culmination of her groundwork of Part I on multiculturalism and Part II on fundamentalism, Zee takes a closer look at Shari’a councils in the UK. It is here that the qualitative difference between Zee’s research and that of Bowen becomes most obvious. Both Zee and Bowen focus on the very same Shari’a Councils, namely the Islamic Sharia Council (ISC) in London, the Birmingham Central Mosque Sharia Council and the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal in Nuneaton. We will therefore look at Bowen’s book, with references to Zee’s. Whereas Zee extensively quotes tabloids throughout her book, Bowen derides the same and turns the rectification of tabloid messages into the raison d’être of his book. Bowen’s book is cohesive, and unmasks many of Zee’s assertions as erroneous. In Part I, “Pathways,” Bowen provides the reader with the origins of the establishment of Shari’a councils in the UK by looking at the historical background of British Muslims in East Asia, and the current topography, i.e., their geographical concentration in Britain and internal divisions (at 10–25). In contrast, Zee qualifies British Shari’a councils as the fruits of Saudi and Muslim Brotherhood efforts to Islamize the United Kingdom (at 116 et seq.) In Part II, “Practices,” Bowen presents his findings collected through interviews, attend ance at client sessions and Shari’a councils deliberations over a period from 2007 to 2013, as well as reviews of case files, wherever available. He deals with the same institutions as Zee does, who, however, only spent two afternoons at the ISC and half a day at the Birmingham Central Mosque Sharia Council (Zee, at 131). Bowen focuses on the legal issues and procedures in divorce cases mentioning only tangentially the general reputation of the councils’ members, with judgment reserved to the readers. This is particularly interesting in relation to the ISC, where some of the council members are known in the press as extremists or Salafists. Zee, in contrast, draws on such characterizations to further her general message of the book, i.e., that Shari’a councils are bad for our constitutional order and must be feared. Bowen’s descriptive style stands in stark contrast to Zee’s, who considers her three afternoons at Shari’a councils as sufficient evidence to draw sweeping conclusions such as that “all Sharia councils condone violence against women” (at 139). Perhaps owing to his descriptive style, Bowen consist ently remains neutral and detached, even when considering controversies surrounding Shari’a councils, for example that Islamic law, as commonly interpreted by Shari’a councils, continues to disadvantage women. The core of Bowen’s work is his detailed analysis of the constitutional challenges at stake in Shari’a councils, which he labels “unstable performativity” (Bowen, at 88–102). Given that Shari’a councils do not have legal legitimacy in the United Kingdom, with no claims to valid legal authority and only a self-proclaimed religious authority (at 89), Bowen analyses what the act of marriage dissolution performed by the Shari’a council actually amounts to in legal and constitutional terms. He explains that institutions depend on the capacity to change the world by performative acts such as decreeing, stating, affirming, announcing, pronouncing. In the works of the Shari’a councils, Bowen identifies, first, judicial performativity, whereby a marriage is dissolved by the council itself, second, the husband’s performativity, when he agrees to a divorce, even if reluctant and, third couple’s performativity, when the council certifies the breakdown of the marriage that has already occurred, i.e., when the marriage is dissolved due to nonperformance by one of the parties. Bowen shows that the Shari’a councils rely on all three performativity theories, despite them being mutually exclusive. Accordingly, their performativity is “intrinsically unstable” (at 90). In Part III, Bowen provides a detailed description of the work of the Birmingham Central Mosque Sharia Council as well as the Sufi Muslim Arbitration Tribunal in Nuneaton, both of which are also covered by Zee. Bowen focuses on the heart of the Shari’a council debate in the media, in particular the popular critique that such councils hollow out women’s constitutional protection. He highlights that within their communities Shari’a councils provide a way for women to break free from an abusive relationship, in a manner acceptable to their community. They are seen as institutions that divorce women against their husbands’ will. Thus, he suggests that they actually support women’s rights. In contrast, Zee argues that the existence of Shari’a councils forces women to seek religious divorces keeping them trapped in failed marriages longer than they should and forcing them to negotiate away rights (such as custody), they might not even know they have. Bowen highlights however that religious divorce proceedings may often last no longer than civil divorces in the UK. In Part IV, “Boundaries,” Bowen acknowledges, albeit indirectly, that Shari’a councils are lacking in terms of equality. At the same time, however, he points out that their services are increasingly adapting to the British constitutional and other legal expectations (Bowem, at 210–28). Perhaps his overall assessment is too positive and apologetic. But only Bowen’s book provides the necessary insights that enable readers to get a better understanding of the complex issues at play. Zee’s book merely polarizes. Reading their texts side by side offers several examples of the complexities involved, one of which shall suffice here for illustration purposes: Comparing Shari’a councils with their Jewish equivalent, the Batei Din, Zee mentions the fact that not many Shari’a councils have thus far applied for registration under the Divorces (Religious Marriages) Act 2002, as proof of their miso gynist leanings. Yet, Bowen’s more detailed discussion shows that the issue is a lot more complicated than that. The Divorces Act was passed with the aim of preventing limping marriages in the Jewish community, whereby a couple may have a civil divorce but the husband then subsequently declines to agree to a religious divorce. Under Jewish law, as commonly interpreted, a woman cannot divorce her husband against his will, nor can a court or Bet Din for that matter. Thus, to incentivize husbands to consent to a Jewish divorce, the Act allows the courts to halt a civil divorce, until a religious divorce is finalized. Hence, as Bowen highlights, registering under the Act might not actually benefit Muslim women. Were Shari’a councils to register under the Act, a husband would be able prolong the civil proceedings by using dilatory tactics in the religious proceedings. Since he may remarry under Shari’a, as commonly interpreted, while still being married, he would not have an interest in finalizing the divorce. Moreover, a Muslim woman may under Shari’a get divorced against the husband’s will, in stark contrast to her Jewish counterpart. There is thus no upside for Shari’a Councils to register, other than making the divorce more difficult for the wife. Bowen’s book is not without fault. While his analysis is based on extensive empirical research on Shari’a councils, he does not sufficiently address the possibility that the sessions of the Shari’a councils he attends are affected by his presence. This is true even where, as in one reported session, one of the ISC members, Haitham al-Haddad, refuses to continue the discussion since it is being recorded by Bowen (at 105). (Haitham al-Haddad is one of the members profiled by the media and Zee as misogynist and extremist.) In line with his descriptive style, Bowen’s book ends without firm conclusions or strong answers, leaving many questions open. This is due to the complex nature of the issue at stake, but can also be a little dissatisfying to the reader. In stark contrast, Zee’s book concludes with a brief plea for states to adopt “political agnosticism” as opposed to “multiculturalism” to stop the advance of Shari’a councils undermining Western democracies. (At no stage does she provide any meaningful analysis of political agnosticism.) Bowen’s book ultimately provides a very valuable resource for readers interested in the workings of Shari’a councils. The same cannot be said for Zee’s book, whose academic quality is questionable, and a good read only for those interested in affirming opinions already swayed by the anti-Muslim zeitgeist.

Cornelia B. Horn

Reviewed by: ʿAbd al Jabbār: Critique of Christian Origins Cornelia B. Horn ʿAbd al Jabbār: Critique of Christian Origins Edited, translated, and annotated by Gabriel Said Reynolds and Samir Khalil Samir Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2010. ʿAbd al Jabbār, a respected figure among the Muʿtazila, a group of rationalist Muslim theologians, spent the years of his long life (ca. 320s/930s to 415/1025) [End Page 311] between the cities of Baghdad and Rayy in Iran. His account of the history of Christianity, likely the first such undertaking by a Muslim, examines significant aspects of Christian doctrine and attends to aspects of Christian liturgy, pious practices in daily life, social customs (some of which are singled out for criticism), and miracle stories that prominently feature ascetics. ʿAbd al Jabbār's approach of combining refutations of the Christians' doctrines with critical discussions of their history and practices grounds the novelty of the work. Given the author's geographical location in Iran, the focus of the work's critique on East Syrian Christians and their practices is easily contextualized. The introduction to the volume situates the Critique within the framework of early Islamic anti-Christian polemical literature. It presents ʿAbd al Jabbār's life and works, comments usefully on still unedited works by him, and attempts to modify scholarly judgments of the author's role primarily as a compiler of earlier material by highlighting the "shockingly original" (p. xxxvi) character of the Critique. It discusses the Critique in relation to literature that expounded on the signs or proofs of Muhammad's prophethood and thus to texts situated in an explicitly inter-religious environment. It describes ʿAbd al Jabbār's method, characterizes the cultural context of the Critique by way of detailing various groups of people with whom the author interacted and whom he targeted in his refutation, and attempts to identify multiple written and oral sources for the Critique. The Critique of Christian Origins is only a portion of one of ʿAbd al Jabbār's larger works, the Tathbīt dalāʾil al-nubuwwa (Confirmation of the Proofs of Prophecy), edited previously for the first time by ʿAbd al-Karim\ ʿUthman\ in 1966. The present volume offers a corrected edition with full vocalization of the Arabic text of the Critique, accompanied on facing pages by the first English translation of the text. Throughout the Arabic text, the edition provides a numbering system that is also represented in the translation. This feature facilitates access to both texts for purposes of comparison. The translation adds numerous headings and subheadings, which in turn supply the bulk of the information listed in the table of contents. They offer the reader a quick orientation to the main points and structure of this voluminous work. Overall, the translation into English is certainly the work of (a) competent translator(s). Still, there are a number of infelicities in grammar and word choice. Some are a bit jarring: for example "screw" (p. 152 [639]) in the sense of "have sex with." Occasionally, however, greater precision and care to theological nuance would have been necessary. Instead of "We did not say God is Christ" (p. 3 [22]), one would need to translate it as "We did not say about Christ that he is God," or at least, "We did not say that God is in Christ." If there is a good reason to translate the verb waladat in reference to Mary as "Mary begot (sic!)" Christ/God, as happens in several instances (p. 15 [137 and 144]; p. 19 [184 and 189]; p. 82 [488 and 491]), it would require a footnote or comment on why the same verb at other times should be rendered as "Mary gave birth to" (p. 19 [186]). At stake is the difference between referring to the one who was born as "Christ" or "God," but not any difference between how she did, [End Page 312] or even could, act. (The English verb "beget" refers properly only to males; the preterite form is "begat.") The annotations are, for the most part, helpful. They provide references to citations from, and parallels to, the Qur'ān and biblical...

Judith Butler

If one wants to begin with most common of beginnings, namely, with the claim that one would like to be able to consider sexual politics during this time, a certain problem arises. Since, it seems clear that one cannot reference ‘this time’ without knowing which time, where that time takes hold, and for whom a certain consensus emerges on the issue of what time this is. So if it is not just a matter of differences of interpretation about what time it is, then it would seem that we have already more than one time at work in this time, and that the problem of time will afflict any effort I might make to try and consider some of these major issues now. It might seem odd to begin with a reflection on time when one is trying to speak about sexual politics and cultural politics more broadly. But my suggestion here is that the way in which debates within sexual politics are framed are already imbued with the problem of time, of progress in particular, and in certain notions of what it means to unfold a future of freedom in time. That there is no one time, that the question of what time this is, already divides us, has to do with which histories have turned out to be formative, how they intersect – or fail to intersect with other histories – and so with a question of the how temporality is organized along spatial lines. I'm not suggesting here that we return to a version of cultural difference that depends on cultural wholism. In fact, I oppose any such return. The problem is not that there are different cultures at war with one another, or that there are different modalities of time, each conceived as self-sufficient, that are articulated in different and differentiated cultural locations or that come into confused or brutal contact with one another. at some that be a it would namely, that of progress and a temporality that they for the of the what time are we are of in the and has in and has are in the of The cannot be to a my that sexual than to the of this is in the of and that to or sexual are that of – within – that would try to and the of as the where sexual and not the claim is that such a of freedom be the with that claim for the it with it a of that be trying to in this But the that this is a one that is a that to notions of sexual and of within a that and into the of freedom and In my the problem is not that there are different in different cultural locations we to cultural to more and That of the and for each of these and then question about how they might the problem is that certain notions of – the spatial of – are this of a certain notions of what ‘this time’ and be are on the of the of I make clear that I not notions of and not of that I if not means for progress and the time of the and that that is of what I to on a of sexual I to a of sexual politics of that is my is that there be no of sexual politics without a of the time of the now. claim will be that the problem of temporality and politics in this way a different to cultural one that the of and The is not just to of the and spatial of some of the that if not of But to that of what is is with a certain on the of the and a to what to of time if we the problem of the the and what and the means and of that or to be to any of The of sexual politics is I would with and that the time of sexual politics as a the of progress is one within that and it is one that for come into is to on how certain of and of what is a within politics on a of freedom that is to time, and which is in and freedom and progress is what is when and to like I to that this is they I do to that a certain of freedom is as a and for certain of and this of have as a sexual politics in a In this I to to a of sexual politics and that that certain of the progress of a sexual politics and the and the of the issues that such a is that a certain version and of be as of and most when sexual freedom or the freedom of and for and is to cultural on that we freedom and in the of or we is not to freedom as a to about and to consider how it be if it is to in the and have that might for a In the for for are to at of and to are they are to and the are to in a that the of to and are in of the claim that of is the as in such how is as sexual and the sexual freedom of is to a as to one that would be It would seem that the has for a of are The the are to the and more than are of the and where is not to be or In the of this has for some time. The of politics with cultural and within politics the and a in the of in the work and the of to not for sexual for of and I in of such it seems that I such for which I have and to are to a cultural in a that as a for into the as In what I will to what this cultural is, how it as and and how it any we might have the and the In this a of cultural are articulated that are of might the that there are such and that and cultural for of or sexual be such But are such not articulated in to and cultural that other of is not to this cultural it is the the of the of and freedom is articulated a of that come to for what freedom and so a certain in which the of certain cultural a for into a that as the of the in of and sexual and would it such a on the such as are on with and have for a to out the it to and to make they are not the of If the of a effort to cultural about and sexual for a one that and for to this we might then cultural in a different not if it is In this the question the the means for or it out of a effort on the of the to that they of and in to into the this a of my freedom for which I be or is my or is my freedom as of one that to and in that do not the that that I to be able to in – But do I to that and they of I If the of the cultural or a of cultural then the is as to a of cultural that are as and are not in to in contact with other or in a in which a of – or fail to – in The is that is a and of and not of this if it is or and that is for to and we already that this of that it is a and that already we are to a of that to a this the freedom of the of a and of cultural and that the issue clear how in cultural as it to I do not in of the as they in my for the most and to be and different different I the way they in these and my to of It to the of – which is other than a In this it seems to as a of cultural of that are or in and not as a of cultural or the that and sexual freedom are as of this version of and are conceived as that are a of we are to for sexual freedom and is no such within a such as the one I have just we of to that this to this the for sexual the and of of we are to within the and so we of within the of But it seems to that more is namely, that are to a one that is and on a certain of of that as a for freedom in the cultural for of cultural and and is not to sexual for to question the that that there be no that to and in that this of is or not there be a or such or the the cultural and If that of – one that is I would a of that is with a of progress – then it would that there are no of cultural contact sexual and that are not of and But in the of a of we on the of and the of we at one that not of of the time, the in which we It in The that has not suggesting that is in a of cultural and that the of is more such as In this is conceived as not of this time or time, as time, one that in this time. But is not such a the to of this time not as one time, as one as a of histories that have not and or a of that might be to be of is to be in where of sexual politics in some with there are differences as In the that is on that debates on sexual of that have sexual politics at the time that it of when they to and to of of and of work and one how a certain of sexual politics is as the of a of freedom at the time that the of as a to or to the of and and the of and and the is more the of with a of is as the freedom to into is to the freedom of and or to the of to the of The that the for the into which any of are on of to on the of and the cultural of that freedom are the to – or – that cultural on the of a of in and that there is a for and the of a The for the has the on the of the any to or to the In the and that or – and this would as – to the that a in to and sexual difference and to in the cultural The is that if a has no that will not come to in the if it is a that will have no way to or is the that the of is the or major cultural for the of if we to the claim that a to be there are to question this any has to a of that are and a of cultural The as it in effort to a to the cultural on the any of and the or and with But in as the of a of is to be the this is or the of of or of no at has to not to into this on these the the issue at But if one to into the one of make the that be and a of if I that I the that the is and be the cultural for the and of and that would be a to the that without a for there be no cultural as a the of the into the of than and as a of and cultural this it is to that of in are in the of the that on it so the as the of the debates on sexual politics with the politics of on of that the of If we these of as then it seems to that we not have a for the which these of are – and which they to be – or for the which they are It here clear that the of that the of the of that the of the of the in that the in the the of a in The of a certain in this as such that we are to the of as of of the that articulated in to where the as a is here as the the of the to the that at the of version of odd in which on the freedom In other be to any of – the of the that has for and But such have to be and the of are the which in and it is this that has to be as it be a or not such is is, in my there are to question it and certain for in the work of on that the is and a of The to for in with to a cultural that to a of conceived as and is if to be in that fail to the and of the which in the of and the of a within that what is most about this of the in the is not that it be and that it to that is for in certain the has to to and to for some have so as to that the of the one such for a on cultural and has that the in to the of the not conceived as a of the the of and of and In this is the way to the cultural of that is, the cultural that are for the of a certain of the that in to in to and to the as of are and such such as that in at and not and they as the and of certain the and the and the as a in such a That the then a of for and in the is that the to such and in to and at we might that at a the to a of freedom that is on is that might the that is, to the of the cultural of In other in or in that do not the of and the of and that in the of the that that cultural which a that is The that as the are that the for into in this is the of and the for to a certain cultural for the of it is not the of the of and on common the question of the of this of as of in particular, the is a if what this about the of In particular, it the question of this as a and of that in with is not the that the is what in a that a in the of is what the of sexual as the difference and in we that the not is to and sexual difference as a cultural and In to the of the in the of and in the and the to The to The seems to to the politics that takes to be a this of with the In to the of one or the differences to be as of and cultural In this is the cultural is to the and to be The of the difference or of the has on a of of the to for of has in for into question the in of and and make and in a of to that this to issues is in a as to be to this in not in and to as they they are to In the that is the is the that a without will not be without will be the cultural and of in able to of the of the to oppose effort to It is, as I to the that a and that of to of some this to the that the into the of the where it is that do not has to the of and one that in of the and the if it means If the to the of when and and to when of In of we the The a that the of just what that and there will and such as to the the that this not that if one it clear that and then it to issue a about the to that there are to this most to the which to the But like to to the it is with and we have already what the about the cultural of the as as the is as a means of in the it a of in this to whom the when it in the of if not to are not the of in a they a time, a and the of I on at I 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Nelly Hanna

States and elites The culture of the Ottoman period has often been analyzed by using the same criteria applied to the periods before and after it, Mamluk Egypt (1250–1517) and the nineteenth century. This is problematic for two reasons, firstly because of the very different roles played by the state in relation to culture and learning and secondly because of the role of elites in providing models and patterns of culture. The influence of the ruling class in shaping culture can change between one period and another, and can be greater at certain times than at others. When the state is centralized, the ruling class is much more likely to play a dominant role than it is in a decentralized state. The cultural production is more likely to be polished and refined when ruling classes dominate the direction that it takes, and less so when their role is reduced. When the state is decentralized, as it was during the Ottoman period, and the structures at the top are weaker, the cultural forms and patterns from below are more likely to emerge. Therefore, rather than compare this period to those before or after it, we may approach it through the larger framework of its changing social and political structures. In both Mamluk Egypt and Egypt under the rule of Muhammad ’Ali and his descendants (nineteenth century), the state was very centralized and played an active role in financing and shaping culture and in education. Likewise the ruling elites were actively involved in creating cultural models.